Gaekwad's Oriental Series
Published under the Authority
of the Maharaja Sayajirao
University of Baroda, Baroda

General Editor :
A. N. Jani,
M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt.,
Kāvyatīrtha,
Director, Oriental Institute

No. 165

सत्यं शिवं सुन्दरम्

SATYASIDDHIŚĀSTRA
OF
HARIVARMAN

Vol. II

English Translation

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HARIVARMAN

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By

N. Aiyaswami Sastri,
Santiniketan

Oriental Institute
Baroda
1978

First Edition
Copies 500
1978

Published with the Financial Aid of the University Grants Commission, the Government of Gujarat and the M. S. University of Baroda.

Price Rs. /- 150/-

Copies can be had of :—

The Manager,
UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS SALES UNIT,
M. S. University of Baroda Press (Sadhana Press),
Near Palace Gate, Palace Road, Baroda-390001

Printed by Shri Ramanlal J. Patel, Manager, The Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda Press (Sadhana Press), near Palace Gate, Palace Road, Baroda and published by Dr. A. N. Jani, Director, Oriental Institute, The Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, Baroda, May, 1978.

FOREWORD

I am very happy to introduce to scholars the Second Volume of the *Satyasiddhiśāstra*. Its first Volume containing the Sanskrit text re-constructed from the Chinese translation was published in 1975 as No. 159 of the Gaekwad's Oriental Series.

The present text is the second part of the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* giving a free English translation of the Sanskrit text. It is hoped that the present translation will prove useful to the English readers who may not have access to the original Sanskrit text. Prof. N. A. Sastri, who is an authority on this particular branch, has taken special care "to preserve the full spirit of the logical arguments employed by the author". I thank Prof. N. A. Sastri for accepting our invitation and preparing both the volumes of the *Satyasiddhiśāstra*. The present volume is published as No. 165 of the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, which, it is hoped, the world of scholarship, will welcome.

I thank my colleague Shri B. P. Pandya, Research Officer, for carefully going through the proofs of the present Volume.

My thanks are also due to the University Grants Commission and the Government of Gujarat for giving financial help towards the publication of this Volume.

I also express my sense of gratitude to my friend Shri Ramanlal J. Patel, Manager, M. S. University Press, Baroda, Shri Bansilal Shah and other members of the M. S. University Press for taking personal interest for expediting the printing of the present Volume.

Oriental Institute,
Baroda,
March 7, 1978

A. N. Jani
Director

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SATYASIDDHIŚĀSTRA

I

Prasthāna Skandha

DISCUSSION ON THE JEWEL OF BUDDHA

1. The First Wealth

The author, at the outset saluting the Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha premises that he will elucidate the teachings of Buddha (1-2).

It is considered to be a treatise of right knowledge which follows strictly the sūtras, never contradicts the *Dharmatā* and definitely leads to complete quiescence (3). The real imports of the Sūtras do not shine, because the Sūtras are mis-interpreted in the wrong teatises. As a result of this the door of the wrong knowledge becomes wide open (4-5). From the wrong knowledge result several defects like sins, wrong efforts, ill fame and mind's distraction, etc. (6). The person who desires to do away with them, should approach to a teacher possessed of a deep knowledge with a view to acquiring a right treatise (Śāstra) (7). To serve a good teacher is the source of good (knowledge) and treatise; and immense merits result from a good treatise (8). A person of sharp wit even though well-versed in tens of thousands of perverted treatises, never gains the ready wit, fame, and material benefits in the debating assembly (9). Learning the Buddha's supreme *dharma* and his teaching one should (attempt) for making Dharma endure for long and never for fame (10). I shall now compose the treatise of truths after having studied manifold doctrines of others and (having fathomed) the inner hearts of the learned (11). Bhikṣus are of various doctrines; Buddha has listened to all. I therefore, commence to rectify the real import of the Tripiṭaka (12).

Now the author investigates: Why is the Tathāgata addressed as Buddha? What are his characteristic virtues making him worthy of salutation? Though he is truly a human being, he has, however, secured omniscience in all aspects, and realized the self-characteristics of things with all distinctions. He has been free from all sins, has acquired all the good merits, and has been always searching after good to humanity; and hence he is designed Buddha. Dharma is what is preached for teaching the people (the ultimate good). The Saṅgha consists of those who practised that Dharma.

The Buddha deserves homage of all men and gods, because he is adorned with five aggregates of Lore. There are other holy persons who are also equally so adorned but Buddha's qualities are purer and blemishless. His wealth of good conduct (śīla) is pure because he is never negligent in his corporeal and other actions. He has cultivated for an immeasurable length of time the loving heart and never entertained any ill-heart (to any living being). He has cultivated good conduct because he is dread of ill-fame; and he has practised it for long under innumerable Buddhas. Thus he was adorned with the aggregate of good conduct.

The Buddha is adorned with the aggregate of concentration. He has acquired omniscience due to concentration. His concentration is firm and unshakable like lacquer painted on the wood. The concentration of other teachers is not so but flimsy like flower in the water. His concentration has been accomplished during the innumerable aeons. It does not require any causal factors. The concentration of other teachers is not so. The Buddha is always (engaged in) the deep concentration, like a person being always mindful to protect his self. The Buddha, while attaining to dhyāna and concentration, employs none of his mind's power. He entertains no sense of restfulness there like a person who, reaching his own dwelling place reflects: I have reached a security and freedom from turmoil. Therefore

the Buddha is said to have remained in a constant concentration. He has abandoned all feelings such as joyfulness (*prāmodya*) etc. which **distract** the dhyāna and concentrations. He is the foremost of those who have obtained the divine supernormal intellections as a result of their prolonged concentrations. He could walk simultaneously in all ten quarters and innumerable spheres of existence by virtue of performing a Ṛdhi-steps. He discharges all the functions at his will. He controls over all the created beings (*nirmita*). His mind is pursuing after all living beings lest they should approach him. He having mastery (over his mind) arouses unhappiness-notion towards happiness, happiness-notion towards unhappiness and the indifference-notion towards the both. Because of his mind being well cultivated he does not contemplate any reaction to the unhappy events like harsh speech, etc. He is unbeaten in the super-normal intellections: divine eye, ear, discernment of other's thought and reminiscence of previous births. He is so due to his concentration-strength. He has a manifest comprehension (*abhisamaya*) over the dhyāna and concentrations. He can enter into and emerge from them. They are his powers as will be stated in the next chapter. No other individuals have any such thing. Therefore Tathāgata is endowed with the concentration-aggregate.

He is adorned with the wisdom-aggregate. He has destroyed two-fold ignorance which is hiding *dhyāna* and giving rise to passions. He has obtained Dharma by his own effort. He is adept in chaste language and in determining the true meaning, and never gets exhausted in logical analysis and insight. Other teachers are not so adept. The Dharma preached by the Buddha is capable to lead one to the goal unlike other dharmas. The Buddha has preached a dharma that is fine and never deviated from the truth; meditation on the foul aspect of things *e.g.*, tends to the destruction of the desire for things.

The Buddha is endowed with the aggregate of emancipation. His mind has been emancipated from the two-fold ignorance, and has no more trace of it.

(causing) pleasant resultant hereafter, (4) unpleasant here (causing) unpleasant resultant hereafter. The Buddha discerns their executor, object, motive and resultant. The Sūtra says: a person is already pleased in his mind, and pure at the moment of giving charity, and does not repent after giving it. This action of the fruit-resultant is termed Resultant. The Buddha alone discerns what action is heavier and what is lighter, what action is of definite fruit and what is of indefinite fruit, and what action is of immediate fruit and what is of distant fruit, etc. No other person can do so; hence it is termed "power".

(3) The Buddha discerns the defiling effect, sustenance, accumulation and purifying effect of all *dhyānas*, *vimokṣas*, *samādhis* and *samāpattis*. *Dhyānas* and *samādhis* are 4 meditations and 4 *arūpya* concentrations; *Vimokṣas*, 8 emancipations. *Samāpatti* is meeting face to face (*ābhimukhya-lābha*) with the operation of these concentrations. The Buddha has the knowledge of all these things; hence this knowledge becomes power.

(4) The Buddha understands truly who is of sharp faculty and who is of dull faculty. Sharpness of faculty lies in the prominence of the faculty of faith, etc. and its dullness in their absence. The extreme limit of the sharp-facultied men is the Buddha and others and the same of the dull-facultied ones is Nāgadāsaka.

(5) The Buddha understands truly the world of various habitual desires, *adhimukti* (= *icchā*). A person who is addicted to wine likes wine. Tathāgata understands that this person is attached to five sensual pleasures and that person to the mind's cultivation, *bhāvanāmārga*. Thus understanding he preaches Dharma accordingly. Thiswise he releases all living beings from the worldly sufferings.

(6) The Buddha understands truly the world of different taste, *dhātu* (=*abhiruci*). Devadatta and others abuse Tathāgata every period and thus become possessed of deeply motivated taste for unwholesome acts and mind. One becomes likewise possessed of such taste for wholesome acts also. Some person

has a kernel desire by his innate nature and some person has it at the sight of a desirable object. Tathāgata understands all such desires and tastes (*dhātu-adhimukti*); this faculty is termed power.

(7) Tathāgata understands truly all comprehensive paths, *viz.* the path leading to hells and the path leading to heavens and upto Nirvāṇa. A man of impure action, *sāsravakarmaka* is born in one of the five places of birth (*gati*). The Buddha understands all these events.

(8) Tathāgata's knowledge about the fruits of the previous actions is termed power of knowledge relating to his memory of the previous births. He recollects all places of birth either in the rūpa-world or arūpa-world not only of his own, but of others as well. So it is termed power.

(9) Tathāgata perceives through his divine eye the elemental streams of all the three worlds of future period. He predicts the events after understanding the three-fold actions and four-fold action-pursuits. This his un-obstructed prediction of events is termed power.

(10) He understands through his knowledge of destruction of impure elements, *āsrava*, the stoppage of the elemental streams. Certain persons continue their life after death and certain others stop it. It is generally termed the path of Nirvāṇa.

These ten powers are accepted on the basis of defilement and purification. The first nine powers constitute his perfect knowledge and the last one his complete obliteration of passions. Since he is adorned with perfect knowledge and destruction (*prahāṇa*) he deserves our homage.

3. *Four Modes of Fearlessness* (*vaiśāradya*)

They are: (1) Omniscience (*sarvadharmābhisambodhi*), (2) Awareness of the destruction of all defiling forces, (3) Prophesying the obstacles that stand in the way of realizing the path and (4) Knowledge of the path for destroying the

misery. The first is constituted of the first nine powers and the second of the last power. These two modes form the Buddha's wealth of personal merits (*svārthasampad*). The last two modes of fearlessness are those by virtue of which he makes others possess the same wealth.

The difference between the power and fearlessness is this: the former is a comprehension (*abhisambodhi*) and the latter is what is acquired by the power. The Buddha by virtue of full comprehension becomes fearless. Even in the presence of full comprehension one may become dread from the others. But the Buddha is not so. The fearlessness consists in the proclamation of that comprehension. Others even though possessed of comprehension are not skilful in comprehensive preaching. Inexhaustible knowledge is *bala* (power) whereas inexhaustible *pratibhāna* (ready wit) is *vaiśāradya*. Delineation of the plane of birth is *bala*, whereas the mastery over that is *vaiśāradya*. The cause is *bala* and the fruit *vaiśāradya*, because the latter results from the former. A person becomes dread because he cannot convince others. But there is none whom the Buddha has not convinced, *i.e.* conquered and hence he is fearless. It is the Buddha who is skilful in speech and comprehending its real import. He is fearless, because having perfectly understood the true meaning of all Sūtras and Śāstras he elucidates all the questions and counter-questions. He is again fearless by virtue of being free from blemishes in respect of family, lineage, complexion, deep learning and good conduct.

Asura Brāhmaṇa addresses the Buddha: The person who speaks of things as they are, and preaches a progressive path logically and on the basis of facts cannot be distracted hence he is invincible. The person who is equipped with the four constituents of debating art is also invincible. The four constituents are: (1) To establish perfectly well one's own premise; (2) To delineate distinction between what is good reason and what is false one; (3) To quote illustrations; (4) To establish

finally one's own conclusion. The Buddha is fully equipped with all these four. No man or god could overcome him in the debate. The untrained person could be overcome, but the Buddha being trained under innumerable Buddhas like Dipaṅkara, etc. cannot at all be overcome.

The Buddha has accepted two truths: *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha*; hence he never quarrels with worldlings. The ordinary person says: Tathāgata exists after dissolution of his body. The Buddha also speaks the same. If the ordinary person says the reverse, the Buddha also follows it and never quarrels with him. Hence he cannot be shaken in the debate.

The Scripture (*Śāstra*) is two-fold; true scripture and false one. The scriptures of other teachers are, in major parts, deceptive. But the Buddha's scripture is perfectly true. In the dispensation of the Buddha is stressed the pure conduct which leads to destruction of suffering. The discourses of the Buddha are pure in their words and meanings and never deviate from the true nature of things and never resemble those of other teachers. His speech (lit. path) should not be taken too literally but in its inner comprehension. So says the Buddha to his disciples: Entertain no predilection towards my speeches but realize the spiritual knowledge in your own body. Again he says: Be straight-forward. The Dharma being preached in the morning you will realize the path in the evening and again the Dharma being preached in the evening you will realize the path in the next morning. The Buddha is accomplished in perfect knowledge with regard to all things and hence fearless.

Men of a little wit cannot understand what the great man acquired. The great man, however, can fully understand the mind of the ordinary men. The Buddha being superior to all persons can comprehend the scriptures of inferior men which are based on mere speculations. The Buddha understands well the origin of those speculations, their extinction, their tastes, their defects and the way of removing them. Other teachers are

unskilful in comprehending the destruction of sins and quarrel with one another, whereas the Buddha is skilful in comprehending things in all aspects and becomes critic of other teachers' treatises but never gets defeated by others. So he is fearless.

These factors help us to distinguish between the fearlessness and the spiritual power.

The Buddha is fearless from everything. Why should only the four modes of fearlessness be stated here? The four modes include all other varieties. The first pair connotes his personal knowledge of his destroyed sins and the last pair his capacity of declaring to others the elements that obstruct the path to their goal. Knowledge of destruction is what is called the path for destroying *duhkha*, suffering. The Buddha and his disciples are adorned with the knowledge of destruction. So all the varieties of fearlessness are thus included in general in the said four varieties.

People suspect that the Buddha is not an omniscient person. Yes, his utterances sometimes resemble the talk of an ordinary person. For example, the Buddha asks: Where do you come from? He himself says in a Sūtra: Suppose a person goes to a town and asks the people there the name of that town; I would not call him all-knower. There are sayings which would make us think that the Buddha is sometimes greedy and sometimes haughty and sometimes proud and so on. The Buddha again says that sexual enjoyments are the obstructive elements of the path. Some people, however, enjoying them realize the path. The Vinaya also says that the person who is deviated from restraints also realizes the path. Some people even practising the path are possessing the fetters (*samyojana*). But the thought that the noble path does not lead to the destruction of fetters is entertained by dull-witted persons. Who will be able to separate himself from the suffering without putting aside all the fetters?

Our suspicions about the Buddha's omniscience are removed as follows: The Buddha follows the world in such speeches. People in the world ask such questions even though they are aware

of these facts. The Buddha also existing in the world talks in the worldly fashion. People, therefore, really devoid of greed, behave as though they are greedy. Similarly the Buddha utters such words with a view to doing good to living beings.

The sexual enjoyments are really the elements obstructive of the path even if we have the statements to the reverse effect. The fetters are present in a person in spite of his practising the path. This fact proves that the path practised by this person is incapable of destroying all his fetters and hindering elements. For example, the curds are by nature antidote to the heat. But they are ineffective in the case of a person who is clad in insufficient garments.

Thus the Buddha is adorned with four modes of fearlessness and hence deserves our salutation.

4. Ten Names of the Buddha

The Sūtra enumerates ten designations of the Buddha: (1) *Tathāgata*, (2) *Arhan*, (3) *Samyaksambuddha*, (4) *Vidyā-caranasampanna*, (5) *Sugata*, (6) *Lokavid*, (7) *Puruṣada-umyasārathin*, (8) *Śāstā devamanuṣyānām*, (9) *Buddha* and (10) *Bhagavān*.

He is designed Tathāgata, because he has won the ultimate true wisdom by means of the true path. Whatever he says, it proves to be true and never false. It is a well-known fact that the day he won the true wisdom and the day he departed from the earth, in between these two days whichever the Buddha spoke it proved to be true only and never false. It is so, because the Buddha preaches Dharma only after realizing it by himself. He preaches Dharma which is suited to the time and place and which is worthy of preaching as stated in the Kimśukasūtra.

His preaching is two-fold: One is from the empirical standpoint of view and the other from the absolute standpoint. He

heart he maintains it without being affected by joy or sorrow towards the good and the bad. He keeps constantly a neutral frame of mind. He is firm in his mind like the Great Earth. He never becomes elated on account of a great calamity being averted or becomes dejected on account of the calamity being encountered like an ordinary folk would behave. He, being a man of great compassion deserves to be saluted by all gods and men.

The Buddha preaches Dharma at the expense of his immense happiness that is derived from his meditation and trance (*dhyāna-samādhi*). He has achieved the supreme path out of his great compassion and never with any other motive. He entertains no idea of an excessive pleasure. Being compassionate he subjects his body to a great suffering. The Buddha moves about in the world in his body constituted of five aggregates which are unbearable like a red-hot iron-ball in order to rescue all living beings out of his compassion. He has cultivated the calm and indifferent mind, and giving up that mind he retains for ever the compassionate heart; and hence he is worthy of our offerings.

The Buddha is the best of all good men and acts for the welfare of himself as well as others. He is an adept in discerning the people's mind. He is possessed of several merit-aggregates of effort, etc. Upāli has praised him on that account in about hundred stanzas. The Buddha has himself enumerated his own virtues in the *Tathāgata-varga* of Ekottarāgama: I am the leader and ornament of men, tusker among the persons, topmost of Śramaṇas and the best of Brāhmaṇas and lord of noble men very attentive farer (pramatta-cārin) and my body never pursues either in enjoyment or in bodily torturing.

The Buddha never cherishes to gain profit and fame. He commends himself for the cause of others' welfare and never entertains the idea of "I". He praises his self only for the benefit of others. His virtues are innumerable. Being free from arrogance he falls no victim of ignorance. Śāriputra in the Discourse on

Purification praises in the Buddha's presence his good qualities. There are immeasurable virtues in his body: little desire, contentment and others. As he has accumulated all such virtues, he deserves our Salutation.

6. *Dharma-Jewel*

THRICE AUSPICIOUS

Dharma is worthy of salutation; so the Buddha has commended it as follows: Dharma is auspicious at the outset, in the middle and at the end, full of good purpose and good expressions, isolative, complete, absolutely pure defect-free and progressive and (it is termed) *Brahmacarya*.

It is auspicious at the outset; because the dispensation of the Buddha is not limited in time; it is auspicious in childhood, youth and old-age. It is so at the time of admission, in its practice and in its goal. It eradicates the sins at first, effects good result in the middle and dispels everything at the end. It is lovable by all learned men and deep in significations. It is not like the other teachers' Sūtras which are elaborate in the beginning, brief in the middle and briefer at the end.

The purpose of the dispensation is to do good to all and to benefit men in this world as well as in the other world the gaining of the transcendental path. It does not resemble the paths of other treatises that are devoted to the prayers to some (imaginary) overlord. Thus it is full of good purpose.

It is of good expression, because it makes known its purpose in a popular local dialect. The purpose of speech is to express one's meaning and the Buddha's utterances discern their purposes. His dispensation is designed for due practice and not for recitation. It expresses its purpose, i.e. the path for purity in the popular local dialect. It is not devoted to the prayers like the heretics' treatises. The Tīrthika, for example, says: The (prayer in) wrong words and uttered in a wrong intonation kills the proprietor of the

sacrifice. Again it is of good expression, because it is apt in expressing the ultimate goal and because it is fitted to the expressions of empirically true things (*loka-satyavacana-kuśala*).

It is isolative, for, the Buddha preaches only the best dharma and not enumerates what happened in ancient days (*prāg-vṛtta-vastu*). As it is devoted to the Nirvāṇa without residue it is isolative. Or it is so, because the Buddha alone has preached it. Though there are many discourses preached by his disciples and other gods, they did so only after having obtained avavāda, instruction from the Buddha. So it is stated in the Vinaya : Dharma is what is preached by the Buddha, his disciples or gods or created beings (*nirmita*); or in brief whichever is well spoken is all spoken by the Buddha. Therefore it is termed isolative.

It is complete. The Buddha's dharma lacks nothing. So the Rudraka-discourse says : The Buddha's dispensation accomplishes its purpose not in its expectation of other discourses; e.g. in (Pāṇini's) aphorisms of Grammar the grammatical analysis can be accomplished only with the assistance of the five fundamental aphorisms. But in the Buddha's system even a single stanza can accomplish its whole purpose. To quote an example :

To do away with all evils and to accumulate all the good,
To purify one's own mind : This is the Buddha's Dispensation.

It is pure in words and bright in thought. 'Pure in words', because its expressions are free from ambiguity. 'Bright in thought', because its purpose is obvious. The Buddha's expressions being fitted to their purposes become pregnant with ideas and the purposes being fitted to their proper expressions become pregnant with expressions. In the Buddha's dispensation the dharma is resorted to and not the person. It is expounded in accordance with the Sūtras of ultimate import (*nītārtha*) and not the Sūtra of secondary import (*neyārtha*). It is a bright (*paryavadāta*) dharma which does not follow the discourses in general. In Buddhism there are three seals of dharma : " Everything

is non-self; all manifested elements are momentary and impermanent and the Nirvāṇa is the eradication (of passions) and quiet." These are three seals of dharma which are difficult to be criticized by any disputant. *Brahmacarya* is what is the noble path constituted of eight constituents and the path is termed *Brahmacarya* as it leads to Nirvāṇa. The Buddha's Dharma being crowned with these virtues deserves our salutation.

7. *Dharma-Virtue-Aggregates*

The Buddha again commends his dispensation thus: My Dharma is an eradicator (*nirodha*) leading to Nirvāṇa, causing the full comprehension and conducive to the goal.

Since the Dharma (*Brahmacarya*) eradicates the fire-like passions, greed and hate, etc. it is called eradicator. The fowl-meditation e.g. eradicates the fire-like greed or the meditation on loving heart dispels malevolence (*vyāpāda*). It does not recommend the fasting, etc. as a means to the goal as some heretics have prescribed.

It leads definitely to Nirvāṇa and not like the teachings of other teachers instruct us to stick to this life and cause us to be engrossed in Dhyāna and Samādhi. It is stated in the Scripture of the Buddha that every manifested element is tainted with the dross and not praise-worthy. It does not commend the world of Brahma as the Brāhmaṇas do. So it leads to Nirvāṇa.

It causes a full comprehension because it is in favour of Nirvāṇa. It embodies in itself the fruit of true knowledge; *e.g.* the knowledge born of listening leads to that of contemplation (*cintā*) and the latter again to the knowledge born of concentration (*bhāvanā*). So it causes a full comprehension.

It is conducive to the goal; since it accomplishes one's own good immediately and then good to others subsequently.

The Buddha's dispensation is again commended in six ways: (1) Well spoken by the Buddha, (2) beneficial in this life, (3) not

confined to any particular season, (4) conducive to the goal. (5) inviting everyone to come in and to realize for oneself and (6) to be realized introspectively by each person.

'Well spoken', this indicates that the Buddha has spoken all dharmas in accordance with their true characteristics and states the unwholesome elements as unwholesome and wholesome elements as wholesome.

'Beneficial in this life', the Buddha's system bestows benefit in this very life. So says a Sūtra: The person given a lesson in the morning realizes the path in the evening and again given the same in the evening he realizes the path in the next morning. The *Śrāmaṇya-phalasūtra* also says that the immediate gain in this dispensation is the fame, offering, respect, Dhyāna and Samādhi. It has a semantic law (or law of purpose-*arthanaya*) and causes to win the remote Nirvāṇa with all immediate benefits of honour and gain. But the dispensations of other teachers are not so.

'It is not confined to any particular season'. It is not observed on a particular day, month or year or on any occasion of some star as in the Brāhmaṇical system. It is stated (in the Vedas): The Brāhmaṇas should set up fire in the month of spring and the king in the summer. One should perform the offering ceremony invariably either after sun-rise or before sun-rise, etc.

That 'it is conducive to the goal' means it leads to the release by prescribing good conduct.

It is 'inviting everybody to come in and to realize for one-self'. The Buddha's *dharma* is to be realized in one's own body and not on reliance upon the other's help. So says the Buddha: Be not, O Bhikṣus, desirous of relying on my words alone. You yourselves investigate which dharma is to be observed and which is not. It is not comparable to any system of heretics who advise their pupils: Do not put questions and counter questions but simply observe what I preach like a deaf and dumb and have holy baths.

It is "to be realized introspectively by every person". It is beneficial to all wise and faithful men. The people engrossed in the fasting, etc. believe that the wise men enjoy not the happiness. Nevertheless the wise men get released through right knowledge, etc. which are destructive of sins. The wise, in spite of his body being nourished by the food and comforts obtains in this very life the mind's one-pointedness, and freedom from oppression by the lust and the hate, etc. A patient, *e.g.* being released from his disease feels a fresh relief. Certain person proclaims that the earth is solid-characterized. Having asked the question: what is the solid-characteristic, one gets no reply to it for the reason that it is to be felt by touch. Just as a born-blind could not talk of the blue, yellow and white, just so is the person not in the possession of the taste of the Buddha's Law and cannot talk of its true purpose which consists in the absolute quietude.

It is to be experienced inwardly by everyone and not to be passed on to others after acquiring it by oneself like the wealth. So says the Buddha in the *Pārāyaṇasūtra*: I will not dispel your doubt but you yourselves would do so when you are capable of realizing my Law. This law reaching the other person cannot be witnessed like the spreading fire. The worldling being covered by ignorance does not believe in this Law; *e.g.* the Buddha cites a simile of the great mountain to a novice Aciravat.

The Buddha's Law is very deep but comprehensible when it is explained. It is very deep for the reason that it lets known the ultimate cause. People at large enjoy their (resultant) fruits in this life; but do not know their cause; they, therefore, imagine Īśvara and others as a false causes. The doctrine of dependent origination is too deep to grasp. The sober-witted person nourishes no sense of deep towards the Law of the Buddha. When he carefully investigates that even the grass is grown out of causes and conditions, its traits (*lakṣaṇa*) becomes very deep. As the doctrine of origination preached by the Buddha is deep,

so also is deep and hardly perceivable his doctrine of Nirodha which is a state of eradication of and separation from thirst.

As to the complaint about Ānanda having nourished a notion of shallowness towards the doctrine of causation, some masters say that the fact is not so. The author meets the complaint thus: Some people nourish that notion looking into the doctrine in its general character. They do not observe minutely actions and defilements and their subtle forces. Or that notion may arise in a person who has reached the extreme point in the doctrine after being trained in it regularly from the outset. Or some people nourish that notion because the Buddha preached it in a clear perceptive.

The Buddha's Law is a preaching of Śūnyatā—voidness which is profound and becomes intelligible when it is explained by the Buddha with several illustrations and reasons. It becomes intelligible even to the ordinary folk like Śrāmaṇera Sudāya, etc. It is dominated by the ultimate truth in every discourse unlike the Bhārata and Rāmāyaṇa which narrate more tales but lack in the ultimate truth. The Brāhmaṇa, Rāgha says that the Buddha trains his disciples in a purposive dharma, an ultimate dharma, i.e. the eradication of *āsravas*, intoxicants. It is preached for the good of sentient beings unlike the Brahmanical system which is devoted to one's own benefit. Even the lord of gods and men who are engrossed in five sensual pleasures have faith in the Buddha's Law and hence it deserves our salutation.

8. *Twelve Branches of The Discourse* (*Pravacana*)

The Buddha's discourses are classified into twelve branches: (1) *Sūtra*, (2) *Geya*, (3) *Vyākaraṇa*, (4) *Gāthā*, (5) *Udāna*, (6) *Nidāna*, (7) *Apadāna*, (8) *Itivṛttaka*, (9) *Jātaka*, (10) *Vaipulya*, (11) *Adbhutadharma* and (2) *Upadeśa*.

(1) The Sūtra is what is uttered by the Buddha with his own tongue.

(2) The Geya is a Sūtra in the form of stanzas and spoken by the Buddha or by his disciples.

The same topic which is preached in the Sūtras is repeated in the stanzas in order to emphasize it or with a view to pleasing the disciples or with a view to beautifying the speech (*Śabdālaṅkāra*). The flowers, e.g. are scattered for the ornamentation or borne as garland. The topic being briefly stated in a stanza becomes obvious. Some people are fond of the prose and some of the stanza. The same topic spoken first in prose and then repeated in the stanza becomes clearer and conducive to the faith and easy for recitation.

Some masters say that the Buddha's speech should not be composed in stanzas which would resemble the ordinary poem. The author says it may be composed in stanzas because the Buddha himself has employed stanzas in his preachings. So says a Sūtra: The people who are (expert) in refined speech have entered my Order. Therefore the stanza becomes a refined expression.

(3) *Vyākaraṇa* is a discourse elucidative of the Sūtra-topics (*artha-vibhaṅga-Sūtra*). The difference between the Sūtra and the Vyākaraṇa is that the former is more preaching without question, answer and elucidation (e.g. Discourse on the four *Pratisamvid.*) whereas the latter has all the three. For example, the passages like: There are four persons. What are the four? etc. Certain Sūtras have profound principle of import (*artha-naya*) which is to be elucidated in the Abhidharma. This is the reason why the Buddha preaches them without elucidation (*vibhaṅga*).

Some masters say that the Sūtras preached by the Buddha are all elucidative of their meanings, but the authors of *Saṅgiti* collected their profound topics and arranged them in the Abhidharma. e.g. a man of fetters analyses the meaning at night; for this reason this topic must be in the *Samyojana-Skandha.*

(4) *Gāthā* is the same as the *Geya*. It is two-fold: *Gāthā* and Śloka. The latter is again two-fold: Śloka, verse addicted to passions and the one free from passions. The latter category of Śloka is termed Gāthā.

(5) *Udāna* is a discourse bereft of the said two-fold Gāthā.

(6) *Nidāna* is a prologue to any discourse. It is sometimes included within the discourse or sometimes remains outside of it.

(7) *Apadāna* is a statement of *paurvāparya*, the first-second-order. The Sūtra says: The speech of the wise men is orderly, purposive and elucidative. This is *apadāna*.

(8) *Itivṛttaka* sometimes serves as a prologue to the discourse and sometimes it may occur at the end of the discourse. When the both are related to the past events, it is *Itivṛttaka*.

(9) *Jātaka* is a description of the past narrative of the personages of the present time. Though the Buddha describes the future, he does so only on the basis of the past or the present; hence it is not stated as a separate kind.

(10) *Vaipulya*, an extensive preaching of the Buddha. Some masters maintain that the great sages who are delighted in quietude would not relish the extensive discourse. So says the Sūtra: A person having secured the path would utter a word once in two months. To remove this wrong idea it is stated that there is the Vaipulya-Sūtra for the benefit of others. So says a passage: The Buddha preaches the law both extensively and concisely; of these two the extensive preaching is superior to the concise one.

(11) *Adbhutadharma* is a wonderous discourse like the statement that the elements at the end of the world would be in rage, the whole earth would tremble and the bodies of gods will be immeasurable. Some people do not believe in these events. Therefore the *Adbhutadharma* has been preached, since the retributive power of actions is unthinkable.

(12) *Upadeśa* is what the great sages like Mahākātyāyaniputra and others composed. They have elucidated elaborately what the Buddha preached. Some masters do not believe in their sayings. Therefore the Buddha says that there is a discourse scientifically analysing ((*Śāstrātmaka*) (the Discourses). The Sūtra being a representative of a Śāstra, treatise, its meaning becomes easily intelligible.

9. *Congregation-Jewel*

Primary Purity

The Buddha commends the congregation thus: It is pure in five aggregates of good conduct, concentration, wisdom, release and knowledge—vision, worthy of invitation, worthy of homage, worthy of offering, worthy of paying respect with the folded hands, supreme fields of merits and beneficial to all donors.

The congregation of the disciples holds fast to the good conduct and fears from even a small breach of conduct. The disciples of the Buddha are not born amongst the men and gods in order to reap their merits. They are delighted in holding fast to their conduct. Their conduct is not confined to any time-limit as that of the Brāhmaṇas is limited to six months or some such time. They keep the pure conduct as freed from the two extreme limits, five sensual pleasures and body of pain; hence the congregation becomes favourite to all noble and wise men. Since their mind is pure their conduct is also pure. Having tranquillized their motivated follies they not only keep up their conduct pure but fear from other world also. Therefore the congregation-jewel is pure in its conduct-aggregate.

Their concentration-aggregate is pure because it causes the knowledge of truth to arise.

Their wisdom-aggregate is pure because it eradicates all their defiling forces.

Their freedom-(aggregate) is pure as it not only puts a check to the defiling forces but also obliterates them entirely.

Their knowledge-vision of freedom is pure as they have this knowledge: my birth is extinct.

They are worthy of invitation, worthy of paying homage, etc. because they are possessed of such and such virtues.

"Supreme field of merits" (is the congregation). The merit derived from donations offered results in immeasurable retribution and lasts till Nirvāṇa.

It is beneficial to all donors. It increases virtues of the donors, because it is qualified with the eight constituents just as a field having eight constituents produces five kinds of grain (*dhānya*) in abundance.

10. Classification of Holy Person

The four-fold practice (*pratipatti*): (1) Stream-entrance, (2) Once-returning, (3) Never-returning and (4) the practice suited to the Consummate One (*Arhan*). The four-fold fruit-winner: (1) Stream-winner, (2) Once-returner, (3) Never-returner and (4) Consummate One.

There are three persons in the first category: (1) *Śraddhānusārin*, (2) *Dharmānusārin*, and (3) *Animittānusārin*. The first person is one who has not acquired the knowledge of non-soul-voidness but has faith in the Buddha's dispensation and entered into his Order.

The person who has gone beyond the stage of the ordinary folk, but has not obtained the fruition of stream-entrant and passes away; in this intermediate stage, he is termed *Śraddhā-pratipannaka*. This person remains in the wisdom born of listening and thinking. Though he has not obtained non-soul-void knowledge, he arouses (its) mundane thought resembling the perseverance of dharma. Since he has come forward to the Order, he is termed a man that has passed over the stage of the ordinary folk. This will be deatiled later (Ch. 189). The person who is devoid of five faculties of faith, etc. remains the external worldling. The person of those faculties, gradually reaching to the stages of

Ūṣma, etc. gains the contemplation-wisdom; he is, however, designated with his original name: *Śraddhānusārin*. He will definitely secure the stream entrance-fruit, because he is remote worldling. The Ugra-sūtra is cited to support this point. Thus it is clear that the stream-entrants, both the proximate and remote are termed *Śraddhā-pratipannaka*.

Dharmānusārin is one who having acquired the non-soul-knowledge, remains in the four stations: (1) *ūṣma*, (2) *mūrdhan*, (3) *kṣānti* and (4) *agradharma* and understands non-soul-voidness in accordance with the Law. This person is termed *Dharma-pratipannaka*.

When these two entrants enter into the path of truth-vision and realize the extinction-truth, they are designated *Animittā-nusārin*. These three persons are entrants in the stream, but are not known as the winners of the three fruits as they abandon their fetters through the mundane path.

The stream-winner is one, who as the Sūtra says, eradicates the soul-idea, perplexity and addiction to rites and ceremonies, never falling back, firm and bent on the enlightenment and liable to rebirth seven times at most. Entering into the stream of Law, he will reach Nirvāṇa definitely just as a log caught in the stream of the Ganges and swept to the great ocean (Ch. 184). He may enter into Nirvāṇa in this life or in the second or third or upto seventh.

The entrant into the fruition of once-returner is one who has abandoned one or two out of the nine aggregates of fetters, and is going to do so three, four or five of them. He is also called *kulankula* as he wanders in two or three families. Or he may enter into Nirvāṇa in this very life.

The winner of this fruition is one who returns once in this world and puts an end to the suffering. His fetters become thinner through contemplation (*bhāvanā*). He may put an end to the suffering in this very life.

The entrant into the fruition of never-returner is one who has abandoned the seventh and eighth aggregates of fetters. When he destroyes the eighth aggregate completely he is termed *Ekabījin* and puts an end to the suffering in this life. One who has destroyed entirely all the nine aggregates of fetters available in the desire-plane of existence is termed Never-returner. The following eight persons come under this fruition: (1) *Antarāparinirvāyin*, (2) *Upapadyaparinirvāyin*, (3) *Anabhisamskāraparinirvāyin*, (4) *Sābhisamskāraparinirvāyin*, (5) *Ūrdhvasrotas*, (6) *Ārūpyayatanagāmin*, (7) *Parāvṛttajanman*, (8) *Dṛṣṭadharmaparinirvāyin* (= *Ihanirvāpaka*).

The first person may be divided into superior, intermediate and inferior according to their faculties. He is so called because he cultivates aversion to the empirical life but does not attain Nirvaṇa in this life on account of a small hindrance; he, however, attains it in the intermediary stage after death.

The next three persons are divided owing to the power of their faculties. The person, who being born, has once aversion to the world and enters into Nirvāṇa is *Upapadyaparinirvāyin* (No. 2). The person after being born remains spontaneously in the paths free from *āsravas* and enters into Nirvāṇa without employing any effort (*abhisasmskāra*) is *Anabhisamskāra-pari nirvāyin* (3). When the same person enters into Nirvāṇa after-employing it is *Sābhisamskāra-parinirvāyin* (4).

The fifth person becomes three-fold owing to their different faculties. The person of sharp faculty is one who having fallen from one station (*āyatana*) and being born in another enters into Nirvāṇa. The person of moderate faculty is one who being born in two or three stations enters into Nirvāṇa. The person of inferior faculty is one who having fallen from every station is born in every station and then enters into Nirvāṇa. The person reaching amongst the *Bṛhatphala* gods from the first dhyāna is known as *Nistīrṇa*. The person reaching amongst the *Bṛhatphala* gods would be born amongst the Śuddhāvāsa

gods; but he would not go to the sphere of non-form as he has a Wisdom-disposition. The person (No. 6) remaining in the non-form sphere goes to the same sphere; in this case he is never born amongst the Śuddhāvāsa gods as he has a concentration-disposition.

The seventh person is one who has already in his previous birth obtained the fruitions of the stream-winning and once-returning and then obtains the fruition of never-returning in the subsequent body. He does not enter into the spheres of form and non-form.

The eighth person of extremely sharp faculty enters into Nirvāṇa in this very same body.

The person may again be distinguished into two: *Śraddhā-vimukta* and *Dṛṣṭiprāpta*. The learner (*Śaikṣa*) of mind faculty, who remains in the path of contemplation is termed *Śraddhā-vimukta*, "freed by the faith". The same person having the sharp faculty is *Dṛṣṭiprāpta*.

The Never-returner who is not lacking in the eight kinds of emancipation is termed *Kāya-sākṣin*. All these persons are the entrants into the fruition of the Consummate One (*Arhan*).

The Consummate One is the person who has destroyed all the defiling elements. The following nine persons are under this category: (1) *Parihāṇa-lakṣaṇa*, (2) *Anurakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇa*, (3) *Mṛta-lakṣaṇa*, (4) *Sthita-lakṣaṇa*, (5) *Prativedhana-lakṣaṇa*, (6) *Akopya-lakṣaṇa*, (7) *Prajñā-vimukta-lakṣaṇa*, (8) *Ubhayato-bhāga-vimukta-lakṣaṇa*, and (9) *Aparihāṇa-lakṣaṇa*.

The first person is of mild faculty, liable to falling from the concentration and not able to meet face to face with the pure knowledge. The second one is able to retain the concentration and does not fall from it. The third person is extremely disgusted with the empirical life and does not attain to the concentration. Hence the pure knowledge becomes difficult for him.

Even it is obtained, its Joy disappears. Hence he intends to die. The fourth person, attaining to the concentration, neither makes progress in it nor falls back from it. The first three persons of the above remain in the range of falling from concentration and the fourth one in its retention. The fifth person attains to it, increases it much more and remains in the range of concentration-increase. The sixth one, attaining to the concentration does not disturb it by any means. Since he is adept in retention of and emerging from it he becomes unshakable. The seventh is one who gets freed through wisdom alone not resorting to the cessation—trance. The eighth one gets freed through the cessation—trance as well as wisdom. The last person never falls from the attained extinction of defilements as stated in the Sūtra.

Thus nine learning-enders and the previously stated eighteen learners constitute the mundane field of merit and therefore deserve our homage.

11. *The Field of Merit* (*Puṇya-kṣetra*)

The congregation of disciples is designated the field of merit for the following reasons:

The disciples of the Buddha have eradicated all their defilements such as greed, anger, etc., have concentrated their mind on voidness and have secured the unartificial *dharma* (i.e. Nirvāṇa). They have given up all the feelings pleasant and unpleasant and are possessed of eight qualities of the field and of seven concentration-requisites and so on. This fact is much more stressed.

When a monk receives the donation and homage from certain donor and attains the illimitable concentrations, the donor gains illimitable merit. There are certain monks in the congregation engaged in the illimitable concentrations, certain in con-

ceptless concentration, and certain in unshakable concentration; hence they are termed field of merit. The Sūtra says: immense merit is gained owing to three factors: faith, the object and the field of merit. Charity is eight-fold: (1) A person of pure mind offers a little occasionally to a monk of violated conduct; (2) a similar person offers a little to a similar monk many times; (3) a similar person offers a little many times to the monk of retained conduct; (4) a similar person offers a little occasionally to a similar monk; (5-8) another four kinds of offerings are enumerated taking into account the offered object in greater quantity.

Good people increase their virtues due to the congregation and become fit for the enlightenment. Whichever is offered to the congregation will lead to freedom and mental purification. The faith and devotion offered to the congregation will purify the mind. Resultant of an action becomes magnificent by virtue of the mind's magnitude. Because of this and other factors the noble men form the field of merit and deserve our homage.

12. *Auspicious* (*Maṅgala*)

These three jewels are virtuous and hence they are mentioned at the outset of the Sūtra. The three jewels are the foremost auspicious in the world. They are stated so in the Gāthā. Some authors of the Sūtras think that the Sūtras commenced with the auspicious word "*atha*" increase the life and fame of the learner; but that is improper. The people aspiring for the most auspicious should take refuge in these three jewels. So says the Maṅgala-gāthā:

The most auspicious is the Buddha
who is the highest teacher and the wisest leader
amongst men and gods.
The most auspicious is the person
Who has firm faith in the Buddha

and keeps pure conduct
The most auspicious is
to serve the learned, not to approach the ignorant
and pay homage to the worthy of homage.

13. Setting up of the Śāstra (Scientific Treatise)

The Law of the Buddha which is beneficial to all worlds is now to be investigated. Some masters preach the emancipation-treatise only to the Brāhmaṇas; but the Buddha's system of teaching on the other hand, is open to all the four groups of people as well as all other living beings; and therefore it suffers no boundary limitation.

The opponent says: If the Buddha has investigated, there is no need for investigation. If he has not done so, no investigation is possible. For, the Buddha's intention in his teaching is hardly discernible. It will be a futile attempt to undertake the investigation without discerning the Buddha's intention. Even the wise man cannot undertake it. The Buddha in the *Parapravāda-Sūtra* says: All the monks discuss the opinion of other teachers and do not discern the intention of Tathāgata. For example, the Elder Mahākātyāyana says: you, monks! leave aside the Buddha and put questions to me: this resembles the person who while cutting the tree abandons the roots and the trunk and seeks for the essence in the leaves and branches. If M. Kātyāyana says this, how would others understand his intention? The Buddha once asked Śāriputra: who are the learners and who are counters (Sāṅkhya)? Śāriputra remained silent thinking that all the dharmas (preachings) are rooted in Tathāgata who alone understands them and none else. Ānanda addresses the Buddha: When the path is gained on account of obtaining the Enlightenment, every benefit is derived (therefrom); for, the right knowledge is obtained through two factors, viz., from the utterance of others and rightly contemplating upon it. The Buddha replies: The benefit of the path is accomplished only when the Enlightenment is secured. He again says: When a dis-

ciple is taught a dharma by me, he institutes a quarrel as a result of not understanding my intention.

Now different disputants entertain different opinions. Some hold that there are as real the past and future things; and others plead that there is no such thing. Thus they, without understanding the Buddha's intention, follow him literally and therefore they quarrel with one another. Ānanda, e.g. says with a view to inducing concentration that every article (*upakaraṇa*) is miserable. Now the Buddha addresses the monks: You look into this thing in its true aspect as illustrated by Ānanda. All disputants agree that the Consumate One (Arhan) is to be respected in the first place. The monks not understanding this fact approached the Buddha and enquired about it. The Buddha replied: In my dispensation the first ordained person deserves the first homage. Thus they did not understand the true intention of the Buddha in the affairs of gross things like food and drink, what is to speak of his intention in respect of the subtle thing (*dharma*) spoken by him. Therefore the investigation is not necessary.

The author replies: This objection is not proper. There are several factors to determine the intention of others. It is stated in the stanza:

Men discern the innermost intention of others
and also discern what a speaker desires to express

There are two ways, noble and ordinary, to discern others' intention. Even in the *Parapravāda*-Sūtra the Buddha makes us believe that the great Kātyāyana and others have discerned the Buddha's innermost intention and hence they were much praised by the Master. Similarly he gave his full consent to what the monk Udāyin and the nun, Dharmadinnā, etc. preached by repeating it again.

This treatise must be composed, then alone the meaning will be intelligible and the Law will endure for long. The Buddha

has himself given his consent to compose the scientific treatise. The Sūtra says: The Buddha addresses the monks: Grasp fully the treatise duly composed. Therefore, gathering ideas from the Sūtras, this treatise is composed and set up as a separate system (*nikāya*).

In the cause of different sentient beings, who are to be rescued, the Buddha has enunciated the different principles of Śāstra, treatise like an empirical point of view, etc. The disciples like Svāti and others were perverted in their mind. They declare that one and the same consciousness runs round and round and transmigrates from one birth to another. The Buddha has stated many things thus (causing an ambiguity). In the absence of a Śāstra, scientific enquiry, how could the true imports of the Buddha's discourses be comprehended? These reasons impel us to compose this treatise.

14. *The Śāstra-principles* (*Śāstra-mukha*)

(1) The Śāstra has two principles (or faces): the empirical and the absolute. From the former point of view it is stated that there is a soul. The Sūtra says: The soul is the overlord of one's own self, etc. Non-sensuous consciousness is permanent. It is said: The person who has cultivated this mind for several days, is born in a higher sphere after death. The doer acts the deed and the doer enjoys its fruit. This person is born here in this place. All this is said from the empirical standpoint. But it is stated from the absolute standpoint that everything is void (*Śūnya*) and non-existent. In the midst of five aggregates of elements there is no such thing as the soul or anything pertaining to soul. The mind is momentary like the air and the fire. There is action and there is fruition but there is no actor. The Buddha says: There is transmigration (*Saṃsāra*) by virtue of continuity of aggregates of elements.

(2) There is another pair of the Śāstra-principles: Ordinary talk and noble talk. From the former standpoint people say

that the moon decays. As a matter of fact it does not decay. The nun Viśākhā is called the mother of Mṛgāra; but she is his daughter-in-law. It is stated; The tongue discerns the taste; but in fact, gustatory consciousness discerns it; and so on. The man is called poor or lord. The Buddha also is called lord by people. The Buddha calls heretics Brāhmaṇa and Śramaṇa. He is also worthy of worship like the Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas. One and the same vessel bears different names in different places; the Buddha also follows it. He, e.g., says: I took a last look at Vaiśāli. All these talks are on the basis of the ordinary men's conception. The noble talk is as follows: The consciousness is originated due to causes and conditions. There is only a conglomeration of aggregates, bases and elements and there is no actor, nor enjoyer. What the ordinary man speaks as happiness the wise declares it as suffering. Things expressed by words are void and conceptless (*animittā*).

(3) The Principle of three times: e.g. whenever the matter (*rūpa*) is talked of, it means of three times.

(4) Another principle is this: If something, e.g. contact (*sparśa*) exists, it exists necessarily on account of the six bases (*ṣaḍāyatana*); but all bases do not cause the contact. If there exists thirst, it necessarily arises on account of feeling, vedanā; but all the feelings do not cause thirst. The entire causality is sometimes expressed when it is said: contact-conditioned is the feeling. The incomplete causality is also sometimes expressed when it is said: feeling-conditioned is thirst; but ignorance is not stated so. The causality is also said otherwise: the body of a joyous-minded person becomes serene; but the body of other person also becomes serene through three dhyānas. A man of serene body feels happiness but a man having serenity through four dhyānas does not feel it.

(5) General rule and exception: This is another two-fold Śāstraic-principle. The person who walks one foot-step with a view to saluting a Stūpa, is born among the gods—this

is the general rule. Its exception is: A great sinner is never so born. The person enjoying sexual happiness does not acquire any merit—this is the general rule. Its exception is: The stream-winner, even enjoying it does not commit any act that would lead to any ill-birth. The sūtra says: Visual consciousness arises due to the colour and the eye; this is a general rule. If one says: it arises due to all colours and the eye; it is wrong. Due to the sound and the ear the auditory consciousness arises but not the visual consciousness; this is exception. These general rules and its exceptions are all reasonable and not contrary to the characteristic of elemental law, *Dharma-lakṣaṇa*.

(6) The determined and the indetermined is also the pair of Śāstraic principles. The example for the first is the statement: The Buddha is omniscient. The Law preached by the Buddha is true fact (*paramārtha*): The elements are impermanent, void, etc. and their extinction is Nirvāṇa; and so on. The example for the second is: Person after death takes birth—this is indetermined because the person will take birth if he is in the possession of craving. In the absence of it he takes no birth. A person of concentrated mind comprehends the truth—this is also indetermined; for it is true in the case of noble person, but not true in the case of heretics. Six bases are contact producers: this is indetermined. Certain base produces it and certain not.

(7) Another pair of Śāstraic principle is the artificial and natural. For instance, the wonderful plant and fragrant flower are not antidotes to the disease of cold (*vāyu*). The flower of *Kovidāra* on the other hand is an antidote to it. Reason for this is the former is human flower while the latter is divine one. Similarly the three-fold feeling, pleasant, unpleasant and indifferent is artificial whereas the saying that whichever exists is suffering (*dukkha*) is natural; and so on. One is *parivrāṭ*, recluse because he is enlightened; and another though not enlightened may also be *parivrāṭ*.

(8) The proximity is a principle of the Śāstra. The Buddha says: Give up the idea of pluralism (*prapañca*) and then secure Nirvāṇa. Though the Nirvāṇa is not secured immediately in the next moment, it will be secured in the proximity.

(9) Similarity in characterisation is another Śāstraic principle. For instance, to say that the mind is light (*laghu*) and fleeting implies that the mental properties are also of the same characteristic.

(10) To accord with the majority of instances is another Śāstraic principle. The Buddha says: The person who comprehends the origination and destruction as characteristics of things, becomes free from greed. (Certain) Stream-winner, however, comprehends them; he nevertheless, possesses greed. Therefore, the Buddha has stated it in accordance with the majority of so comprehenders being freed from greed.

(11) To express the cause as a result is a Śāstraic principle. The statement that the gift of food brings forth life, beauty and others is to be interpreted to this effect that the gift brings forth the causing factors of that results, life, etc. One eats coin (Kārṣāpaṇa), i.e. what is obtained through it. Fire sensuous objects are enjoyments (Kāma) i.e. causes of enjoyments. Fire is misery or happiness; Wealth is life; etc. These expressions are indicative of their causes.

(12) There is also an expression of the result as the cause. The Buddha says: I must reap my previous deed. Here deed (*karman*) ought to denote its fruit.

Thus there are several Śāstraic principles that are to be understood carefully.

15. The Scientific Treatise Commended

This treatise should be studied for the following reasons: The treatise discusses 5 aggregates, 12 bases and 18 elements. The person who studies this treatise will secure the knowledge of man's nature; he will become an ex-ordinary man. A person,

even though dwelling at home becomes noble because he is possessed of the faculty of faith, etc. The person who puts on the religious garments and with head shaven, etc. is far off from the Buddha's dispensation, because he is not possessed of the faculty of faith, etc. Therefore, one should endeavour to have these five faculties of faith, etc.

There are two benefits: the benefit for the self and the benefit for others. The latter is far superior. To engage oneself in preaching the scripture to others is the benefit for others. That benefit is superior to the recollection of the Buddha. The person who is inclined to preaching the scripture is the most excellent among the men. To listen to the Buddha's scripture is more beneficial than the act of charity. The person who listens to the scripture with attention can remove five hindrances and meditate on seven constituents of enlightenment. That person, being of composed mind goes beyond this shore of existence. One becoming well-versed in the true import of the scripture never gets entangled in the worldly life for ever. He never hurts himself, nor others. The heretic, maintaining pure conduct hurts his own body alone. The person who says that there exists neither sin, nor merit nor their results, falls in an unhappy sphere of birth and also hurts others. But the person, well versed in the Buddha's scripture and its meaning hurts none. Therefore the treatise should be studied.

The person well versed in this treatise deserves conversation. The Sūtra says: A person may be judged from his speech whether he deserves friendship or not. If a person, being questioned does not stick to a definite reasoning (*hetu*), cites no example, and follows no method of logical discussion (*vāda-paddhati*), he deserves no friendship. The person reverse of the above deserves friendship and this latter person is he who is well versed in the scripture of the Buddha.

Again the person who is good expert in four kinds of elucidation (*vyākaraṇa*) only deserves friendship and not others. One can become expert in such four elucidations suitable to four

different questions only when he studies the scripture. Hence this treatise on the dispensation of the Buddha should be studied.

There are four types of men: (1) filled with blames, (2) having abundant blames, (3) having a little blame and (4) having no blame. The person well versed in the dispensation of the Buddha could be either one having a little blame or one having no blame.

16. *Four Categories of Dharmas*

The person studying this treatise acquires four devices for gathering people, *saṅgrahavastus*: (1) charity, (2) to talk good words, (3) to serve other's purpose, and (4) equilibrium in the event of grief and joy. When one gathers people through charity of Dharma, they stand firm. The charity of Dharma is the same as the study of this Śāstra treatise. On the study of this treatise again one secures the highest shelter. The Sūtra says: There are four shelters: The first shelter is to stick to the idea of the separate elements and not to that of *pudgala*, "person". The highest test to judge the true words of the Buddha is embodied in this formula: The words that are traced to the Sūtras, not contradictory to *dharma-lakṣaṇa*, law of nature, and suited to the disciplinary codes are to be admitted to be true words of the Buddha. The other words are not to be so admitted despite the assertions made by some person that I heard them from the Buddha, his disciple or congregation, etc. The Sūtra meant here is that of the absolute import (*nitārtha*). It is the absolute-import-Sūtra the meaning of which never contradicts the law of nature (*dharma-lakṣaṇa*) and also is suited to the law of restraints. To conceive things as impermanent, etc. only helps one to abandon the greed for things. The knowledge of impermanence, etc. is the law of nature and this law should be sought.

The second shelter is to adhere to the Nitārtha-Sūtra, the scripture of the absolute import, and not to the scripture of the secondary import. The next shelter is to adhere to the meaning,

i.e. the absolute meaning (*nītārtha*) and not to the letters. The last shelter is to devote oneself to the knowledge (*jñāna*) and not to the consciousness (*vijñāna*). The consciousness is to cognize the *rūpa*, etc. whereas the knowledge is insight into things as they are (*yathābhūtadharmābhisamaya*). Voidness alone is *yathābhūta*, the state of things as they are.

There are four merit-increasing circles of men and gods: (1) To live in a favourable place, (2) To have association with a good person, (3) Right aspiration and (4) To have merits accumulated previously. The favourable place is *madhyadeśa*, central country. The association with a good person is to have birth in the period of Buddha. Third one is nothing but the right vision which is gained from listening to the Buddha's scripture. The fourth circle is not to be deaf and dumb. Therefore this treatise on the scripture should be studied.

Again the study of this treatise helps to gain in this very life the great essential goal known as the truth-penetration. The four essences enumerated in the scripture are: *vacanasāra*, *samādhi-*, *darśana-* and *vimukti-sāra*. The passage: every manifest thing is impermanent, etc. forms the first essence which is otherwise termed the wisdom born of listening. On the basis of this listening is obtained concentration known as the wisdom born of thinking. On the strength of the latter (concentration) is obtained meditation (*bhāvanā*) on things as impermanent, suffering, etc. leading to the right vision and fulfilling the wisdom born of meditation. The essence of freedom is obtained as a result of the above three factors.

To listen to the right treatise on the Buddha's dispensation is to secure the great benefit (*mahārtha*). There are four such benefits: (1) To serve the holy person, (2) to listen to the right scripture, (3) to reflect in accordance with reasoning, and (4) to observe the religious observances (*dharma*) and other minor ones (*anudharma*). Reflecting correctly one contemplates on things impermanant etc. and this contemplation causes pure vision.

The following four bases (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of virtues are also gained on listening to the right treatise: (1) The base of wisdom, (2) the base of the truth (= voidness), (3) the base of abandoning and (4) the base of tranquillity: the former causing the latter and the latter again causing still latter, and so on.

On account of studying the right treatise the following four roots of merit spring up: (1) heat (*Ūṣma*), (2) head (*mūrdhan*) (3) perseverance (*kṣānti*) and (4) the uppermost (*agra*) dharma. The first is called "heat" because when one medidates on the five aggregates of elements as impermanent, etc. a mild root of merit leading to Nirvāṇa arises heating his mind. A moderate root of merit being developed by the heat is termed 'head'. A higher root of merit being developed by the 'head' is termed "perseverance". The highest root of merit being developed by the perseverance is designated "the uppermost dharma".

There are again four roots of merits as pertaining to (1) abandonment, (2) persistance, (3) excellence and (4) penetration. The first root is when one abandons all the good acts such as salutation, worshipping, meditation, and concentration etc. The second persisting root of merit is to engage oneself in dhyāna, concentration and other good acts. The third root of excellance is the same as the roots of merits born of listening, thinking, etc. The last one is the root of merit freed from the intoxicants (*āsravas*).

The person who listens to the Buddha's scripture avoids the first root of abandonment and take to the last three roots.

17. *Four Truths*

The person who listens to the scripture discerns all the four truths with all details.

The truth of suffering is applicable to the whole universe consisting of three worlds. The world of desire includes from the hell, *avici* upto the heaven of *paranirmitavaśavartin*. The

world of form contains Brahmā heavens upto that of Akaniṣṭha gods. The formless world constitutes the four formless dhyānas.

There are four stations of consciousness: (1) Matter, (2) feeling, (3) idea, (4) formation. Some heretics maintain that the consciousness is also a station as it serves as the station of the soul. The Buddha, therefore, says that there are only four consciousness-stations associated with the four aggregates of elements.

There are four kinds of birth as proceeded from the egg, embrio, moisture, and the absence of a visible cause (*aupapāduka*). Gods and beings of the hells are born without parents. The ghost is both born from embrio and without parents. Other beings are to be brought under four kinds of birth. The four foods: (1) edible food, gross and subtle, (2) contact-food, (3) volitional activity of mind and (4) consciousness as food for the intermediary and unconscious beings and those engaged in the cessation-trance, the ghosts of the hells, and the beings of the formless world. The beings of imperceptible consciousness are said behaving the consciousness food because they remain in an imperceptible contact with it.

Six kinds of birth are: Hell-beings, animals, ghosts, gods, men and demons.

Six dhātus: earth, water, fire, air, space and consciousness. The space surrounded by four great elments, and having in the centre the element of consciousness is termed man (*puruṣa*). Six bases of contact are the six faculties, eye, etc. when they are combined with consciousness.

Seven stations of consciousness in which consciousness dwells happlly. Eight worldly phenomena: gain, loss, fame, loss of fame, blame, praise, happiness and suffering. Nine dwelling places of living beings; the sentient beings dwell in them.

All the elements are divided into five, viz., five aggregates of elements, twelve bases, and eighteen elements (*dhātu*), twelve

causal links and twenty-two faculties. Then the five aggregates of elements are briefly explained.

There are four factors of giving rise to consciousness : (1) cause, (2) preceding moment, (3) object-cause and (4) sense-organ. The cause is the action of the previous birth; preceeding moment is consciousness; the object-cause is the visible; and the eye, etc. are the sense-organs. The consciousness is brought about by two factors : the eye and the visible matter—mind and dharmas. These things form twelve bases. By adding consciousness to each of them eighteen elements are formed, viz. eye-element, visible-element, visual-consciousness-element, etc.

The said elements are divided into twelve causal links. The first is ignorance and the second action. On the support of these two links appear the following in order : Consciousness, mind-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*), six bases, contact, and feeling. Craving and clinging, those two are defiling elements. Becoming is action. Birth is the first consciousness of the future body-formation. The rest are the old age-and-death. These twelve links are mere causal elements, soulless and pointing to the three periods, past, future and present.

Then follows an exposition of twenty-two faculties. Things that are above summarized come under the truth of suffering. The person who comprehends the above is known as adept in the truth of suffering.

Truth of origination comprises action (*karman*) and defiling elements. They are termed *samudaya* because they are the main causes of rebirth.

Nirodhasatya is the cessation of the three-fold mind, viz. the idea of nominal things (*prajñapti*), the idea of separate elements and the idea of voidness.

Truth of path consists of thirty-seven constituents of the Enlightenment; viz. four foundations of mindfulness, four right

efforts, four *ṛddhi*-steps, five faculties, five forces, seven constituents of Bodhi, and eight constituents of the path.

The four foundations of mindfulness in respect of the body, feeling, mind and elements. The mindfulness becomes wisdom. The mindfulness of the body is to dwell in the idea that the body is impermanent. It is developed gradually along with wisdom and discriminates the feeling : this is the mindfulness of feeling. Again, being purified it discriminates the mind : this is the mindfulness of the mind. It discriminates again mental elements (*dharmāḥ*) through good behaviour : this is the mindfulness of *dharma*.

The four right efforts : the first effort gives rise to the will and exertion to destroy the sins that have already arisen; and the device for this is to have insight (*Jñāna-darśana*) into their cause. The second is aimed at not giving rise to the sins that have not yet arisen; the device for this is the insight into their cause. The third produces the will and the exertion to arouse a meritorious actions that have not yet arisen, and the device for this is the insight into their cause. The fourth effort is aimed at increasing the same actions that have arisen, and the device for this is by means of superior moderate and inferior elements.

The four steps to Ṛddhi-supernatural powers are : The first is associated with *chanda-samādhi-saṃskāra*. *Chanda-samādhi* is a concentration on the basis of the will (*chanda*). *Saṃskāra* comprises will, exertion, faith, serenity, memory, mindfulness (*samprajanya*), volition, indifference, etc. It is termed *ṛddhi-pāda* since it is aimed at increasing virtues. To cultivate the will the excertion (*Vīrya*) is made. This is the second *ṛddhi*-step. The Yogin with such will and exertion cultivates mental concentration and analytical knowledge. To obtain the mental concentration is concentration. (This is the third *ṛddhi*-step). Concentration on investigation (*mīmāṃsā*) is wisdom. (This is the fourth *ṛddhi*-step).

The five faculties : The faculty of faith arises from listening to the scripture. The person having faith exerts to eradicate the defilements and to gain the purification-elements : this is the faculty of exertion. To practise foundations of mindfulness is the faculty of recollection. To cultivate the concentration resulting from the latter is the faculty of concentration. The wisdom resulting from the latter is the faculty of wisdom (*prajñā*). These faculties being further developed become forceful and hence called five forces (*bala*).

Eight constituents of the path : The right view is when one having the wisdom born of listning believes that the five aggregates of elements are impermanent and suffering, etc. When the knowledge turns to be reflective (*Cintāmaya*) it is called right thought. As a result of this thought one attempts to eradicate sins and cultivate merits; that is right endeavour. In due course he, being ordained in the order, follows good conduct and adheres to right speech, right action and right livelihood. As a result of these restraints, the foundations of mindfulness, trances and concentrations are achieved in order. And as a result of the latter again the yogin secures a true knowledge of things as they are. This is the order of eight constituents of the path. Amongst the eight constituents of the path good conduct (*śīla*) ought to be first, because the aggregates of conduct, concentration and wisdom are arranged in a purposive order (*arthakrama*). The right mindfulness and the right concentration form the aggregate of concentrations. The right endeavour operates everywhere. The aggregate of wisdom is proximate to the path and hence it is stated at the very outset of the constituents as the right view. That wisdom is of two kinds : gross and subtle. The gross comprises the wisdom born of listening and thinking, and it is included in the path as right thought. The subtle comprises the wisdom born of meditation which ascending gradually on the state of 'heat' etc. eradicates the nominal five aggregates of elements. This subtle wisdom is termed right view, by virtue of which one visualizes the complete cessation of the five aggre-

gates of elements. The person at this stage is known as *abhisambuddha* (lit. obtainer of the path), awakened for the first time. On the basis of this stage he secures gradually seven constituents of enlightenment.

The seven constituents of enlightenment: The learner (*śaikṣa*) engages himself in constant mindfulness (*smṛti*) with a view that all the defiling elements would crop up in the absence of mindfulness. Being engaged in the mindfulness he takes hold of the right view that is already gained. This is known as analysis of things (*dharmapravicaya*). The continued effort of the same is exertion. Such exertion being continued, his defiling elements become thinner and thinner, and then he experiences joy (*prīti*) in his mind, due to which his body becomes calm and serene (*praśrabdhi*). By virtue of this he becomes happy (*sukhin*). Being happy his mind gets concentrated (*Samādhi*). This concentration which is hardly obtainable is comparable to diamond (*vajra*). The abandonment of joy and happiness, etc. and the detachment to the ultimate fruit form the indifference (*upekṣā*). This is the highest act. The indifference is not something that emerges or submerges, but the mental equanimity of the both. The supreme knowledge (*sambodhi*) is the knowledge pertaining to the learning-ender (i.e. *Arhan*).

By virtue of the above described thirty-seven constituents of knowledge one acquires four fruits of the recluse. The fruit of the stream-winner is to realise voidness of things due to which he abandons the three fetters. The fruit of the once-returner is when he cultivates the path and reduces the passions thinner and thinner. The person of this stage returns once to this world of desire. The fruit of the Never-returner is when he abandons all the defiling elements pertaining to the world of desire. The fruit of the Consummate One is to abandon every defiling element.

The person well-versed in the scripture of the Buddha will realize the four noble truths and win the four *Śrāmaṇa* fruits. Therefore this treatise on Buddhism should be studied.

18. *Dharma-Aggregates*

Again, studying this treatise one will acquire knowledge of the aggregates of all knowable things. They are divided into two : knowable (*jñeya*) and cognizable (*vijñeya*); material, non-material; visible and invisible; destructional and non-destructional; pure and impure; manifest and unmanifest; mind-element and non-mind-elements; mental elements and non-mental elements; and so on.

Three-fold things : matter, mind and dissociates; past, present and future; good, bad and indeterminable; and so on.

Four-fold things : Things pertaining to *kāmaloka*, pertaining to *rūpa-loka*, pertaining to *arūpaloka* and pertaining to none; and so on.

Five-fold things : Five aggregates of elements.

Six-fold things : Six elements (*dhātus*); six internal bases, etc. seven purifications; eight good births; nine gradual attainments of trance, ten dwelling places of the wise, twelve causal links, etc.

The knowable thing is the absolute truth (*pāramārthika satya*) and cognizable thing is the empirical truth. Material things : colour, taste, odour and touch; non-material are mind and unmanifest things (*asaṃskṛta*), etc. The visible thing is the base of colour. The impure thing (*sāsrava*) is, *e.g.* the notion of ordinary folk relating to the empirical things. Reverse of this are pure things. Manifest things are products of causal functions, *e.g.* five aggregates of elements and their opposite is unmanifest one, *e.g.* cessation of five aggregates. The mind-element is the mind that cognizes its object and the mental element is what is produced immediately after the consciousness that relies on its object, *e.g.* idea (*saṃjñā*), etc. Thus the author explains in brief other terms mentioned under two-fold things. The following are some of the three-fold things : Matter-elements :

five aggregates of matter, etc. Mind-element : as stated before, Dissociate element is unmanifest action (*avijñapti-Karman*, etc.). The following four-fold things are made clear by the author : (1) the elements pertaining to the desire-world, (2) the elements pertaining to the form-fold, (3) elements pertaining to the form-less world and (4) the elements pertaining to none. The four paths : (1) Difficult path difficult to practise; (2) difficult path easy to practise; (3) easy path difficult to practise and (4) easy path easy to practise. Four tastes (*āsvāda*) : (1) the taste of homeless life, (2) taste of separation (*visamyoga*), (3) taste of tranquillity and (4) taste of Enlightenment. Four foundations of mindfulness; four dhyānas; four clinging-bodies; four modes of entering into the womb; four causal factors : (1) cause : productive cause, perfuming cause and receptacle cause; (2) proceeding moment-condition, (3) object-condition and (4) predominant condition; four-fold faith : (1) faith in the Buddha, (2) faith in Law, (3) faith in Congregation and (4) faith in restraints; four-fold *āryan* clan (*gotra*) and four-fold misconduct are explained.

The matter-aggregate : five elements, visible, etc. Feeling aggregate : relying elements, idea-aggregate : empirical and imaginary elements. Formation-aggregate : elements causing rebirth. Consciousness-aggregate : consciousness-elements relying upon the bare objects. The earth-element : a collection of colour, odour, taste and touchable dominated by hardness. The water-element : a similar collection dominated by moisture; fire dominated by heat; and air dominated by lightness. The sky is devoid of matter; consciousness-element : a relying element. The eye-base is made of four great elements and support of the eye-consciousness and so are the other bases : the ear, etc. The mind-base, Citta, a thinking element; the colour-base is the object-element; so are the sound, odour, taste and touchable. Six genus-self-beings (*Jāti-Svabhāva*) : a man of black nature resorts to a black act; the white-natured to the white act. Six joyful-mind's co-farers are based on the desirous mind; six

sorrowful-mind's co-farers on the hateful mind and the indifferent-mind's co-farers on the mind of infatuation. Six good behaviours are based on the knowledge of truth.

Six dhātus : earth, water, fire, air, space and consciousness. Seven purifications : (1) purity of conduct, (2) purity of mind, i.e. possession of trances and concentrations; (3) purity of view is to abandon the soul-theory; (4) purity of crossing over the doubts—to eradicate the fetter of doubt; (5) purity of knowledge as to what is the path and what non—path is to give up the adherence to rites and ceremonies; (6) purity of the path-knowledge—vision is the contemplative path; (7) purity of knowledge—vision is the path of the learning-ender.

Eight meritorious creations are rich amongst men and upto the Brahmā i.e. world because the happy ones are found here due to their good resultant.

Nine gradual attainments of trance (*samāpatti*). The person engaged in these trances gradually suppresses the following elements. In the first trance speech, in the second *vitarka* and *vicāra*, in the third joy, in the fourth breathing, in the fifth characteristic of visible, in the sixth the space, in the seventh consciousness, in the eighth everything and in the ninth *saṃjñā-vedita*.

Ten dwellings of Ārya. The noble person becomes (1) deprived of five evils, i.e. five fetters of higher order, (2) possessed of six modes of indifference at the sight of visible, etc. (3) protected by one guard, of mindfulness, (4) supported by four things, food, etc. (5) abandoning the truth of individual things, (6) obliterating desire for sexual pleasure and life, and cultivating *brahmacarya*, (7) maintaining a pure aspiration, (8) with calmed corporeal actions, (9) with pure and isolated mind and (10) with freed wisdom. Having done his duty he becomes isolated and without companion.

Twelve causal links. Ignorance is the mind that pursues after the conceptual things; on the basis of this actions are

accumulated. Since consciousness pursues after the *action*, it assumes its body (*satkāya*). On the basis of the body spring up the mind-and-form, six bases, contact and feeling. These links become matured in course of time. It experiences all the feelings and pursues after the conceptual things, this fact arouses a craving for them. On the basis of this craving arise other defilements which are known as clinging (*upādāna*) and due to the craving and the clinging is achieved becoming (*bhava*). From the conditions of action and defilement the future rebirth takes place. Then the old age and death follow from the condition of rebirth.

Ignorance and action (*saṃskāra*) represent the past life-which fact removes the wrong view of eternalism. It is well-known that the one assumes the body due to action and defilement in the everchanging life without beginning. The links, birth and death represent the future life—a fact removing the wrong view of nihilism. The eight remaining links represent the present life. Thus the wheel of twelve links rotates endless. The person of true knowledge accumulates no action and suffers no more birth.

The person who is well versed in this treatise realizes that every element is devoid of its own characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) and does not accumulate actions. In the absence of the action no rebirth is possible and due to this the old age, death, grief and other sufferings cease to exist. Therefore the person desirous of having one's own benefit and others' should adopt the path of Tathāgata and give up the others' one. This person should resort to this treatise.

19. Ten Points of Dispute

The First on the Existence-Trait

The different points of dispute are stated at the outset of the treatise. They are also referred to in Tripiṭaka. They are summed up by different authors in their treatises with a view to entertaining the wise. They are : (1) the past and future

exist or not, (2) everything exists or not exists; (3) intermediary life exists or not exists; (4) gaining of four truths is gradual or of one moment; (5) *Arhan* falls or not falls; (6) *Anuśaya* is the mind's associate or dissociate; (7) mind is pure by nature or impure; (8) certain action of exhausted fruition exists or not exists; (9) Tathāgata is included in the congregation or outside of it; (10) Pudgala exists or not exists.

Some scholars hold that the past and future exist as real, since our mind cognizes them in all times. What is the definition of the existence? It is something where our knowledge operates. *Criticism*: Our knowledge operates on what does not at all exist. Several examples may be cited here; *e.g.* a person witnesses a non-blue object as blue in accordance with his habitual disposition (*adhimukti*). Similarly we may witness an illusory object even though it is non-existent. We have seen the perosn say: I see two moons in the sky. The Sūtra also says: I realize inwardly the absence of *chandarāga*. It says: Abandon *chandarāga* towards the visible, then the visible will become extinct.

Reply: This contention is improper; for, the consciousness arises on the support of two things: its base and object and not *vice-versa*. Consciousness is defined as something which cognizes an object. What does not cognize an object is not consciousness. The Sūtra says: Mind and mental elements are subjects and all other things are their objects, and causes of their subjects. The non-existent object cannot serve as cause.

Your illustration of a non-blue object being witnessed as blue is not convincing, as the blue nature is really present in a non-blue object. The Māyājāla Sūtra says: The illusion and illusory object exist; the magic is when the people witness an apparent living being (*sattva*) that is non-existent in reality. The Yogin realizes everything as non-existent in the *Ākiñcanyāyatana* due to his mental culture and not due to their really non-existence. Rūpa, *e.g.* is refuted on the plea that it is void, and

this is so because the Yogin engaged in a trance witnesses very little of the visible. We hear people say that a dish is absolutely without salt when it is short of a little salt, etc. In the trance called *Naivasaṃjñā-nāsa-ṃjñāyatana* thought (*saṃjñā*), even if it really exists there, is considered as non-existent.

The vision of double moon is possible due to the defect in the eye-organ. The absence of *chandarāga* in one's own mind is also possible due to a mental assumption produced after realizing the seven constituents of enlightenment which oppose the five hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*). That does not prove its complete non-existence. The abandoning of *chandarāga* is paralleled with the destruction of *Rūpa* because the insight into the supreme truth contradicts a perverted notion about *Rūpa* and its reality.

(Author's) criticism of the above reply. Your argument that consciousness arises due to two causes is not sound, for, the Buddha says so with a view to not pressing his opinion about the two causes as real but criticizing the existence of a permanent agent (*puruṣa*). You said that because of cognizable element existing consciousness exists. The cognizable element being present a knowledge arises thus : It exists; when the cognizable is absent the knowledge arises : it does not exist. When something is non-existing one sees it non-existing and that is void. Three-fold cessation is termed cessation-truth. If the void-thought does not exist, what will cease. To your plea that the visual consciousness cognizes the visible, etc. I may say that consciousness knows its object alone, but does not discriminate its existence or non-existence. The mind and mental elements are, in fact, devoid of their objects (*anālambana*) because they do not grasp the real supreme truth. Thet are again devoid of objects because dharmas are deprived of the trait of the supreme truth. Your reasoning that the objective things are productive causes of their consciousness and that no cause is possible in their absence proves that a particular consciousness arises with the support of a cause. Contact (*sparśa*) is said to be an assem-

blege of three things where three things are available. It does not, however, prove that invariably it is so. The argument that wherever knowledge arises it is always related to an existent object and that wherever the object is non-existent no knowledge arises can be restated with regard to your thesis also, namely, the knowledge arises from the existent object alone. To accept that the blue nature is really present in a non-blue thing as attested by the scripture where it declares that a tree is potentially possessed of pure character, smells the defect of *satkāryavāda* of the Sāṅkyas.

The citation from the Māyājāla Sūtra proves that such knowledge is only related to a non-existent thing. You pleaded that an existent thing turns to be a non-existent one due to the Yogin's mental culture and you cited the example of the matter, *rūpa*. If Rūpa is mentally refuted in spite of its real existence, then it will be a case of perversion. The salt example is also an erroneous expression. The example of the double moon would testify only to my contention and can be supplemented by another example of a circle of hair viewed in the sky by the person of the cataract-eye. You have stated that having realized the seven constituents of the enlightenment one assumes that he has comprehended the absence of *chandarāga*. This does not stand a moment's scrutiny, for the realization of seven constituents and the absence of *chandarāga* are quite different things and how are they identical? You have stated that the insight into the absolute truth is contradictory to the false notion (of *rūpa*, matter) is nothing but the abandonment of *chandarāga*. The false notion is an idea of a false thing. Therefore, it is stated that the abandonment of the matter flows from the realization of the abandonment of *chandarāga*. The *knowledge of the absolute truth*, on the other hand, is *to view things as impermanent*.

Therefore, there is knowledge which operates on a non-existent thing. Thus your definition of *Sattā*, *i.e.* an entity on which a knowledge operates is not at all a definition.

20. *Trait of Non-Existence*

The assumption that things that are grouped under aggregates, elements and bases ought to be existent is wrong, for you hold that such things are accepted by the ordinary folk, but they are not in conformity with *Dharmalakṣaṇa*. If they are existent, things like Tathāgata, etc. would also be existent; but they in fact are (substantially) non-existent. Therefore, the things like the aggregates, etc. are characterized as non-existent (substantially).

If you think that the trait of existence is when one believes that there is something experienced by our perceptive knowledge. It is not the trait of the existence, because, this believable thing is invariably in the nature of a discriminative thought but not a connotative of what is actually experienced. The Sūtra warns that one should resort to knowledge (*jñāna*) but not to the (discriminative) consciousness (*vijñāna*). Things like the matter, etc. as they are obtained by nature (*svabhāva*) are not the objects of experience. This point will be made clear in future (Ch. 147). Things characterized as non-existent are not to be negated in truth. It is not possible to say that a thing is existent because of its association with an attribute of *bhāva*, existence; for no one existence is associated with another existence. As things are originated due to causes and conditions, their existence-trait invariably lies in our imaginative thought and it cannot be considered as an actually experienced thing. It exists in the empirical plane and not in the highest one.

The past and future cannot be considered as existent in the empirical plane too; because the aggregates of elements, Rūpa, etc. of present time discharge their functions. The trait of the matter, Rūpa, i.e. *Rūpyate* (modified = *vipariṇamyate*) is applicable to the matter of the present time only and not to that of the past or future. Therefore, the five aggregates exist in the present moment alone. A thing short of its function is also short of its own trait. The past fire does not burn and hence

it cannot be termed fire. The same rule is applicable to consciousness.

If the past one does not cognize, it would not be a consciousness. What is without cause cannot be stated as existing. The past thing is without cause; hence it does not exist. Things that are existing empirically are produced through causes and conditions; *e.g.* earth, seed and other things being present the sprout is produced. Likewise the paper, pen and human effort being present the letter is produced. At the conjunction of two things consciousness is produced. In the future period the causes of sprout, letter and consciousness are all not assembled. How would they be stated as existing? Therefore the past and future are non-existing.

If the future thing exists, it would be permanent, since it has reached from the future to the present like a person going from one hut to another hut. This idea has been rejected in the Sūtra thus : The visual sensation while arising does not come from somewhere else and the same while disappearing does not run to somewhere. If the future eye sees the visible, it would possess the function. If the past and future things exist, they would be obstructing and covering. They are not so in fact; hence they are non-existent. If the pitcher, etc. of the future time exist now, the potter would not make an effort to produce them. So the future is not to be accepted as existent.

The Buddha says : The manifest thing has three traits : birth, death and modification (*sthityanyathātva*). Birth indicates a thing which, being previously non-existent, is now functioning; death denotes a thing being produced, becomes non-existent; the modification is a change of the thing's statie condition in succession. All these three traits partain to the present time alone, but not to the past and the future.

21. Existence of The Past and The Future

The opponent again argues in favour of existence of the past and the future. The past exists because our mind operates

on the past which is existing like the present thing. The Buddha while expounding the matter (rūpa) remarks : matter whether past or future is termed *Rūpa*. Again it is stated that the matter-aggregate includes every matter whether internal or external, whether gross or subtle and whether past, present or future. A knowledge arises from another knowledge of the actually perceived like one plant from another plant. If the past does not exist, the present fruition will be fortuitous. Another Sūtra says : The Buddha preaches what is past, is really existing and beneficial. It is stated : One should meditate on everything past and future as non-soul. The non-sensuous consciousness of the future object rests on the past mind. If the past is non-existent what it would rest on? The right knowledge lies in knowing that the future result comes from the past action. The Tathāgata's ten forces comprehend all the actions, past and future. The learner, having an impure mind would not have the faith, etc. as pure faculties. The noble persons would not as a rule prophesy the future event. If there is no memory of the past and the future, man would not remember the five sense-objects; for, no non-sensuous consciousness comprehends the five sense-objects. Eighteen *mana-upavicāras* rely on the past object. The Consummate One (Arhan) declares : I entered into the trance. He does not speak while in the trance. So the past (trance) exists. The four foundations of mindfulness and four right efforts and all will be impossible as they are all related to either past things or future ones. The Tathāgata will be non-existent if the past and future do not exist.

22. *Non-Existence of The Past and The Future*

The author replies : Your proposition is wrong. It has already been pointed out that a non-existing thing can also evoke thought. The matter of the past moment cannot at all be termed *Rūpa* since it is short of *Rūpaṇa*, modification. To your plea that a knowledge arises from another knowledge, etc. we can reply that the cause having discharged its function in favour of

its fruit disappears. The same idea has been expressed by the Buddha thus : When this thing exists that one appears. True, the Buddha has preached what is past is beneficial; but that thing exists in the present moment. What is considered as past and extinct is known as non-existent. The Buddha says : One should meditate on everything as non-soul; because the ordinary men think that everything past and future is possessed of the soul.

As to the explanation of the right knowledge as your support, I may say that this body is producer of the action which, discharging the causal function for (future) fruition, disappears and the fruit is experienced in future. Therefore, they say that there is a fruit. In the dispensation of the Buddha the statement of existence and non-existence is introduced as an expediency and with a view to demonstrating the causality of merit and demerit and not with a view of the absolute truth. As we say that there is a man (*sattva*) in dependence on causes and conditions, so also do we say that there is a dependent past or future.

The statement of the non-sensuous consciousness as resting on the past mind is also introduced by way of expediency. It does not convey that the resting resembles that of a person on the wall, etc. It is also obvious that the mind does not rest on its own self. Taking the previous mind as its cause the next mind arises. The same is the case with the force of action. The Buddha knows fully well that the action even though it disappears discharges its causal function to its fruit; he does not say that he knows it as definitely existing. The evil act can be compared with the script in a loan-mortgage. The action is executed by this body and its resultant never dies out even if the action itself disappears.

Your argument that the faith, etc. would not be pure faculties may be replied thus : The learner secures the pure faculty in the present moment alone. The past is what disappeared and the future is yet to come and only the present is

reachable. Hence I do not say it does not exist. The noble men would prophesy by virtue of the power of their *Āryan* knowledge. They prophesy an event which does not exist in the present moment. For example, a person may comprehend the past event by dint of his strong memory. The ordinary men would also remember the previously experienced sensuous objects thinking that they are existent at present through ignorance. That is the nature of memory. The same explanation is applicable to the eighteen *upavicāras* as well as Arhan's declaration about his trance.

With regard to the mindfulness, it is to be noted that the mind is two-fold : momentary and contingent (*ānuprābandhika*). The person meditates on the latter by using the present mind. It does not follow that a remembered object exists in the present moment. With regard to the four right efforts the person removes the causes of the future sins and secures the causes of the future good.

You argue that Tathāgata would be non-existent. Tathāgata has been gone out (of this world). Even though he was witnessed by people in the past, he is never considered either existent or non-existent as he has entered into Nirvāṇa and has gone to the other shore. But the people take refuge in him just as the ordinary men propitiate their dead parents. In respect of your argument on the basis of the practice of conduct for long or a short while, I may say that the conduct becomes not distinguished on account of time. The time is not a substance for us. The appearance and disappearance of things continuously is said to be the time.

23. *Everything Existent or Non-existent*

Some masters hold that everything exists on the authority of the Buddha's saying : Everything, O Brāhmaṇa, exists, viz. twelve bases. That 'everything' means the substances like the earth, etc. attributes like number, etc. action like stretching out

and stretching down, etc. and the qualities like generality and speciality, etc. and the primordial matter, etc. The following do not exist even in the world : horn on the head of a hare, hair on the body of tortoise, foot of the serpent, odour of the salt and the colour in the air (*vāyu*). So also the Buddha says :

No foot-print is possible in the sky
Śramaṇa exists not outside
The people are indulged in the talk of
plurality (*prapañca*)
The Tathāgatas never indulge in pluraliy.

Things are said to be existent as they are experienced as such *e.g.* six categories of substance as the Vaiśeṣikas uphold, twenty-five ultimates as of the Sāṅkhyas; sixteen things as of the Nayasomas.

Things may be accepted as existent when there are sufficient proofs, *e.g.* twelve bases. Nevertheless in the dispensation of the Buddha the statement that things exist or not exist has been introduced by way of expediency (*Upāyatayā*), and not with a view to conveying the actual fact. The reason is : to accept an absolute existence evolves the fall into an extremity of eternalism and to assert the non-existence leads to the extremity of nihilism. Hence to be aloof from these two ends is the middle path (*madhyamā patipat*).

24. *Intermediary Life*

Some masters maintain that there is an intermediary life after death and before rebirth. The Buddha in his discourse to *Āśvalāyana* says : (Rebirth is effected) when the mother and father get co-habited and Gandharva is also present. The Vatsa-Sūtra also says : There is an intermediary life between this body being thrown out and next body being followed. Among the seven good people there is one who is termed an attainer of Nirvāṇa in the intermediary state of life. It is counted as one of the four becomings (*bhava*) and of seven ones. It

is also stated that the king of death (Yama) threatens the person in that state. The Buddha comprehends the previous dwelling of the living beings on the basis of their intermediary life. The scripture has it : a person reaches to the other world through succession of intermediary life. The worldly men also believe in it. If it is not accepted the man will be perished in between his giving up this body and taking up new one. All these prove that there is an intermediary life.

25. *No Intermediary Life*

Some other masters, on the other hand, deny it. The Buddha's discourse to *Āśvalāyana* does not prove it definitely. If the Aryas do not declare : Who is he and wherefrom does he arrive at, etc. we may be sure that it does not at all exist. The *Vatsa*-Sūtra has been misinterpreted by you. The context is that the Brāhmaṇa has conceived that the body and living being (*jīva*) are different. So the Buddha replies that there are five aggregates in the intermediate state. The *Antarā-parinirvāyin* is a person who has reached Nirvāṇa in the body in between the desire-plane and the form-plane. The four or seven becomings as cited by you are all contradictory to *dharmalakṣaṇa*. Yama's threatening is related to the sphere of rebirth and not to *antarā-bhava*. The Buddha comprehends the other's previous dwelling as a result of his superior knowledge (*āryajñāna*). He can comprehend anything that is non-existent and anything yet to come through his devine eye. Your cited scripture on *antarā-bhava* intends to convey that there is another world and not to prove the existence of *antarābhava*. Things experienced by the worldly person are not at all trustworthy and cannot be cited as an argument. The man would not perish in between the two lives, because as a result of action, he takes rebirth in one or other sphere of existence as one recollects the past and the future, etc.

It is stated in the discourse on the *Pūrvanivāsa-jñāna* that a particular person after his death takes rebirth in a particular

world and no statement has been made there that he remains in the *antarābhava*. Of three classes of actions that are to be experienced in this life, next life or in a subsequent one, there is not a fourth class of action to be experienced in the *antarābhava*. If it is accompanied by the sense of touch, then it is the same as a rebirth (*upapattibhava*). The Sūtra declares : When abandoning this body one assumes another : that I call as a rebirth. If you maintain that *antarābhava* is effected by action, then it would be nothing but a rebirth. If you think that it is not by action what is the use of it?

Some master may answer thus : Yes, we accept a sort of rebirth as *antarābhava*. However the person entering in the intermediate state may again undergo another rebirth; because the *antarābhava* for me is an entering of consciousness into the *kalala* state of embrio.

Here is a criticism. The consciousness enters into embrio as a result of action. Why is again the assumption of *antarābhava*? The mind, having disappeared from this world appears in another world by force of action. And we do not witness it reaching in succession from this place to that one as we, for example, experience a painful effect in our head when we are hurt in our sole. Therefore *antarābhava* need not be assumed.

26. *Gradual Intuition*

Some masters hold that intuition of the four noble truths is gradual. So says the Sūtra : The person, visualizing the cause of the world inhibits the wrong view of nihilism (*nāstitādṛṣṭi*) and the person visualizing the cessation of the world suppresses the wrong view of eternalism. The spiritual eye is described as a comprehension of the fact that whichever is liable to production is liable to perishing. The *Dhammapada* also declares :

> The wise should blow out one's own impurity
> gradually moment by moment like a goldsmith
> does so of the silver.

The Discourse on the destruction of *āsravas* says : *āsravas* are destroyed while the man is thus knowing and visualizing. The Buddha expresses openly in his own words : Intuition of the four truths is gradual; and it is comparable to a person who ascends a ladder step by step. All these statements prove that the four truths are intuited gradually, but not in one moment.

27. *One Moment's Intuition*

Some other masters opine that the intuition of four truths is not gradual.

If you stick to your first Sūtra passage, your own system will be violated. You have propounded that the path is secured in sixteen moments and with twelve aspects. The passage on the spiritual eye would lead to conclusion that the path is possible within two moments : first, knowing of the cause and the second, knowing of its cessation. The Dhammapada verse also will not support your theory of sixteen moments for acquiring the path. The Discourse on the destruction of āsravas proves that there are not only sixteen moments but several ones before acquiring the path. As to the Buddha's explicit expression of the gradual intuition. We have not studied such words so far. Even supposing that such expressions are traced in a Sūtra, they may be disregarded because they are contradictory to *Dharma-lakṣaṇa*. Therefore, your theory of sixteen moments for gaining the path cannot be supported by any scriptual authority.

The Yogin has no different truths but only one truth, viz. visualization of the cessation of suffering which is termed the first (moment of) Enlightenment. The Yogin, by virtue of viewing the visible things as products of causes and conditions and through gradually (developing the meritorious) dharma of "heat" etc. visualizes the truth of the ultimate cessation of suffering. The gaining of the path is stated as a result of visualizing the cessation-truth.

28. *Falling*

Some masters hold that Arhan may fall from the state of his saint-thood. So says the Sūtra : There are five causes and five conditions leading to the falling of an Arhan who is emancipated temporarily : He is occupied : (1) by manifold activities, (2) by preaching, (3) litigation, (4) engagement in a performance of very long duration and (5) a long sickness. Again the Sūtra says : Arhan is two-fold : one is liable to falling and the other not liable to falling. There is another saying that it is appropriate if this Arhan is fallen from the channel of emancipation. The *Dhammapada* proclaims :

One should consider this body similar to a pitcher
and this mind similar to a town.
He should fight Māra with the weapon of his wisdom
and protect what is conquered and be abodeless in it.

This protection of the conquered would not be possible for him who is not fallen from emancipation. Knowledge is two-fold : knowledge of extiction and knowledge of no more rebirth. The person in the possession of the former takes no rebirth. What use will be there by the latter? Udāyin was hardly able to secure the cessation-trance (*nirodhasamāpatti*) and that was the cause for his falling. However, he was reborn in the form-world.

All these facts prove that an Arhan may fall from his saintly state.

29. *Never Falling*

Some other masters maintain that the Arhan never falls from the Āryan path even though he may do so from the dhyāna and concentration. All Arhans may be subject to such falling; they nevertheless, are in possession of self-mastery (*vaśitābala*).

The opponent argues that the monk Godhika falling six times from the mind's emancipation, cut his throat with sword.

He did not fall merely from the Dhyāna-concentration. If he did so, he would not cut his throat. In the Buddha's system the mind's release is very essential and not concentration.

The author replies : Godhika, relying on this dhyāna-concentration touched the path of Arhan. The person who falls from the concentration lets loose the mental purity (*anāsrava*). But as a matter of fact he never falls from that state. So says the scripture :

> The old (action) is destroyed, no more rebirth possible,
> The mind becomes disgusted with future life.
> Those of the destroyed seeds develop no wish to do action
> And bravely passed into Nirvāṇa like a lamp blows out of existence.

Again it says :

> Just as a huge mountain is unshaked by any amount of storm
> Just so do the wise never wave either in encomium or in blasphemy.

The Arhan has completely rooted out the craving which is the root-cause of rebirth and hence he has no more fetters. Another Sūtra declares : The learner and the seeker of the path ought to be diligent; but as for those whose passions are completely destroyed no more passions (*āsrava*) would reappear. Hence the Arhan does not fall. The *Dhammapada* says :

> The Bhikṣu who is delighted in diligence and
> Mindful of the dread from indolence
> becomes no liable to falling and remains always
> in the vicinity of Nirvāṇa.

Again it is stated :

> Animals retire to the forest and birds to the sky.
> The Dharma is inclined in isolation and good men live in quiescence.

There are three causes of fetters : undiminished *chandarāga*, presence of its object, and arousing a false attention to it. The Arhan has completely destroyed *chandarāga* and hence entertains no more *chandarāga* and the false attention to its object. Therefore, the Arhan has no more fetters. The passions (*āsrava*) would crop up in the mind of those who conceive things wrongfully. The Arhan, on the other hand, has no passions as he does not conceive things in a wrong perspective.

There are numerous Sūtras in support of the above conclusion. One Sūtra points out that the Arhan resembles the streamwinner in respect of not falling from his status. According to another Sūtra, Arhan is never affected by fetters as he is in a complete possession of : pure conduct, concentration and analytical wisdom and seven constituents of Bodhi, etc. Another reason for his not falling is that he has realized the unshakable mind's freedom which is the quintessence in the Buddha's dispensation. When the Arhan has once eradicated his fetters, that state will follow him whether he is conscious or unconscious of it. He is adept in destruction of the craving and hence his mind gets completely emancipated from it; he never falls its victim again. For example, the fire burns what is unburnt but nevet burns what is already burnt. The Buddha proclaims in the following stanza :

If a victor becomes again victim to rebirth
He is no more a victor.
He is a veritable victor who never becomes
subject to rebirth again.

All these sayings prove definitely that the Arhan falls on no account from his sainthood.

30. *Mind's Nature*

Some masters hold that the mind is pure in its original nature, but becomes polluted by intruding dirts. This is wrong

because the defiling elements are in association with the mind and are not intruders. Of the three-fold mind *kuśala* and *avyākṛta* are pure and *akuśala* impure in the original nature and not due to external influence. The mind appears and disappears in every moment. By what dirt would it be influenced? If you consider the mind's continuum as affected by dirt, then your mind's continuum is permissible only from empirical standpoint. But as a matter of fact it is indescribable.

To accept empirically the mind's continuum would evolve several errors. The mind disappears the moment it appears and how could it continue? The Tathāgata declares that the mind is pure, etc. for the benefit of those who consider the mind as permanent. Moreover, the dull and indolent men, who listen to the mind as originally impure will think that the original nature cannot be rectified and therefore they would not attempt for purification of the mind. This is the reason why it is stated that mind is pure in its original nature.

31. Association and Non-Association

Some masters maintain that the latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) are the mind's associates—which point will be discussed in future in the chapter (136) on *Anuśaya*. *Chandarāga*, etc. are functions of the defiling forces and that function again is associated with the *anuśayas*.

You maintain in your system that *anuśaya* is a dissociate element and discharges the causal function for the outburst of the mental associate fetters. But this is improper; for, the Sūtra says : The fetters, greed, etc. are produced from ignorance, illogical conception and wrong purpose, etc. It does not say that they are produced from *anuśaya*.

You have characterized *anuśaya* in your system as a long habituated and outbursting factor of fetters. This is also wrong; for, the corporeal action as well as the vocal one are also long habituated; but they are not considered *anuśaya* by you. In case

you consider so, then all things may appear from the present causal action also. Thus the resultant (*vipāka*) would not occur from the deed done in previous birth.

Moreover *anuśaya* being momentary how can it be a productive cause? Nor is reasonable to say that the productive cause and its result are co-existent. For, the cause and its effect never become co-existent which point will be discussed in future (Ch. 65) on the occasion of criticising the lamp-simile (Chs. 40, 72). The *anuśaya* therefore is not a mind's dissociate element.

32. *Past Action*

Kāśyapīya holds that the past action, the fruit of which is not yet experienced, exists and other actions do not.

The author replies : If an action disappeared, that is past and no more exists. If that did not disappear, it would be permanent. If you say that the past exists, the past being another name of what disappeared, it would disappear once again. The past action (for me) disappeared after having discharged its causal function for its fruition which would take place in the future birth. The Sūtra says : This thing being present, that thing appears. For example, the milk while disappearing, discharges its causal function for the curds. No much use of talking of the past action (and its existence or non-existence). In case you give consent to the above, it would incur another error. How does the consciousness (of the present life) appear in the absence of the cause (*i.e.* past action)? In the absence of the milk what would turn into curds? And in the absence of the body and the mouth, etc. constituted of the four great elements what would be the basis of the action? and so on.

33. *Dispute Over Two Jewels*

The Mahīśāsakas maintain that the Buddha is included in the congregation of monks.

The author replies : It is all right if you hold that he is included in four assemblies, viz. of sentient beings, breathed (*prāṇin*) beings, human beings (*manuṣya*) and noble men. If you think, on the other hand, that he is amongst the listeners, then I would object; for the Buddha did not listen dharma from others, but his disciples, on the other hand, did listen from the Buddha.

The person who offeres to the Buddha the chief of the monastery (*saṅghārāma*) is considered a donor to the congregation. Thus, the Buddha is included in it.

The author replies : To whose congregation does this gift pertain? The Sūtra appears to be lacking some word and it must be filled in as pertaining to the Buddha's congregation.

The Buddha says to Gautamī : Offer these garments to the congregation; then I shall be respected as well as the congregation. (Does this not indicate that the Buddha is included in the congregation?). The author replies : The Buddha says this with a view to respecting the congregation. The Sūtra *e.g.* says : The person who views (things as) a disease beholds me.

The opponent continues : Some persons possessed of noble characters like Śāriputra, etc. are counted under congregation. The Buddha ought to be so on account of similarity in characters with them. The author replies : If you count the Buddha under *Saṅgha* on such semblance, then all other worldlings and things known as non-sentient beings would also be counted under congregation which proposition will be absurd. Therefore, the Buddha is not to be counted under congregation. Moreover, he is neither subject to the congregational duties nor is he comparable to any other congregational things. The Buddha, being a distinguished jewel, does not come under congregation.

34. *Non-existence of Pudgala*

The Vātsīputrīyas maintain that there is Pudgala which is denied by other masters. The reason for denying is as follows:

The Buddha declares in more than one Sūtra that Pudgala exists merely nominal, conceptual ande xpedient. Another Sūtra says: One who does not perceive things as suffering conceives the soul. One who beholds things as they are conceives no soul.

The noble persons think that the soul exists in the empirical life. The Buddha says: There is a nodding where the Inotion prevails. What is truly existent, the nodding is absent in it, *e.g.* the eye. Because it is truly existent, it lacks the nodding. The soul-doctrine has been negated in different places.

The noble nun addresses Māra thus:

What you consider as sentient being
pertains to the Devil's view.
This (life) is a heap of manifest elements;
No sentient being is found here.

The group of manifest elements continue in succession,
This is created by Māyā, a magic, and deceiving
the ordinary men.

This resembles an arrow pierced deep into heart and it has
nothing essential.

It is stated again:

No soul exists, nor anything pertaining to it
No living being nor man is found
There are mere five aggregates which are void
and characterized by appearance and disappearance.
There is, however, action and its fruition
But no doer of action is found.

The Sūtra has enumerated the objects of consciousness but there is no mention of *ātman* as an object.

A monk, Cunda by name, once asked the Buddha: Who eats the food of consciousness? The Buddha replied: "This question is improper. I do not say that someone eats the consciousness-food". If the soul exists one can say that the soul eats it.

In the *Bimbisārapratyudgamana*-Sūtra the Buddha says: Ponder, O Monks, over the fact that I speak of the soul in accordance with the ordinary men's conception of the soul, but in the absolute sense there is no soul or anything of the soul amongst the five aggregates. Different denominations as soul, living being, man, etc. are all based on the five aggregates. A heretic Pūraṇaka by name, declares that the ordinary person through wrong view speaks of the existent as non-existent. The Buddha has removed this wrong notion but not removed the empirical sattva-conception. So the soul does not exist.

In the *Yamaka*-Sūtra Śāriputra addressed Yamaka: Do you think that the aggregate of matter is Arhan? No sir. Do you think that the aggregates, Vedanā, etc. are Arhan? No, Sir. Do you think that the aggregates put together form Arhan? No, Sir. Do you think that Arhan is outside of the aggregates? No, sir. Then Śāriputra continues: If the Arhan being searched is not obtainable even in this life, it is appropriate to describe that the Arhan is annihilated and does not exist after death. Yamaka confesses: I had previously nursed an unmeritorious and wrong view which has now been given up. If there is really soul, Yamaka would not have confessed that his previous view was wrong and unmeritorious.

Amongst the four clingings is said a clinging to the soul-theory. If there is a soul, it would be described as the clinging to the soul just in the same manner as the clinging to desire, etc. and it would not be described as clinging to the soul-theory. The Śreṇika-Sūtra declares: Out of three teachers there is one who does not find the soul of the present time or the soul of the future time, and I call him to be the Buddha. The recollection on the

sattva, soul that is described in certain Sūtra is related to the five aggregates. For, the recollection is made by non-sensuous consciousness which relies on *dharmas*, conceptual and other mental elements alone. So there is no such thing as a Sattva-recollection.

To accept the soul as absolutely existing causes one to fall into one of the six wrong views. True, to deny it also is a wrong view. But my view is founded on the double truth. I do not plead for the non-existence of the soul in the empirical plane and for the existence of the same in absolute one; but I plead *vice versa* without incurring any logical error. The following stanza is uttered by the Buddha in course of conversation with a Brāhmaṇa pupil, Mogharāja by name:

> Look at, O Mogharāja, the world as absolute void
> and be mindful of it always.
>
> Eradicate the soul-view and be crossing over the
> Death;
>
> The king of Death will not behold you thus viewing
> the world.

The dharmas like joy and pleasant-mindedness, etc. which are cited as proofs for showing the soul are included in the five aggregates.

35. *Pudgala Existent or Non-existent*

The advocate of the Pudgala pleads in favour of its existence: The soul exists because amongst the four modes of answering question the fourth one is *Sthapanīya*, *i.e.* avoiding the answer to the question. Examples: Does the Tathāgata exist after death, or does he not exist, or does he both exist and not exist or does he never exist nor not exist after death? This question should not be answered or decided. Since this mode of answering has been upheld, we must accept the existence of the soul. To deny the person that is to enjoy in future is a wrong view.

The Buddha says in several Jātakas that he was at that time the same person as King, Mahāsudarśana, etc. The present five aggregates are produced from the previous ones, hence there is the soul which continues through all these stages. The Buddha states:

The person of great merits rejoices in this life,

Rejoices hereafter and rejoices in both of them.

In the case of the five aggregates alone being accepted the statement that he rejoices in both lives, would be contradicted. Another Sūtra says: the sentient beings get polluted on account of mind's pollution and they get purified on account of mind's purification. It is further stated: Certain person is born in the world in order to do great harm to many, and certain others in order to do good to many. To commit good or harm appertains to a sentient being (*Sattva*). The Buddha in several Sūtras says specifically that there are living beings who experience a future body and that a person is adept in one's own benefit and not in others'. All these sayings would prove definitely the existence of the soul.

The following is the criticism against the non-existence of Pudgala.

Your citation that the Pudgala is nominal, etc. is not correct, for, the Buddha denies the soul with a view to criticizing the other teachers who have accepted a permanent soul other than the five aggregates. We, however, plead that the five aggregates put together form the soul. If the soul is nominal simply none would incur sin in killing a cow. A nominal gift by children would cause a real fruition as a real gift does. The true-speaking Aryas would turn to be false-speakers if they assert the non-existent thing as nominally existing. Supposing that the noble person perceiving truly non-soulness talks of empirically the existence of the soul the person would be considered to be of perverted view for the reason that he perceives something and

speaks some other thing. If the non-existent thing is considered to be empirically existing those dharmas found in the Sūtras, viz. Twelve causal links, Three channels of emancipation, etc. would be null and void. (You may say:) The existence is accepted from the standpoint of those who view the other world as existing and the non-existence from the standpoint of those who consider it non-existent. There are some who hold that innumerable things proceed from supreme god, and those Sūtras of wrong views are based on these statements but it is not proper to accept all these. Therefore the no-soul-theory is not justified.

Now the author replies: Your citation of the fourth mode of question-answer in support of your soul-theory is not appropriate; for, the soul is an indescribable dharma which point will be discussed later on in the section on the cessation-truth (Ch. 154). So the unspeakable soul is non-existent in reality, but it is nominal only and not real. According to your system the soul is cognizable by the six-fold consciousness. So says your Scripture: The soul is perishable as it is based on the visible (matter). In that case it becomes visible by the eye. Then it should not be stated as neither visible nor invisible, *na rūpa na arūpa*.

The theory that the soul is cognizable by six-fold consciousness is contradicted by several Sūtras, one of which states that the five senses do not cognize one another's object. This statement points out that the soul cannot be cognized by the six senses. Moreover, your statements are contradictory to one another. You maintain that what is cognizable by the eye is not visible (*rūpa*). You hold further that to assert the non-existence of the soul is a wrong view. But the Buddha, on the other hand, declares: Even in the absence of the soul I hold that life and death are accountable on the basis of formations (*saṃskāras*) continuing in succession. I witness with my own eye the people dying and being born; nevertheless I do not maintain that there is the soul.

Your scripture asserts that the soul is not born. What is unborn is short of parents. Who is short of parents cannot incur the heaviest crime (*ānantarya*) and other sinful acts and hence your system itself proves to be false. The idea of King *Sudarśana* rests on the five aggregates, and the aggregates continuing in succession become the Buddha. And for this reason the Buddha says: I myself was such a king. Since the soul in your system is one, there would be no distinction (among the men).

With regard to your citation of the stanza to the effect that a man of great merits rejoices in both lives, the Buddha next expresses in plain terms: I do not accept anything that abandons these aggregates and take up those ones. But the expression "rejoices in both lives" has been made in view of the fact that the five aggregates continue in succession and are viewed as identical. Your statement that the sentient being gets polluted on account of his mind's pollution only proves that the soul does not exist in reality. The soul, if it exists, would be other than the mind. The *Sūtra* does not say that sentient beings get polluted on account of their pollution. For, it is not possible to assume that the sentient being partakes of the mind's pollution. But because the cause and conditions are nominally polluted it is said that the sentient beings are polluted. Therefore the soul exists nominally and not in reality. According to your system the soul is other than the five aggregates and hence it is unborn, undestructed and short of merits and sins which proposition incurs many logical errors. We, however, consider *ātman* as an integration of five aggregates. This *ātman* may have birth and death, etc. What is nominal does not imply it is non-existent. But it implies simply that it is only a non-substance.

You have stated that the Buddha denied the soul in order to criticize the opinion of the heretics. This is all your imagination. All the soul-theories are defective. You also consider that *ātman* is other than the five aggregates. This your soul is

indescribable either as permanent or impermanent. And this soul is absolutely freed from the aggregates.

The aggregates may have three parts : good conduct, concentration and wisdom, etc. but *ātman* is not so and hence it is other than the aggregates. *Ātman* is the same as *pudgala*. The aggregates are other than *pudgala* becuase the former is five whereas the latter is one. If the soul exists at all it ought to be other than the aggregates. There is no any element as indescribable in the world and an isolated element as indescribable. Therefore, there exists no any indescribable (*avaktavya*) element.

The opponent (*Vātsīputrīya*) thinks that *ātman* cannot be described as either one with or different from the aggregates, on the analogy of the fire and fuel. The author views this analogy as *Sandigdhasama*, indefinite. What is the fire and what is the fuel? If the heat element is the fire and other elements are fuel, then the fire will be different from the fuel. If the heat element itself is the fuel, how are not the fire and the fuel identical? In the case of their identity the fuel would burn even in the absence of the fire. Therefore this analogy is indefinite.

Those who consider the fire as possessor of the fuel like the soul possessor of *rūpa*, matter, will fall into the wrong view of the soul (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*). They will also incur the fallacy that the soul is many. The fire in the wood is different from the fire in the cow-dung. Similarly the soul of men is different from the soul of gods.

Even though you plead that the fire and the fuel are neither identical nor different, we, however, actually witness them as distinctly separate. Similarly, the soul also will be different from the aggregates. The latter again perishes while the soul does not. The soul falling from this world takes birth in another world, because he is to rejoice in these two worlds. (But this is only apparently true, because) what perishes or originates along

with the five aggregates, would behave no better than the five aggregates. The soul behaving like the aggregates will not rejoice in these two worlds. Therefore you imagine this soul through your false idea. What benefit do you derive therefrom?

You accept the *ātman* as a thing to be cognized by six-fold consciousness, but there is no such thing amongst the cognizable objects. Your *ātman* is not included in the twelve bases nor in the four noble truths. Therefore your talk of the *ātman* is all false.

It is stated in your system that there are certain cognizable things, viz. five categories of things : the past, future, present, unmanifested (*asaṃskṛta*) and indescribable. The soul is included in the fifth category which you accept as distinct from the previous four categories. But this fifth category is impossible to exist. Thus the soul-theory incurs several defects. Therefore, your plea that ' the heretics accept the soul as distinct from the aggregates, but we do not ' is unfounded.

Your opinion that the fact of the soul being only nominal is deeply to be pondered is also unreasonable; for the dispensation of the Buddha has not stated that the empirical thing is a matter of deep thinking.

Your plea that every topic that is spoken of in the world, viz. things are created by god, etc. should be pursued is not admissible, for, what is beneficial and uncontradictory to the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) is only admissible. This point will be made clear in future.

You stated previously that the killing of the clay-cow will incur no sin. Now we reply : Action and its fruition are all possible when the five aggregates that are integrated with consciousness are at work in succession. In the case of clay-cow, on the other hand, no such aggregates are operating.

Therefore, we hold that integration of five aggregates is termed the soul nominally but not by way of any substance.

II

Duhkha-Satya-Skandha

RŪPA, MATTER

36. Rūpa-Trait

It is stated that the SATYA-SIDDHI-ŚĀSTRA will be composed. The term SATYA stands for the four noble truths : suffering, origin of suffering, cessation of suffering and the path leading to its cessation. The suffering is the five clinging aggregates; the origin : action and defilement, the cessation : the extinction of the suffering, and the path : eight-limbed path. This treatise is composed in order to accomplish this (said) *Dharma*, law. The Buddha has himself accomplished it and preached it in order to save the living beings on several occasions and in different places. He preached *Dharmapiṭaka* in eighty-four groups (of topics) condensing (all his preachings) viz. four *pratiśaraṇa*s (adherence) and eight causes and so on. Some masters neglected to explain and some others explained them in brief. Now, I intend to state collecting all with a view to ascertaining the meanings of these terms.

The five clinging aggregates are the *rūpa*-aggregate, etc. It is the same as the four great elements and the four derivative elements. These two put together are termed *rūpa*. The four great elements are : earth, water, fire and air. These four are formed on the basis of (*upādāya*) colour or visible, taste, odour and touch, and on the basis of great elements are formed the five sense-organs, the eye, etc. The sound is produced from the mutual contact of the four great elements.

The collection of the visible, etc. dominated by hardness is termed the earth. Similarly the collection dominated by moisture is the water; the collection dominated by heat the fire

and the collection dominated by lightness and movement is the air.

The eye is what serves as the base of the visual consciousness and so are the other sense-organs. The *tatsabhāga* eye which does not serve so is also the eye because of its affinity with the former. The visible, *rūpa* is what serves as the object (*ālambana*) of the visual consciousness. The visible which does not serve so is also *ālambana* because of its affinity with the former. So also are to be stated the taste, odour and touch. The sound is produced from mutual contact.

37. *Naming the Matter*

The Sūtra says : Whichever is *rūpa* is all the four great elements and the four derivative elements. The statement : " whichever is *rūpa* is all so " etc. determines that there is no any other *rūpa*. The heretics accept the five great elements. To refute them it is so stated.

The four great elements are nominal, *prajñaptisat*. They are great because they are pervasive (*vyāpin*) and gross (*audārika*). Non-material element is imageless (*amūrta*) and unrelated to space and invisible.

The sound, etc. are also *rūpa*, because they are obstructional (*sapratigha*) and possessed of form (*sākāra*) like the earth, etc. The sound can reside in a single object along with the other elements as the latter does. Hence it is *rūpa*.

The etymology of *rūpa* is : what is modified (*rūpyate*), cut (*chidyate*) or hurt. Or the *rūpa* is that which depicts the good and bad actions of the previous birth. Or it consists of colour (*varṇātmaka*).

38. *Nominality of Great Elements*

The four great elements are nominally real. The Sāṅkhya says : *Rūpa*, colour etc. are themselves the great element. The

Vaiśeṣika pleads : There are four great elements apart from the *rūpa*, etc. In order to refute these errors the *Sūtra* asserts : The great elements are formed on the basis of *rūpa*, etc. Therefore they are nominal.

The *Sūtra* says : Hardness and the abode of hardness is the earth-element. So hardness alone is not the earth-element. The worldly men talk : I see the earth, I smell it, I taste it and I touch it. The man demonstrates : This is the earth's colour; this is the earth's odour, earth's taste and earth's touch. This demonstration cannot be applicable to the substance-earth. It is further said : The earth is situated in the water-hemisphere. Only the nominal earth is situated and not mere hardness, and so on.

The *Kūpopama-Sūtra* says : The water is seen and touched. If the moisture alone is the water, it cannot be stated in two ways. For, the Buddha says : The five sense-organs experience their own objects each separately, and not one another's object. The water is said to be in possession of eight attributes : cool, soft, sweet, pure, etc. These attributes are included in the base of touch. The thirst-quenching and gladdening are its influence (*prabhāva*). Conglomeration of these attributes is water. Therefore the great elements are nominal.

All the derivative (*upādāya*) elements are nominal. So says the Gāthā :

Just as the term chariot (*ratha*) is employed
When certain constituents are assembled,
Just so is the *sattva*-expression formed in
The presence of five aggregates of elements.

Ānanda says : Things are made of causes and conditions and the soul is the ground of uncertainty.

Some masters say that hardness, etc. are the great elements and that they are receptacles of colour, etc. (*rūpādi*). This

implies that (elements, colour, etc.) reside in a receptacle (*adhiṣṭhāna*), and it is an ultimate substance; hence this will not the Buddha's dispensation. Therefore the four great elements are only nominal.

(The elements) subtlety, mildness and softness, etc. of things are brought under the base of touchable. The conclusion may be arrived at, viz. the four elements, hardness, etc. (that are included in the base of touchable.) are meant for the four great elements. Therefore they are nominal.

39. *Great Elements : Substance*

The Ābhidharmikas argue : They are substancially real, because it is stated in the *Abhidharma* : The earth has the trait of hardness (*khakkhaṭalakṣaṇa*), the water moisture, the fire heat and the air movement. (1) So the great elements are real. The *Rūpādi*, colour, etc. are derivative, *i.e.* produced from the four great elements. What is nominally real cannot produce its derivative (*i.e. Rūpādi*). (2) The great elements are elucidated (*nirūpyate*) by the traits of hardness, etc. (3) The *Sūtra* says : The great elements are spoken of in their two aspects : *Khakkhaṭa* and *kharagata*, *sneha* and *snehagata*, etc. implying that the *khakkhaṭa*, hardness is real and *kharagata* nominal. The implication is to be applied to other great elements also. It is stated in the *Abhidharma* : What is the nominal earth is the abode of forms (*saṃsthānāyatana*) and the real earth is the trait of hardness. (4) The Buddha says : What is hardness (*i.e.* real) and the abode of hardness (*i.e.* nominal) in the eye-ball is the earth, etc. (5) Since the Buddha does not speak of the air-element and its abode, the air itself a real element. (6) If the great elements nominal as some master pleads, they would be separated from their traits with the result that what is abode of hardness is the earth. In this case the water being sometimes the abode of hardness would be earth. A lump of clay being sometimes abode of moisture would become water. So it is not

proper to state separately that the hardness alone is the earth-element and the abode of hardness is the (nominal) earth. (7) The great elements being produced simultaneously, are mutually inseparable. So says the *Sūtra*: What is *Rūpa* is all made of the four great elements. This *Sūtra* will be vitiated if we accept that the great elements are mutually separated as pleaded by the advocates of the nominality of great elements.

The Abhidharmikas in conclusion reply to the reasonings stated in the previous chapter.

40. *Stated Arguments Invalid*

Now the author answers to the above arguments. The statement of the Abhidharma that hardness is the earth element is improper; for; the Buddha himself says: 'hardness and the abode of hardness is the earth and not merely hardness.

(1) Your statement that the derivative elements, *rūpa*, etc. arise from the great elements is untenable; because they arise from several other causes: action and defilement, etc. Ānanda says: This body is a product of craving etc. The opponent thinks that though rūpa, etc. are products of action, etc. the great elements are partly their causes. The grain, *e.g.* is produced from the action; nevertheless it arises from its seed, etc. The author replies: certain thing arises even in the absence of apparent causes; *e.g.* torrential rain at the end and the beginning of the aeon. Gods accomplish their desires through mere recollection of the desirable things. Or the Sage (*bhadanta*) merged in *dhyāna* achieves his desirable through a wish (*chanda*). The stream of elements of matter survives and continues even after its utter destruction. The person being born in the formless realm, again takes birth in the realm of form. What would be root of this material stream?

A man of inferior action requires the external causes, seed, etc. and a man of superior action does not require them. So

are the elements. Some person secures the birth through his sole action and some person needs the external causes. The person requiring the external causes would say that the seed is the cause of the sprout.

Why do you say that the derivative element arises on the basis of hardness, etc.? They both are produced simultaneously. Why do you say that the colour, etc. arise from hardness, etc. and not *vice versa*? Of things that arise simultaneously one does not become the cause of the other; *e.g.* the horns on the head of the cow.

The opponent cites the example of lamp and light to prove his viewpoint. They both are simultaneous, nevertheless the light is on the basis of the lamp. The author remarks : The light is not different from the lamp and they are identical. Therefore the example is inapt. If the light goes outside of the lamp, it would be experienced even in the absence of the lamp.

Your another example of the eye and its consciousness is also improper. The cause of the visual consciousness is its previous mind and not the eye-matter which serves merely receptacle. Therefore, the visual consciousness and its cause are not simultaneous. The four great elements are not producer of the (derivative) elements (colour, etc.) because they are not homogeneous. We experience that things are produced from their homogeneous cause; *e.g.* *śāli* grain arises from *śali* grain and *yava* comes from *yava*. Likewise the earth comes from the earth and not from the water. Thus the derivative element (*rūpa*) comes from *rūpa*, but not from the four great elements.

The opponent remarks : The worm and the insect spring up from a heterogeneous cause, *i.e.* the heap of cow-dung, etc. The author replies : I do not claim that it does not come from a heterogeneous cause, but I say that it arises when a homogeneous cause is present. Therefore, it is said that *rūpa*, etc. arise from *rūpa* etc. and not from the four great elements only. Thus

the assertion that *rūpa*, etc. arise only from the four great elements is inappropriate.

(2) The argument that the great elements are elucidated by means of hardness, etc. is not proper; for, the four aggregates are to be distinguished by their invariable traits of hardness, etc. The elements, smoothness, etc. are not invariable. They can be found sometimes in the aggregates dominated by hardness and sometimes in the aggregate dominated by moisture. Therefore, the elemental aggregates cannot be distinguished by the smoothness, etc. The *Sūtra* says : The abode of hardness, etc. are the distinguishing (traits) of the four great elements. Therefore, we understand that the abode of hardness is the earth-element and not hardness-trait alone. Hence hardness-trait is the main factor to determine what is the earth. Therefore, it is stated distinctly. The other traits of the great elements are to be explained likewise. Some masters say that the hardness-trait alone is the earth-element. In order to refute this opinion the Buddha says : Hardness and the abode of hardness is the earth-element; the moisture and the abode of moisture is the water-element, and so on. This talk in two ways is because hardness is fuller in the aggregate characterized by the hardness. The hardness is the main factor of the earth and hence it is termed the earth. An empirical designation is given to an empirically known factor.

(3) You argued that the great elements are spoken of in two aspects : hardness and abode of hardness implying that hardness is real substance-earth and the abode of earth is the empirical one. This argument is invalid. If the truth is determined from the style of expression, the elements like the twelve bases, ayatana, etc. would turn to be untruth. Thus the expression that the visual consciousness arises depending upon the eye and the visible will become untrue. And the whole treatise will be a perverted science.

When the Buddha is anchored in a concentration named *Tejovat* various flame-colours came out from his body. Why are

not those colours named fire (*tejas*)? The fire is formed through the colours, etc. and not through the heat alone. The Buddha says: This body is something like a box. It is filled with nails and hairs, etc. These nails, etc. are the earth-element. It is not proper to say that they are substance because the expression *dhātu*, element is employed there. For, the *Bija-Sūtra* says: Be there the earth-element and no water-element, the seeds would not, then, grow and flourish. Here the earth element is the empirical field and not the hard element alone. The water is also empirical. One thing cannot be both: Substance and empirical. Colour, etc. are substances while the eye, etc. are empirical. The great elements, on the other hand, are both; thus this will be a perverted treatise. The *ṣaḍ-dhātu-Sūtra* says: The hair, the nail and others are the earth-elements. The *Hasti-Padopama-Sūtra* also employs the expression *dhātu* on the hair, etc. How do you say that the term *dhātu* is substance and not empirical thing? It is not at all in the *Sūtras*.

(4) You cited the passage: In the eye-ball what is hard and abode of hardness is the earth. The Buddha tells in this passage that the five sense-organs are derivatives of the four great elements. Some masters say that they are products of *ahaṅkāra*. Others say that they are other than the great elements. Still others say that they come from different natures, *i.e.* the nose-organ from the earth, and so on. In order to refute these opinions the Buddha says: The eye-organ, etc. are in the nature of the four great elements, void and non-substance. The discursive thought (*vikalpa*) achieves the cause and condition of the nominalism (*prajñapti*) or empirism, which is non-existent. The Buddha, by the declaration that there are four distinctive parts in this ball of flash, viz. the hard and the abode of hardness, etc. tells that everything is the product of the four great elements.

(5) The Buddha does not state that the air-element is lightness and the abode of lightness and hence the air-element by itself is substance. This is not correct; for, lightness (*laghutva*)

is the distinct trait of the air and not the abode of lightness. The distinct traits of the earth, etc. are the abode of hardness, etc. The air is very little abode of lightness and hence the air is not stated as abode of lightness.

(6) To say that the great elements are empirical implies that the traits of the great elements become separated. This argument also is at fault. What is hard and abode of hardness, and produced from the four great elements is said to be the earth-element; but I do not say that some other thing is the abode of the trait. A thing which is other than the trait cannot be the abode of the trait. This is what is inseparability of the trait. It is designated as āśraya which is not something different and serving as the abode of trait. What is produced is divided by us; *e.g.* people say that sky goes everywhere. As a matter of fact there is nothing that goes anywhere.

(7) You stated that the four great elements are formed simultaneously. This is wrong. For example, we experience in the rays of the sun only some touch combined with colour and nothing else, and in the moon-light some cool touch along with the colour. Therefore, there are no four great elements in everything. There is something bereft of taste, *e.g.* gold, and diamond, etc.; something bereft of odour, *e.g.* gold and silver, etc. something bereft of movement, *e.g.* stone, etc. and so on. Therefore, the four great elements are not inseparably associated.

The opponent argues: A (new) character is produced in the great elements on account of external causes. For example, fluidity is produced in the gold and the stone, etc. due to the heat, solidity in the water due to the extreme cold; heat and coldness in the air due to contact with the fire and the water, and the movement in the tree and other plants due to the wind. These characters being already existent in those things spring up due to the external cause. Therefore, the four great elements are not separable mutually. The author replies: Then, the odour will be a part of the air for the reason that some fragrant

air is occasionally experienced just as the odour is the part of the fragrant oil. But this is improper. No derivative element is produced from the great elements. The moisture produces moisture; likewise *rūpa* produces *rūpa*. If the great elements are mutually inseparable, then *Sat-kārya*, presence of the result in the cause will have to be accepted. But we do not accept it. Though there is no curd in the milk, nevertheless the curd is produced from the milk.

Thus what use will be there by construction of nomenclature and its recollection, viz. the four great elements are mutually inseparable.

41. Delineation of the Author's Tenets

You argued : We do not accept the great elements as identical with or different from the visible, etc. (rūpādi) and do not incur any error; that is wrong. For, the heretics wish to establish them as either different from (the Vaiśeṣikas) or one (the Sāṅkhyas) with the visible, etc. and hence their difference from or identity with the latter are specified. The Buddha delineates their import because they have been brought under usage in the empirical world. The Buddha elucidates it to the worldlings; for they in spite of their knowledge about the great elements, do not understand their real truth. The Buddha does not speak of things like the hand, etc. If the great elements are formed of hardness, etc. what benefit is gained thereby?

You pleaded that the meaning of *āśraya* is in two ways and that the great elements are substances. I do not understand that this is *āśraya*-object and what is other than that is empirically true.

The statement that the water is possessed of eight attributes is from the standpoint of the worldly talk and not from the viewpoint of the substance-great-element. This argument too is improper. Neither in the Scripture nor in the world is made

the nomenclature of the four great elements on the colour, etc. (*rūpādi*) without the foundation of the causes and conditions. For example, people say : I see the man (*puruṣa*). This nomenclature of man in respect of colour, etc. is not made in the absence of causes and conditions. The person who does so may call the horse as a man. Why do the people not name the sound as earth? The man in the world always distinguish the earth and the sound; they never mistake the sound for the earth. If anyone makes nomenclature without proper foundation, he will call the sound as earth. None does this. Therefore, the four elements, colour, etc. constitute the earth. The name 'earth' is employed even in a part of the earth. This visible makes the foundation of nominalism and there the nomenclature of man is made. In the group of trees is made the nomenclature of forest and in the group of monks the nomenclature of congregation. Likewise in the elements, colour and others the nomenclature of the four great elements is made.

You cited a scripture : There are six bases of contact or there are elements derived from them; and this is an apocryphal one. It is your system that the derivative element is not a producer of anything, and likewise it is my system that it is not a product of anything in the empirical field. Therefore this scripture is not valid and traceable. If you trace it, it should be interpreted otherwise. You cited a passage showing that a translucent material element derived from the four great elements is the eye. This is also invalid. In an integration of the four great elements is termed eye in the empirical field. The four great elements that are empirically existent are termed *rūpa*. The translucence of that *rūpa* is the eye.

You have stated that one element exists upon another element and the same is short of receptacle and a basic ultimate (*adhiṣṭhāna*). An element in fact is both receptable and basic ultimate. It is receptacle (*āśraya*) through which something exists; and it is a basic ultimate (*adhiṣṭhātā*) upon which something rests.

You stated that the trait of the hard is 'to retain'. It is not good. The hard thing alone does not retain, but it does so depending upon the totality of causes and conditions. Other traits are also to be explained likewise. Therefore, the four great elements are empirically existent.

42. *Non-Existence of Hardness-Trait*

(The opponent objects) You have stated that the integration of the colour, etc. (*rūpādi*) dominated by hardness is the earth and hence the earth, etc. are nominal. This is not correct; for, no hardness (as a separate element) exists. How does the nominal earth exist? (1) A lump of clay which is hard becomes sometimes soft. So it is not a definite element. (2) The atoms being loosely integrated, the notion of softness arises. When they are closely integrated we have the idea of hardness. (3) Two sorts of touch cannot be found in one and the same thing and hence hardness is indefinite. (4) Hardness and softness are relatively experienced, *e.g.* a piece of cloth is soft in relation to a piece of rug (*kambala*) and the latter is hard in relation to the former. No real touch can be experienced relatively. (5) On looking at things like the gold and the stone one knows that this is hard. No touch can be cognized by the eye. Therefore, hardness does not exists. For the same reason softness, etc. are also not there as separate elements.

43. *Existence of Hardness-Trait*

The author replies: Hardness is substantially existent. You argued that the lump of clay is now hard and now soft. It does not exist in substance for us. It is only totality of so many elements existing nominally. Your second argument may be replied thus: Hardness exists since it is available in the closely knit molecules of atoms, and softness exists as it is in the loosely knit molecules of atoms. What is experienced is said to be existing. Your third argument is not good. We experience several tactile feelings in one and the same thing, viz. feeling of the hard

and the feeling of the soft. Your plea that they are relatively existing and indefinite is invalid. The short and long, though relative mutually, exist indeed. The person, *e.g.* who has tasted the sugar-candy feels other tastes unsweet. The person having tasted *harītakī* feels sweet taste of things other than the sugar-candy. If the relative things do not exist, then the taste itself will become a non-entity. If you say that things other than the sugar-candy have two tastes, the piece of cloth also will have two sorts of touch; hard and soft.

The last argument that hardness on looking at stone, etc. experienced by the eye is also invalid. It is not at all experienced by the eye, but it is inferred in the wake of contact with things, gold, etc. We, *e.g.* understand the heat on looking at the fire. But the heat is not visible. The person, again looking at the rug (*kambala*) doubts whether it is hard or soft. Therefore, the touch is not visible.

Hardness, etc. are substantially existing, because they arouse the discriminative thought (*vikalpa-citta*) about them. If hardness does not exist, what would be discriminated? It causes its own thought. The act of chiselling and chopping, etc. is directed towards the hard thing. What is contradictory to the softness and the moisture is termed hardness. There is hardness because it is the causing factor of retention, *Sandhāraṇa* and because it obstructs our hand and others. We experience it by our perceptive knowledge. A thing which is experienced in our perceptive knowledge requires no more an evidence to prove it. People in the world design such thing as hard. Therefore, it is evident that hardness exists really.

44. *Traits of the Four Great Elements*

Q. Hardness exists, all right. But we witness fluidity in the melted gold. The water becomes hard, *e.g.* hailstones. There is a doubt whether the gold is earthen because it is hard or it is watery because it is fluid. A. There is in each case a

svalakṣaṇa self-trait. What thing is hardness and abode of hardness is the earth-element and what is moisture and abode of moisture is the water-element. Q. You may say that the hard gold becomes fluid due to the contact with the fire and the water becomes hard due to extreme low temperature; thus the great elements become bereft of their self-trait. A. For us no hard thing itself becomes fluid and the moisture-thing itself becomes hard. But on the other hand what is hard discharges the causal function for fluidity and the moisture-thing for hardness. Thus the great elements do not give up their self-traits.

Fluidity, moisture and flowing (*syandana*) are different names of the water. Q. The water's function, fluidity is a visible element; so it is the trait of the water and not the moisture or flowing. A. Fluidity is conditioned by moisture and flowing. What is moisturous runs downwards; therefore fluidity is flowing. Moisture and flowing are the traits of the water and fluidity is its function.

Q. Lightness and movement, trait of the air are quite different. The former comes under the base of touch whereas the latter under the base of the visible. Thus the air becomes possessed of two things. A. Lightness is the trait of the air and the movement its function. The above trait is said by putting these two together. Q. Since everything is momentary nothing can have movement. A. The action is accepted from the empirical standpoint. Rising of something in another placee due to lightness is termed action and at the same time we say it moves. Q. Lightness is an indefinite element. e.g. a thing weighing ten *palas* is lighter than that of twenty *palas* and it is heavier than a thing of five *palas*. A. Weight exists on the basis of the mind as well as on a relative basis; *e.g.* certain thing is long in relation to some other thing and it is short in relation to some other thing. Their common trait is what exists on the basis of the mind. If lightness does not exist because it is mutually relative, other things (weight, etc.) would also become non-existent. Therefore mutual relationship is not correct reasoning.

Lightness does not exist due to mutual relationship, but it is *atolya*, not-weighable; *e.g.* the air contained in bellows (*drti*). Heaviness alone exists relatively. A thing bereft of heaviness is unweighable. Q. If unweighable thing is light, the visible and other weightless things become light as they are unweighable. A. We do not hold that heaviness is other than the visible, etc. (*rūpādi*) but the latter sometimes arise as possessing weighable character *e.g.* hard and soft, strong and feeble, new and old, accumulated and non-accumulated, extinct and non-extinct, gross and fine, etc. do not at all exist apart from the visible, etc. Similarly the trait of heaviness is accepted. If the aggregate of the visible, etc. (*rūpādi*) is earthen or watery then it becomes weighable. If it is airy or fiery then it becomes unweighable.

Q. Heaviness is not separate from *rūpa*, etc.; likewise the lightness also will not be a separate element. A. True. Lightness is not separate from *rūpa*, etc. But the aggreagte of *rūpa*, etc. becomes light. Q. It is not so. Idea of the heavy and the light is felt by the organ of touch, and hence the heavy and the light are not the aggregate of *rūpa*, etc. A. Hardness, etc. are sometimes conceived through the eye and sometimes through the ear, etc.; they are not, however, separate from *rūpa*, etc. Likewise are the heavy and the light. Though the organ of touch operates there, nevertheless it does not thereby become other trait. The organ of touch without touching does not produce tactile consciousness, the heavy-trait produces its consciousness even when it is not touched by the organ of the touch. *e.g.* heaviness of something is understood through some other heavy-container. Q. One does not know at that time that this is heavy. A. *e.g.* a person clad in garments can be understood even without touch that this man is strong or feeble. Similarly are the heavy and the light. For, manifold touch produces manifold tactile consciousness, several kinds of touch are illustrated here.

Q. What is heavy or light is only an aggregate of *rūpa*, etc. How do *rūpa*, etc. serve as cause of the tactile conscious-

ness? A. No aggregate of *rūpa*, etc. serves as the cause, but the touch of its part does so; just as hardness and smoothness, etc. even though existing in the aggregate of *rūpa*, etc. can be understood through the eye and again happiness of serenity, etc. are conceived through the body which consists of *rūpa*, etc. So also are these (heaviness and lightness).

Q. The heavy and the light are mere modes of touch. What harm will be there? What use is served by conceiving this aggregate of *rūpa*, etc.? A. People in the world speak of the new grain and the rotten grain. This trait of the new and the rotten will be separate from *rūpa*, etc. But the fact is not so. The first production of grain is termed new. If this trait of new is no other the aggregate of *rūpa*, etc. why are not so the traits of heavy and light?

Q. If the heavy and the light are only the aggregates of *rūpa*, etc. the trait of heaviness and lightness will be present in the air as well as the fire. Then the aggregate of *rūpa*, etc. dominated by lightness becomes the air. In that case the fire itself will become air. A. Which great element is dominated by whose traits, that great element is termed by the name of that great element. In the fire the traits of lightness and heat are predominant. Because the heat is more predominant there, it is called fire. In the air there is only lightness and not heat. Therefore, its name goes by lightness alone. For us the air is not merely by lightness; but what is light and causes movement is termed air. The Sūtra says: The air is characterized light and moving. Here lightness is its trait and movement is its function.

Q. The air throws the whole mountain topsyturvy. If it is light how can it do that? A. The air being grosser becomes stronger and capable of doing such marvels. As it shakes a small grass, it can root out even the mountain. Such is the function of the air.

Q. Is it that the great elements, earth, etc. are all the aggregates of the colour, taste, odour and touch without distinct-

aggregates of the colour, taste, odour and touch without distinction? A. There is no such fixed rule; the earth contains four: the colour, taste, odour and touch. Sometimes there are only colour and touch; *e.g.* gold and silver, etc. In the water there are four: colour, taste, odour and touch; sometimes there are only three: colour, taste and touch. In the fire there are all the four and sometimes there are three: colour, odour and touch and sometimes there are only two: colour and touch. Therefore there is no fixed rule.

The air has the following varieties of touch: cold, heat, hard, fine, etc. It is the touch of that great element in whose stream it is invariably associated. Q. The physician says the air is of black colour. What is the truth? A. It causes the black colour. A patient of *vāta* has souer taste in his tongue and on this ground that physician does not say that the air has the taste. (If he says so) then it may be that the air causes the taste. Q. Some masters say: the air is cold and not light. A. It is not the fact that what is cold is the air; *e.g.* snow is cold, but not the air. Coldness of the air is something different. For, the hot air and the air of neither heat nor cold both are termed air. Therefore the aggregate, abode of lightness becomes the air. Again the element which is causing touch, etc. and bereft of colour is the air; but what is cold is not the air.

Q. If there are colour and taste in the air, what is harm? A. They are not experienced in it. They exist but not experienced because of their subtlety. This is not proper. We do not accept the theory of *sat-kārya*. Therefore what is experienced in the effect does not necessarily exist in its cause. This is the ultimate import of the four great elements.

45. *Nominality of Sense-Organs*

Q. Are the sense-organs one with or different from the four great elements? A. The sense-organs, eye, etc. are formed on the basis of the four great elements and due to action; and

hence they are not different from the latter. The Buddha describes the eye thus : What is hardness and abode of hardness in the fleshy eye-ball is the earth-element. For, the eye, (etc.) are only some discursive thoughts and nothing else. In order to impress upon the people that the eye is void, the Buddha says so. Therefore all the sense-organs are not separate from the great elements. The *Ṣaḍdhātu-Sūtra* says : This person consists of six elements. If the sense-organs are (not) different from the great elements, it will imply that the eye etc. are not the factors of the man-formation. The great elements are formed on the basis of the visible, etc. *rūpādi*. The sound also would be regarded a man's factor. But (in the Sūtra) *puruṣa*, man is conceived only on the six elements. Therefore the sense-organs are not different from the great elements.

The Buddha explains to a monk the eye thus : The eye is obstructional, undemonstrable, material and formed on the basis of four great elements. Therefore it is understood as not separate from the great elements. The Bhikṣu (to whom the Buddha explains as above) is sharp-minded and doubted the eye. But the ordinary men think that what sees the visible is the eye, etc. and what touches is the tactile organ. The Bhikṣu doubted about the separate existence of the eye, etc. For, some masters say that five senses are of five characters. The other masters say that they are of one character. Therefore the monk asked the Buddha with a view to ascertaining the Buddha's opinion in the matter. He replied as above stated. What is substantially existing is not formed on the other's basis. A thing that is formed on the basis of nominal thing (*prajñapti*) is itself nominal; *e.g.* forest conceived on the basis of trees. (Likewise the eye that is formed on the basis of the nominal great elements is nominal by itself).

Some masters say that the eye is a perfection (*prasādhana*) of *rūpa*, matter. What is perfection is imperfection. The four great elements formed due to the action-cause are termed the

eye, etc. If it is not so, this monk would not have his doubt cleared. Since the Buddha has stated that the eye, etc. are formed on the basis of the four great elements, this monk came to understand that the eye is a non-substantial thing. So the senses are not different from the great elements. The Buddha in order to demonstrate voidness of the eye discriminates the great elements in several places. He says, *e.g.* : This body is divided into six elements, *i.e.* what is hardness and abode of hardness is the earth element. Thus one should observe. For the person who becomes detached from the five elements (*pañca-dhātu*) there remains only one consciousness. The *Hastipadopama*-Sūtra discriminates only four great elements and not the eye. If it exists separately, it would have been discriminated. The Vātsaputrīya and the Abhidharmikā also make this sort of statement and this may be trusted as it is free from error.

Q. Five senses are different from the four great elements; for, the eye, etc. are brought under the base of the eye, etc. whereas the great elements under the base of touchable. The former is internal whereas the latter extrnal. The former is the sense-organ whereas the latter is non-sense-organ. The former is derivative matter-perfection whereas the latter is not so. Therefore the former is not the latter.

A. One and the same thing is described variously due to different factors; *e.g.* faith, and other senses are detailed in the formation-aggregate. The four great elements that are formed due to the action and brought under the eye, etc. are internal bases; they are also called sense-organ and sense-factors. The wheel, etc. are the factors of the chariot. The chariot is nothing but the wheel etc. The sense-organ is also likewise.

Q. It is not so. The faith is the mind's *prasāda*, and the mind is different and its *prasāda* different. The sense-organ also likewise. A. This argument is wrong. *e.g.* the water becomes crystal-like on account of its purity. The water and its purity

are the same. Likewise the mind's stream having the faith-crystal is termed *prasāda*. This *prasāda* is the mind itself. We do not accept in this treatise the faith as separate from the mind. Therefore your example is not apt. The senses are nominal. The nominal thing and its factor which is also nominal cannot be distinguished (*e.g.* the forest and trees).

Q. They cannot be also stated as identical. A. What is formed out of the great elements is designated as sense-organ and not the great elements themselves. Therefore we understand that the sense-organs are not different from the four great elements.

46. Discrimination of Sense-Organs

Q. If the five senses are formed out of the great elements and have their properties in uniform proportion; why does one sense-organ perceive the visible and not the other organs? A. Every sense is produced from the action. But the energy of the great element pertaining to the eye that is produced through the action perceives the visible. Likewise are other senses. One does not know all the objective things through one sense-organ. For, the action is divided into five kinds, certain action causes the factor of perception; *e.g.* donation of lamp has the resultant of the eye-sense. Likewise are hearing the sound, etc. Q. Then what is the use of the five senses? The consciousness born of action would grasp all the objects. A. It is not so. We actually experience in the world the cognition does not arise for the person of no sense-organ. The blind, *e.g.* does not see and the deaf does not hear. It is the law of nature (*dharmatā*) that the sensory cognition never arises in the person bereft of the senses. For, no external great elements bereft of the senses understand things and hence it is the law of nature that sense-organs are required for the purpose. The body of living beings is adorned with the senses and hence the five senses are born of action (as the body is). The harvest of grain, *e.g.* though is due to action, requires its seed, etc. Likewise is the sensory cognition.

Q. Why is the mind also not so? The visual consciousness has the eye-organ-base and also depends on immediately past mind; the mind, on the other hand, has the immediately past-mind as its organ. It does not have any organ-base as the eye, etc. have. A. There are five kinds of consciousness definitely assigned to their respective five objects. But the mind is not so. It is the law of the mind that it has the immediately past mind as the sense-organ and requires nothing else. Just as things past and future, though not existent, become objects of the mind just so are the past mind and mental elements. This (viz. conclusion) is parallel to your conclusion (*siddhānta*), viz. consciousness with regard to the object, visible, etc. arises depending on the sense-organ and the non-sensuous consciousness arises depending upon the immediately past mind alone.

Q. If the non-sensuous consciousness has no organ-base, where does it reside? A. It depends upon the body formed of the great elements. In the formless realm consciousness has no any support (*āśraya*). It is the law of nature that it remains without support because of its characteristic distincition. That consciousness alone knows whether there is any or none. The consciousness belonging to the form realm (*rūpa*) has support. Though formless, it exists; and hence the consciousness exists without support in the formless realm. Consciousness arises due to totality of the causal factors. The *Sūtra* says: Depending upon the mind and *dharmas* non-sensuous consciousness arises. What is the support of this consciousness? It has no any support like the wall, etc. for men. Therefore, all things reside in their own natures (*prakṛti-pratiṣṭhā*).

47. *Sense-Organs with Great Elements in Equal Proportion*

The heretics say: Five senses are produced from the five great elements. It is not correct; for there is no element named ether, *ākāśa*.

The heretics again say: In the eye the fire element is predominant because of equality in their action-cause. The eye

is obtained by donation of the lamp. The eye sees in collaboration with the light. The light illuminates distant things. The eye also has contact with the distant thing because of its ray. It is said in the Veda : The eye of the dying person goes to the sun. Therefore the sun is the source of the eye. It sees only visible which is fiery and thus it sees its own body. Likewise the ether, earth, water, and air are in disproportion in the sense-organs. The ear of dying man goes to the ether. It hears invariably the sound which pertains to the ether. Therefore in the sense-organs the great elements are in unequal proportion.

The author replies : Your argument that there is similarity in their action-cause is wrong. If the fire is predominant in the eye, it would see even in the absence of the light. The eye being washed by the water sees clearly things; then it will be dominated by the water. The intensive light, *e.g.* sunlight destroys the eye. Therefore it is not dominated by the fire. The divine-eye sees the visible even in the absence of the light. In the moon-light also the eye can see. The moon is not of fiery nature. Likewise is the power of the eye; certain eye needs the light and certain not. It is the natural law of the eye that it sees distant things even in the absence of contact. Therefore no nomenclature be assumed, viz. the eye is dominated by the fire.

You have stated that it does not see in the absence of the light. If it does not see without the ether, attention and the visible, then it will be dominated by the ether, etc. Some eyes do not require the external light; *e.g.* birds like the owl, etc. the animal like the cat, the jackal, etc. can see without the light. Therefore the eye is not dominated by the fire.

You pleaded that the eye, because of its ray can contact with the distant things. We do not have any ray in the eye. The statement that it goes to the sun, implies that the eye is permanent. The sun, etc. are not the senses. Why does the eye go to the sun? The eye of the gods above the sun being dead, where does it go? If the sun dies, where does its eye go? There

is no another sun above. The ether being functionless cannot be shelter to any sense-organ. The senses being momentary, cannot travel to the sun, etc.

Some masters say that one sense-organ is of one elemental nature. The earth has only odour and hence it causes the odour-knowledge. In the water, the fire and the air there are taste, colour and touch and hence they cause colour-taste-touch-knowledges. A. It is already stated (Ch. 44) that such a fixed rule is not permissible. The earth has the odour as well as others. The great elements are formed through mutual co-ordination. No piece of earth is experienced as separated from the water, etc. If the earth causes the odour-knowledge, it causes also the knowledge of the colour, etc. because it has all the four attributes.

Q. There is only odour in the earth, and the nose is earthen and hence it intimates the odour alone. A. The attribute of the earth (odour) exists in the earth alone, then the nose will be deprived of the odour-knowledge. One would be able to experience through the tongue and the eye only the cold touch of the water and the hot touch of the fire respectively. But, in fact, this is not reasonable. It is the function of each sense-organ that it causes the knowledge (about its object) as a result of contact with its object. When that contact is broken, it ceases to function. Therefore the sense-organ is not constituted of one nature.

48. *Sense-Organ not Cognizer*

Q. Does the sense-organ cognize its object through contact or non-contact? A. No sense-organ cognizes. If it does, it would cognize all the objects at once; but it does not do so. Therefore, consciousness cognizes. Some masters say the sense in collaboration with consciousness cognizes simultaneously, but not being separated from it. It is not correct; no element is capable of effecting anything in collaboration with another element. If the sense cognizes, why does it require the other's

assistance? Then you must distinguish what is the function of the sense and what is the function of consciousness.

To say that the function of the sense to light up things and that of consciousness to make them cognized is not proper. In that case the senses, ear, etc. would not light up the objects because they are not in your system, in the nature of light. If the senses do the service of the lamp to the consciousness, then they will be illuminator like the lamp. The illuminator then, requires another illuminator; this evolves infinity. If the senses alone light up without an illuminator, the consciousness also will cognize without the sense. Therefore to light up the object is not the function of the sense. The sense does not cognize; *e.g.* the lamp, though illuminating, does not cognize. Therefore, the function of senses is necessarily to give support the consciousness. Thus the consciousness cognizes, but not the senses. The consciousness being present, knowledge arises; *e.g.* when the fire is present, heat is felt.

Q. The *Sūtra* says: Looking at visible through the eye one should not grasp its characteristic mark (*nimitta*). This makes clear that the eye grasps the visible. If the senses do not cognize; how are they senses? The *Sūtra* says: We, disciples, discern even a very minute thing as if our eyes see it. The sense grasps the object and the consciousness discriminates it: This is the difference between them.

A. The Buddha himself says: The eye is the door for perceiving the visible. So the eye does not see, but the consciousness residing there perceives through the eye serving as instrument. That is why it is said that the eye sees. The immediately past mind likewise serves as the instrument to the non-sensuous consciousness. Therefore the mind does not cognize but its consciousness does. The Buddha says: The eye desires the lovable objects. The eye is a dead matter and does not desire in fact; but its consciousness desires. However people say that the eye sees and the ear hears, etc. The Buddha also follows

their sayings. Why is *rūpa* alone perceivable? The desire, etc. are also stated as perceivable. The Buddha says: I see the vices; greed, etc. The people talk: the moon is decayed; the man is poor, or rich etc. The Buddha follows their talk. He never quarrels with them. They call Viśākhā, a daughter-in-law of Mṛgāra as *Mṛgāra-mātā*, mother of Mṛgāra. The Buddha also calls her *Mṛgāra-mātā*. It follows, therefore, that the Buddha, following the worldly talk, says that eye perceives.

The eye is stated as seer because it serves as supporting cause of the consciousness. Several examples are cited for attributing the function of the effect (*kārya*) to its supporting cause; this or that fellow sees; men perform the merit and demerit; the ether sees; the centre of the door sees, etc. etc. When something is burnt, people talk: This burns. They also talk: the fuel burns, cow-dung burns; the oil burns, etc. But the fire alone burns. Likewise the consciousness alone sees; but the eye is talked together with it. That is not an ultimate talk. It should be stated that it sees through the door *i.e.* eye. The eye is the instrument of the man's enjoyment. The men are makers of nominalism and hence they ought to have some instrument for it. When one sees through the eye, they talk that the eye sees. When the men sitting on the cot are screaming people talk that cots are screaming. The function of the result is attributed to its cause; *e.g.* certain person burns certain village; one eats the gold, etc. When the consciousness proximate to the eye sees, it is said: the eye sees, as they say: village is on the Ganges. Thus several examples for different explanations of this metaphorical expression are cited.

Q. If the eye is not seer, how is it termed sense-organ? A. Because the eye, etc. excel others, their objects, *rūpa*, etc. they are talked so. How do the senses excel their objects? Consciousness is distinguished by its sense-organs thus: eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness. The sound, *e.g.* is produced when the drum is struck with the stick. Here the drum being

more conspicuous in this act, people talk of it as the sound of the drum (*bheri-śabda*). Again, the sprout of *yava* is produced on account of the earth, water and the seed, etc. being put together, nevertheless it is spoken of *yava*sprout (*yavāṅkura*), because of the seed more important in this act. Likewise consciousness is distinguished by its support and not by its other factor. When one says: *rūpa*-consciousness, the doubt arises whether it is a visual consciousness or it is a non-sensuous consciousness. Consciousness resides in the sense-organ, not in its object. An illusion of the soul arises only on the eye, etc. The sense-organ is within our own body, and not on the object. The sense is the instrument for enjoyment; it is termed *sattva* and not the object. The sense being dull the consciousness is indistinct. When it is sharp the consciousness is distinct. These facts prove the importance of the senses. The sense is extraordinary cause whereas the object is the common cause. The sense and consciousness are resultants of the same action. The sense is the cause while the object is conditioning factor. Consciousness is distinguished on account of the distinction in the senses. The seed, *e.g.* is the cause whereas the earth, etc. are conditioning factors (*pratyaya*). On account of the seed-distinction, the sprouts are mutually distinguished. It is termed *indriya* because it excels the conditioning factor.

Your citation of the passage to the effect that the disciples discern minute things as if their eye sees them is an empirical statement. Because men in the world talk that the eye sees, the disciples also speak so. The Buddha says:

If an intelligent man serves the wise for a shortwhile

He quickly discerns the Law just as the tongue tastes the soup.

The tongue though unconscious is not similar to the spoon.

Because the consciousness residing in the tongue cognizes the taste, the Buddha says: The tongue knows the taste. Similarly the consciousness that resides in the eye being arisen they

say that the eye sees. That is why the Buddha's disciples also speak so. You pleaded that the sense grasps the object and the consciousness discriminates it. This is already replied. The sense is not the cognizer. You do not say that the sense thinks thus: I am of a distinguished trait. In your opinion knowledge does not arise on the basis of the sense; for, *Mahat*, *Ahaṅkāra* and others are produced before the senses. Your realities like *mahat*, etc. are not there because the primordial-Matter (*mūla-Prakṛti*) is not accepted. It is your system that *mahat*, etc. are the products of the primordial-Matter which does not exist.

49. Contact and Non-contact between The Sense and The Object

The visual consciousness cognizes its object without reaching its place (*prāpti*), and hence it cognizes the distant things like the moon, etc. It perceives the visible with the assistance of the light and ether in between them.

The auditory consciousness is two-fold: One hears it through contact and the other otherwise. The former hears the crying sound while the latter the thundering sound. The other three consciousnesses cognize the contacted object. The mind-organ being non-material, cognizes without contact.

Q. (The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*-masters remark): Your opinion that the eye perceives the visible without contact is improper. For, the eye has the rays which travel to the object. The rays being fiery elements, the eye comes from the fire. If the eye cognizes without contact, why does it not cognize all? It can do so even the obstructed object. It does not cognize all the objects because it is not ubiquitous. The *Sūtra* says: There is *sparśa* known as coming together among three things (the sense, the object and consciousness). If it does not contact, how is their coming together? The five senses are *sapratigha*, striking against their objects. Hence they cognize the objects after contact (*prāpti*). If they do so without contact, they may cognize the past and the future things.

The sound also is heard after reaching the ear. That is why the man in the distant place speaking in low voice is not heard. The sound is heard even in the distance. But being obstructed by the wall, etc. it is not heard. When the air is favourable, the sound is indicative of the meaning and not otherwise. The sound is heard in its entirety. If it is heard without being contacted, it will not be heard so.

You have stated that the senses, ear, etc. cognize without reaching their objects. It is not correct. The sound, odour, colour, taste and touch reach their respective senses. The plea that the sense travels to the place of its object is incorrect, because the ear, etc. have not rays. Only the fiery element has the rays. The ear hears the sound even in the darkness, It cannot do so if it has rays. The sense with rays cognizes things in one direction and not in all directions simultaneiously. The ear, etc. do not behave in this manner.

People say that the mind travels to the object. So it also cognizes making contact with its objects. The *Sūtra* says :

> The mind travels lonely to the distant place in
> all directions like the rays of the sun.
> The mind moves here and there like a fish
> on the shore and commits what it desires.

Therefore, all the six senses cognize after reaching their objects.

Now the author replies : Your theory of ray travelling to the object is not correct. A man at the sight of a pillar at the distance doubts whether it is a person or it is a pillar. If it travels, the doubt will not arise. A blade of grass being put very close to the eye is not seen. Why does the eye see the gross thing but not subtle? In perceiving the visible there is a division as it is in the East and the West, etc. also nearer and farther. Such division is not there in the case of odour, taste, and touch. There-

fore, it cognizes without travelling to the object. If it has already seen it, why does it travel? If it has not seen it, where does it travel? It sees simultaneiously the nearer object as well as the distant one. It cannot travel in that manner. In the case of travelling, it will see all the visible that are fallen in the tract of its course; it does not do that. If it goes off the body, it will be no more its organ. The finger, e.g. being cut from the body is no more felt as a part of the body. We do not witness the eye leaving its own abode. The reason is invalid in the absence of a homogeneous example. The visual ray is not acceptable when no witness to it is available.

Q. There is the visual ray, but being covered by the sun-rays, becomes invisible. The stars in the day-light, e.g. are invisible. A. Then it will be seen at night. Q. Visible elements necessarily are seen with the assistance of the external light. In the night there is no external light. So they are not seen. A. If this ray is not experienced both in day-time and at night, it is entirely non-existent. Q. The visual ray is seen in the animals like the cat, the rat, the jackal and others that are wandering at night. A. It is a visible colour that is seen in the eye of those animals. A brilliant colour, e.g. is witnessed in the body of moths; but this is not the visual ray. The animals hunting at night see at night, but the men do not see. Therefore, the animals alone will have the visual ray and not others. That will be the law of nature.

You have stated that if the eye sees without contact, it will see the whole world. My reply: The visible is that which is within the focus of knowledge. The *Sūtra* says: When the eye is unhurt, and the object falls within its range (*ābhāsagata*) and the attention is directed to the object, then it becomes visible. What is it that falls within the range? When there is contact (*sannipāta*) between the eye and the visible. Q. If the eye does not travel, how is this contact? A. This is equal to us. The eye, for you, even travelling to its object, sees it sometimes and

does not see sometimes; *e.g.* the eye reaching the sun sees its disk but does not see its action. For me, likewise the eye without travelling, sees what falls within its range, and does not see what does not fall in its range. Q. The visual ray travels far away, but does not see the sun's action because of its velocity. A. If it is so, why does it not see its gross size? When it sees the distant disk of the sun, why does it not see the nearer town like Pāṭaliputra? If you say that because the town is not within its range, the eye does not see it for me, the eye even not travelling to its object, does not see it because the latter does not fall within the former's range.

Q. What is visible and what is invisible (*dṛśya-adṛśya*)? A. There are twelve factors for rendering the visible invisible: (1) Time, *e.g.* the past and the future; (2) more powerful light, *e.g.* the sun covers the stars; (3) the meditational stage; *e.g.* the eye of the first meditation-stage does not see the object of the second meditation-stage; (4) darkness, *e.g.* a pitcher in the dark; (5) supernormal power (*ṛddhi*), *e.g.* the body of the ghost; (6) very thick coating, *e.g.* the surfacial colour of the mountain; (7) very distance; (8) very close vicinity; (9) non-contact, *e.g.* the atoms outside of the sun rays; (10) very subtlety; (11) homogeneity; *e.g.* one crow in its crowd; [(12) the eye-defect].

The eye-defects are: disease due to *vāta*, etc. The eye affected by *vāta* sees the colour blue, red, etc; affected by heat it sees the yellow, red and fire-flame; affected by cold it sees generally white the lake-water, etc.; affected by the lack of sleep it sees the trees shaky; affected by the mind's fatigue it sees but not discerns the object; the disturbed eye sees double moon; affected by ghost it sees the unusual sight; due to demerit it sees the ugly form; due to merits it sees the beautiful form; affected by *pitta* it sees the fire-flame, etc.; veiled by very thick darkness it does not see at all. These are defects of the eye. Similarly the defects of other senses, ear, etc. are to be guessed.

Q. Five objects become cognizable because they fall within the cognizer's range. What are things that do not fall so? A. The mind of the first meditation-stage does not cognize things of the second and still higher stages. The mind of the dull-sensed man does not cognize mental states of the sharp-sensed one: *e.g.* the stream-winner does not cognize the once-returner's mind. Non-cognition due to the distinguished power, *e.g.* non-sensuous consciousness of the distracted man cannot cognize that of the concentrated-minded man. The hearer (*Śrāvaka*) cannot cognize the mind of the Pratyeka-Buddha. The very subtle thing cannot be cognized. According to the *Abhidharma*, the mind that has experienced something can recollect it and no other mind. But the Aryas, on the other hand, can recollect all the experienced or non-experienced as a result of their superior knowledge-power. The cognition is due to superior objectivity *e.g.* experiencing the mind of the form-realm one can experience the mind of the desire-realm. No cognition due to the perversion, *e.g.* the mind that relies on the soul-view does not visualize non-soul-view; also it realized no impermanence and suffering. The reverse of the above stated is termed what falls within the range (*ābhāsagata*).

The following is the mind's defect (*upaghāta*) : Distraction, perversion, occupation by the ghost, pride, intoxicant, foregetfulness, and drug, disease and swoon, mind's bewilderment, excessive love, anger, perfection of defilement, and others. Therefore your objection that in the case of non-contact the eye will see the whole universe is not reasonable.

You stated there is the contact known as coming together of three elements. The contact is the moment of the sense, the object and consciousness appearing together and it is not necessarily meeting together. For, the coming together is said even in regard to the mind and the sense. There is no meeting together. Your argument that the senses are *sapratigha*, etc. is also incorrect. There is no such thing as one striking against the other. The plea that knowledge arises on the present thing alone will imply

that the sixth consciousness also will cognize only the present thing, like the discerning of the other's thought. The argument that the knowledge arises due to several causal factors including the eye's contact with its object has been replied by the sixth consciousness and by declaring that the moment of the sense, the object and consciousness appearing together is *sannipāta*. Then the statement that non-sensuous consciousness arises on the basis of the mind and *dharmas* would be meaningless; for, the mind cannot contact with its objects. *Sannipāta* is fixed to certain definite things. The visual consciousness occurs as related to the eye alone and not to the other and nor unrelated. Likewise it occurs on the basis of visible alone and not on the other nor unbased. Similar rule is to be stated appropriately to other sense-organs upto the mind.

50. *Audition of the Sound*

(The opponent's theory of contact in respect of the ear is criticized in this chapter). You have stated : A man in the distant place speaking in low voice, is not heard and hence the sound reaches the ear. This is not correct. You plead that the low voice of the distant speech produces another sound in succession and is not able to produce it to the distant end. Likewise I say that the sound even (accepting the theory of) not reaching is not heard because it is very thin in its volume. As you say that the visual ray even reaching the sun sees only its disk and not its action. Likewise, for me, the sound being gross is heard and being subtle not heard.

You pleaded that the air being favourable, the sound is the meaning-indicator. It is not valid. Then it would result that none hears it in the unfavourable air. Just as the odour is not smelt in the unfavourable air just so will the sound also not be heard. It is heard in fact. Therefore, the sound being not reached, is heard. The fact that it is very vaguely heard is due to the air-obstruction. Moreover, the sound is to be carried (by some

other medium) and what is the use of talking t he favourable and unfavourable air?

Your argument of the sound being heard in its entirety is not proper. It is the nature of the sound differing from *rūpa*. Things are of varied nature though they are similar in their cognizability. The bell-sound is heard in the bell. That is why anyone desirous of hearing it turns his ear to the bell. The sound being an attribute cannot travel.

Q. The sound being produced in succession is said to be travelling, like the wave-succession. A. What is the example for the sound-wave? The wave is produced when the water of the drum-leather is present. What is that sound which produces another sound? If you think that one sound produces another one, why does it produce in the original place and not elsewhere? If one says that the person creates the sound the ear will be speaker for him. Therefore the sound being uttered does not travel. If the sound-stream arises from the bell, then the latter will never be bereft of the former. If the sound arises by way of the wave-succession, then the water will be without the wave. If, likewise, the sound goes away from the bell, the latter will be without the former. It is evident therefore that the sound remains with the bell. When the bell is caught the sound ceases. Therefore it resides in the bell. If it resides in the bell and also becomes separated from the bell, the bell being caught the sound that resides in it will not be extinct. And it will continue to exist after being separated from the bell. In our daily affairs there is no such thing as the bell-stream that we experience. There is a spatial distinction in the sound, viz. eastern sound, western sound, nearer and farther sound. If the sound travels to the place of ear, this distinction will not be possible. The divine ear also will be useless, etc. etc.

The sound being momentary cannot produce another sound. We do not experience any momentary thing producing another thing. The momentary action does not produce another

action; likewise the sound being momentary produces no another sound. In your system one sound is contradictory to another sound and they cannot be in the same place. If they are in one and the same place, they cannot be contradictory mutually. The previous sound being ceased another sound arises by itself. Therefore one sound does not produce another. Being single how can it produce another. We do not see any single thing producing another thing. Q. The conjunction being single is producer of things; likewise does the sound also. A. The single conjunction produces what sound that also will be single. *Rūpa* also being single produces another *rūpa*; so will be the odour, taste and touch. Thus the substance will not be constituted of five, three or two characteristics.

The sound is parallel to action. It is said the sound though an attribute ceases like the action. The finger and the sword, etc. are combined with the action of sounding and brandishing, etc. but the brandishing cannot be separated from the sword. Likewise the sound ceases when the sword is caught by the hand. So no sound produces another sound. You assume that a potency (*saṃskāra*) from the first action produces the subsequent actions. Likewise the potency produced from the first sound produces the subsequent sounds. No potency produces another potency. The cause-action produces potency, not the sound. The action being ceased, there is no cause-substance. For, the action first ceased, then the substance is produced. So also the sound first ceased, then the sound arises by itself. Thus the next sound will be without the cause. Even then, if you say that the first sound produces another sound, it will not be momentary; for, the sound-arising is the first moment, the production of the second sound is the second moment, the time of the produced sound is the third moment and the cessation of the first sound is the fourth moment; thus it becomes something other than momentary.

How is the sound contradictory to another sound? Is it like the poison contradictory to its remedy drug or the medicine

to disease? If it is not so (*i.e.* non-contradictory), the bell will be of two sounds. If the bell is of two sounds in one moment, it can be so in thousand moments also. For example, the attribute being absent arises in the substance because of its fire-contact. When the first black colour ceases, the red colour arises. Likewise, the sound also. When the previous one ceases, the second one arises. If it is not so, the bell will be of the two sounds at the same moment. But it is not so in fact. If one sound arises from another sound, it will not then accompany its cause (*i.e.* bell). It is produced, in fact, from the bell and thus accompanies its cause. The another sound will be numberless, *i.e.* it will never cease, because the cause is not ceased.

Q. A subtle sound is formed from the first sound, hence it ceases. A. Why is the subtle sound? Potency gets manifest in accordance with the intensity of striking, and the first sound is in accordance with its manifestation. The second sound and its parts, etc. are also in accordance with its peculier manifestation. The manifestation of potency is discontinued because of the lack of the striking-cause. Because of the lack of potency the sound becomes dim. The person who says that one sound produces another sound may say that the colour is produced in the water or in the mirror on the basis of (other substance-) colour. Thus only the moon in the water and reflection (image) in the mirror will become *rūpa*. In this manner the whole Vaiśeṣika system (*Sūtra*) will be vitiated.

You have accepted that the sound is produced from disjunction. This is also not good. It is not produced from the hand-disjunction. It is however, produced from the conjunction. When the bamboo and the sword and their parts are mutually joined and disjoined there arises a mutual friction (*nodana*) which produces the sound. We do not say that the sound is produced from the conjunction; for no conjunction of the hand and the ether produces the sound. The four great elements alone being forcibly joined or disjoined, the sound is

produced. The great elements' action is not separated from them. (Likewise is the sound)

51. *Smelling of the Odour*

You have stated that odour reaching the nose is smelt. It is not correct. Just as the sound is heard from the distance just so can the odour of the distant place be smelt. If you think that from the odour through succession is produced the cause of the odour, it will evolve the same defect that is stated in connection with the sound-stream. How is it smelt? The subtle particles are travelling; the odour also accompanies them. This is not correct. If the flower-particles travel, their colour also will be visible. So they do not travel.

If you say the colour is very subtle, hence it is not visible, the subtle odour also will not be smelt. Q. It is smelt because of its excessive smelling; *e.g.* in a dish the *hingu* (asafoetida) though invisible, is smelt. A. Wherever there is a subtle particle of the flower, the odour is also smelt there—this is our daily experience. Why is the colour of the subtle flower particle not visible? If the flower is burnt, its fragrance increases. The colour, however, is extinct. Therefore the fragrance is not the flower's part. If it is so, it could be little smelt. The fact is not so. If the flower's parts travel far away, the flowers will be diminished. For, the saffron of one *pala* weight, is always fragrant and weighs the same weight. Q. It is diminishing, but it is not seen because of its subtlety. A. The flower diminishing for ever will become non-existent. How is it that it is diminishing, and it is not realized? If the flower is diminishing for ever, then the nose will not experience it. Because it is diminishing for ever, it will be appearing and disappearing and for this reason, it will be another substance. Why is it that another attribute has not arisen? In fact the flower's fragrance is experienced. Therefore the flower particles do not travel.

Q. If the odour alone travels it will also diminish. Since it has no particles, it will entirely extinguish. A. We do not

accept that the flower-particles accompany the air, nor that the air travels carrying the fragrance. But on the basis of the flower's odour alone another odour arises. On the basis of that the fragrant air arises and on the basis of this air another fragrant air arises : in this manner the last fragrant air reaching the nose is smelt. For, we smell the fragrance in the sesame seed and not the fragrance of the flower-particles. The seed is perfumed by the flower. The seed's fragrance is not the part of the flower. When the flower is crushed or pasted, its fragrance disappears. The fragrance that is in the seed does not disappear. So it is not the part of the flower. The fragrance resides for long time in the seed but not in the flower and thus it is not the part of the flower. Q. Whose fragrance is this? A. It is of the seed. The fragrance of the seed that is produced from the flower is not separated from the seed. Likewise the air on the support of the flower-fragrance produces another fragrance.

We experience sometimes hot air and sometimes cold air, but we do not witness there the colour of the water or of the fire. Therefore, we understand that there arises another touch in the air, but no parts of the water or the fire that is carried travel along with the air. If the hot touch of the air pertains to the fire or the cold touch of the air to the water, then the touch of the air which is neither hot nor cold ought to be earthen. The watery and the fiery colour is not experienced in the air and the earth's colour too is not experienced because of its subtlety; if it is so, the air will be touchless. This is at fault.

There is someone's saying: Just as the air has the hot and cold touch on account of its conjunction with the fire and the water, just so it has the touch neither hot nor cold on account of its conjunction with the earth. But there is not a definite evidence to say that the particles of the water and of the fire alone accompany the air and not the earth-particles. For example, your *Sūtra* says : Three sorts of touch, are not parts of the earth, the water and the fire, thus they are indicators of something unseen, *i.e.* the air. From this statement the three sorts

of touch in the air will be sometimes intruders or sometimes non-intruders. For, if they are indicators of the unseen thing, then they pertain to the air. It is your opinion that in the seen water and the fire are the cold and hot touches; hence they do not pertain to the air. Thus the touch neither hot nor cold exists in the seen earth; and hence it also will not pertain to the air. If that touch already exists in the air and not due to the conjunction with the earth, then you may say that this touch pertains to the air. But it is not experienced at the outset. How is it to be understood that the touch of the air alone is neither hot nor cold, and it is not the part of the earth? We can also declare that the colour, taste, odour and touch exist in the earth alone and not in the water, etc.

It is your opinion that the (black) colour, etc. that exist in the seen water and others are due to the conjunction with the earth but they do not exist there like the heat in the water. There is not any definite evidence to prove that heat in the water is only due to the fire-conjunction and not the (white) colour due to the earth-conjunction. What is not seen in the water, etc. as existing separately cannot come into existence due to the earth-conjunction. If it is seen at the outset, then it is possible to say that this colour pertains to the water and this pertains to the earth.

Q. You said that a different odour arises in the air; it is not good. In the air-tight room the fragrance is smelt from the distance. So no different odour arises in the air, but it arises on the basis of other odour. A. Two-fold factor for the odour. Where there is the air, there the fragrant air arises, where there is no air, there fragrance arises on the basis of fragrance.

You have stated that the odour is smelt from distance and hence it would be smelt without contact. This is improper. It does not stand on a par with the colour. The odour of the smoke that is seen from the distance is not smelt. Coming into contact

it is smelt. Because of the absence of the divine nose, it is smelt on contact.

52. Sense (*Buddhi*) of Touch

Q. Touch is also felt without contact, as the *Sun*'s touch exists far off. A. How does the *Sun*'s touch becomes known? Q. The fiery particle coming from the sun to this body becomes known. A. If it comes from the sun, it will remain even after the sun-set. Q. Though the sun is set in, nevertheless its fire remains and that is inferred from the touch. A. Then, the fire will be without colour. Your Sūtra says: "There is no fire without the colour" and this is the defect (in your system). Q. There is a subtle colour. A. The fire is more with the colour and less with the touch. The colour of the lamp-light, *e.g.* is seen even without knowing its touch.

Q. Is the touch felt invariably through contact? A. Yes, it is so. On the basis of the odour arises a different odour in the air. Likewise, on the basis of the sun arises the heat. Q. At the sun-set why is its colour not seen? A. Certain heat has only touch and not the colour, *e.g.* heat after sun-set. In the hot room (*gharmagṛha*) though the fire is extinct, its heat continuous. So is the heat in the just cooked gruel. All this heat is without colour. Therefore certain fire has colour and certain not.

53. Mind

You have stated: The mind travels to its objects. This is incorrect. It is appearing and disappearing every moment like the air or the action. Such thing can have no movement. If it travels after knowing its object, it is useless. If it does not know it, it cannot travel. If it exists in the eye, how does it travel to the ear? When the mind think: I shall travel to the ear, it is the recollection of the ear. What is the desire to hear the sound that is the sound-recollection. If the mind is existing in the eye, it cannot recollect the ear. Therefore the mind does not travel. If it travels, it will do so first to the nearer and then

to the farther. But it recollects all at once. So it does not travel. It knows what is non-existent, viz. past, future, horn on the hare-head and many non-existent things which cannot be reached.

If the mind travels to its objects, then non-knowing, doubt, false knowledge will not be possible. If it travels to its object, then *Nirvāṇa*, the un-manifest element is reached by the manifest (mind); that is inappropriate. It is further incorrect that the un-manifest element characterized as the removal of the round of rebirth enters into the manifest element. When the mind recollects that there is another world, then his mind goes to another world. Thus its body will be dead. So it does not travel. Moreover there arises a different colour in the face of the greedy-minded; so also in the face of angry-minded. If the mind travels to another place, the difference in facial colours will not be there. So it does not travel.

The mind residing in an object is termed feeling which is divided into three, sad, etc. These feelings will be impossible if the mind goes to somewhere else. The mind is situated in the body. The Sūtra says: Consciousness is situated in the name and form (*nāma-rūpa*). Therefore, it goes nowhere leaving its body behind. The body being associated with consciousness is termed *kāya*. If the mind goes elsewhere, the body will be with no consciousness.

Q. The mind in dream travels to all quarters. A. Not so. All the acts like the semen-discharge, etc. pertain to the body, but people on account of mental perversion say that mind goes to the other place. It does not go in fact. All the acts in dream are false. A man, *e.g.* dreams that he drinks water and this drink does not quench his thirst. He dreams that he commits the sin but this sin does not render him polluted. So the mind also does not travel in dream. The mind resides only in what is seen, heard, thought and known and does not move to other thing. Q. The mind that is supported by the supernormal potency

(*ṛddhi*) moves and travels to other quarters. A. This point will be detailed in the chapter on criticise of that potency (*cp.* ch. 72).

54. *Sense-Organs not Localized* (*amūrta*?)

Q. Are the senses localized or not? A. What is this localization, etc. Q. The knowable and the causes of the senses, eye, etc. are localized. A. Then the sense is not localized; for, no senses are knowable and causes of the eye, etc. Q. The black star of the eye, the tongue and the body are all visible. The ear and the nose are invisible because they are inside. A. Even the dead man has them and not the senses. Q. The black star is two-fold : with the sense-organ and without it. The former is absent in the dead man but the latter is present. A. The sense-star is not perceiver. Therefore it is not experienced by the eye, etc. The Sūtra says : Five senses are material, undemonstrable and obstructional. If it is demonstrable, then it could be divided : this is the sense-star and this is the senseless star.

Q. The *Sūtra* says : Five senses are translucent matters and formed of four great elements. Why is it said again : The five senses are undemonstrable etc. A. That is why they are suspected as the forces of the unthinkable action. The four great elements are transformed into senses, as a result of the action-force. The Buddha says to his inquisitive disciples : The five senses are born of the action. Therefore they are material. Some heretics (= Sāṅkhya) say that they are born of *ahaṅkāra* which is invisible (*arūpin*). They again say that the five senses cognize both the big and the small and hence they are unfixed (to any size of the object). Therefore the Buddha says that the senses are material and formed from the great elements, *rūpa*, etc. Things which are formed from *rūpa*, etc. are sometimes demonstrable. Therefore he says : Senses are undemonstrable. One may think that they are non-obstructional. So it is said : They are obstructional. What strikes against the object is *sapratigha*. The form (*rūpa*) which is image-endowed

and obstructing is gross and it becomes visible by the eye. (So it is said that they are undemonstrable).

The heretics (= Vaiśeṣika) say : Colour, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, superiority, inferiority, action, generality and particular are visible though they are invisible by themselves because of their association with the visible things. Therefore the Buddha says : Of the above, rūpa alone is demonstrable and not other things.

The obstructional is that which strike against the hand, etc. Q. Then, its touch will be experienced. A. Though all strikes against the other, nevertheless, its touch is not experienced everywhere. Experience of touch is felt after tactile consciousness and hence the senses are classified (as obstructional).

The senses are truly unfixed (to anywhere). If a thing is so fixed, it will grasp only one thing just as a hand takes only one thing at a time. The eye on the other hand, perceives many things *i.e.* the big as well as the small at one time. A thing which has a definite touch has its own function, *e.g.* at the touch of the fire there is a burning and at the touch of the sword-edge, there is a cutting. The eye sees even the distant thing and hence it is unfixed. A thing which is fixed, strikes a fixed thing, *e.g.* one hand strikes the other hand. The eye, however, is not struck by the water, mica, a piece of cloud and others. If the sense is fixed (to anywhere) it will be within the body, and then, though it is associated with the mind it will not see the external things. If the (sense–) element is fixed, the senses may (not) be counted as five; but they will be eight : the eye, etc. two each (= six) and the body and the tongue. Their base *adhiṣṭhāna* is fixed but not the senses. The right eye sees and the left eye discerns it. It is not possible that one sees and the other discerns. The senses are not characterized as right and left and hence unfixed to a place.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika masters say : The visual ray sees all things big, small, near and remote like the sun-rays. The ray

existing in both the eyes is one. The eye, the ear and the nose residing inside the body cannot be divided. Therefore your argument that one eye sees and the other discerns is thus not valid. The knowledge pertains to the soul and not to the sense which is to be employed. Your statement that things conjunction with the ray is not visible is replied by stating that it is overcome by the Sun. The conjunction of the senses, ear, etc. being hidden inside is not visible, as for example, the underground conjunction of the tree's exterme point with the earth is not visible. Sensibility (*caitanya*) is on the support of the soul and not of the sense-organs. They are derived from the great elements and hence senseless (*acetana*). The pot is caused by the atoms. The atoms are senseless and hence the pot also is senseless.

The author replies : For you the ray is the sense-organ. Since the ray is not a settled thing the organ also will be an unsettled thing. The theory of the visual ray is already set aside (ch. 49). Your plea that the organ is one is improper; because one eye sees something; the second eye see some other thing. If one eye is perished, then there is no ray. The point of the right organ and the left organ is already replied. Q. If one eye produces consciousness, what does the second eye do? A. Nostrils are two and hence the organ is not one. Even if it is evert, it remains distinct, like the finger. Your plea that the organ is employed by the soul is also set aside, as the soul does not employ it. The argument that the organ's conjunction being hidden is invisible is not good. If the organ is settled in a place, its conjunction with the object will be impossible, because of its peculiar self-characteristic. The tree's conjunction even though it is hidden, is perceivable in its end when it is dug out. The organ's conjunction is not so. Your contention that sensibility (*caitanya*) is due to the soul is replied by not accepting the soul. The statement that the senses are derived from the great elements is no more good. The great elements are transformed into senses due to the action-force.

Q. (The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas say:) The senses are fixed (to some place). They are derived from the great elements which are fixed. Because the senses are fixed the great elements serve them. The sense ought to be wih its object and the latter again ought to be with the former. If the organ is unfixed, there will be no mutual possession. Men in the world speak of the eye-star, etc. as the organ. The senses cognize five fixed objects unlike the mind grasping everything. They cognize things that lie in their front, and other things by inference. It is the organ which cognises the existent object. The mind on the other hand relies on the non-existent object like the past, etc. The sensuous knowledge is produced as a result of joining of the senses with their objects, because the fixed thing is struck by the fixed organ. Therefore the sense-organ is understood to be fixed.

The author replies: Although everything is derived from the great elements, certain becomes the sense-organ and certain not. Likewise certain is fixed and certain unfixed. You said that the great elements do good to the senses. They do good to the knowledge but not to the senses. It is said that the sense is modified (*vikṛta*) of the great elements. This modification is for the sake of knowledge and not for the senses. Since the organ is the translucence (*prasāda*) of the great elements, it is unfixed (= vibhu? = amūrto). You spoke about the mutual possession between the sense and its object. This rule is applicable to the mind alone, because the sense-organ is unconscious. All other senses are the particulars of the mind's force. Statement about the six types of consciousness is made by taking into account the non-sensuous consciousness. *e.g.* the statement under intuition (*abhisamaya*) of the four truths that one visualizing things meditates on their law of nature is all by virtue of non-sensuous consciousness alone. Just as it sees the fire-brand, magic, mirage, castle in the air and all which are false and unreal, just so does it see forms (*rūpa*) also. Therefore all the senses, eye, etc. are relied on the false objects. You have also stated that the knowledge is produced as a result of joining of the

senses with their objects. This is replied by querying whether it is by contact or no contact.

55. *Colour-Base-Trait*

The colours : blue, yellow, etc. are termed ***Rūpāyatana***. The Sūtra says : The eye-base, disassociated from the past colour : This is understood as the base (*āyatana*). Some masters say : The action and dimension also are the ***Rūpāyatana***. For, the Sūtra says : The black, white, short, long, gross, and fine are *rūpa*s, forms. The author replies : Shape (*samsthāna*), etc. are varieties of colours. How is this understood? The notion of dimension is not experienced apart from the colours. If the shape, etc. are different from the colours, the notion of the shape may arise apart from the colours. It does not arise in fact. Therefore the shape is not separate from the colours. Q. The idea of colour arises first and then arises the idea of the shape. For, the ideas of the black, white, round, square and circular cannot arise simultaneously. A. The idea of the short and long, etc. arises in the non-sensuous consciousness on the support of the colours; *e.g.* non-sensuous consciousness arises only after the seeing the colours. Because the manifest things are momentary, there exists no concept-forming act (*nimitta-karman*) like " man and woman " (in the sensory consciousness). The consciousness-nature (*dharma*) is not the movement. What is past is termed action.

Q. The past is the corporeal action. If the past is non-existent, there will be no corporeal action. A. It exists in the empirical notion, but not in the absolute sense. Q. If it does not exist in the absolute sense, there will be no merit and demerit in the absolute sense. Because of no merit and demerit there will be no resultant. A. When certain thing springs up in some other place then it does good or harm to others. Then are achieved the merit and the demerit.

56. *Sound-Trait*

Q. Why do you not say that the great elements are formed on the support of the sound? A. The sound is separated from the colour, etc. and the latter again is separated from the former. The sound is not continuing for ever in succession like the colour, etc. Nor is it produced together with them. It is produced in a different manner. The colour, etc. (*rūpa*) are together produced, and gradually increase by way of the root, sprout, and others, but the sound is not so. It is named after (a producing) thing like the pot-sound, etc. None says that the sound on the pot. People sometimes say: I see the pot's colour; none says: I hear the pot; but they say: I hear its sound.

Q. Things become with the sound; for, the sound is produced when they mutually clash. Because they always clash, they will be with the sound for all time. A. All the clash does not produce the sound. We actually witness that the clash of the two fingers is not maker of the sound. Q. There is the sound, but it is not heard because of its subtlety. A. It is not at all produced there. Even the subtle sound is not heard. The person who says that there is the sound will have no faith in perception. The opponent also may say that there is odour in the water, the taste in the fire and the colour in the air, but they are not experienced because of their subtlety. Therefore all the clash produces no sound.

Q. People say empirically that the sound is the attribute of the ether. How is it known that it is produced from the great elements? A. We witness it so in our daily life. This observation is based on perception. People also say: " the bell-sound ", and " the drum-sound ". It is therefore understood that it is the sound of the bell and the drum. Because it is different from the great elements, it is so qualified. When a copper-vessel is struck its shaky sound is at once produced. As soon as it is caught the sound also stops. A man making the sound needs an image made of the great elements. Therefore it is produced from the great elements.

The sound is distinguished due to the action-cause. The voice of some sentient being is harsh and that of some others sweet. It is not produced as the attribute of the ether through the action-cause. There is also cause-trait, viz. what element arises from what source that source is the cause of that element. When the cause, great elements is present the sound is produced. When the cause is absent the sound is not produced. When, *e.g.* the fire is present there is heat, and when there is no fire there is no heat. Thus the fire is cause of the heat. Likewise is the sound born of the great elements. When there is ether the sound sometimes exists and sometimes does not. Therefore it is not the cause of the sound. The opinion that the sound is the attribute of ether is not to be trusted. We do not witness the sound taking the ether as its cause. Nor is there inference. How can there be inference? There are several contradictions in the (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) Sūtras. There is not a single trustworthy statement.

57. *Odour-Trait*

Q. The odour that is produced from the combination of various fragrant ingredients, *Tamālapatra*, etc. is different from the original one. Does the same odour of those ingredients produce another odour? A. A different odour is produced as caused by the mixture of odours. The green colour, *e.g.* is produced from the mixture of the blue and the yellow colours. Various odours are produced from the various actions also.

The Vaiśeṣika says : The odour is the attribute of the earth only. The author replies : It has already been stated that there is no such substance and hence improper. The Vaiśeṣika again says : bronze, lac, zinc, iron, gold, silver and copper all pertain to the fire. Those elements have also the odour and hence the odour is not the attribute of the earth alone. Q. Their odour is due to the mixture of the earth. A. Their odour is not an intruder. It has not been experienced in another substance. What odour has already been experienced that odour

cannot be stated as intruder. The person, *e.g.* having smelt fragrance of a flower smells the same fragrance in garments, then that fragrance is to be stated intruder. The odour of the bronze is not of this nature. Therefore your reasoning is unreasoning. I also may say that there is no colour in the water, but it is due to the mixture of the earth. If you say that the water has its own colour, we also say that the bronze, etc. have their own odour. What element exists inseparably in certain thing that element is the property of that certain thing. The odour exists in the bronze, etc. There is the odour in the water, etc. and it is not experienced as it is in a very subtle degree. What harm will be there? They say, *e.g.* that there is the heat in the moon along with its brightness, and that the heat in the warm house has a very subtle colour. Likewise the water has the odour. There is no any definite reason for saying that the water has not the odour.

Your substances are of indefinite trait. You promised : The odour is settled in the earth. The diamond and crystal, etc. though they are earthen have no odour. You say that the water has coldness. The milk, etc. are definitely cold, they are nevertheless earthen because *ghee*. etc. are fragrant. You say : The fire has heat. The bronze, etc. are not hot, yet they are fiery. The moon, etc. though cold, are fiery, you say. Thus your substances are of indefinite traits. Therefore, the theory that the odour exists in the earth alone is improper. Your theory that the bronze, etc. are fiery is also improper as they are not invariably hot. The Vaiśeṣika says : Heat is settled in the fire. The bronze, etc. are not hot. Q. They have the heat in their effect (*kārya*) but not by touch. A. The *ghee* is cold in its effect and hence it will be watery. You say, on the other hand, it is earthen as it is fragrant. Your plea " in effect " is not reasoning. The fruit *Harītaki* will be fiery substance as it is definitely hot. But it is not so because it has five sorts of taste and fragrance, and because the statement " in effect " is unproof.

The bronze, etc. are not fiery. The fire's trait is lightness; but the bronze, etc. are heavy. The fire is bright; but the bronze,

etc. are not bright. They are contradictory to the fire; because they being melted in the fire become diminished. If they are fiery, they would increase. Therefore they are not fiery-substance. Because of wrong thinking you say that the odour exists in the earth alone. But that odour exists in all the four elemental aggregates.

58. *Taste-Trait*

The taste consists : sweet, sour, salt, pungent, bitter and *kaṣāya*, etc. These six tastes become distinguished on account of varied nature of things. They do not exist disproportionately in the four great elements. The Vaiśeṣika, *e.g.* says that the sweet taste is in the earth and the water in the main. That is wrong. There are innumerable varieties of the sweet. Therefore we understand that the taste is produced from things peculiar to each one of them.

The physician says : There are only six kinds of taste. Such limitation is not possible. There is a mixture sometimes of two tastes, sometimes of three and sometimes even of the four and so on. There is no such rule that the sweet and sour being mixed up become sweet and sour, but they on the other hand produce some other peculiar taste. Thus the tastes are innumerable. They are divided empirically, men *e.g.* think that the sweet becomes sweet.

The variety of tastes is caused by *pāka*, maturing process. The sweet taste becomes nectar through *pāka*, or it is turned into some other one. Likewise are other tastes also. Therefore things have such capacity. The tastes are not six alone.

59. *Touchable-Trait*

The touch consists of several kinds, viz. hardness, softness, heaviness, lightness, strength, feebleness, coldness, heat, roughness, smoothness, thinness, grossness, severity, fatigue, disease, health, bodily alertness, inertia, idleness, bodily heaviness, swoon,

confusion, stillness, pain, paralysis, yawning, hunger, thirst, satisfaction, pleasure, displeasure, and idiocy (*maurkhya*) and so on.

Some masters say : There are three kinds of touch : cold, hot and neither cold nor hot. A. In regard to hardness, etc. knowledge arises and there is no knowledge of cold and hot apart from the hardness, etc.

The Vaiśeṣika says : The earth has a touch neither cold nor hot and so also the air. The water has a cold touch and the fire has a hot one. A. There is no such rule and this has previously been stated, viz. ghee, etc. have coldness and the bronze, etc. have heat. If the touch of the air (i.e. cold or hot) is intruder (i.e. not of its own), the air will be of indefinite trait as it has no other touch. Since in the gruel coldness is not found, the trait of the water, viz. coldness will be indefinite.

Q. There is a subtle coldness in the gruel, but not experienced because it is overcome by the heat and because coldness reappears at the disappearance of the heat. A. The bronze, etc. and the ghee, etc. are hard substances and become fluid by virtue of the fire. If there is fluidity when hardness does not disappear, then fluidity will be the same as hardness. If there is fluidity when hardness disappears, then the previous cold touch being ceased, another will again arise. The touch of the earth, *e.g.* is neither cold nor hot. If that touch does not cease at the conjunction with the fire, then there will be no *pāka*. If the touch ceases, then the same touch will produce another similar touch. Thus the cold touch being ceased will appear again. If so, the attributes of the water will also be matured (*pacyeran*). But you say the reverse of it. Q. All things perish in the presence of their destructive elements. Grass, etc. *e.g.* perish on coming into contact with the fire. If you plead that hot touch turns into cold touch, then the opponent may say that the milk without ceasing its self trait turns into curds. But it is not so experienced. If you say that we do not witness the milk in the form of milk again, then it will not be affected by *pāka*. For, in the beginningless

world which thing is not burnt by the fire? We, indeed, witness on the earth some soil blackened by the smoke. It is to be understood that it has been affected by *pāka*, fire-contact. Therefore we understand that *pāka* is not permanent and un-returnable. Thus the cold touch being ceased it arises again in the water. The black colour which sometimes disappeared because of the fire-contact, again arises. The red colour, if it desappears, reappears. Likewise the cold touch being disappeared reappears in the water, when the fire is removed. What harm will be there?

The Vaiśeṣika says: *Pāka* is possible in the earth alone, but not in the water. The physician says that the person who drinks the hot gruel gains a distinguished effect. If there is no *pāka* in the gruel, the gain of the distinguished effect becomes lost. Therefore the water, etc. also have *pāka*. Because the substance matured by the fire has another character after destruction of its previous character we understand that the substance has a peculiar character from *pāka*. Likewise, the water also (becomes of peculiar character after *pāka*). Because of their mutually opposing potencies things become destructive of one another. The water, *e.g.* quenches the fire and the fire matures the water. The power of the fire does not mature non-substance. Moreover the cold touch goes away on the fire-contact. Therefore the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra to the effect that the water has only cold touch is faulty.

CONSCIOUSNESS

60. *Proving Of No Mental Elements*

The mind is severally designated as *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna*, etc. What relies on dharmas is called *citta*. The feeling, idea and formation (*saṃskāra*) etc. are all some modes of the mind (and not separate elements). *e.g.* one and the same memory has been spoken of in different terms: *Smṛtyupasthāna*, *Smṛti-indriya*, *Smṛti-bala*, *Smṛti-Sambodhyaṅga*, and *Samyak-Smṛti*. Similarly, *vīrya*, energy, etc. have different names. The same pure wisdom again has different names: *Duhkha-bhāvanā* and

Sambodhi and others. One and the same concentration (*samādhi*) is termed *dhyāna*, *vimukti*, *nissrti* and *samāpatti* and so on. Likewise one and the same mind is given different designations as it may suit different occasions. The *Sūtra* confirms this : His mind gets released from the desire-intoxicant, the becoming-intoxicant and the ignorance-intoxicant. If there is a separate mental element, it would have been stated that the mind gets released from the mental element. The Sūtra says : When the Buddha knows the living beings' opportune mind, soft mind and disciplined mind, then he preaches the four noble truths. There is no mention of the mental element separately. It is again stated that the sentient beings get defiled through their mind's defilement and get purified through their mind's purification. In twelve causal links consciousness is stated as conditioned by the formation. *Puruṣa*, person is constituted of six elements (inclusive of consciousness alone). It is said : Unsteadiness is not different from the mind. The Buddha addresses Rāṣṭrapāla : What is, O King, running to and fro, I call it mind. It is said : Internal is the consciousness-body and external is nāma-rūpa. Here consciousness-body alone is stated but not the mental element. The contact is the meeting together of three elements. If there is a separate mental element, it would not say of " three elements ". Therefore we understood that there is mind alone and not separate mental elements.

61. *Proving Of The Mental Elements*
(*Caitasika-sthāpana*)

Q. (The Sarvāstivādi-Vaibhāṣikas say) : The mind and the mental elements are different; for, there is association, *samprayoga* between them. In the absence of the separate mind and mental elements the association that is accepted by all will have to be denied. Your argument that one mind is associated with another mind is improper. The *Sūtra* says : The mind fares singly (*ekacara*), and bodyless, etc. Here the company of homogenious mind alone is negated and not of the mental ele-

ments. The mind can be stated as faring singly even in the company of the mental elements. *e.g.* the monk is lonely; this implies that he lacks the company of other monks and not that of some insects, mosquito, etc. Therefore it is evident that one mind is not associated with another mind. The mind is again counted under seven *dhātus*, one *āyatana* and one *skandha*, whereas the mental element is brought under one *dhātu*, one *āyatana* and three *skandhas*. The mind is the supporter (*āśraya*) while the mental elements are supported (*āśrita*). The *Sūtra* says : "The mental elements operate on the support of the mind ". There will be no five aggregates if there are no mental elements. These two differ in their genesis. The mind arises through two factors and the mental elements through the three. The visual consciousness arises depending on the eye and the visible (*rūpa*); "the meeting together of three elements is the contact and the contact-conditioned is the feeling ". It is again stated : "consciousness operates due to nāma-rūpa, name and form whereas the feeling due to the contact ". The mental elements are associated with the supporter, rely on the same object and existing at the same moment. The mind does not behave like this. In the four *pratiśaraṇas*, *jñānapratiśaraṇa* is stated as superior, but not *vijñāpratiśaraṇa* so stated. If the knowledge, *jñāna* and consciousness, *vijñāna* are the same, the said distinction will be improper.

The Buddha himself says : What are born of, and supported by the mind are the mental elements. He does not say that there is the mind alone. The opponent also may say that there are mental elements but not the mind. If you criticize the mental elements as mere idea, then I may criticize the mind as mere idea. Trait of things is distinguished on account of their functional differences. *e.g.* the water causes moisture and the fire maturation. Likewise the feeling, etc. are distinguished due to their functional differences. The *Sūtra* says : "A searching mind (*vitarka*) arose in the mind. " The mind does not arise in its own mind. (You) cited : The sentient beings get defiled

through their mind's defilement and they get purified through their mind's purification. If there is the mind alone, then the defilements and purification will be fortuitous. Nor do we have the idea that the defilement through ignorance and purification through wisdom. It will evolve on the other hand that the mind itself is the defilement and the mind itself is the purification; and this is not possible. Therefore there are separate mental elements.

62. *(View Of)* "*No-Mental Elements*" *Denied*

You argued : The mind relies on dharmas; and the mental elements are some modes of the mind like the memory, etc. That is improper. The trait of the mind and that of the mental elements are quite different : *Vijñāna* is what cognizes (*vijānāti*). The feeling, *vedanā* is the experience of happiness and misery; the idea, *saṃjñā* is conceiving (*saṃjñāna*) of the blue, yellow, etc. and the formation, *saṃskāra* is *abhisaṃskaraṇa*, manufacturing. Therefore the mind and the mental elements are separate. You said : The mind gets released (etc.) and that is incorrect. It is said in another *Sūtra* : The wisdom gets released as a result of ignorance-separation. The mind alone is not released. The mind alone is stated there because of its importance. Men in the world generally know the mind only and not the mental elements. Therefore the Buddha makes the partial statement. The Buddha in his discourses does not say definitely that this is the expression of that idea. The *Sūtra* says : Abandon one *dharma*, I swear that you will attain to the path of the Never-returner and that one *dharma* is a wish for the sensual enjoyment (*kāma-chanda*). As a matter of fact, it does not happen by abandoning one partial *dharma*. This replies your plea that "the opportune mind" etc. Your conclusion from the saying that there is internal consciousness-body, etc. is not good. There what is stated as the external, i.e. mind-and-form is the same as the mental element. It is the external because it is brought under the external base.

The Buddha says three things: What is internal consciousness-body is the same as the consciousness together with sense-organ. The thing that is stated as external is the same as the object. You said there is only consciousness-body. It is not correct. In the same *Sūtra* it is stated that everything external is only the mental element. Your citation of the contact as meeting together of three elements is not good. For, the contact serves as a cause of the mental elements, feeling, etc. Therefore, it is termed contact (*sparśa*).

63. No Mental Elements Existent

Now we shall reply: You said: because of association, there are mind and mental elements separately; that is no more valid. We shall detail later on (ch. 76) the fact that every element fares singly. Therefore there exist no association. This replies also your citation: this mind fares lonely, etc. It denies all the mental elements and not the homogeneous mind. You pleaded that there are mental elements because they are brought under different categories. That is faulty. These nomenclatures are invented by the collectors of discourses (*Sūtra*). The Buddha never says grouping of any thing. You pleaded that the mind is the supporter and mental element supported. Your non-sensuous consciousness supports itself on the mind; but it is not called as "mental element" though it is supported. Likewise, one mind supports another mind and hence it is given no new name. Your argument of the impossibility of five aggregates is also at fault. For me, the feeling, idea, etc. are only modes of the mind as they are separate aggregates for you. Thus, for me the minds are three separate aggregates. Your plea that they are separate on account of their separate genesis is improper. If the mind and mental elements come into existence simultaneously, why is it said that the mind arises through two factors and the mental element through three factors. The person who accepts only the mind, will have the same rule; for he says that the first is the moment of consciousness and next is the moment

of idea, etc. You have also stated that knowledge is distinguished on account of association, object, and period; this has already criticized on the ground of non-existence of the association. You pointed out *jñānapratiśaraṇa* is superior to *vijñānapratiśaraṇa*. I call the mind by two names : one is knowledge and the other consciousness. Therefore *jñānapratiśaraṇa* mind is to be resorted and not the other.

You cited the Buddha's saying to the effect that the mental elements are those which are supported by the mind. *Caitasikā* is what arises from the mind. You plead that the Buddha does not say that there are no mental elements. I too do not say that there are no mental elements. But I say, at the same time, that only modes of the mind are the mental elements. The person who has a sound reason will have it even though it is not expressly stated. An unsound reason though stated is similar to an unstated one. We shall declare that the mind and the mental elements are for the sake of nomenclatures (*saṃjñārtha*).

The mind, *citta* is what accumulates (*sañcinoti*). The feeling, etc. also are mind alone, because they are similar in the accumulation function. The mind is termed *caitasika* because the mind arises from the mind along with *caitasika*. The person who says there is only *caitasika*, mental element, will say that the mental elements are named as objects. This should not be accepted and hence it is not an argument. You spoke about the functional differences, and of the searching element arising in the mind. It is replied by this. For me, the function differs only because it is a *citta-viśeṣa*, mode of the mind. When one mind arises from another mind, that mind is styled as a searching element arising in the mind (*citte-vitarka*). You pleaded that the defilement and purification become fortuitous. That also is wrong. They are possible even in the absence of the mental element. The mental elements are not there because their traits are no other than that of the mind. For you the mental elements are there because they are associated with the mind. We shall

demonstrate later on (ch. 65) that there is no association (*samprayoga*) at all. Therefore there are no mental elements other than the mind.

64. *Delineation Of No-Mental Elements*

You have stated that the mental element is existent on account of its distinct trait. That is faulty. There is no distinction in the traits, of consciousness, intellection and others. The mind which cognizes the visible is termed *buddhi*, intellection, as well as ideation, etc. Man in the world say : your understanding of this as man is nothing but a knowledge and your experience of happiness and misery is also nothing but the knowledge. Therefore the consciousness alone is understood as feeling and idea. If there is any definitely separate trait of these elements, it ought to be stated. Your statement that the wisdom gets released is also improper, as there is no sound reasoning in it. By virtue of the mind defilement and ignorance (*vidyā*) are all there. In this mind-aggregate defilement and ignorance are all integrated. What is polluted by ignorance is the wisdom, *prajñā* and what is polluted by defilement is the mind, *citta* : this plea is baseless. Thus the statement that the mind gets released because of its separation from the defilements and the wisdom gets released because of its separation from ignorance is also groundless. This *Sūtra*, moreover, is of the secondary meaning (*neyārthaka*). The authentic *Sūtra* says : The mind gets released from the three-fold intoxicant (*āsrava*). Therefore it is evident that the mind itself gets released from the ignorance. Your interpretation of *vihāna* as the release of the mind from the defilements and *prahāna* as the release of the wisdom from ignorance is not very comprehensive. If it is so, you must say what gets released from malevolence and other evil elements. Therefore, it is understood that nothing but the mind gets released.

Your explanation that only the mind is stated there because of its prominence leaves us in the dark as to what prominence the mind has over the wisdom, etc. You argued that people

at large know only the mind and hance it is used in sevral passages. The people at large know also of the happiness and misery and hence the feeling, etc. also ought to be expressed.

Your citation : Abandon one *dharma*, etc. is based on the following reasoning : The Buddha becomes much depressed on observing the sentient beings who suffer on account of their varied defilements and says : This is the sole *dharma* (= *kāmachanda*) that causes their suffering; and by abandoning this, other *dharmas* are also abandoned. You pleaded that what is stated as *nāman* is the same as the mental element. That is the discursive thought of your own nomenclature-recollection. That idea is not meant by the *Sūtra*. If you stick to your nomenclature, why do you not say that the object (*ālambana*) of the mind is meant by *nāman* which is appropriate? You have again stated that the contact serves as the cause of the mental elements, feeling, etc. This saying is defective in many ways : Even if things are mutually associated why is the contact alone the cause of the feeling, etc. and not *vice-versa*? This and other defects are there. It is, therefore, understood that there is the mind alone and not the mental elements.

65. *Saṃprayoga Non-Existent*

There exists no *saṃprayoga*, association. In the absence of the mental elements, with what does the mind get associated? The feeling, etc. do not operate simultaneously with the mind. No simultaneity is possible between the cause and its effect. The consciousness is the cause of the idea, and others. But there is no simultaneity between them and therefore their association is not possible. The Buddha in the discourse on the deep causal links, says : "This thing having arisen that thing arises". For example, the seed, sprout, stem, leaf and flower, etc. are seen gradually springing up. Likewise the consciousness, etc. also are gradually produced. You think that desire and other defilements are the co-existing causes of *rūpa* and co-products. That is improper. The matter, *rūpa* does not

cognize as it has no *ālambana*, object-cause. The mind and the mental elements alone have *ālambana* and cognition (*pratīti*). They cannot appear at the same time and be co-existent; for there is no manifold cognition simultaneously. One body is termed one sentient being, as it has one cognition. If there are several mental elements at one and the same time, then there will be several cognitions. Because of several cognitions one body will be in the nature of several man, which proposition is impossible. Therefore the feeling and others cannot happen at one moment.

Six kinds of consciousness do not appear at one and the same time; because the first is the cause and the next is the result. The *Sūtra* says : "One, looking at the visible, should not seize its self mark (*nimitta*)". The seizing the mark is the idea-forming. Hence the Buddha prohibits the idea-forming after the consciousness-act. It is evident, therefore, that certain person has the consciousness but not the idea-forming. The person who seizes the mark does so after looking at the visible; but not at the time of his looking. Therefore consciousness and others are gradual. It is stated : Looking at the visible one becomes not delighted. Here also the consciousness-act is stated first and then come the feeling, etc. The *Sūtra* says : viewing is seeing. Therefore it is evident that every mind is not possessed of the feeling, etc. This becomes clearer from different traits of five-fold consciousness. For the person who does not seize the mark of the desirable or undesirable form has neither idea nor joyfulness or sorrowfulness for the reason that the discursive thought is absent in him. Some masters say : he has also no desire and other defilements. Therefore there is no *vitarka*. What follows subsequently after the searching mind (*paryeṣaka*) is termed *vitarka* (initial application of thought). This point will be detailed later (ch. 92). It is understood, therefore, that *vitarka* is absent in the five-fold sensuous consciousness. For you five sensuous consciousnesses are free from *Vikalpa*, discursiveness, and how can they have *vitarka* and *vicāra*. The discursive mind being gross at first, becomes subsequently finer;

these two states are termed respectively *vitarka* and *vicāra*. When you, *e.g.* say : in order to let you know a *vitarka* governed by a guess (*abhyūha*) arises in me, that is the time of *vitarka*. In the absence of the desire of letting others know how is there *vitarka*?

Some masters say : There is an idea, *saṃjñā* in five-fold consciousness but not *vitarka*. This *vitarka* arises on the support of the idea, and how is there *vitarka* at the time of idea? Therefore it is accepted that the five-fold consciousness is free from the idea, *vitarka* and *vicāra*. For, at the time of the sensuous consciousness there is neither any thought of the visible whether it is female or it is male, nor is there any feeling about it. By what is the discursive thought effected? You have accepted that the five sensuous consciousnesses are free from the discursive thought; therefore the non-sensuous consciousness arises (and reasons). If the sensuous consciousness itself reasons, what does the non-sensuous consciousness do? *Vitarka* and *vicāra* are not in the same moment because grossness and fineness are mutually contradictory. It is comparable to the ringing the bell. The first sound is equal to *vitarka* and the next one to *vicāra*. If they are present in the sensuous consciousness, their function ought to be stated. But it is not possible to state. Therefore, we understand that mental elements are gradual. Ignorance and wisdom are mutually contradictory and will not be in the same moment. Knowledge and ignorance are not possible in the same moment.

Some master says: The memory about the mental element is running after the past; and the mind relies on the present object and how can the memory be the mind? The memory is when one recollects: this man has helped me, and after that recollection he feels joy. How will these two occur in one and the same mind? How are there desire and non-desire in the same mind? The *Sūtra* says: " The person who is delighted in his *dharma*, duty, the merit (*dharma*) increases in him; and the merit decreases in him who is not so ". How will these two be in the same mind?

Then there will be in the same mind knowledge and ignorance, doubt and decision, belief and disbelief and so on. Due to what impediment are there in the same mind no happiness and misery, no love and hate, etc.? If you say that the happiness and misery being mutually contradictory do not reside in the same mind, the knowledge and ignorance, etc. also will not reside in the same mind because they are mutually contradictory. Therefore there is no association.

In the seven *bodhyaṅga-Sūtra* the Buddha has expressed the successive order of the mental elements: " One who walks in the four foundations of mindfulness cultivates the mindfulness-constituent of the enlightenment. While in the mindfulness, his mind analyses things; due to the analysis of things he makes endeavour; due to the endeavour-force he accumulates merits, and has pure joy in his mind; due to the joy his mind becomes serene; due to the serenity he controls his mind; due to the mind's controlling he gets concentrated; due to concentration he remains indifferent towards greed and sorrowfulness, and due to indifference he discerns (the truth) ". Thus the mental elements become gradual. The order has been stated also in the *Aṣṭāṅga-mārga-Sūtra*: One who gains the right view, arouses right resolve (*saṅkalpa*) and then upto right concentration. In the *Anukrama-Sūtra* the Buddha addresses Ānanda: One retaining good conduct, does not think of (*praṇidhāna*) doing of the wicked action (*kaukṛtya*); one bereft of wicked action does not resolve his mind for gaining the contentment. The nature of this mind by itself is the contentment. The mind of the content man gets joy and the body of the joyous-minded becomes serene. The body becoming serene, he feels happiness; feeling happiness his mind gets concentrated and on the concentration he discerns the truth. The discerner of the truth gets detached and being detached he gets released. It is understood, therefore, that the mental elements are gradual. A similar order is stated in The Eight Great *Vitarkas*. The monk who remains of little desire becomes content; being content he becomes isolated (*pravivikta*);

being isolated he makes endeavour; making endeavour he becomes well-mindful; being mindful he gets concentrated; getting concentrated, he acquires wisdom; acquiring wisdom he becomes free from enumeration (*prapañca*). The Seven-Purity-Discourse also emphasizes the order: The purification of conduct is meant just for the mind-purification; the latter is meant just for the wrong view-purification; the latter is meant just for the purification of transcending doubt; the latter is meant just for the purification of knowledge—vision of what is, and what is not the Path; the latter is meant just for the purification of knowledge vision of practice; the latter is meant just for the purification of practice-abandoning. The *Nidāna-Sūtra* also stresses the order: "Depending upon the eye and the visible, memory arises as polluted by the elements pertaining to infatuation (*moha*). Here infatuation is nothing but ignorance. The infatuated person's aspiration is thirst. The manifestation (*abhisaṃskaraṇa*) of the person affected by thirst is the action and so on. There are nine elements stated as headed by thirst: Depending upon thirst there is searching, depending on the latter, gain, depending on the latter, decision, depending upon the latter, *chanda-rāga*, depending upon the latter, conviction, depending upon the latter, seizing, depending upon the latter, envy, depending upon the latter, security and depending upon the latter, taking to stick, weapon, quarrel and dispute and many other miserable events take place". The *Srota āpannadharma* also mentions the order: "Serving the wise man one listens to good law, listening to it arouses right mindfulness, due to mindfulness he cultivates the practice of the path". Another *Sūtra* says: "The visual consciousness arises depending upon the eye and the visible; meeting together of three elements is contact". For the person who says that the mind and mental elements are simultaneous the meeting together of three elements (only) is not possible. But the person who accepts that they are gradual will have *sannipāta* of the only three elements. These and other arguments prove that there exists no *samprayoga*, association.

66. *Existence of Samprayoga*

Q. There is *samprayoga*. For, one who perceives, feels: this is the soul. The cognitive mind resides in it and is associated with it. Likewise the idea-aggregation and others also reside in it. The *Puruṣa-Sūtra* says: " Depending upon the eye and the visible the visual consciousness arises; meeting together of these three elements is contact (*sparśa*) and born together with the contact are the feeling, idea and other aggregates ". In this *Sūtra* there are various designations, viz. *Sattva, deva, manuṣya, strī, puruṣa,* etc. All these designations are made depending upon the five aggregates. If the mind and mental elements are gradual, then the man (*puruṣa*) will be conceived on the basis of two aggregates alone and not five. The man will not be conceived on the basis of the past and the future aggregates. You say that there are no five aggregates in the present period. How are the names *deva, manuṣya,* etc. stated on the basis of five aggregates?

Samprayoga is also stated in the *Sūtra*: " Faith is associated with the sensuous knowledge ". It is again stated in the *Sūtra*: The contact is born together with the feeling, idea and the searching mind (*vitarka*). Again it is stated: the first *dhyāna* is constituted of five constituents. It is said: The feeling and others are stations of consciousness (*vijñāna-sthiti*). If the consciousness is disassociated, how is it that consciousness resides in its stations, feeling, etc.? Consciousness itself is not stated as its station. It is stated: " The mental elements are born and resident of the mind ". It says: The mind of the sentient beings is for long polluted by greed and aversion. If there is no *samprayoga*, what does pollute? The mind and the mental elements are by nature dull and rely on mutually supported like the bundles of reeds. It is stated in the *Sūtra*: " When the mind is stubborn it is inopportune moment for cultivation of three enlightenment-factors, viz. inquiring into the nature of elements, exersion and joy; because the stubborn mind can hardly be pacified. But it

is the opportune moment for cultivation of three enlightenment-factors, viz. of inquiry into the nature of elements, of exersion and of joy, because the low-spirited mind can easily be awakened through these factors ".

The Ābhidharmika says: Enlightenment-elements are not separated from one who is at one time anchored in the contemplation-act (*bhāvanā-yoga*). It is understood, therefore, that there is *samprayoga*.

67. *Non-Existence of Samprayoga*

(The author replies:). You stated: One who perceives feels; he is the soul. That is wrong. The worldlings entertain this wrong view. They do not distinguish that this feeling resides in that consciousness. If they do so, they may enter into Voidness. Watching the mind's continuum they speak in such fashion and their speech is unreliable. You pleaded that designation of *puruṣa*, ' man ' has been made on the basis of five aggregates. People, e.g. say that one is happy, unhappy and neither happy nor unhappy. But these three feelings are not possible at one time. You pointed out that *samprayoga* is accepted in the saying: Faith is associated with the sensuous knowledge. It is also stated in a *sūtra*: It is associated with others. One, e.g. says: two monks are associated in one place. They again say: misery is associated with aversion and disassociated from love. In your system, though the matter, *rūpa* is non-associate, it is, however, said to be associate empirically. Likewise are the knowledge and the faith. Faith is to believe in impermanence, etc. and the knowledge to know it as it is cognized (*yathā-pratīti*). Since these two achieve one thing they are said to be associated. You again pleaded that feelings and others are born together with the contact. That is wrong. Things which are contradictory mutually in a lesser degree, are spoken of as co-existing. They say, e.g. that the teacher walks along with his pupil; the king, Māndhātā ascended the heaven by means of its mere

memory. But it does not appeal to the reason. There are four elements gradually appearing in the objectivizing act of the worldlings' cognition: idea born immediately after cognition, feeling born immediately after the idea, volition born immediately after the feeling and joyfulness and sorrowfulness, etc. born immediately after the volition. Therefore they are stated to be co-produced.

You have pointed out that the first *dhyāna* is constituted of five constituents. There are five constituents in this region (*bhūmi*) but not simultaneous; e.g. three feelings in the desire-world. The region is assigned to the (constituent) elements previously enumerated. The searching mind and fixing state of mind are never associated together and the point has already been replied. As to your plea on *Vijñāna-Sthiti*, this *Sūtra* means to state that the feeling, etc. are conditioning factors for consciousness but not the supporting factors. This idea is evident from another statement of the *Sūtra*: "Consciousness depending on the matter remains with love and delight". Your argument that consciousness does not remain depending upon its self is wrong; for, at the time of cognition, the mind cognizes something. The feelings, etc. about what is cognized arise in the mind then the thirst towards it and due to this thirst consciousness continues and this *continuum* is said *vijñāna-sthiti*. Hence consciousness itself is not stated as consciousness-station. Moreover, the authority of this *sūtra* is questionable and it should not be interpreted literally. It is comparable to the saying: One crosses over the flood (i.e. empirical life) through faith, i.e. wisdom.

You remarked that the mental elements are supported by the mind. That is improper. The mind first cognizes and then the idea and others arise. The *Sūtra* says: "The feeling, etc. are supported by the mind". The mental elements are said to be supported by the mind but the mind is not like the wall supporting (the painting). You again said that they are mutually supported like the bundles of reeds. It is contradicted by some other

Sūtra. If they arise at the same time, why do you say that the mental elements are supported by the mind and not *vice-versa.* If you reply that the mind first arises and due to that it is their supporter, then my thesis is accomplished. You also stated that since the mind is polluted by defilements, there is their mutual association (*samprayoga*). It is not a proper way of reasoning. If the mind being pure previously becomes polluted by the external greed and others, then the same pure thing becomes spoiled, which proposition contradicts the law of nature (*dharma-lakṣaṇa*).

The opinion that the mind pure by its nature becomes polluted by the external impurities is to be replied thus: If it is pure by its nature how do the greed and others affect it? The *Sūtra* says: Sentient beings get defiled on account of the mind's defilement and they get purified on account of the mind's purification. Thus the sentient beings also will be subject to *samprayoga.* If they are not so, the greed and others also will not be liable to *samprayoga.* When the mind runs in succession, a polluted or purified mind arises. The pollution of the mind's continuum is spoken as the polluted mind. The statement that the mind gets released from the defilements means this: when a pure mind arises in course of the mind's continuum, that is termed the released mind. This interpretation alone is reasonable. People, e.g. talk that clouds, fog, and others hide the sun and the moon even they do not get associated with the sun and the moon. They also say that the smoke, etc. hide the sun and the moon. Likewise they talk, the greed, etc. defile the mind even though they are not associated with the mind.

Q. The clouds and the fog, and the sun and the moon are existing at one time; but the mind and the defilement are not so. Hence the said example is inappropriate. A. The example is set up for pointing out a similarity in hiding, and hence not defective. The defilement is that which defiles the mind's continuum. The mind and the mental elements are dull by nature

because they are perishing every moment, but not because they are in need of assistance and operate together on the object (*ālambana*). Things which are in need of mutual assistance must stay for some time. The mind and the mental elements have no power to give mutual assistance. What use will be of *samprayoga*?

You cited the enlightenment-factors (as a support to your contention). This passage intends to stress on the fact that those factors one should cultivate on suitable occasions. It does not mean that one should meditate on them at one and the same time. Śāriputra says: I dwell in seven enlightenment-factors at will. When my mind becomes stubborn, at that time I meditate on the enlightenment-factors of equanimity, etc. (gradually). The Buddha also stressed their gradual meditation. Your contention of their simultaneous meditation is unreasonable. If the meditation of thirty-seven enlightenment-elements is simultaneous, one should, then, meditate on two faiths and five mindfulnesses, etc. simultaneously. It is not a logical process, and all the thirty-seven elements cannot possibly be meditated upon simultaneously.

68. *Minds Many*

Q. It is made clear that there exist no mental elements apart from the mind and hence there is no association between them. Now the question is whether the mind is only one becoming many due to its genesis as some masters say, or it is many. A. The mind is many. The mind and the consciousness are the same. The consciousness of the visible is different from that of odour. The visual consciousness depends on the light, space, etc. whereas the auditory consciousness depends on other factors. The non-sensuous consciousness again depends on several other factors. When a consciousness cognizes a thing as its invariable objects, how can that consciousness cognize other object? This will be possible if the mind is many. The right knowledge and wrong one are different; similarly the

decisive knowledge and the doubting one are different. So also are wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminable minds. Under the wholesome come : *dhyāna*, *samādhi*, *vimokṣa*, etc.; under unwholesome: greed, aversion, and infatuation, etc.; and under indeterminable: past, future, etc. Certain consciousness produces corporeal and vocal actions, and certain, other mode of behaviour. The mind differs on account of its cause, preceding conditioning factor, object and the dominating factor which are different. It differs also on account of distinction in feelings sometimes pure and sometimes impure, etc. The pure and impure mind are different in their own nature. The mind that is pure by nature does not become polluted, e.g. the sun-ray cannot be polluted. What is impure by nature cannot be made pure, e.g. the black hair cannot be made white. While giving donation one's mind is pure and the same at slaughtering is impure. So the mind is not the same. If it is one, the same mind will cognize all objects. For the advocate of several minds the consciousness arises in accordance with each sense organ. If it is one, by what impediment does it not cognize all things?

The subject differs on account of its different object; e.g. certain person experiences his own mind sometimes. How does the self form experience its own self? The eye does not see its self ; the sword does not cut its self and the finger does not touch its own tip Hence the mind is not one. The *Markaṭopama-Sūtra* says : The monkey moving in the forest seizes one branch and leaving it seizes another branch. Likewise one mind appears in day time and another disappears in night time. In case of one mind the saying of the six consciousness-bodies will be spoiled. Another *Sūtra* says: The body sometimes continues for ten years even, but one mind appears in day time and another disappears in night time. It is stated: The mind is impermanent; it continues in succession, and never becomes interrupted. The action is once done and the same cannot be done again. Likewise consciousness also does not adhere to one

object. The grass-fire does not migrate to the fuel; likewise the visual consciousness does not reach the ear. Therefore, we understand that mind is many.

69. *The View of one Mind*

Some philosopher says : The mind is only one. The *Sūtra* says : This mind has been, for many days, polluted by desire and others. If it is many it will not be polluted for all time. The *Ratnahāra-sūtra* says : "One who cultivates his mind through faith, good conduct, liberality, learning and wisdom, is born after death amongst gods." The *Dhyāna-sūtra* says : The gainer of the first dhyāna enters into the second one in order to tame his mind. The *Citta-varga* says :

The mind tosses hither and thither like a fish on the ground:

You all destroy it, the army of Māra.

A monk in the *Saṃyukta-piṭaka* says :

The monkey being strong in the hut of five doors
runs through one of the doors

But now stop, O Monkey! do not run as before
you are restrained by my wisdom lest you will run herefrom.

It is, therefore, understood that the mind is one wandering in the hut of this body in and out of the five doors. That is its nature. Hence it is said: do not run as before. Again it is said:

This mind is of all time like the sun-rays.

The wise controls it like the spear does the tusker.

It is evident that one mind wanders in the objects. Since there is no soul accepted, the mind alone will be the executor of the action. One and the same mind accomplishing the action reaps its fruit. The mind dies, takes birth, gets bound, and gets released. It recollects what was experienced. It is, therefore,

understood that it is one. Being one it accumulates impressions. The momentary mind has no accumulating power. There is no soul in the Buddha's dispensation. The mind being one, becomes *sattva*. For the advocate of many minds no sattva-trait is possible. Seeing through the right eye one cognizes through the left eye. But it is not possible that one sees and another cognizes. It is evident, therefore, that one mind sees by itself and cognizes by itself.

70. *Denial of the Many-Mind-View*

(The opponent's criticism of the author's view). Your statement that the consciousness of the visible is different from that of odour, etc. is wrong. For, one and the same mind discharges several duties of grasping the visible, sound, etc. One person, e.g. watches from the inside of his house through five holes the several external things. The same mind lingering in the eye sees the visible with the aid of the light, etc. It is like the person who discharges other duties in other place. The mind is the same but its cognizables are distinguished. A man, e.g. being knower at first and then becomes ignorant. Likewise the wrong knowledge becomes again right knowledge. The pure man becomes later on impure. Likewise the doubting knowledge becomes decisive one. A man, e.g. previously being undecided becomes decided later on. The unwholesome mind becomes wholesome like the person who sometimes recollects the good and sometimes the bad or sometimes something indeterminable. The same mind does the past and the future acts just like the same person doing different acts in the past and future. In the like manner the pure mind itself becomes impure and the impure mind becomes pure e.g. the same person being pleased at first becomes unpleased later. The same mind is happy and then becomes sorrowful, e.g. the same person pleases others at first and then displeases them. Therefore it is said that one and the same mind is capable of discharging several duties.

You stated that one consciousness cannot seize the six kinds of objects. That is not correct. For me, consciousness is distinguished due to distinction in the sense-organs. What consciousness lingers in the eye, that sees the visible alone and nothing else. You accepted that the subject differs on account of its different objects; that is wrong. It is the law of mind's nature that it cognizes its own self. e.g. the lamp illuminates its own self as well as others. An accountant counts his own self as well as others. In the like manner, one mind cognizes its own self as well as others. Your monkey-illustration is not appropriate. It means this : just as the monkey seizes one branch and leaving it seizes another branch, just so the mind grasps one object and it grasps another object leaving the previous one. (To you other argument) this is said in brief, viz. the mind itself accomplishes the action and itself reaps its resultant. If the mind is different it will evolve this defect: One mind does the act and another mind reaps it, one mind dies and another mind is born, and many other errors. It is, therefore, understood that the mind is only one.

71. *Not One Mind*

Now the author replies (to the arguments stated in Ch. 69): You have stated that the same mind is polluted for long by the desire, etc. That is wrong. Identity of the mind is applicable to its continuum. People, e.g. say that the evening-breeze is the same as the morning one; the river of today is the same as that of yesterday; the lamp in the royal court of to-day is the same as that of yesterday. They also say that tooth has reappeared. But, in fact, the same previous tooth does not reappear. Likewise the mind, though it is different, is said to be same as it continues in succession. As regards the mind recollecting the already experienced thing (my reply is): a man may, sometimes, recollect his previous mind by himself. When the previous mind has now come, what use will be there by memorization? How is it possible that same mind recollects

the same mind? There is no any knowledge cognizing its own self. Hence it is not the same mind.

You argued that the mind is accumulating impressions. If the mind is one and permanent, what benefit is there by accumulation? If it is many, then there is the benefit as it continues in succession through different stages: inferior, moderate and superior. You said that the mind is the trait of *sattva*. If it is one, it will be permanent. What is permanent will be the soul. It is the soul which is one, permanent, unmodified, now acting and will be acting in future. The mind appears as one to him who is ignorant of the mind's distinctions. People speak of it as one since it continues in succession like the stream of a river. The eye-diseased person perceives the cluster of hairs as one; but the man of clear vision sees their distinctions. The wise discerns the mind's differences. Even Brahmā and others being entangled in confusion think that this body is impermanent but the (mind i.e.) consciousness is permanent. If Brahmā and others nurse this confusion, what is to speak of others that are addicted to things as permanent? Therefore the element (*dharma*) that is produced from the totality of conditions of good volition is stagnant and the element other than that is not so.

You pleaded that seeing through the right eye one cognizes through the left eye. It is quite possible by virtue of the knowledge-power. e.g. one man composes the treatise and another understands it. The noble person understands well what is done by others. He understands by virtue of Āryan knowledge what is to come and what is not yet come into existence. This will be made clear later on.

72. *Delineation of Several Minds*

(The author replies to the arguments made in Ch. 70)

Your statement that one mind is capable of discharging several duties is wrong. For, the mind lies in the form of right perception and (hence) the perception of the visible (*rūpa*)

is different from that of the sound. How are these two identical? The hand-action, e.g. holds the pot and the same cannot hold other thing. Likewise what mind perceives the visible cannot hear the sound. The visual consciousness arises taking the eye as support and relying on the visible as the object. Both the eye and the visible are momentary. How can the visual consciousness be non-momentary? The shadow, e.g. follows the tree. Since the eye and the visible are momentary, the consciousness that is related to them is also momentary. What is momentary is incapable of moving. This is already stated in the chapter on the mind(53). Therefore the mind does not move.

You pointed out that the consciousness lingering on the eye sees depending on the light just as the same man sees as well as hears, and so on. That is the wrong reasoning. In this Śāstraic treatise the true nature of things is investigated. The man is empirical thing and cannot be set up as example. The true trait of the man ought to be searched for. We declare that the five aggregates of elements form the man, and that the decisive knowledge and indecisive one are quite different and that they are not identical. Likewise all other points are to be replied.

Your statement that consciousness is distinguished due to distinction in the sense-organs is not appropriate. The sense-organ is a causal factor for the genesis of consciousness. If the consciousness is one and the same, what does the sense-organ do? You stated the lamp as the example, and it is not apt. It illuminates what is not illuminated, but it does not illuminate its own self. When the darkness is dispelled by the lamp the visual consciousness arises in respect of the objects. That consciousness having arisen, sees the lamp as well as the objects, pot, etc. The accountant, however, knows his own form as well as the other's form. That is termed *lakṣaṇa-jñāna*, knowledge of the traits.

Your objection on the mind's action and fruition is replied in the chapter on action (chs. 55, etc.). If the mind is one

and permanent, then there will be action, but not resultant. The action occurs on the direct support of the mind and on the (indirect) support of something related to the mind. If it is one, what is the resultant of the action? The bondage and release will likewise be (impossible). You remarked that one acts and another reaps it, is not correct. The continuum of the aggregates of elements is neither identical not different. To assert either evolves the falling into either of two extremes. The talk about the action and others is made from the viewpoint of empirical ideas, but not from the absolute viewpoint. Therefore the talk of identity in the form: " This is the same " is related to the continuum of aggregates, and hence the said defect is ineffective. Therefore we understand that the mind is many.

73. *The Mind Continuing for a Short Time*

Q. It is settled that the minds are several. Now the question is whether they are momentary or continue for a short time. Some masters say that they continue for a short time in order to arouse thought (*pratyāyana*) of the visible, etc. What is momentary, cannot do so. If the mind does not continue it cannot arouse thought of the visible, etc. The lightning e.g. though it stays for a while is not well discernible. How is it that a momentary mind arouses the thought? Therefore it is not momentary. The saying that the visual consciousness arises depending on the eye and the visible implies the identity of these two and hence the consciousness is also identical. The mind seizes the patch of blue, etc. simultaneously. Therefore we understand that it is not momentary.

Your thinking that the mind's continuum decides (*adhyavasyati*) is not proper. If each mind does not decide, its continuum also will not decide. When one blind e.g. does not see, many also will not see. If you argue that one thread does not bind the tusker, but many of them are capable of doing so. Likewise one mind does not decide, its continuum, nevertheless can do so. This argument too is not good. In each thread

there is a little bit of strength and hence a bunch of threads increases enough strength. The single mind, on the other hand, has no any capacity to arouse thought in one moment. Therefore its continuum also does not do so. It arouses thought in fact. Therefore it is not momentary. If it is momentary, the actions past and future will be futile. If it is stagnant for a short time, it can make them useful. Though it is impermanent, it necessarily stays for a short time.

74. *Momentary Consciousness*

The author replies : Your argument that the mind is not momentary because it arouses thought (*pratyāyaka*) is not satisfactory. The mind arouses thought because of the force (*bala*) of the ideas (*nimitta*) formed in the mind (*cittagata*) and not because of its being stagnant for a short time. If it is not so, the vocal action (or sound-action) would not arouse thought. We actually experience (in our life) that though it is momentary it arouses thought. Therefore, we understand that the mind arouses thought not because of its being stagnant for a while. The mind is the arouser of right thought. What conveys the thought of the blue patch, that does not convey the thought of the yellow. Therefore the mind that conveys the thought of the blue patch, though continuing a short while, does not, however, convey the thought of the yellow patch. The moment of the blue patch-thought-conveyance is different from that of the non-blue patch-thought-conveyance. No one element will be in these two moments. The element is one with the time and the latter is one with the former (v. ch. 22, end, n. 2970). The grasping is two-fold: decisive and indecisive. If the consciousness is non-momentary, it would decide all the graspable in its entirety (*sākalyena*). For me, however, the grasp that is produced by the continuum of several consciousnesses decides the object. When the continuum is of a few consciousnesses it does not decide. The consciousness

may grasp the object either slowly or quickly but there is no rigid rule in either way.

You remarked that there is identity between the support and the object (*āśrayālambana*). Since (everything) is momentary, the visible, *rūpa* though it is the support-object is not identical. You stated that it grasps simultaneously. The consciousness is the grasper of all parts of the body and hence its grasping is (falsely) said to be simultaneous. Therefore there is no consciousness grasping everything. For, the mind before accomplishing its grasping (action) ceases to exist. How do you obtain one mind as grasper of everything? Your statement of the action past and future is not correct. The lamp, e.g. is useful for illumination even though it is momentary. The storm-actions, though they are momentary, shake things. The lamp and others are capable of illuminating things though they are momentary. Likewise the momentary consciousness is also capable of grasping things.

Citta, *manas*, and *vijñāna* are momentary; for, the aggregate of the blue, etc. being present in our front arouses quickly consciousness in us. Therefore the latter is momentary. The man has sometimes this thought; I grasp every object at one time. Therefore consciousness is not stagnant. If it continues a little while then the man would not have that illusory thought. It may continue a little while like the succession of the seeds (*bija-Santāna-vat*). The man does not have the illusory thought about it, viz. the sprout, stem, etc. are simultaneous. Therefore it is momentary. The person who sees the pot recollects it. The memory is (immediately) after perceiving; hence it is momentary. For the advocate of consciousness as non-momentary the one and the same knowledge will be right as well as false. The idea that this is a man will be the same as the idea that this is not a man. Likewise the doubt itself will be decisive idea. But it is not possible. Therefore it is momentary. The vocal action (*śabda-karman*) being momentary arouses know-

ledge of the idea by succession; (likewise is consciousness also). Therefore we understand that the mind is momentary.

75. *Consciousness Simultaneous*

Somebody questions whether the consciousnesses are simultaneous or gradual. Certain Ābhidharmikas say : They are simultaneous; for, a man can grasp all objects at one time. A man, e.g. seeing the pot, hears the music also, smells the flower-fragrance through the nose and swallows a tasteful food through the mouth; the fan-breeze touches his body, and his mind (*cetanā*) corrects the mistake. Therefore the man grasps all the objects at one and the same time.

If one and the same consciousness discerns all the happiness and misery in the body, one can grasp all the trees through one visual consciousness. But it does not happen. Therefore it is evident that several consciousnesses grasp all the touchables at the same time. The knowledge about several things arises at one and the same time. What is the blue-knowledge is not the same as the yellow-knowledge. The knowledge in the parts of the body arises very quickly. At the very same time of grasping one part they grasp all other objects. In the dispensation of the Buddha there is no one separate whole other than the constituent parts. It is not possible that one and the same consciousness grasps all the constituent parts. We, therefore, understand that several consciousnesses that have arisen grasp all the constituent parts.

76. *Consciousness not Simultaneous*

The author replies; Your contention that several consciousnesses arise at the very same time is not reasonable, because a consciousness arises depending on the attention (*manaskāra*). The *Sūtra* says : The eye is unhurt and the visible falls within the ken; if the attention that arouses consciousness is not there, then the visual consciousness will not be

produced. Therefore it is understood that consciousnesses arise depending on the attention and that they are not simultaneous. All things of origination are governed by the action-cause. Because the mind arises one by one, no resultant is experienced simultaneously on the earth as well as in the hells. If several minds arise at one time, then their experiences will be simultaneous. It does not, in fact, happen. Therefore they are not of one time. The consciousness seizes the object very quickly. Because the fire-brand e.g. is rotated very fastly, its interval breaks are not noticeable. Likewise consciousnesses being of the extremely minute time-duration, are not divided. If they are simultaneous, all things liable to origination would be brought into existence at one and the same time. Thus there need not be made any effort for bringing about their existence. Even the man not making any effort will be released. But this is not possible. Therefore consciousnesses are not occuring at one moment. The body is the follower of the mind. If all the minds come up at one moment, then the body will be scattered; because all the minds past and future would be brought about at one moment. But the body, in fact, is not scattered. Therefore it is understood that all the minds do not come up at one moment. We witness with our own eye the external things, the seed, the sprout, etc. fluid (*kalala*) flesh and hardened fleshy lump (*peśī*), childhood, youth and old-age and all occurring gradually. Likewise will be the mind also.

The *Sūtra* says : When pleasent feeling is felt the other two feelings, unpleasant and indifferent are extinct, and so on. In the case of consciousness occuring at one moment the three feelings will be felt all at one moment. But it does not happen so in fact. Since one mind operates at one moment it is termed one man. In the case of several consciousnesses operating at one moment, there will be many men in one body. But this is not reasonable (to accept). Several consciousnesses do not possibly operate in one body. If they do so, they would cognize at one moment all the objects. For there may be several hundred

thousand consciousnesses in the eye. Likewise they may be in the other sense-organs upto mind. But it is not admissible. Therefore consciousnesses are not occuring at one moment.

Q. Why are consciousnesses necessarily occuring gradual? A. Because the immediately preceding moment-factor is one, consciousness occurs one by one. Q. How is the fact of one praceding moment-factor correct? A. Such is the law of nature. As for you one soul has one mind, so for me one mind has one *samanantara* factor. The sprout springs up immediately after the seed, but not after the stem, etc. being arisen. Likewise the element pertaining to the mind arises in a successive order of the minds, and not otherwise. The consciousness-trait is so unalterably settled that it is governed by a gradual succession of each appearing and disappearing in the just same manner as the fire-burning. Therefore consciousness appears necessarily in a successive order.

77. *Idea-Aggregate*

Saṁjñā is to conceive *nimitta*s of empirical things (*prajñapti-saddharma-nimitta-grahaṇā-tmikā*). *Saṁjñā* is associated with perverted notions. So it is stated : To view the impermanent as permanent, misery as happiness, non-soul as soul and unwholesome as wholesome is all a perverted thought.

The objects of cognition are divided by *saṁjñā* into three categories, viz. pleasant, unpleasant and indiffernt and therefrom arise three kinds of feeling which again produce three varieties of poison. Therefore *saṁjñā* is defective and that is why the Buddha says that it should be abandoned. The scriptural passage : " Do not seize the characteristic mark on looking at the visible with your eye " proves that *saṁjñā* is the seizure of the charactreistic mark of the empirical things.

Q. The above interpretation is wrong; because one abandons all the defilements through *saṁjñā*, thought. The *Sūtra* says : The idea of impermanence cultivated intensively

causes to eradicate greed for sensual pleasure, greed for the visible, greed for becoming, all arrogance, all ignorance, and all the self-conceit. *Saṁjñā* as interpreted above would not lead to the abandonment of the defilements.

The author replies : Such thought is indeed wisdom and spoken of as *Saṁjñā*. It is stated: They say : the feeler is released from all; through the mind all defilements are removed; and all actions are extinguished through the action which is neither black nor white. It is also stated :

One crosses over the flood through faith, and the ocean through diligence; one surpasses over the misery through exertion and gets purified through wisdom.

As a matter of fact one crosses over the flood, etc. only, through wisdom and therefore *saṁjñā* in the above cited passage referes only to *prajñā*, wisdom. *Saṁjñā* is not counted amongst thirty-seven constitutents of the Aryan Path; hence it cannot cause the destruction of fetters. The Sūtra says : Knowing and viewing one realizes the destruction of passions (*āsravas*) and not otherwise. What are described as pure senses, viz. (1) *anājñātaṁ ājñāsyāmi*, the sense : 'I shall know what is not previously known,' (a) *ājñā*, the sense : 'I know' and (3) *ājñātau*, the sense : 'I have known' : all these are termed knowledge. The Buddha says : Wisdom-aggregate, *Prajñāskandha* becomes Release-knowledge-vision-aggregate (*vimukti-jñāna-darśana-skandha*). It is stated : Enlightenment is no other than the meditation (*dhyāna*) and the meditation is no other than the mental equilibrium (*sāmya*). The *Anukrama Sūtra* says : The heart of the retainer of the pure conduct never repents and he prepares his mind worthy for the knowledge of things as they are (*yathābhūta-jñāna*). The knowlege of elements (*dharma-jñāna*) etc. are all termed *prajñā*. Training in *prajñā* is supreme amongst three trainings (*sikṣā*). It is stated : The wealth of wisdom, *prajñā* is the wealth of the Release-knowledge-vision. The Sūtra of seven purities says :

There is a Release through knowledge-vision of the practice. The Buddha declares : The knowledge of all elements as they are is the topmost wisdom. *Saṁjñā* is not of this kind.

Prajñā alone is the destroyer of all defiling forces and not *saṁjñā*. This interpretation (*yoga*) is reasonable. For, the *Mahānidāna-Sūtra* says: What is found in the *Sūtra*, also expressed in the *Vinaya* and does not run counter to *dharmatā*, the law of Nature that is to be accepted (as true teaching). It is stated : To place (speech) in the right import is (to grasp) in accordance with the import (*yathārtha*) and to place (the import) in right speech (*ruta*) is (to grasp) in accordance with the speech (*yathāruta*). Though the *Sūtra* says : The idea of impermanence, etc. destroys defiling forces; this idea logically is only a wisdom. A *Sūtra* says : The root of all defiling forces is ignorance (*avidyā*) and by the separation of ignorance *prajñā* gets released. Therefore it is understood that all defiling forces are destroyed by means of wisdom alone.

It is previously stated that the *Saṁjñā* is to seize the *nimitta* of the emperical things. Now, what is that *nimitta* here meant? Some masters say : Certain empirical things are *nimitta*s; they are five : the past, future, convention (*saṅketa*), conjunction (*saṃyoga*) and *pudgala*. This is improper. For, *Pudgala* is conceived on the basis of five aggregates. *Prajñapti*, empirical thought is not there in the absence of an accomplished *nimitta*. Then what is the meaning of *nimitta*? What is *ālambana* that is *nimitta*. How is it so? It is stated thus : The lion, king of animals conceiving from this side of river a *nimitta* (a prey) on the other shore crosses over the flood. If he does not find the *nimitta* there, coming back to this shore he does not forget that *nimitta* until his death. This *Sūtra* refers to the tree and other things as *nimitta*. Again it is stated : The ascetic reveals a *nimitta*. Here the ascetic dress, etc. are *nimitta*. The Buddha discloses *Nimitta* of this sort. It is stated again : The butcher collects *nimitta* that is desired and suited for the royal dish. The people say that the early light (*prabhāta*) is *nimitta* of the

sun-rise. It is further stated: There are three *nimittas* : concentration-*nimitta*, restraint-*nimitta* and equanimity-*nimitta*. The concentration-*nimitta* is a thing which is chosen in mind and the mind is tied to (it as) *ālambana*. There appear five previous *nimittas* for the denizen of heavens liable to falling down. Here five things themselves are *nimittas*. Therefore, we understand that *prajñapti-dharma*, the empirical things (past, etc.) are not *nimitta*. Nor are they included in the formation-aggregate (*saṁskāra-skandha*). Śāriputra gathers a face-*nimitta* from Pūrṇa-Maitrāyaṇī-putra. The Sūtra says: Looking at the visible the ascetic should not grasp *nimitta*. The *Dharma-mudrā-Sūtra* says : The ascetic who perceives *nimittas* of the visible, sound, etc. as extinct (*prahīṇa*), I do not call him as gainer of the pure knowledge-vision. From this it is understood that *Ālambana*, (a conceived) object is *nimitta* but not the said five empirical things.

Q. *Ālambana* is not *nimitta*; for, the concentration known as *animitta-samādhi* has also an *ālambana*. If *ālambana* is *nimitta*, how is it that looking at visible, the ascetic does not grasp *nimitta*? A. *Nimitta* is two-fold : blame-worthy and not blame-worthy. In order to put a stop to the first one the Sūtra says: The ascetic should not grasp *nimitta*, (characteristic mark) on looking at the visible. The object (*ālambana*) of the conceptless concentration (*animitta-samādhi*) is also blame-worthy and this will be dealt with in the section of *Nirodha-Satya* (ch. 154) thus: The ascetic, suppressor of three-fold idea (*citta*) resorts at first to the conceptless concentration and dwells thereon. So no defect is to be attributed to the person who grasps *nimitta* of concentration, restraint and equanimity, etc. *Nirvāṇa* is not an entity (*asan dharma*); (hence not a *nimitta*). Thus no defect can be imposed on this account. It is stated : The person nursing *dharma-nimitta* incurs no defect. But the person who nurses *nimitta* of empirical thing (i.e. soul, etc.) incurs all defects. For, when one nurses a *nimitta* dividing it into desirable and undesirable, the feelings of joyfulness and sorrow-

fulness arise in him and due to that arise all the vices of greed, hate and other passions. Therefore it is understood that *Saṁjñā* is characterized as seizure of *nimitta*s of the empirical things (i.e. *nimitta*, characteristic marks tend to the conception of empirical entiteis).

78. *Feeling-Trait*

The feeling is three-fold : pleasant, unpleasant and neither pleasant nor unpleasant. The pleasant feeling is when the body and the mind become expanded (*vikāsa*); the unpleasant one is when they are contracted (*hrāsa*) and the third feeling is the reverse of the said two. These feelings are not indefinite though their basic factors are indefinite. The fire, e.g. in certain season causes happiness and in certain season causes suffering. The feeling born of that factor, on the other hand, is definite.

When there is a factor for stopping the suffering, on that occasion the happiness is felt. When a man, e.g. is oppressed by a severe cold, a touch of the fire causes pleasure to him. Q. The pleasant feeling is not existent; for, the hot touch being intensive, causes suffering. A. It exists in the empirical sense but not in the absolute sense. The hot touch causes pleasure to one who is desirous of it. That is when the touch serves as remedy of one's previous suffering, it causes pleasure. When the suffering has already been removed, the hot touch causes no more pleasure. Therefore there is no pleasant feeling in the absolute sense.

Q. The statement that the pleasant feeling is nominal not correct; for, in the Sūtra the Buhdha says : There are three feelings. And it is stated : " If the matter is invariably miserable, people would not adhere to it ". " The taste of matter is that it causes joy ". " While the pleasant feeling arises, the pleasure being present one has the feeling of pleasure " and the same is to be said in regard to displeasure and indifferent feeling. The pleasant feeling is the resultant of the merit and unpleasant

feeling of demerit. If the pleasant feeling is not in the absolute sense, the resultant of the both merit and demerit would be only misery—which fact is improper to accept. There is even in the realm of desire a pleasant feeling. If it is not there, the form-realm and the formless realm would be devoid of it. It is stated- " in the pleasant feeling greed resides ". Where would the greed reside: in the absence of pleasant feeling? Therefore we understand that there is in the absolute sense a pleasant feeling.

A. If there is in the absolute sense the pleasant feeling, its characteristic must be elucidated. It is understood that we talk certain misery as happiness. All the world from the hell upto the top-most realm of existence is characterized as miserable. A man being oppressed by a lot of misery feels happy when his misery becomes less oppressive. A person e.g. being burnt by an intensive heat thinks as pleasant a touch of cold. Therefore the above cited Sūtras do not contradict my standpoint.

Q. It is proper to say that everything in the universe is pleasant when pleasantness becomes less then the idea of misery arises. This proposition not being accepted, the other proposition, viz. an idea of happiness arises when the misery is less intensive cannot be stated. A. The feeling of misery is grosser and hence it is improper to say that when the happiness is less it is thought of misery. The less happiness is never characterized as oppressive. For, we do not observe anybody being in the mood of happiness and at the same time lifting his arms upwards and sighing (for relief). When the feeling of happiness becomes subtle it is spoken of tranquillity (*upaśama*) as, e.g. it is occurring in the higher region of existence. Therefore, to say that an idea of misery arises when the happiness is less is simply a vain talk. But it is, on the other hand, proper to say that when the misery is less intensive the people wrongly conceive of it as happiness.

79. *Formation Misery*

All feelings are liable to misery; for, the ascetic dress, food, etc. are all factors of misery. How is this conclusion? It is

well experienced by all that when things like food, etc. are more than required the suffering increases. The misery of painfulness in our hands, feet, etc. can well be pointed out, but not so the sense of happiness. The food and dress, etc. are alleviating the disease. For a thirsty man the cool drink (quenches his thirst) but causes no happiness. A person, again, being oppressed by misery thinks it happiness when that misery is removed. People, e.g. being frightened by the capital punishment view other punishment as happiness. Everything is ultimately a cause of misery and hence the misery which is already there, is subsequently realized just like a decay of the shoe. People, first arouse a sense of pleasure towards the beauty of a woman (*strīrūpa*) hate it subsequently. It is therefore understood that the sense of pleasure arises due to the recollection of wrong notions and the recollection being removed, one finds its defectiveness. The body of a woman, etc. are causes of disease of drought and headache, etc. When there is a sense of disgust (*vairāgya*) that base (i.e. woman's body) is given up. When a thing causes happiness to certain individual the same thing causes to the same individual misery on a subsequent occasion. Therefore happiness is not a real fact.

This body is a cause of misery and not of happiness. Just as the grass and other wild plants easily spring up on the uncultivated land of forest, just so do groups of misery spring up in the land of body but never the false happiness. The people nursing a wrong notion of happiness towards misery attach themselves to it. If there is really a happiness it would not be called a wrong notion (*viparyāsa*). Just as there is nothing like the permanent and pure soul, just so there is nothing like happiness, as both these notions are perverted ones. The people in the presence of a pungent misery arouse a sense of happiness. A carrier of a load, e.g. relaxes his shoulder. Therefore there is no really happiness. The Buddha says : View, O Monks, the pleasant feeling as misery, the unpleasant one as an arrow and indifferent one as impermanent. If there is any definite

happiness, the Buddha would not say that the happiness is to be viewed as misery. It is to be understood that the ordinary folk nurses misery as happiness. Therefore the Buddha says : Where the ordinary folk raises a sense of happiness there one ought to view it as misery.

These three feelings are included in the Truth of Misery. This is possible only when there is only misery in an absolute sense. The idea of happiness is an illusion. This is evident in the statement that one rejects all the fetters through contemplation on the idea of misery but not on the idea of happiness. All things are causes of misery like an enemy. The enemy is two-fold: One is at all times creating misery; the other, though he may be mild at first sight, kills ultimately the person. Similarly, certain things, though at the beginning auspicious, are cruel at the end. The person, though he has achieved what he desires, nevertheless, gets never content therewith, just like a person drinking a saltish water (*lavaṇāmbhas*). Happiness is the absence of aspiration for sensual pleasure (*kāma-prārthanā*); so the aspiration is the source of misery. We do not see anybody not aspiring (for something). They are naturally unhappy. The people are always accompanied by either bodily suffering or mental one. Therefore the body is the source of misery.

The body is a bondage and is comparable to a prison. For, the man when he is freed from the body is called released. So the bondage is misery. All things become gradually despicable. E.g. the body of hellish beings, etc. summer and other seasons, the organs of the children, etc. The body has several enemies; it is comparable to a cobra-case, deceits and a murderer. This and other sufferings always accompany the body. Therefore it is understood that everything is misery. The body of the sentient being is accompanied by various sufferings, viz. birth, old age, disease, death, etc. When there is the soul, there is the rise of attachment to what pertains to the soul and other calamities. Therefore the body is the source of sufferings.

Five destinies of the sentient beings, four kinds of behaviours are all deviated from happiness. The Sūtra says : The matter is misery, feeling, idea, formation and consciousness are miseries. The matter being produced, old age, disease, and death, etc. come into existence. So also in the case of feeling, etc. The body is always engaged and some functions are discharged by the body, tongue and mind. This manifestation of function is misery. The noble men become pleased by the extinction of the body; if there is really happiness, how do they become pleased when they lose their happiness? We understand, therefore, that everything is misery.

80. *Misery-Abandonment*

It is already stated that everything is source of misery. The ordinary folk through perversion, mistakes misery for happiness. How could one believe in what is stated by the ignorant? The ascetic should cherish as misery what is aspired and obtained; because everything is unpleasant; and producing misery when they are modified. The Buddha says : "Men and gods are delighted, attached to, and joyous of the matter, and they dwell in misery when it is modified and disappears." They do so also in respect of idea, feeling, formation and consciousness. It is to be understood as misery because it undergoes modifications. The ordinary men having felt a false happiness cling to it, and due to this clinging there arise several cares, protection, and maintenance, etc. Happiness is an entrance for misery. From the greed for happiness arise three poisons and from the latter arise unwholesome acts. As a result of these acts one suffers a lot of misery in the hells, etc. So, we understand that everything is the root of misery. Every association culminates in separation, and at the separation one experiences immense misery. Therefore happiness culminates in misery; it is understood. The factors of happiness are meant to allure the sentient beings and cause them to fall in misery. The food, e.g. for the wild birds and the bait for fish are intended

for their catch. So happiness must be viewed as misery. In order to gain a bit of taste of the pleasant feeling one endures immeasurable sufferings. The pleasant feeling is the birth-place of all defilements. Sensual pleasures are prayed for out of one's body's greed. Conditioned by the sensual pleasure the defilements, malevolence, etc. spring up gradually. The pleasant feeling is the root of the worldly life. For, thirst arises for happiness. The Sūtra says : Thirst is the root of misery. The actions of all the sentient beings do not lead to happiness. Therefore they are said to be roots of misery.

The pleasant feeling is stronger than the iron chain and hardly abandonable. Men are tied to the worldly life by praying for happiness. They do not leave it only because of their greed for happiness. The pleasant feeling is always producer of misery. The desirable is misery at the time of its search and its recollection is misery at the time of its destruction. At the time of gaining it one never becomes content like the ocean swallowing the river's flood at all times. This also is misery so. The pleasant feeling is the cause of activities; for as a result of happiness-greed one is engaged in actions which are cause of this body-experience. The pleasant feeling is an obstacle to Nirvāṇa. Men do not desire it on account of their conviction of happiness in the worldly life. The greedy longs for this pleasant feeling and this longing (i.e. thirst) is the productive cause of misery. Therefore it is understood that the pleasant feeling is the root cause of the misery-aggregate. The Sūtra says : There are, O monks, two hopes (*āśā*) difficult to abandon. They are; hope for gain and hope for life. The former is that which causes perpetual thinking about sensual pleasures while the latter is that which is inclined for obtaining the life with a view to enjoying them. There two hopes have the pleasant feeling as their root. Therefore the wise aiming at true happiness, should abandon them even though they are difficult to do so.

The taste of pleasant feeling disturbs the mind of even the wise, because it is hardly abandonable. It is so deep-rooted.

It is the cause of greed and other vices. When it is absent, there is nothing to be coveted. That taste leads the man to abandon the true knowledge. For, the wise man necessarily abandons the lower region only in expectation of higher region-taste. The living beings' mind is tied to some base of birth; even the domestic animals are greatly attached to their own bodies. All this is due to the taste of the pleasant feeling and therefore it should be viewed absolutely as (a source of) misery.

81. *Discussion on three Feelings*

Only one feeling of misery is divided into three on different occasions. What is oppressive (*vihethaka*) is termed misery. The person so oppressed in order to avoid the previous misery seeks some other object of misery. By aspiring for what is sought, the intensive misery is stopped for a short while; on that occasion it is termed happiness. When there is no any sense of joy and grief, one neither aspires nor seeks for any thing; on this occasion it is termed feeling neither pleasant nor unpleasant.

Q. The third feeling is not there because it is not experienced distinctly as the other two feelings are felt. A. The man is really met with these three sensations (*sparśa*), viz. pleasant, unpleasant and indifferent. The cause being present there ought to be its result. For example, in the presence of intensive heat a man experiences a touch of cold as pleasant, and a touch of heat as unpleasant. He also experiences an indifferent touch as indifferent feeling. Thus we have an indifferent feeling (in our experience) i.e. neither pleasant nor unpleasant. To say that at the indifferent touch there is no any feeling is not correct. The man experiences this feeling and the basic object of our experience is feeling. The object of experience (*ālambana*) from a personal standpoint is divided into three: lovable, unlovable and indifferent. From the lovable arises joyfulness, from the unlovable sorrowfulness and from the indifferent equanimity. Therefore these three feelings are

there by virtue of different nomenclatures which again are made on account of tastes of different objects (*ālambana*). The object is again three-fold : (1) beneficial, (2) harmful and (3) the reverse of the two. The first two are mutually contradictory. The factors of greed, aversion and infatuation are contradictory to one another. The joyful and sorrowful also are contradictory. Three feelings ensue from the three objects (*ālambana*) which are resultants of the merit, demerit and something indeterminable (*āneñjya*). Therefore we understand that there is an indifferent feeling. The pleasant feeling is when the mind is in a favourable mood; when it is in an unfavourable mood, it is unpleasant feeling, and the indifferent feeling is when the mind is in neither favourable mood nor unfavourable one There are eight worldly affairs (*lokadharma*): Gain, loss, blame, praise, fame, ill-fame, happiness and misery. The ordinary man are unfavourable in respect of the four affairs; loss, etc. and are favourable in respect of other four affairs; gain, etc. But the desire-freed noble persons, on the other hand, are quite unaffected and tranquil in all these affairs and this tranquillity itself is indifferent feeling. Therefore it is not proper to say that there is no any feeling neither pleasant nor unpleasant.

All the mind's co-farers (*mana-upa-vicāras*) can be counted as feelings. So says a Sūtra : " There are eithteen mind's co-farers. " Here only one mind is divided into eighteen : six joyful mind's co-farers, six sorrowful and six tranquil ones. Of these, certain co-farer is constituent of misery, certain of happiness and certain of tranquillity. Therefore all these mind's co-farers are brought under feeling. A Sūtra says : All the feelings are liable to misery. It is stated : When there is the production of matter it is the production of misery. A matter is termed misery because it causes misery, etc.

All formations, *saṁskāras* must be viewed as misery as they cause the misery. Since it is modified as misery, the pleasant feeling must be viewed as misery. The misery in misery (*duhkha-duhkha*) is in itself misery. Thus these three

feelings are source of misery and produced due to the totallity of conditions and hence momentary. The wise men, therefore, view them as misery.

The pure feeling ((*anāsrava-vedanā*)is also misery, because it is also given up subsequently by the wise men, that is, gradually from the first Dhyāna upto the last one, *Nirodhasamāpatti*, cessation-trance. Impure meditations are misery on account of their association with the soul-view. The pure meditations too are misery for the same reason. The wise men faring in pure minds (meditations) are disgusted with all meditations. The igorant men view even misery as a happiness. The wise men well-versed in deep truth and disgusted even with the top-most realm of existence are superior to those who are disgusted with the desire-world. Thus the pure misery (*anāsrava-duhkha*) is superior (i.e. bigger or heavier) than the impure misery. The wise man having obtained the pure mind (i.e. *anāsrava-dhyāna*) is bent only on Nirvāṇa; for he at that stage perceives in a clear perspective all the manifest elements (deeply plunged into) misery. If the pure feeling is pleasant, the wise would rejoice in the happiness and not direct his mind on the Nirvāṇa.

Q. If the mind's co-farers are feeling; how are not the mind's elements etc. separate ? A. The only one feeling moves about in different fashion on *ālambana* and becomes differentiated. The mind's elements also move about on different *ālambanas* (and thus become differentiated). However, when there is consciousness-object, this (a reflex) act is termed " mind ". This has already been elucidated (chap. 60 etc.). When all these elements are present in the body there are some excellences beneficial or otherwise and hence they are termed feeling. Defilements being accomplished by several minds, they at that time are termed feeling. The Sūtra says : greed persists in the pleasant feeling, hate in unpleasant one and infatuation in the indifferent one. Therefore, in regard to the objects conceived by the idea (*saṁjñā*) there arise joyfulness

and other elements and they are termed feeling; because all the defilements spring up on that occasion.

Q. In each feeling there are three defilement residues (*anuśaya*). How is it fixed that in the pleasant feeling greed resides? A. In the unpleasant feeling no greed resides; infatuation, however, resides every feeling. Only due to infatuation one has the notion of happiness in respect of misery. When one encounters with misery he has aversion because he has no knowledge-vision into true things. In the subtle indifferent feeling neither greed not aversion is experienced because the man does not cherish the notion of either happiness or misery. Only infatuation resides in this feeling, because the person has not obtained the knowlege-vision into a real thing. When in an indifferent object, there operates neither greed nor hate the ordinary men call this a superior object, *ālambana*. Therefore, the Buddha says: Your object is not superior; greed and hate do not operate because their (respective objects) are not experienced. The Sūtra says: The indifference of ordinary folk in respect of the material thing, all that is situated in the material thing. So that object is not superior. An indifferent feeling is characterized as tranquillity like the formless-realm-concentration. The defiling forces operate there in a very subtle degree as it is tranquil. The ordinary folk arouse in it a notion of Release. Therefore the Buddha says: There resides ignorance as a latent force. Happiness and misery are not noticed there because their respective objects are not experienced. The person who discerns them notices very well happiness and misery and at that time greed and hate become possible.

Q. The person who experiences such an object, *ālambana* has the notion of happiness and misery. Therefore there are only two feelings, pleasant and unpleasant. A. The man has no notion of either happiness or misery towards that object; therefore there are not the pleasant and unpleasant (feelings) done. As it is stated previously, everything is misery and divided

into three. Q. You have stated that when there is the sense of experience of an object one has the notion of happiness and misery. Why is a sense of experience of that object not possible? The sense of experience happens through ignorance. A. This person has already grasped the mark, *nimitta* on that object and therefore he has on that object either ignorance-latency or greed-or hate-latency. Q. In the pleasant and unpleasant feelings there is only infatuation-latency. The Sūtra says : One who does not truly discern the origin, setting down taste and removal of the feelings, has that latency (*anuśaya*) which resides in the feeling neither pleasant nor unpleasant. Therefore in the pleasant and unpleasant feelings only ignorance-latency resides, and not in the third feeling. A. This Sūtra itself says that in the third feeling ignorance-latency resides, etc. Q. The meaning of this Sūtra is not to be understood in this manner. The ignorance-latency resides in the third feeling of one who does not discern the origin, etc. of the pleasant and the unpleasant feelings; how is this possible? How does the ignorance of something else reside as *anuśaya* in something else? So the Sūtra must be explained thus : For the non-discerner of the origin, etc. of neither-misery nor-happiness ignorance-latency resides in his feeling which is neither-pleasant nor-unpleasant, or in that feeling ignorance does not reside. A. In his third feeling the mind becomes three-fold : (1) a tranquillity-notion, (2) the notion of neither happiness nor misery and (3) no-misery-no-happiness-conviction (*buddhi*) born of the latter. The convinction of happiness arises for the grasper of the mark (*nimitta*) through a wrong knowledge. The conviction of misery arises for the discerner of the taste of the higher-realm-happiness. It is why the plural, *vedanānām* is expressed in the Sūtra. For, all feelings are latently tainted by ignorance. The third feeling becomes divided into three in accordance with the occasion, when the origin, etc. of unpleasant feeling are not discerned, on that occasion a notion of happiness arises on the unpleasant feeling as well as the notion of neither-misery nor-

happiness. Therefore, it says : ignorance-latency resides there foi the non-discener of the origin, etc. of the feelings; but in the feeling neither pleasant nor unpleasant ignorance-latency resides in the main.

82. *Question on Feeling*

Q. The Sūtra says : When he has a pleasant feeling, he experiences thus: a pleasant feeling has arisen in me. Who discerns the feeling truly? The past and the past feelings are not experienced and the present one does not discern itself. A. The Sūtra means to state that the person experiences it. It may also be explained without harm that the pleasant feeling comes into contact with the body and relies on the mind. The factor of happiness is spoken of as happiness. It is a common talk in the world expressing the cause in the place of effect. The person experiencing the pleasant feeling has grasped a *nimitta*. So it is said, if the pleasant feeling arises, he discerns it truly.

Q. What feels that is feeling. In this case the feeling becomes different from happiness, etc. The Sūtra says : pleasant feeling, etc. If what is felt is the feeling; by what it is felt? So it should be : What feels that is the feeling. A. The factor of happiness is spoken of happiness; e.g. fire is misery or happiness. The knowledge of experiencing the causal factor is termed pleasant feeling. The sentient beings feel this feeling. Therefore what feels that is the feeling (*Vedayati iti vedanā*). Q. There is no feeling in the sentient beings. The Sūtra says : *Vedayati iti vedanā*. A. The meaning of this is thus : What is with a *nimitta*, that has the function. In the empirical life the mind experiences these (feelings) pleasant, unpleasant, etc. being combined with *nimitta*, a causal concept, and coming into contact with the body. Therefore it is said : feeling is that which feels.

Q. In the Sūtra the experience-vision of all feelings is stated. How does a *nimitta* arise for the meditator at the time of meditation of the pleasant, unpleasant, and neither-

pleasant nor-unpleasant (feelings)? Does the notion of misery not arise for him at that time? A. He simply recollects three feelings without knowing that every thing is misery. Q. If the four foundations of mindfulness are effected through the act of non-sensuous consciousness, how is it termed corporeal happiness? A. In feelings as a result of forming such recollection he may have: This happiness is corporeal and this is mental. At the time of the mindful-foundation he has in his body the notion of happiness and on account of the mindfulness being tied to that happiness it is termed corporeal happiness.

Q. If all the feelings are mental, how is it said as corporeal feeling? A. It is said so with reference to the heretics. They say that the feelings are situated in the soul. Therefore the Buddha says: feelings are situated in the body and the mind. The corporeal feeling is that which arises on the support of five senses, and the mental is that which arises on the support of the sixth sense.

The feelings that are accompanied by defilements are called *sāmiṣa* tainted with flesh and other feelings not accompanied by them are *nirāmiṣa*. Likewise they are again said to be tainted with *kāma* and not tainted with *kāma* (*āmiṣa*). This is comparable with other saying: *Sāmiṣā prīti*, etc.; the joy that is produced on the basis of five sensuous objects (*kāmaguṇa*) is *sāmiṣa*, tainted with the flesh. The joy that is born in the first dhyāna is *Nirāmiṣa*. The feeling that is directed towards Nirvāṇa alone is said to be related to *Naiṣkramya*.

Q. Each of the five senses has a pleasant feeling or unpleasant one and why not indifferent one. A. Joyfulness and sorrowfulness are necessarily produced from the concept-construction; but the pleasant and unpleasant feelings are not so. The indifferent feeling is not divided into two; because the concept-construction is very subtle there. Q. In the third dhyāna, non-sensuous consciousness is experienced; how are there happiness and joy? A. Happiness pervades the whole body and

mind and it is termed happiness. Joy pervades the mind alone. In the third meditation on the support of an excellence of joy it is said : One experiences happiness in his body.

Q. Of three feelings which is producer of the heaviest defilement? A. Some Ābhidharmikas say that it is the pleasant feeling. Other Ābhidharmikas say that it is the unpleasant feeling. For, the sentient beings being oppressed by misery produce the heaviest defilement in their eagerness for happiness. The slightest misery surpasses many-fold happiness. A mosquito-bite e.g. causes worry to the person who is in possession of all sensuous objects. In the worldly life unpleasant feeling is plenty but the pleasant one is not so. Many sentient beings are born in three unhappy realms of birth and inferior to men and gods. Their misery is not so much due to the nature as it is due to their eagerness for happiness. The wild plants grow themselves in the field unlike the cultivated plants. One is engaged in a heavy sin on account of his unpleasant feeling; for, in the unpleasant feeling resides anger-latency. The Sūtra says : The anger (*pratigha*) is a heavier sin.

Other Ābhidharmikas say : The feeling neither pleasant nor unpleasant arises (as the cause of the heaviest defilement). Herein resides the infatuation-latency. It is the root-cause of all defilements. This (third) feeling is very subtle, and the defilements therein are hardly noticeable. This feeling is the original nature of all living beings; the other two are intruders. It pervades all the three realms of existence and persists for long. It runs counter to Nirvāṇa; for people mistake it for Nirvāṇa that is characterized as tranquillity. None understands that it is not the true Nirvāṇa. It pollutes the noble path. It is said : The Release is obtained when one realizes the nature of aloofness, *visaṁyoga*. The other two feelings pollute even the mundane path. The third one persists upto the end of the mundane existence. It is cut off when the very stream of elements (santāna) is stopped for ever. Therefore it is the most burdensome (lit. producer of the heaviest defilements).

83. *Five Senses of Feeling*

The two senses of happiness and misery pertain to the body and continue to be so upto four Dhyānas. The other three senses pertain to the mind and continue to be so upto the topmost realm of existence (*bhavāgra*).

Q. A Sūtra says : The sense of sorrowfulness disappears in the first Dhyāna; the sense of joyfulness in the third Dhyāna, the sense of happiness in the fourth Dhyāna and the sense of indifference in the cessation-trance. So the above statement is not apt. A. According to this Sūtra the sense of misery exists in the first Dhyāna. But in your system the first Dhyāna is devoid of it. Therefore the above Sūtra is not to be trusted. The whole universe is misery. In the two higher spheres of existence misery exists in a subtle form, The four modes of acts (*iryā-patha*) are said to exist in four Dhyānas. Wherever there is a mode of act there is misery. Form-realm has the visual, auditory and tactile consciousnesses whereof the feeling is either pleasant or unpleasant. For one mode of act another mode is sought; hence there is misery. The taste of matter is happiness and joyfulness produced from it. Its blame is misery of impermanence, misery of modification. The form-realm has the matter; hence there is the taste-idea, and blame-idea. Hence there are happiness and misery.

The Buddha says : The first Dhyāna has the speech, etc. as arrow. The second Dhyāna has *vitarka* and *vicāra*, and upto *Naivasaṁjñā-nāsaṁjñā-yatana* has the feeling and the idea (*saṁjñā*). The arrow means misery. Just as the feeling is harmful in the desire-world just so it is harmful in the form-world and hence it is misery. The disease, etc. exist therein as in the desire-world. The lustre in each person there differs and hence there is a division of action. Due to this there ought to be the enjoyer of the resultant of such action. A Sūtra says : Here are some defilements such as jealousy and envy, etc. For example, Brahmā addresses to another Brahmā : This abode

is eternal; do not approach Gautama, the Recluse, etc. It is stated again : Here is a defilement of wrong view, etc. All these are unwholesome and cause sorrowful resultants. Therefore there is misery. The Ābhidharmikas say : All the defilements are unmeritorious. How is not there the unpleasant feeling? The Sūtra says : Men and gods are delighted in material thing. When it is modified and disappeared they dwell in a great misery. The same is to be said with regard to other four aggregates of elements. Therefore the person not freed from desire has sorrowfulness and joyfulness. Joyfulness comes from securing the lovable and sorrowfulness from the loss of the same. Why does the ignorant folk not have them in the presence of such conditions? The Sūtra says : To a person who has entered into the noble path the joyfulness and sorrowfulness towards rūpa, matter disappear at his death. Therefore these two elements follow all the ignorant folk at all time.

The Buddha says : Arhan has one virtue, that is, his mind being got rid of sorrowfulness and joyfulness abides in tranquillity. Six modes of tranquillity-co-faring are the acts of holy men and not of ordinary men. The ordinary folk occasionally fares in tranquillity, but it is not conditioned by a true knowledge-vision. A Sūtra says : The tranquillity-mind of the ordinary folk is all related to the matter, *rūpa* and not freed from the greed for it. So it is not a tranquillity-mind in fact. According to a Sūtra lust-latency exists always in the pleasant feeling.

You opine that the lust-latency exists sometimes in the indifferent feeling. That is not stated in any Sūtra. The body and mind in higher region are greatly blessed by pacifying, happiness. The Sūtra says : Gods abide here for several thousand years. If they do not abide there in happiness, they would not continue to abide in that mode of act for several years. The serenity-happiness is the highest; and it is, according to a Sūtra, the same as the pleasant feeling. Therefore it exists in all regions. Your opinion that the serenity-happiness is

different from the pleasant feeling is not correct. Whichever is causing a beneficial effect to the body that is termed happiness. The serenity-happiness is also of the same nature and hence not different from the pleasant feeling.

Q. If, in the Samādhis of higher regions there exist happiness, misery, joyfulness and sorrowfulness. *Dhyāna-Sūtra* would not be favoured as authority. A. This Sūtra runs counter to the law of nature, *Dharmatā-lakṣaṇa*; if it is set aside as anomalous, what harm will be there? There is an abiding in happiness, calm and free from any attachment. There does not arise any gross greed or indignation. Therefore it is said that there does not exist happiness or misery. These elements exist there in a very subtle degree and hence not noticed. There does not exist any misery caused by sword and arrow, etc. and also not exist any sorrowfulness caused by imprisonment and capital punishment; hence it is said that there is no misery. It is, for instance, said that the form-sphere is devoid of heat-cold. There also exist four great elements; how can it be said to be devoid of heat-cold? Gods in three dhyānas are said to be of one body, etc. Even there exist varieties of their bodily lustre. A man is called the absolute ignorant when he knows a little; and the food is said to be absolutely saltless when it has a less salt. Similarly joyfulness and sorrowfulness are not obviously felt there and therefore they are said to be non-existent.

You say that there is no searching mind, *vitarka*, in the higher region. The Buddha says: *Vitarka* is conditioned by *Saṁjñā*, a definite concept. When there is *Saṁjñā*, why is not there *vitarka*? Therefore *vitarka* is understood to be existing in the higher region upto the topmost realm of existence (*bhavāgra*). Grossness of the mind is *vitarka* and hence it is said to be disappeared in the (last) two Dhyānas. Therefore even in the two realms of existence there exist happiness, misery and others.

FORMATION. (*Saṁskāra*)

84. *Volition.* (*Cetanā*)

Sūtra says : Formation-aggregate is what are six volition-bodies (*cetanākāya*). Here aspiration (*prārthanā*) i.e. *praṇidhāna* is volition. The Sūtra says : *Saṁskāra* is what produces manifestations (*abhisaṁskaroti*). The thirst that produces manifestation of (*saṁskāra*) Skandha is aspiration (*prārthanā*). The manifestations are supported on the thirst. The unlearned being oppressed by six-fold contact (*sparśa*) like *yavakalāpi* wills again for a future existence; he is much more oppressed by the same. This makes clear that the aspiration is the same as volition. It is said : The volition-food is equal to the fire-pit (*aṅgāra-karṣa*). The future life is comparable to the fire-sparks, as it causes numerous miserise. The Sūtra says : The sense of "I" is activity (*iñjita*), etc. Wherein exists the sense of "I", therein is activity, the mind's act,..and abode of greed. What is manifested is termed abode of greed. Therefore we understand that the aspiration is the volition. The Sūtra says : Karman is will and voluntary action. Here will, *cetanā* is mental action and the voluntary action, *cetayitvā karman* is bodily and vocal action. *Cetayitvā* is *prārthayitvā*, having aspired. The *Upāli Sūtra* says : Nighaṇṭa, Nātha's son hates cold water and uses hot water. He aspires for the cold water and not obtaining it he dies and is born amongst the gods known as *Manassakta*. He is born there because he is thinking of the cold. Therefore it is understood that the aspiration is the same as volition.

Some objects : Aspiration is thirst, not volition. The *Sahetu-Sapratyaya*-Sūtra says : What is aspired by the unlearned is only thirst, The *Mahānidāna* Sūtra says : Searching is due to thirst. The Sūtra says : When the man is engrossed in five sensual objects that lust is aspiration. Again the Sūtra says: Clinging is conditioned by thirst. The searching first happening, clinging comes next. The searching is only thirst. Therefore

the view that aspiration is volition as you stated is not correct. You said that the resolve, *praṇidhāna* is volition is not right. The *Upāli Sūtra* says : Non-volitional action is not a great Sin. The non-volitional action follows ignorance. People in the world also think that knowledge is *cetanā*, volition. They talk thus : Who, a knowledge-possessor will do this and who having *cetanā*, will do this? They mean thereby an intelligent person. Therefore we understand that knowledge is *cetanā*.

The author replies : *Praṇidhāna*, a firm vow is termed *Samudaya*, origin, and *Praṇidhāna* which is *aṅga*, a limb of action is *cetanā*. One, e.g. making a vow, says : I shall obtain such body in a future life. Q. If it is so, then it will be impure. *Cetanā* is the cause of thirst. The Sūtra says : When the food of mind's volitional activity is known, three-fold thirst becomes known. Therefore *cetanā* is the cause of thirst. A. You say that *cetanā* is impure. I also say the same; because, formation, *saṁskāra*, is defined as what manifests, *abhisaṃskaroti* and that is volition. The pure element does not manifest (any action); a *cetanā*, on the other hand, manifests and not in the nature of cessation. Your opinion that volition is the cause of thirst is wrong; because it is the result of thirst and its limb (*aṅga*), but not its cause. It is said that due to abandonment of the result the cause is abandoned, viz. through abandoning the food of the mind's volitional activity three-fold thirst is abandoned. It is therefore understood that volition is the limb of thirst. Thirst is two-fold: cause and result. Thirst is the cause and its result is aspiration, *prārthanā* which is the same as *cetanā*, volition.

Q. In that case, volition will be a limb of thirst. For, a thing in the state of being cause is something else and a thing in the state of being result something else. The *Sahetu-Sapratyaya Sūtra* says : Whichever is aspired by the ignorant is the thirst alone; whichever is acted upon by the man of thirst is attempt (*ceṣṭita*). Thus *cetanā* is the action-trait (*karmalak-*

ṣaṇa). So it is different from the thirst. For what object one has desire, he has aspriation for that object. So aspiration comes from lust, *rāga*. Aspiration is volition. Therefore lust (*rāga*) is the cause of volition. A. I previously stated that volition (*cetanā*) is the limb of thirst (meaning thereby that thirst itself is regarded as the limb of thirst). The first effort of thirst is desire (*rāga*). The effort of a desirous is aspiration *prārthanā*. *Praṇidhāna*, firm resolve is the limb of volition. The first is an act known as *praṇidhāna*, next one enters into action. Q. Is volition different or not different from the mind? A. They are identical. *Dharma-pada* says : "When one speaks or acts with the polluted mind, misery arises therefrom". Therefore we understand the mind and volition are one and the same. If it is not so, what will be a mental action? It is the mental act which fares in the mind-*ālambana*. Therefore volition is the mind alone. Though it is said by a general characteristic that volition is the mind's co-farer (*mana-upa-vicāra*), it is stated as related to something wholesome or unwholesome. The volition is many-fold; When a man prays for good or bad to other living beings, it is termed volition (*cetanā*). When he prays for what is not yet obtained, then it is aspiration (*prārthanā*). When one prays for a future life, then it is a firm resolve (*praṇidhāna*). Therefore we understand one and the same volition is designated by various names.

85. *Sensation* (*Sparśa*)

Consciousness being related to an object (*ālambana-gata*) is termed sensation (*sparśa*). To say that meeting together of three elements is sensation is not a proper definition. For, no sense-organ reaches the object (ch. 49); hence there will be no meeting together between the sense-organ and the object. Since three elements grasp one object, it is termed *sannipāta*, meeting together.

Objection, There is a separate *sparśa*, a mental element (*caitasika dharma*). The Sūtra of twelve *nidāna*s says : Feeling

is conditioned by *sparśa*. It is said : *Sparśa* is the cause of feeling, idea and formation (*saṁskāra*). *Ṣat-Ṣatka-Sūtra* says: There are six sensation-bodies. It is also said : *Sparśa* is the cause of the ignorance and others. In case the causes are nominal things (*prajñapti-dharma*), *sparśa* would not be stated in the Sūtra as a separate element. Two-fold *sparśa* is found in the Sūtra: one is the contact between three elements and the other is an effect due to the such contact. Here one is real element and the other nominal (*prajñaptisat*). For example, brilliance that is found in the sun, jewel and *gomedaka* is each different; the watery element of the moon is different from that of the moon-stone (*kānta*). Likewise the contact is different in each sense-organ, the eye, etc. (that is real). What will be the fault in so saying? e.g. a congregation of monks is not different from the monks; the combination of the five aggregates is ont different from the aggregates; the combination of two trees is also not different from the trees. Likewise, contact is not different from the eye and other sense-organs. (This is nominal).

Answer. I have already stated that it is termed *sparśa* when the mind grasps the object (*ālambana*). So when the mind becomes the cause of consciousness-genesis, immediately after that spring up the feeling and other mental elements. That moment is termed *sparśa*. So is stated in the *Ṣat-Ṣatka* Sūtra. We do not accept two-fold *sparśa*. It is said every-where that meeting together of three elements is *sparśa*. The Sūtra speaking of two-fold *sparśa* is to be disregarded as it runs counter to *Dharma Lakṣaṇa*, law of the elemental nature. If *sparśa* is different on the analogy with brilliance and coldness as stated above; their functions would also differ. Since no difference is found in their functioning, *sparśa* is not different from the three elements.

If *sparśa* is a separate mental element, it will differ from the other mental elements. The former is the cause of the latter. *Sparśa* is not the cause of its self. It is not a mental element

because of its different origin. If you say that a special kind of *sparśa* is the condition to the mental elements just as it is said that thirst is conditioned by feeling and not *vice-versa*; then it may be asked: what is the special characteristic of *sparśa* which cannot be attributed to other mental elements. No any speciality can be pointed out and hence it is not an argument. What is in the first moment is feeling and what is in the next moment is thirst; so the thirst is conditioned by feeling and not *vice-versa*. If there is *sparśa* as a separate element, its characteristic must be elucidated. Since its special trait is not stated, it is not a separate element. The Buddha employing *sparśa* in some other sense, says : The oppression of misery approaches and touches the crowd of people. It is said again that one, being touched by a pleasant feeling, should not become negligent nor should one being touched by unpleasant feeling become indignant. Here the term *sparśa* is employed to mean the feeling. The Buddha addresses a Yakṣa Sūciloma by name, thus: Yours touch is sinful; and hence I take away (my) body. The people in the world say: Pleasant is the warm touch. *Sparśa* is also said to be a food. In all such cases the term *sparśa* is used in an element which is cognised by tactile consciousness.

It is also said elsewhere : The blind does not touch the visible. The nomenclature of *sparśa* is also used in the objects like the visible, etc. Thus the talk of *sparśa* is not strictly governed by any rigid rule; hence there is no any separate mental element like *sparśa*. What is said as a mental element, that is contradictory to the trait of *sparśa*. Buddha says : Coming together of three elements is *sparśa*. It is therefore understood that there is no any separate and ultimately real mental element like *sparśa*. What element approaches the body that is termed *sparśa*. What discharges the causal function to the mental elements, feeling, etc. that is given the designation of *sparśa*.

86. *Attention* (*Manaskāra*)

The arresting of the mind to (an object) (*ābhoga*) is *manaskāra* and that is its charactristic. Hence a different mind arises

for each attention. It is also said to be characterized as a maker of determination about the object. The Sūtra says: The eye, an internal base is unhurt, the visible, an external base is present in front, but the attention that causes the rise of other mind is not operative, then no visual consciousness would arise.

The Experience of all the (sensuous) consciousness does not spring up solely by virtue of attention. It may, sometimes arise by virtue of *ābhoga*, spontaneous arrest of the mind, as of those who are devoid of strong desire. Sometimes it arises by virtue of the sense-ogran, as, e.g. a person having a clear sight-organ and the light examines minute things. Sometimes it arises by virtue of object-force as e.g. a person notices from distance a lamp but not its shaking (*kampa*). Sometimes it arises on account of a frequent practice, as e.g. painting and such other act. Sometimes it is on account of grasping the truth, as, e.g. conviction of the visible. Sometimes it arises as a result of elements self-characteristic, as e.g. *dhyāna* at the end of aeon. Sometimes it arises due to life-time, as e.g. unwholesome mind of the living beings of less life-duration. Sometimes it arises due to the nature of birth-base as e.g. the mind of the cow and the goat, etc. Sometimes it arises by foce of the bodily nature, as e.g. the mind of the man and the woman. Sometimes it arises due to a particular age as e.g. the mind of children. Sometimes it arises by force of the previous action, as e.g. the experience of sensual pleasures (*kāma*) etc. etc. etc.

Q. Experience of all conciousness is characterized as happening in a successive order. Why is not said the attention as a separate element and producer of another mind? A. It is for the sake of the heretics who say that experience of consciousness arises as a result of conjunction of the mind with the soul. In order to refute this opinion it has been pointed out that consciousness is experienced as conditioned by its preceding moment. Therefore it is said that when one has no attention,

producer of another mind no experience of consciousness arises in him; because it arises on the basis of each preceding moment, a *samanantara*-condition. Consciousness everywhere arises each as single and one after another. For example, one first cuts the tree and then pulls it down.

It is previously (chs. 65,76) stated that the consciousness, by its nature, is successive. It does not come up on the basis of conjunction of the mind with the soul. Just as the external things, sprost, stem, leaf, flower and fruit are all successive, so are the internal things also.

Attention is two-flod: right and wrong. The right is the attention directed to true nature of things (*yoniśaḥ*). People talk, for instance, of right question, right refutation and there is a reasonable solution to the question and refutation. It is the right one which interrogates the impermanence of all things and also employs what is good *probans* and *probandum*. The right attention, therefore, is that which follows good reasoning and which is directed towards truths. It is also right attention which is done in accordance with the nature of person and time. For example, the meditation on the foul object is suited to the person who is filled with desires; and the mind being low-spirited, to it a stimulus (*vyuthhāna*) should be applied. The reverse of this is wrong attention.

The right attention is capable of accumulating all virtues whereas the wrong one of all defiling forces.

87. *Faculty of Desire* (*or wish*)
(*Chanda*)

The desirous mind is termed the faculty of desire. The Sūtra says: *kāmacchanda*, the term is to be parsed : *Kāmān chandayati*, the mind desires the sensual pleasures. The Sūtra again says : *Chanda* is the root-cause of things (dharma). It is so designated because one obtains all things by means of pray-

ing for. The Buddha tells his disciples: If you are having an intense with (*chanda*) for my dispensation, it will prolong for all times. An intense desire is what is desired or wished for by a concerted mind (*cittaikatāna*). *Chanda-Samādhi* is one of the four Ṛddhi-pādas. *Chanda* is what is desired or wished (*abhilaṣyate*) by the mind. This desire or wish with the assistance of endeavour (*virya*) accumulates the concentration of wisdom (*prajñā-samādhi*); hence it is wished from the four Ṛddhis and given the designation of *Ṛddhiaṅga*. A Sūtra passage (S.I. 202-3) is cited to the effect that a disciple of the Buddha (after attaining Arhant-hood) ceased to recite the Sūtras as before. Gods asked him the reason for this; the disciple replied: I previously cherished a wish for (*chanda*) the Sūtras, but now as I am freed from the wish, I cherish *Chanda* no more. This proves that what is wished is *chanda*. On the basis of a wished (element) one cherishes a wish, *chanda* towards the sensual pleasure (*kāma*). Thus *Kāmacchanda* (is formed).

88. *Joy* (*Prīti*)

Joy is delightfulness of the mind (*cittābhirati*) in respect of a desired object (*abhipsita*). It is said (in a Sūtra): Living beings by virtue of this joy in the unwholesome acts due to their elemental characteristics pursue the unwholesome acts and by virtue of joy in the wholesome acts pursue the wholesome acts.

Q. Elemental characteristic (*dhātu*) is not joy. For, (it is said before, Ch. 2): (The Buddha's) *Dhātujñāna-bala* is what the Buddha discerns the various elemental natures of the sentient beings and his *adhimukti-jñāna-bala* is what he discerns the sentient beings' mental propensity. Therefore *dhātu* and *prīti* (=*adhimukti*) are quite different.

A. Dhātu is a mental disposition (lit. mind) that has been accumulated through a habitual practice for immemorial days. Joy is produced in accordance with the *dhātu*. Therefore *dhātu-jñāna-bala* is a discernment of the mental disposition that has

been accumulated since long; and the *adhimukti-jñāna-bala* is a knowledge that the joy is produced in accordance with *dhātu*. Therefore it is said that the streams of sentient beings pursue and have joy in the good or bad acts in accordance with their elemental nature (*dhātu*). However, the joy that is arisen in the person depressed by severe cold towards the fire is not due to his elemental nature but it is caused by a perceptible experience (*dṛṣṭa-hetu*). This is the distinction between *dhātu* and *prīti*, joy.

89. *Faith* (*Śraddhā*)

The mind's steady concentration is the characteristic of faith. Q. It is the characteristic of wisdom (*prajñā*). For the steady concentration is always present in the person who has abandoned any doubt (in regard to the Buddha and his doctrine). A. Faith is the mind's purity obtained by a person through listening to the discourses from the holy men on the Dharma which has not been discovered by himself. Q. The person who has witnessed Dharma himself may not have the faith. A. Arhan is not in the possession of faith. So says the ***Dharma-pada***:

> He is the supreme person who is of no faith and gratitude, has cut off knots and killed opportunities and hopes.

The Sūtra says : I believe in this thing in accordance with the Buddha's saying. When one perceives the law for himself, his mind becomes clarified. This (mental state) also is termed "faith." Having first heard the Dharma one perceives it face to face in his own body; he thinks that the Dharma is absolutely true and not false. On account of this his mind becomes pure (*prasīdati*). The faith is included in the four *avetya-prasādas*. For example, a patient believing in a doctor's advice undergoes his treatment; being freed from the disease he entertains a pure mind towards the doctor : This is *śraddhā*, faith.

The faith is two-fold: One produced from illusion and the other produced from knowledge. The first is when a person does not think of good or bad, etc. and has a steadiness of the mind

towards the unholy teachers, like Pūraṇa, etc. The second is when one keeps on a steady mind towards the Buddha, etc.

The faith is to be divided into three : good, bad and indeterminate. One may say that the bad faith is to be brought under the category of defiling forces and thus it becomes non--faith. The bad faith is not a non-faith. The faith is characterized as the mind's steadiness and the bad faith also of the same character. If it is not so, the bad feeling will not at all be a feeling. Hence it is to be divided into three only.

The faith that is counted under the *Indriyas* and condusive to final release and the faith that is brought under thirty-seven constituents of enlightenement is all wholesome for all time.

90. *Endeavour* (*Vyavasāya = Virya*)

Endeavour (*vyavasāya*) is the mind's enthusiasm (*abhyutsāha*). It always resides in other dharmas, viz. attention or concentration. The enthusiasm for this is the constant operation of the mind's one-pointedness, and that is endeavour.

It is three-fold: good, bad and indeterminate. The good is what is included in the four right efforts (*samyak-pradhāna*). The other is bad. An ascetic who believes in blasphemy of the bad acts and in the value of the good acts makes endeavour in sequence in order to give up the bad acts and accumulate the good ones. This is the reason why the faculty of endeavour (*viryendriya*) is spoken of after the faculty of faith. The endeavour directed towards the good acts (dharma) is termed *virya*, courage and it is the root-cause of all benefits. The dharmas like the attention, etc. being assisted by this courage cause the production of grand fruits; the fire, e.g. when assisted by the wind consumes everything.

91. *Memory* (*Smṛti*)

Memory is a knowledge of what is previously experienced. The Sūtra says : The fact that one recollects what is experienced in the distant past and never forgets it, that is memory.

Q. Memory pertains to three times. The Sūtra says : I declare memory conducive to all purposes. It is included in the four recollections which pertain to all the three times. Why do you say that it rests on the past object alone? A. The said passage is applicable to all times and not to the three times alone. When the mind becomes arrogant (*uddhata*) then the memory is directed to two (things), and then it is termed " ubiquitous " (*sarvatraga*). Of the four foundations of mindfulness pertaining to the three times, the mindfulness relying on the present object is in fact only a wisdom and not the memory. Therefore, when Tathāgata spoke at first of release by the name of memory, he afterwards declared the same as wisdom.

Q. How is it that one consciousness recollects what was experienced by some other consciousness? A. This is the law governing the memory, namely a thing is experienced previously in one stream of elements and perished immediately, and afterwards, the same thing of the distant past is relied upon as the object by some other consciousness of the same stream of elements. It is the law also of the cognizing faculty of knowledge, namely, what is experienced by one consciousness is cognized by some other consciousness; e.g. a visible object (*rūpa*) which is cognized by the visual consciousness, the non-sensuous consciousness cognizes it (again). One person (*pudgala*) experiences something. The other person cognizes the same; e.g. a holy person cognizes everything that is experienced by other body in a previous life by virtue of his memory-strength (*smṛti-bala*).

Q. In case memory is the knowledge of the previously experienced object. the phenomena of announcement (*vijñapti*) in the present moment, etc. would be memory; because they also relate to the things of previous experience. A. True they are also memories. The Buddha, for example, advising Śalyaka, a disciple of Nātha says : " Think attentively first and then argue. " It is also said : The moment one thinks of the happiness he has previously experienced, he give rise to (a deep

desire), a defiling force. Therefore the announcement in so far as it recollects things of the past moment is to be regarded as memory. The memory is possible from an object whose characteristic features are already well grasped. The memory arises in regard to the object the characteristic of which has been grasped, and it arises in regard to no other object. Concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*prajñā*) shall be explained in their respective chapters (Chs. 156, 194 etc.)

92. *Vitarka and Vicāra*

The mind that is unconcentrated (*vyagra*) and frequently attempting (a search) is *vitarka*. The mind that is concentrated (*samāhita*) has two stages : coarseness and subtlety. The coarse stage is *vitarka*. A mind in termed coarse for the reason that it lacks concentration. The Buddha says : The ascetic dwells in the (first dhyāna) which is with *Vitarka* and *Vicāra*. Therefore the first dhyāna is coarse and unconcentrated and hence it is with *vitarka*. *Vicāra* is a state of the mind which is unconcentrated and a bit subtle. These two mental states are present in all three realms of existence as they are gross and subtle states of the mind. The mind that is unconcentrated and distracted become *vitarka* and *vicāra*. These characteristics can be obtained in all the spheres of existence. A thing that is imperceptible can be apprehended by inference. A deep guess: This may be of such fashion and it may not be so, is *vitarka*. A Subsequent guess (*anuvitarka*) of the imperceptible object may be either a right one or false one. A guess (=knowledge) free from the discursive thought is named the right knowledge (*samyak dṛṣṭi*). The false *vitarka* is a perverse thought e.g. to conceive impermanent as permanent, etc. The right *vitarka* is when the ascetic, by means of inference, acquires the true knowledge previously not acquired and abides in the source of merit known as *Nirvedhabhāgīya*. This (stage) is termed *kṣānti*. Thus the inferential knowledge accompanying along with other (right) paths is right *vitarka*. Here perception is what is free

from the constructive thought of the concept-recollection (*samjñā-anusmaraṇa-vikalpa*). In the sequence of the same *vitarka*, a thinking or searching in the form "This is possible for this reason and that is not possible for that reason" is *vicāra*.

Some masters say that *vitarka* and *vicāra* are brought under the (mind's) one-pointedness. That is not correct. You have already stated the example of striking the bell (ch. 50). Here the first sounding is *vitarka* and the other sounding is *vicāra*. The example of waves also has been stated. The coarse wave is *vitarka* and the subtle one *vicāra*. They are not the varieties of the mind's one-pointedness because they appear in a different space and a different time. The five sensory consciousnesses are free from the discursive thoughts and therefore not characterized with *vitarka* and *vicāra*.

93. *Other Mental States*

Pramāda is non-observance or wrong observance of meritorious acts. There is no any separate element known as *pramāda*, carelessness. The mind's operation on the above occasion is termed *pramāda*. The reverse of this is *apramāda*. It is also not a separate element. The mind bent on the unwholesome act is *pramāda* and the same bent on the wholesome act is *apramāda*.

The roots of merit are non-greed, non-indignation and non-infatuation. Non-greed is the detachment headed by a right attention and thinking (*yoniśo-manaskāra*). Non-indignation is not giving vent to anger headed by love and compassion. Non-infatuation is the non-perversion and non-illusion headed by the right vision. Therefore non-greed (etc.) are not separate elements.

Some masters say: non-greed is the absence of greed. This is not correct. The absence of greed is a non-entity which cannot serve as the cause of any positive dharma.

The reverse of the three roots of demerit are three roots of merit, complacency or arrogance (*Mada*) and pride (māna)

etc. are also roots of demerit. But only three roots of demerit are stated here in brief. This will be detailed in the chapter on demerits (*akuśala*).

The roots of indeterminate acts : Some masters say that they are four, viz. the thirst, wrong view, pride and ignorance. The other masters say that they are three viz. thirst, ignorance and wisdom (*prajñā*). This is not stated by the Buddha. The mind accompanying the indeterminate acts is produced by what cause, that cause is termed the root of the indeterminate acts. The mind (i.e. thought) arises : The bodily and vocal acts in general accompany the indeterminate (mind): (hence) the indeterminate mind is termed " the root of the indeterminate acts. "

The mental cerenity (*praśrabdhi*) is: When at the time of the mind's working the body and mind become ca'm and free from ill-being, at that moment it is temed *praśrabdhi*.

The mind not interested in any particular thing is *upekṣā*. In feelings when the mind takes no interest in any particular feeling, that state is termed *upekṣā*, tranquillity. In dhyānas the operation of the mind which is freed from happiness and misery and bent on release is *upekṣā*. In the seven factors of enlightenment, what operation of the mind is not depressed (*alīna*), unshaky and steady, that (state) is *upekṣā*. The mind that is released from joy and displeasure and has secured equilibrium is termed *upekṣā*. In four *apramāṇas*, illimitables the mind that is free from hate and love is *upekṣā*.

Thus the division of the mental states is not countable.

94. *Mind's Dissociat Elements*
(*Cittaviprayukta-saṁskāras*)

The mind's dissociates are *prāpti*, *aprāpti*, *asaṁjñi-samāpatti*, *nirodhasamāpatti*, *āsamjñika*, *jīvitendriya*, *jāti*, *vyaya*, *sthiti*, *anyathātva*, *jarā*, *maraṇa*, *nāma-kāya*, *pada-kāya*, *vyañjana-kāya*, *pṛthak-janatva* and others.

Prāpti is the sentient beings' association with (the resultant) elements. A sentient being who has obtained five (skandhas) aggregates of elements in this period is termed *prāpta*. The sentient being is obtained with the resultant elements of the good and bad actions of a previous life-period, whose resultants are not experienced. The Sūtra says : The Pudgala is possessed of good and bad (resultant) elements. Some masters say that he is *prāpta* who is met with the good and bad corporeal and vocal acts of the past; *e.g.* an ascetic is met with the past moral conduct and its resultants. But this is not correct. For *prāpti* signifies obtaining of all elements. So says the Sūtra : Him who acquires merits and demerits, they always accompany just as the shadow accompanies a material object. Another Sūtra says : merit never perishes even for the dead person, *i.e.* it necessarily produces its result. The merit and demerit which do not accompany him are incapable of producing their results, and such actions perish.

Q. There is no obtaining of the past restraints; for, in your system, the past element perished and the future one is non-existent. The present also is not always capable of obtaining the wholesome mind. How would one be obtained with good conduct and restraints? A. The person is obtained with the present restraint and not the past one, just as a polluted mind arises from the polluted mind, so from the present good conduct arises a good conduct and not from the past one. The person who accepted certain moral conduct previously and never forsakes it is regarded as obtained with the past restraint.

The Ābhidharmikas say : The sentient beings are possessed of the mind either good or bad pertaining to future period. But they, in fact, are not so possessed of; because there will be a logical error known as *akṛta-abhyāgama*, production of the fruit from the act not done previously. So *prāpti* is the obtaining of the elements of the present period only. It is not a separate element. Reverse of this is *aprāpti* and this too is not a separate element.

There is no any dharma of *samāpattī* known as *asamjñi-samāpatti*. There is no such stage when the mind and mental elements disappear utterly of the ordinary folk. This question will be detailed later on (ch. 170). The mind and mental elements operate very discretely at that stage and hardly understandable; and therefore it is termed *asamjñi*, unconscious. So is to be explained *āsamjñika*. *Nirodha-Samāpatti* is so termed because the mind does not operate in its cessation time. That is not a separate element like Nirvāṇa. The life (*jivita*) is continuum of five aggregates of elements conditioned by the action; it is the source of numerous activities and hence it is termed *jivitendriya*.

Jāti (birth) is the production in the present period of the five aggregates of elements. *vyaya* is their separation from the present moment. Their continued flow is the *sthiti*. The continuity of their flow in modified form is *anyathātva*.

There are no separate elements such as *Jāti* and other. The Buddha's dispensation is very deep and unique which declares that things are produced due to the totality of causes and conditions. And there is no any one element that produces other elements. It is said: The eye, the visible object (the light, etc.) are conditioning factors to the visual consciousness. This passage does not speak of *jāti*. Thus there is no any separate element like *jāti*.

Some masters (Sarvāstivādin) say that *jāti* and other elements are simultaneous. The dharma which is of one moment disappears at once. It is now to be investigated that of what use would be those elements *jāti*, etc. to it? The Buddha himself explains the import of the term *Jāti* in the *Dvādaśa-Nidāna-Sūtra* thus: The birth (*jāti*) of such and such living beings in the midst of such and such places is the gaining of the five aggregates of elements. So *jāti* is the first appearance of five aggregates of elements. The same Sūtra says: Death is falling down on those elements, and their vanishing. The Sūtra says again, *jarā* is that those elements becoming old and broken. Therefore death and old age are not separate elements.

Nāma-kāya : The word like *Devadatta* is formed from the letters (*vyañjana*). The sentence (*pada*) is an instrument to express an idea in accordance with its letters. *Vyañjana* is a letter.

Some masters say that bodies of the name, word and letters are separate elements not associated with the mind. But this is not correct. These elements are of the vocal nature (*vāk-svabhāva*) and brought under the base of dharmas (*dharmā-yatana*).

Some master says that there is a separate element named ordinary-manhood (*pṛthak-janatva*). This is incorrect; for there is no such element apart from the ordinary-man. If it is so accepted, there would be pot-nature (*ghaṭatva*), etc. other than the pot, etc. Similarly the number, dimension, oneness, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, *paratva* and *aparatva*, etc. would be separate elements. The heretics aphorism says : The pot and potness are each different. On the basis of potness one knows this is pot. Colour and colourness are different each. This is incorrect. For, that-ness is the nature of that. If you say that there is a separate man-hood, then *rūpa* would be bereft of its nature, because it needs the presence of *rūpatva* (for its becoming fully *rūpa*). This will be quite improper. Therefore you, not considering its full implications, have propounded the view-that there is a separate element known as *pṛthak-janatva*, ordinary man-hood.

The Ābhidharmikas, having studied the treatises of the heretics composed the *Abhidharma-Śāstra* and declare that there are separate elements like manhood, etc.

Other Ābhidharmikas also say : There are certain unmanifest elements like *Tathatā* suchness, *Bhūta-koṭi*, *Pratītya-Samutpāda*. Dependent Origination and others. Therefore, please consider this deep principle (*naya*) and not follow mere words of the Buddha.

III

Samudaya-Satya Skandha

KARMAN ACTION

95. *Action-Characteristic*

Samudaya-satya consists of action, *karman* and defiling forces (*kleśa*). Karman is three-fold : corporeal, vocal and mental. The corporeal is what is done by the body. This is three-fold : good, bad and indeterminate. Good is paying homage to *caitya*, a Buddhist shrine, etc.; bad, killing, etc. and indeterminate, unconsciously cutting grass, etc.

The pot and other manufactured things are the results of corporeal action and not that action itself. Q. The bodily movement produces action and this is impossible because things are momentary. A. This point has already been answered in the chapter on momentariness (ch. 74), viz. when one thing springs up there is some increase or decrease to some other thing; that is regarded as corporeal action. The body is an instrument of committing action. When the body moves to some other place, the rise of merit or demerit is action. So the body itself is not the action.

Q. The rise of merit and demerit is *avijñapti*, unmanifest action. What is *kāya-vijñapti*, manifest action of the body? A. The body moving to some other place, the action is manifest and that is *kāya-vijñapti*. Q. It is good or bad; but the mere body is not so. A. The body moving to some other place the action originates by virtue of the mind and this origination is good or bad, but the direct product of the body is not so. The good or bad vocal action is also not mere speech, but the action originated from the speech by virtue of the mind is good or bad. The same is to be said in regard to mental action also. When

a person is of decisive mind (*i.e.* thinking) thus : I shall kill this sentient being, at that time he produces demerit (*pāpa*). So also the merit (*puṇya*) is produced.

Q. The corporeal and vocal actions are different from the body and the mouth; similarly the mind is different from the mental action. A. The mental action is two-fold : The mind itself and the product from the mind. The mind which decides thus : "I shall kill this creature" is the mental action in the form of mind itself. This action in the nature of accumulated demerits excels the corporeal and vocal actions. When the mind is not decisive, then the mind is different from the action.

From the manifest action is originated the action whose characteristic is unmanifestation (*avijñapti*). The unmanifest action pertains not only to the body and the speech but to the mind also. The Sūtra states two kinds of action : will and voluntary action (*cetanā vā cetayitvā vā karaṇam*). *Cetanā*, will which is the mind itself is action. The voluntary action is that which is accumulated by *cetanā*, will and it is corporeal or vocal. Amongst three the mental action is the heaviest; this point will be elucidated later on (Ch. 119). The element known as *avijñapti* that is accumulated by the heavier action continues constantly by way of stream. It is thus clear that there is unmanifest action (*avijñapti*) even from the mental action.

96. *Unmanifest Action*
(*Avjñapti*)

What is this? That which is originated depending on the mind, is known as *puṇya*, *pāpa*, merit and demerit, and that which constantly follows even at the time of deep sleep and swoon, etc. is termed *avijñapti*. So says a Sūtra :

Those who endow gift of gardens and grove, water-shed and shelter, their merits increase for ever and day and night.

Some masters say : the manifest action is actually witnessed by our eye, viz. donation of the cloth, paying homage to the shrine and killing, etc. The unmanifest action is not so witnessed and hence non-existent. The author replies : If it is non-existent, then *dharma* like abstention from killing, etc. would not be there. Q. Abstention is non-action; non-action is non-entity. For example, when a man does not speak, then there is no element of non-speaking; when one does not see the visible object, then there is no thing like non-seeing. (Likewise the unmanifest action is non-entity). A. One ascends the heaven by means of abstention from killing. If abstention is non-entity, how can it serve as a cause? Q. One ascends the heaven not through abstention but through the meritorious mind. A. It is not correct. The *Sūtra* says : A man of good effort produces numerous merits by living a long life and because of numerous merits one obtains the heavenly pleasure. If it is through mere meritorious mind, how does it speak of numerous merits? The person cannot remain eternally in the good mind. It is said : The merit of rearing the grove increases day and night. The moral conduct is eternal. If *avijñapti* is a non-entity how is to be explained that merit constantly increases ? The manifest action (*vijñapti*) too is not mere killing, but it is an element (*dharma*) occurring immediately after killing and immediately after that one obtains the sin of killing. For example, a person orders another person to kill (a creature), the person giving the order obtains the sin of killing immediately from the moment of actual killing. Therefore it is understood that there is *avijñapti*. The mind and the moral restraints are not one and the same; for, if any one is of ill-mind or indeterminate mind, or he is absent-minded, he is also regarded as the possesser of moral restraints. This makes clear that even at that stage there is *avijñapti*. The same is to be stated in regard to immoral restraints also.

Q. It is clear that there is *avijñapti* apart from the mind. What is it? Is it material or the mind's dissociate force? A. It

is brought under the aggregate of formations (*saṁskāra*), because it is characterized as *abhisaṁskaraṇa*, manufacturing. The matter, *rūpa*, is characterized as modifying (*rūpaṇa*) and not as *abhisaṁskaraṇa*, Q. The *Sūtra* says: Six volition-bodies constitute the formation-aggregate. But it is not stated as mind's dissociate element. A. It is previously stated (Ch. 18) that there are merit and demerit apart from the mind. Q. Let it be material; what harm will be there? A. The five material elements, colour, sound, odour, taste and tangible are not in the nature of merit and demerit. So *avijñapti* is not of material nature.

Q. *Avijñapti* is in the nature of corporeal and vocal actions which are only material. A. This contention is simply a verbal one. It is not, in fact, done by the body and the speech alone. It is produced by the mental action depending upon the body and the speech and therefore it is termed corporeal and vocal. Or simply it is produced by the mind alone. *Avijñapti* is available also in the non-material sphere of existence. How could it be of material nature? Q. What action does produce *avijñapti*? A. It is originated from the performance of the good or bad actions and not from the indeterminate actions because the latter has no strength enough to produce it. Q. When is it produced from the said action? A. It originates from the second mind, i.e. second moment of the mind in action. The mind which pursues good or bad action and is strong enough continues for long. The mind which is not strong enough does not continue. For example, a moral restraint adopted for one day will continue for one day and the one that is adopted till death will continue till death.

97. *Cause and Non-Cause (of Action)*

Q. The *Sūtra* says: The action done with the cause and the action done with non-cause. What is the cause and what is non-cause? A. The action that is done consciously is *hetu-kṛtam*, done with cause and the reverse of it is *ahetu-kṛtam*,

done with non-cause, which is a non-action. The action consciously done can produce *vipāka*, resultant. The action done with the mind's conviction (*adhyavasāya kṛtam*) is done with cause. Its reverse is not done with cause. The talk of the soldier is non-causal, and that of non-soldier is causal. The *Sūtra* says : I shall count your faults; if you talk like the soldier, I shall not. When one acts with no causal mind, one, e.g. kills small worms while walking on the ground; this action is non-causal. The non-causal action which is not capable of being accumulated does not produce a *vipāka*, resultant.

The action is four-fold : (1) action done, but not accumulated; (2) action not done, but accumulated; (3) action done and accumulated, and (4) action not done and not accumulated. The example for the first : one kills or gives donation but afterwards repents; or one makes up his mind to do action, but forgets it afterwards. The illustration for the second : a person inducing other person to commit murder or to give donation, becomes delightful in his mind. The third action is : one committing murder or giving donation himself becomes delightful. The fourth is what one neither commits nor accumulates. The third kind, i,e. *kṛtopacita* has the resultant-experience, *vipākapratisaṁvedanā*. So says the *Sūtra* : The action that is done and accumulated producess necessarily the resultant-experience. So the resultant of this action may be experienced in this life, or in the next birth or some time in future.

Q. There will be no release, because the resultant is to be experienced indefinitely. A. The action though consciously done does not get accumulated in the case of the person who secures the knowledge of truth. The seed, that is burnt, e.g. cannot germinate. The Buddha in the *Lavaṇapalavarga*, however, says : A person of pure body (*bhāvita-kāyo*) committing a wrong action resulting in the retribution of the hells, will have to experience in this life the same kind of result in a diminished form. Q. When a heavier wrong action becomes lighter in

this life, why is it not completely destroyed? A. The person who has not contemplated on the knowledge of Truth obtains the residue of the sinful action; so the resultant becomes lighter for the person of pure conduct. The holy person (*arhan*) does not experience the resultant of wrong action; for, he, practising the supreme wholesome action, destroyes the wrong action. The person who habitually accumulates moral restraints, etc. in the course of thousands of lives does not give vent to the wrong action, e.g. the **Buddhas**, the omniscients. No other person has that capacity. Therefore he commits the wrong actions. The holy person, however, even though he has cultivated the knowledge of Truth, experiences the resultant of the wrong action for the reason that it has been committed in a previous life. Q. The Buddha also, as stated in a *Sūtra*, has experienced the result of blasphemy, etc. A. No, the Buddha is omniscient and has no resultant of the wrong action as he destroyed the roots of all evil actions. But He, by means of his innumerable supernatural powers (*ṛddhi*) heralded that Buddhahood is unthinkable. The Ekottarāgama says that there are five such unthinkables.

The action is two-fold: (1) the action having definite resultant and (2) the action having indefinite resultant. The first kind whether it is big or small has the resultant necessarily to be experienced, while the second one is utterly destroyable. Q. What are these two kinds of action? A. The actions that are specified in the *Sūtra* are of *niyata-vipākas*, necessary resultants. Q. Are the five heavier actions only *niyata-vipākas*? A. No, there are many other actions of this kind but not specified in the Sūtra; or an action may be said as *niyata-vipāka* because of their objects being heavier (*viṣaya-gaurava*), e.g. to pay respect to the Buddha or his disciple or a small disregard to them; or it is so because of the mind being heavier (*citta-gaurava*); one, for example, kills small insects with well premeditated efforts. This is the heaviest of all killings. The actions other than the above said are of uncertain resultant.

Q. If the five heavier sins can be reduced to a lesser degree, why are not they utterly destroyed? A. These sinful actions are not at that time utterly destroyed. The Stream-winner, e.g. even though he may be caught in laziness (*kausidya*) never enters into any one of the eight inauspicious wombs (for taking rebirth). Or they are not utterly destroyed for the reason that they are very strong and stable in their criminal character. A person, for example, committing murder of his own teacher becomes necessarily punishable and never to be condoned according to Royal edict (*Rājadharma*).

98. *Sins Heavier and Lighter*

The *Sūtra* states there are two sins. What are they? The action whose result is to be experienced in the *Avīci*, hell, is termed heavier sin. What are they? The action that causes the split in the Buddhist Order is of the said kind. For, the jewel of Order is quite distinct from the jewel of the Buddha. The action causing the split in the ***Dharma*** is also (of the result to be experienced in the hells). The person, having an extreme type of wrong view executes this action. Or one executes it on having an intense jealousy and ill-will towards the Buddha. The person who has cultivated for long the ill habit commits such action with covetous motive. When this man denies the well-known *dharma*, many people who are faithfully practising the auspicious *dharma* are hurt in their feelings; this is reason why this action is a heavier sin.

The wrong view, declaring that there is no sin, no ment, no fruit of respecting the father, mother and other elderly meir, produces the above-said resultant. The person inducing others to fall into wrong view and also causing others to commit wrong actions, experiences the said fruit. The persons like Pūraṇa and others composing the aphorisms of wrong views proclaim to the people the cause for inauspicious *dharma* with a view to hurting right knowledge are also liable to the said fruit. To

impose blasphemy on holy persons also produces that result. So says Dharmapada :

The person of mild faculty, serving a malicious teacher
contradicts the advice given by the holy men
He is similar to a thorn hurting one's own body
and falls in the hell with upward-legs and downward-head
the person calumniating the holy men
and planning the malicious speech and mind
goes to the hells for several thousand years
of *Arbudas* and *Nirarbudas*.

The killing, etc, having heavier objects and heavier mind, would lead to the Avici, hell.

The reverse of the heavier is the lighter sin, which causes experience of the bad result in the inferior hells of ***Tapana*** and ***Pratapana***, in the animal kingdom, amongst ghosts, ***Pretas*** and men and *gods*.

99. *Actions of the Great and the Small Purposes*

The action through which one obtains the suprememost Enlightenment is of the highest purpose. Through action inferior to the above, one obtains the path leading to Pratyeka Buddha; through action still inferior one obtains the path leading to Śrāvakahood; and through action still inferior one obtains the life in ***Bhavāgra*** for eighty thousand great aeons-which fruit is the most superior in the wordly life. Through the action still inferior one obtains the life in the sphere of ***Ākincanyāyatana*** for sixty thousand seons and gradually obtains the life in the sphere upto ***Brahma-loka*** for half an aeon. Through the action still inferior one experiences the life among the ***Paranirmita*** gods for sixty thousand years in divine counting and experiences the fruit upto amongst *Caturmahārājikas* for five hundred years in divine counting. Thus one obtains the fruit by virtue of action amongst men below *caturmahārājikas*.

There is also the action of small fruit in the animal kingdom, *pretas* and hells.

The fulfilment of six pāramitās, charity, etc. leads to the suprememost Enlightenment (*anuttara-samyat-sambodhi*). The good action done in a slightly inferior form leads the Enlightement of Pratyeka Buddha. and the action in a still inferior form leads to the enlightenment of the Śrāvaka. The person practising in the most intensive form four illimitable minds (*apramāṇa-citta*) takes birth in the topmost existence (bhavāgra). The person practising them in an inferior form takes birth in an inferior region (*avarabhūmi*) and a person practising them in the still inferior form and also by vi tue of good conduct and concentration takes birth in the sphere of form (*rūpadhātu*). By virtue of charity and other good conduct one takes birth in the sphere of Desire (*kāmadhātu*).

Every action, giving charity, etc. becomes distinguished on account of the excellence or non-excellence of its recipient; charity, e.g. given to the Buddha is the superiormost, while the same given to the Pratyeka Buddha is inferior to it.

The field of merits (=recipient) is excellent on account of supreme knowledge, which consists in the absolute Śūnyatā. The supreme knowledge excels the abandonment (*prahāṇa*). The Buddha, for example, excels his disciples, Śrāvaka by his supreme knowledge and not by abandonment. So says the Kṣudraka-piṭaka :

> To clean the floor of the Saṅgha as wide as *Jambūdvīpa* is equal to cleaning the floor of the Buddha's shrine which may be as small as the palm of hand.

Omniscience is aimed at the abandonment. Continued stay in the world of Bodhisattvas for longer times is aimed at right abandonment which is the same as the abandonment of one's own *saṁyojanas*, fetters, and the abandonment of *Sattva*,

soul-idea. These fetters are gradually abandoned through supreme knowledge, *Bodhi*. Therefore it is obvious that the field of merits (i.e. recipient) is more excellent by *Bodhi*, than by the abandonment.

The stream-winner of sharp faculty is superior to the once-returner of mild faculty. Q. This is wrong. The *Sūtra* says: To respect hundred stream-winners is not equal to respect one once-returner. It is said: For lazy men the coveteous and quarrelsome mind increases. To give charity to the desire-freed person produces numerous merits. The once-returner has reduced the three poisons, but not the stream-winner. Therefore the former is superior to the latter. A. This *Sūtra* has a secondary import (*neyārtha*). For, the same *Sūtra* says that to give charity to animals produces several benefits. But, in fact, the fruit of such charity excels that of charity to the heretics adept in five super-intellectual powers (*abhijñā*). Therefore the authority of that *Sūtra* is to be closely investigated. The *Sūtra* says with numerous arguments that *prajñā*, supreme knowledge is aimed at *Nissaraṇa*, release.

The stream-winner, though enjoying the worldly pleasures, is regarded *puṇya-kṣetra* on the strength of his *prajñā*; but not the ordinary person of abandoned desire and (upto) the person definitely destined to *Bhavāgra* are so regarded. The knowledge acquired from such learning (*Bahuśruta-jñāna*) being directed towards *Nirvedha-bhāgīya* is superior, but the person destined to Bhavāgra and not directed towards *Nirvedha-bhāgīya* is not so superior. Maitreya Bodhisattva, though has not obtained Buddhahood, is nevertheless, salutable by Arhans. The person that has awakened *Bodhi-citta* causing Śūnyatā is salutable by the Arhans. For example, one Śrāmaṇera respects Arhan by accompanying him and carrying his robes and bowl. But when the same Śrāmaṇera awakens the highest *Bodhi-citta*, the same Arhan must accompany him and carry his robes and bowl. This has been well illustrated in the treatise of *Dṛṣṭānta*.

It is therefore obvious that the field of merits (=recipient) is superior on account of supreme knowledge alone.

100. *Three-Fold Action*

The action is three-fold: good, bad and indeterminate. The good action is that which causes desirable benefit (*priya*) to others. The good action springs up from charity, good conduct, compassion and the like and not from the holy bath, redemption-ceremony (*prāyaścitta*) and others. The desirable is what causes happiness to others; it is also termed *kuśala* and *puṇya*. What causes pains to other ought to be *pāpa*, sin. Medical treatment and surgery operations, though causing pains temporarily, cause ultimately happiness and therefore they are not sins. Adultery, though causing happiness, is invariably sinful. Happiness here and hereafter is true happiness. A little happiness here, in this world but causing the great misery in the next world is not at all happiness.

A person providing food and drink gives happiness to others; but the same food and drink may sometimes cause death to them. This person, nevertheless, incurs only merit and not demerits because he provides the food with good intention. Adultery though done solely for happiness is invariably unmeritorious because it will cause great misery hereafter. In providing food and drink there is a partial scope for merits because the person taking food and drink does not necessarily die. The adultery people commit solely being influenced by sex-desire. So it always causes demerit.

Q. Some people serve others by killing the living beings. For example, thieves being punished. kingdom becomes free from menace (*iti*); the cruel animals being killed, men are releved from distress. Some people protect their parents by theft, some produce children through sexual intercourse; some save other's life by telling lie and some serve others by uttering harsh words. But all these actions are classified under ten un-

meritorious acts. How do they cause merits? A. They cause both merit and demerit. They are meritotious as they benefit others and also unmeritorious as they hurt others. But the medical treatment being done with beneficial motive is always meritorious.

Q. Killing, etc. are all meritorious, e.g. the punishment of thieves etc. as stated above. The desirable that is obtained from the charity, etc. is also obtained from killing, etc. By killing one gains the desirable fame, as well as joy and happiness which are the results of good actions. The Sūtra says: The man being killed in a battle-field ascends to heavens. One *Gāthā* declares: The heavenly nymphs choose the person killed in the battle-field. It is also said: One confronting a thief should kill him and not killing, he will obtain the sin. The *Dharma-Sūtra* says: There are four *varṇas*, castes; Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra. Brāhmaṇa has six duties (*dharma*), Kṣatriya four, Vaiśya three and Śūdra one. Six duties are: sacrifice, priesthood, study, teaching, giving and receiving charity; four: sacrifice, study, giving charity and protection of the subject; three: sacrifice, study and giving charity; one; to serve all other castes. The Kṣatriya obtains only merit in killing for the sake of protection of his subjects. The Veda says: The animals being killed in the sacrifice ascend to the heavens. The Vedas are trustworthy. It is said: There is no sin in killing what is to be died necessarily. A sage of five *abhijñās*, super-intellectual powers, e.g. kills a man by his charm (*mantra*) but the sage obtains no sin. This cannot be done by other than the sage. So the killing does not at all cause the sin. When one kills the animal with good intention and for the sake of happiness, how will he incur sin? For example, the butcher and others. The shephered and cowherd by giving cow and sheep will also incur sin. Thus there is partly merit also in committing theft.

The author replies: Your statement of gaining merits by killing is not correct. Something is desirable on account

of its causing merits. It is not proper that the killing is good as it causes a desirable end. The Sūtra says : The person having wealth obtained by stealing, etc. gives charity and this charity is impure as it is conditioned by sorrowfulness and lamentations. This charity is stated as impure; one necessarily experiences bad result on account of his impure action. This person has merit in the previous birth and also sin due to killing. Therefore he has now the body and obtains resultant due to killing. Some living beings may have the life which is to be repaid in debt, and therefore one obtains by killing them his desirable object; but not all the living beings are so. Therefore he enjoys by killing. People in the world, e.g. say that this person is of meagre merit and that is for this reason that he, though makes attempt, does not succeed. One obtains by dint of merit the fame, bodily strength, and happiness. But that merit being impure, he obtains his desirable by killing.

Your Sūtra-statement about the warrior going to the heavens is not correct. For, the Sūtra simply allures the ignorant by wrongful statement with a view to inducing bravery. Merit comes out of merit and demerit out of demerit. In the absence of merit there will be no gain of merit. You argued on the authority of the *Dharma-Sūtra* that Kṣatriya has no sin in killing. That duty is similar to his domestic duty. The killing, etc. practised by the butchers daily as a part of their domestic duties are not free from sins. Similar is the case with Kṣatriya's duty. If Kṣatriya is free from sin as their killing falls within his royal duty, the butchers also may be so free. Kṣatriya, however, has a compassionate heart towards his subject and (discharges his duty) by forsaking his enmity and therefore he obtains merit due to that. If a person deprives any one of his life, he will have sin. If a person in order to protect his parents steals other's property, he will obtain both merit and demerit mixed.

Q. According to *Dharma Sūtra* a person remaining without food for seven days is allowed to steal even from Cāṇḍāla and

he does not thereby incur any sin. A person at the point of death by starvation can steal even from Brāhmaṇa. These persons living by bad deeds are not spoken of as good-conduct breakers; because they are in the state of calamity. They are not polluted by sins as the sky by dusts. The author replies:- (It is said) in the *Brāhmaṇa-dharma* that at the time of theft the owner of the property rescues it. At this stage he should investigate : If the thief is un-equal to himself, the owner of the property, in character, the thief should be killed; because, I am superior to him and I can eradicate the sin by redemption ceremony. If he is equal to the thief in character, then the sin will be equal in killing himself or the thief. The person living by bad deed commits bad deed; how can there be merit for him?

Your statement : A thief being confronted by us must be killed and there is no sin out of such killing, has already been replied, viz. if the thief is superior in characters, one should kill himself. If there is no sin out of killing how could there be such alternative that one should kill the thief or himself? Your argument from the Veda that the killing is meritorious is also replied by saying that there will be no merit in killing. If you say: The killing of a creature that ought to be died incurs no sin, then the killing of the wicked thief would also not incur sin. All the living beings are sinners as they have committed the bad actions causing the experience of five aggregates of elements, hence there will be no sin in killing them. This proposition will be an impossible one.

Q. The sentient beings have committed in a previous period the cause of killing; if they are killed, how will there be sin? The same may be said in respect of stealing A. Then, in that case there will be neither merit nor demerit; because the killing of a person will not cause sin on the ground that he has committed in a previous period a killing and also on the same ground the abstention from killing will be unmeritorious. Likewise the person who gives charity to others will not have merit

therefrom, because the recipient has given charity in the previous period and enjoys its resultant now. This will be absurd. It is, therefore, evident that the killer of a living being, even though the latter committed in the previous period, the killing incurs the sin definitely. Because it is done by dint of three vices, greed, hate and infatuation. These vices are wrong perversions and the sin is incurred when one has developed a mind perverted by the vices. What is to speak of the sin when one produces corporeal and vocal bad actions, being impelled by these vices.

The world is endless. If it is not so, the sages would not fall down from their supernormal powers (*ṛddhi*) when these vices appear in them. If the above said is not the sin, of what thing the merit will be the reverse? It is to be understood thus that the murderer of the living beings that have committed previously the same crime will be sinner. Your conclusion that a man of low caste could achieve nothing is wrong; for, (we hear) even Cāṇḍāla, and others have killed man by dint of the power of their charm (*mantra*). The sages with evil heart achieve the desirable end; they, achieving their end by virtue of their meritorious acts, incur also the sin from the action of killing.

Your contention that some (sage) committing murder by his mental power produces merit, and sacrificing his life demerit, is wrong. For, one achieves merit necessarily through his mind's strength as well as the meritorious condition, but not merely by his mind's strength. The person who commits adultery with his teacher's wife or kills a Brāhmaṇ with good heart; does he achieve merit thereby? The people living in the border area like Persia, etc. commit adultery with their mother, sister and others on the presumption of merit; do they achieve merit? Therefore it is obvious that the meritorious cause achieves the merit but not the mere mind. This rule is applicable to stealing, etc. The killing and other vices are un-meritorious as they cause grief to others. One may obtain now some temporary happi-

ness but in future he will have to suffer a great deal. To do harm to others is unmeritorious. We actually experience many men commiting the killing, etc. suffer much in the world: Thus suffering is the result of killing, etc. as the fruit ought to be homogeneous with its cause.

Virtues like the abstention from killing, etc. are obtainable amongst men and gods but not in the three unhappy spheres of existence; and it is thus clear that the vice produces its result, acute pains. Men, on account of killing, etc. become of diminished life-span and happiness. In the olden days men were of immeasurable life-span, possessed of the bodies emitting rays like the sun and the moon, moving in the sky at their will. The earth was in possession of all natural commodities, and rice-supplies. All this vanished in the presence of vices, killing and others. The life-span of men was reduced upto the extent of ten years, and all the natural supplies of butter, oil, sugar, rice, maize, wheat and all disappeared. It is, therefore, obvious that killing, etc. are un-meritorious actions. Now the Northerners say: the rice was natural and the cloth was produced from the trees. To put in brief; all the instruments of happiness of the living beings arose from the abstention from the killing. Therefore killing etc. are un-meritorious actions. They are avoided by the good men. Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, Pratyeka-Buddhas, Śrāvakas and other holy men abstain from them; therefore they are un-meritorious.

Persons who permit the killing for the sacrificial purpose in the Veda are not at all holy persons. The holy person is well-wisher of other's happiness. He is compassionate in his heart and equal in respect of friend and foe. How will such person permit the killing of the animal? So the men who were influenced by greed, indignation have composed this Veda. Some person, wishing the heavens for himself may achieve it for others by dint of his own merit (*puṇya*). The person wishing release from such vices will not do that. The untimely meal is not

taken by the holy men as it causes demerit. A flawless conduct is not at all neglected by the holy men. The untimely meal hurts the holy life (*brahmacarya*) and hence the holy men always avoid it. Certain conduct is in its own form is un-meritorious and not practised by them. Such conducts are killing, stealing, etc. Certain conduct is the cause of demerit, e.g. drinking wine, untimely meal, etc. So they are avoided. The habitual killer is disliked by all; e.g. the lion, tiger, dacoit, *Cāṇḍāla* and others. The abstainer from killing, etc. is liked by all; e.g. a person practising habitually compassion becomes beloved of all holy men.

Some person, killing the animal becomes beloved of men on account of his valour, but he is not absolutely liked by all as his action causes demerit. It is said, e.g. certain person by his gallant act pleases his master's mind; but when the master is bent on Nirvāṇa, he dislikes the very same person. The man of bad conduct becomes enemy of himself, what is to speak in regard to others. The killing, etc. are causes of beating, binding and other sufferings and hence un-meritorious. The person given order by the king to kill, but does not kill, such person may sometimes be killed by the king himself. This argument will contradict the Royal Code (*rājaśāsana*). For, when the king understands that this person has no mind bent on killing, he would respect the latter. The murderer is not trusted by any one; he is not trusted in his own community. What is to speak in the community of holy men Likewise he is reviled by all. He is avoided in distance by all like the caṇḍāla, the butcher, the hunter, etc. We see here in this world that the un-desirable result arises from the killing, etc. We can understand that the same will be in the future also.

Q. If the killing, etc. are bad, there will be no maintenance of the body. There is no any moment of *ahiṁsā*, non-killing in the human life. In moving here and there downward and upward some insects are always killed. One takes others'

things as if of his own and talks that they are of his own. A. What is done through the cause (i.e. consciously) is the sin and what is done through non-cause is not sin. The Sutra says : One accomplishes the sin when he kills sentient beings knowing that they are sentient beings and arouses that notion towards them and also have the intention to kill them. The stealing, etc. are also to be understood in the same manner. Q. For example, poison being swallowed kills the person whether he knows it or not; or the fire being touched burns whether one knows it or not. Likewise the killing will cause the sin. A. The said examples are not apt. Poison causes death by poisoning the body. The merit (and the demerit) are mental. When one, being conscious, feels pain and being unconscious does not feel it. Similarly the mind being present, action is accomplished and the mind not present it is not. So also accomplishment or non-accomplishment of the sin depends on the presence or the absence of the mind. The decision of good and bad actions is made on the strength of the mind. In the absence of the mind how could there be a sense of high and low? The decision of merit and demerit also rests on the strength of the mind. The child, e.g. by touching the mother's breast incurs no sin; because the child has no sexdesire. When one does it with sex-desire, he incurs sin.

If there is the sin even in the absence of the mind, the released person will also incur the sin as he kills the insects unconsciously, then he will not be released; for, no sinner would be released. In case there is the sin or merit in the absence of the mind, one and the same action will be both of merit and demerit. A person, e.g. doing a good action thinks by illusion that he has killed a creature. Then his action will be meritorious as well as un-meritorious. This is absurd. In case there is action without the mind how can there be the division: This is good and this is bad? The division is solely due to the cause of the mind. For example, three persons circumambulate in company the shrine: one does it with a view to recollecting the Buddha's qualities,

the second with the motive of stealing and the third for pacifying the passions. Their corporeal actions of the same kind are to be distinguished into good, bad and indeterminate respectively due to distinction in their minds. Certain action has definite retribution, certain indeterminate retribution, certain, highest, certain, lowest, certain moderate, certain retribution in this world, certain retribution in the next birth and certain retribution in distant future, and so on. This division is impossible, if there is merit or demerit without the mind. If there is the action without the mind, things known as *asattva*, "non-sentient" will incur merit and demerit; for example, when the living beings are destroyed by stones hurled by a strong wind, the sin will be incurred by the wind, and the fragrant flowers falling on the shrine, etc. will incur merit. It is, therefore, evident that there is no merit or demerit without the mind.

The heretics say: The merit is acquired on account of the following factors: abstention from food, sleeping on the ground, piercing the body by the iron pins, treading on the fire, dipping in the holy water, falling down from the peak of the mountain and other such actions. Now the wise men ridicule this: If so, the living beings in the hells are always burnt and scorched. Pretas, ghosts are hunger-stricken and thirst-depressed, the birds enter into fire; the fish, crocodiles remain always in the water and the pig and sheep are lying in dirty and damp place. Do they acquire merit? The heretics may reply: "The person suffering so consciously acquires the merit and not otherwise. Men in the hells do not suffer consciously and hence acquire nothing". If the merit or demerit is acquired in the absence of the mind, there would be no holy person and higher birth. He cannot avaoid killing in his daily mode of behaviour. As a matter of fact there are holy persons and Brahmas with lustrous bodies in the heavens. Therefore we understand that the merit or demerit is not available in the absence of the mind.

In your system taking in the impure food incurs demerit. The person who thinks that all the food and drink are impure,

will become non-Brahman by touching the wine. Have you not read the saying that in eating the food with pure mind there is no sin? Thus there is no merit or demerit without the mind. In the sacrifice animals are killed with the sense of merit hoping that the sacrificer may ascend the heaven. Since the killing is done with the sense of merit, the merit is acquired. A *Brāhmaṇa* passage says: some stealing is sinless; for example, remaining without food for seven days one may steal from Sūdra and one may do so also from Brāhman at the point of death. Adultery is sinless for him who does it for the sake of son. All these divisions will be impossible in the absence of causal mind. He who gives poison to someone with bad intention will acquire sin; when he gives it with good intention, the poison eradicates the disease causing the merit. Again, e.g. some person supplied food. When the food is not digested, the man dies, then it would cause demerit to the donor. Thus the whole human conduct would become promiscuous if there is merit or demerit without the mind. The men in the world trust the mind in their daily conduct; the same word, e.g. would cause joy or grief on the basis of intention. Therefore the actions (whether they are good or bad) depend on the mind. The fact that the action purely of the mind is superior to other actions will be elucidated later on (ch. 119).

It is by virtue of the mind that the wise man even though remaining amidst the five sensual pleasures acquires no sin. For, the wise person perceiving the visible objects does not entertain false impressions and therefore stands free from the vice of attachment towards them. He behaves likewise in the case of the sound, etc. If the person not holding false impressions incurs the sin, all his insight and learning would become sinful. The plea of the heavier mental action would also become purposeless. The wise man crowned with wisdom does not raise any attachment for the sensual pleasures. The sensual pleasures do not pollute him. Is this not due to his mind's strength? So there is no acquiring merit or demerit without the mind.

Q. The contention that the characteristics of the good and the bad are beneficial and non-beneficial (*anugraha-ananugraha*) respectively is not proper, for, one feeding one's own body may also cause merit. The shrine and the monastery are inanimate things and sprinkling water on and cleaning them are meritorious. But the salutation, etc. are not beneficial to others and would not cause merit. Feeding others one achieves merit, but one practising mere compassion would not do so. Breaking and plundering the shrine and monastery, inanimate objects, one would not incur sins. In absentia to talk ill of others would cause no sin. Here the victim does not hear it. Someone blames oneself, or kills oneself; here he would cause sin. Therefore the above contention is improper.

A. Your statement that one protecting one's body has the merit is wrong; for, if it is so, none would respect the other. But the person wishing merit respects others. Selfishness is not meritorious. ...... says: the self-feeding is for the sake of practising meritorious acts. If one feeds one's body in the hope that one's body is for other's benefit then this frame of mind causes merit and not merely feeding one's own body does so. The idea that sprinkling and cleaning the shrine and the monastery are also meritorious implies that the qualities of the Buddha are respectable and therefore the people recollecting this fact sprinkle water on and clean the shrine and the monastery. This action being related to the sentient beings is meritorious. Q. The released Buddha is not a living being. So says the Sutra: Tathāgata is neither existent nor non-existent, etc. A. True, the people recollecting the Buddha while he was alive on the earth, pay homage and achieve merits as they e.g. offer sacrifice in honour of their parents as a result of their memory about their parents in relation to their childhood and bringing up. Your saying that the salutation, etc. are not beneficial to others is not correct; for they are beneficial in many ways. One saluting others, becomes himself deserving salutation. From him others learn to salute and acquire salutable qualities. By saluting others

one breaks his arrogance and also makes others' good qualities known to the world. The salutation is practised with the devotional mind and not with a view to showing his own inferiority as done by the heretics. To offer clothes to others, though beneficial, implies inferiority of the recipient and hence would not cause merit. Therefore the merit and demerit depend on the frame of the mind. The Sūtra says: Certain monk rubbed other monks body while taking bath. The Buddha, hearing this, called him and rebuked: This monk is Arhan and serving others. The monk who is so served is of broken conduct. You, monks, learn (not to do so henceforth). No lion could serve the dogs and other animals.

The mind is the root of all good qualities. One's doing good to the other in any one of three periods is rooted in the mind, and also doing bad to the other is rooted in the mind. One, practising compassion does good to all and as a result of one's compassion even when there is a tempest or violent downpour, the sun, moon and stars go on moving over the sky and never fall down; the great ocean never transgrasses its boundaries; the great fire never breaks out and the violent wind does not inundate the whole earth. All this is due to the powerful retribution of compassion. So says the Sutra: If everyone cultivates the compassionate heart, all the requisite things become natural. To say that stealing the wealth of the shrine does not incur the sin is wrong; for the thief steals it thinking that it is some person's wealth. You assume that the abuse of the Buddha does not cause the sin as it hurts no Buddha, then the uttering harsh words towards an Arhan will be sinless as it causes him no harm.

The opinion that *in absentia* ill-talk incurs no sin is also wrong, because the ill talk is always done with the malign intention. Whether the victim hears or does not hear it, such talk necessarily causes grief to him, and hence is un-meritorious. To say that a man, rousing up some wicked mind towards the

other but not doing anything harmful bodily or vocally does not incur sin is likewise wrong; for he will incur sin for the reason that he has roused up the wicked mind in order to hurt the other. When the victim is informed of it by some other person, he will have necessarily grief and worries. For example, when a thief steals away the other's property, though the owner of the property not being awake does not know it. Nevertheless it gives the owner much grief afterwards. Mere self-killing and self-blaming are not sinful. If any one troubling his body becomes sinner, none will secure a better birth. For, people trouble themselves in their four modes of behaviour and all of them would become sinners. None will secure a better birth. Therefore the merit or demerit does not come from mere troubling one's own body. The good conduct is decided in the Vinaya as the cause of the path thus: the person hurting himself with wicked intention incurs sin.

The indeterminate action: The action which is neither good nor bad and neither beneficial nor non-beneficial is termed indeterminate (*avyākṛtam*). The consciously good or bad action causes retribution, but the indeterminate one causes nothing; for the former is so strong while the latter is so feeble. The rotten seed e.g. does not germinate its sprout.

The retribution is two-fold: agreeable and disagreeable. The agreeable retribution comes from the good action and the disagreeable one from the bad action, but the indeterminate action has no retribution. This division is made from the Buddha's saying: the wrong corporeal action leads to disagreeable retribution and the right corporeal one to agreeable retribution and there is no third way between these two. The merit has the retribution of agreeable talk and pleasant memory, etc. while the demerit has the reverse. Happiness and misery are retributions of the merit and demerit respectively. Neither-pleasant nor-unpleasant feeling is the retribution of good conduct (*sucarita*). It is, therefore, obvious that there is no indeterminate retribution.

101. *Wicked Conduct* (*Duścarita*)

The Buddha says: There are three wicked conducts: corporeal, vocal and mental. The first one is what is manifested by the body. It is two-fold: one included in ten bad actions like killing, stealing and adultery, and the other not included there like beating with whip, stick, binding, intercourse with one's wife in an improper manner etc. and the bad actions preceding and subsequent to ten bad actions. The sinful killing is sometimes committed with one's own body; e.g. one kills the sentient being by oneself. It is done also with the speech, e.g. in ordering others for killing. It is done also with the mind, e.g. in raising such mind that one could die. The same division is to be made in regard to stealing and adultery. The above action done by oneself incurs the fullest sin. The corporeal bad action is made by the body. When one arouses an indicative mind occasionally, the other person understands it and may commit killing, etc. However, it is done in the majority of cases by means of body and hence it is termed corporeal. Similarly the vocal bad action is committed by the speech. It is also two-fold: (1) one: when someone puts a question, the man (not answering it straightforward) deceives the questioner in the very moment: This is included in ten bad actions, and (2) two: the other not included therein. Covetuousness (*abhidhyā*), malevolence (*vyāpāda*) and wrong views are mental wicked actions.

The wrong view is otherwise termed *sammoha*, infatuation. This being fully matured turns into wrong view, and it has no other characteristic. Q. The Sūtra says: All the wicked conducts result in an undesirable fruit and all the right conducts in a desirable fruit. Desirable and undesirable are not definite. What is desirable to one is undesirable to the other. A. Happiness is characterised as desirable. The Sūtra says: The resultant of the meritorious action is happiness. Misery is undesirable. So says the Sūtra: " Be fearful of demerit as it causes misery ". The dog, pig and others enjoy impure happiness. The impure

happiness is the result of impure merits. So says the Karma-Sūtra: untimely charity, impure charity, charity to unworthy person, light-hearted and impure-hearted charity result in impure resultant.

The Sūtra again says that the right conduct has the heavens as the retribution in order to refute some master's opinion that the wicked conduct also may result in the heavens. One experiences suffering in an unhappy place of birth as a result of wicked conduct, and as a result of the right conduct one is born amongst men or gods and experiences happiness.

102. *Right Conduct* (*Sucarita*)

The corporeal good conduct is what is meritorious and committed by the body. Likewise are the vocal and mental good conducts. The abstention from the three bad actions, killing, etc. is the corporeal good conduct. The abstention from the four vocal bad actions is vocal good conduct and the abstention from the three mental bad actions is mental good conduct. These three abstentions are brought under restraint (*samvara*) which is constituted of *sila*, *dhyāna* and *anāsrava-samvara*. Salutation, donation of dresses, etc. are corporeal good conduct. The vocal good conduct is truth-speaking and gentle-talk, etc. The mental good conduct is *anabhidhyā*, etc. These are three good conducts.

The heretics adopt without announcement (*jñapti*) and mentally the moral restraint (*śila-samvara*). Some adopt it through announcement. Others also adopt the good conduct included in the moral restraint. A man, e.g. having the life span of ten years, adopts the abstention from the killing and hence obtains the son of twenty years' life span.

The Sūtra says: Good conduct, pure conduct, pacifying conduct. How are they distinguished? The Ābhidharmikas explain them thus: The ordinary men's conduct is good conduct (*sucarita*). The same of the learner (*śaikṣa*) is termed pure

conduct (*viśuddha-carita*) as it leads to the destruction of fetters and the same of *aśaikaas*, Arhans, is *vyupaśamacarita*, pacifying conduct as it leads to the separation of the fetters. The Arhans have absolutely stopped the unmeritorious actions and hence are styled as the men of pacifying conduct. It is said: pacifying of the body, pacifying of the speech and the pacifying of the mind.

Some masters think: These three are the names of one and the same thing. However, it is praised "good" as it accords with betterment and "pure" as it is freed from the vices and also "pacifying" as it is freed from every unmeritorious element. These three are not differentiated in their import.

The Ābhidharmikas say that the pacifying conduct is the mind alone and not the volition (*cetanā*). The author says: These three conducts are nothing but the mind. There is no will apart from the mind and also no vocal and corporeal actions. Q. The Sūtra says: A person of accomplished good conduct becomes godlike or similar to the person known as god. But all men of good conduct are not born amongst the gods. How is this? A. The man of good conduct does not necessarily take birth amongst the gods. Nevertheless, the man who is born in a place highly respected by noble persons is alike the god and hence he is termed *devasaṅkhyāta-dṛśa*. All men of good conduct would be born amongst the gods and some of them may not do so for some other reason. When good conduct and bad one are mixed up (in a person) the bad conduct being prominent, he will not be born amongst the gods. The Buddha spoke to Ānanda thus: I perceive some person, even having three good conducts takes birth in an unhappy sphere of birth (*durgati*); and it is the retribution of his bad conduct practised in a previous period. Now, because the good conduct is imperfect, the wrong view presents itself at the time of death before the dying person's mind, he falls in the unhappy sphere of birth. Likewise the person of bad conduct may also take birth in a better place. Therefore, the state of being an ordinary man (*pṛthak-janatva*)

is not trustworthy. It is thus to be understood that one experiences birth by virtue of his prominent action.

103. *Actions Related to (The Spheres of Existence)*

The Sūtra says: The action is three-fold: action related to the world of desire, action related to the form-world and the action related to the formless world. The first is causing the experience of retribution in the world down from the hells and upto *paranirmita-vaśa-varti*-gods. The second is causing the experience of retribution in the world down from the Brahmā-world and upto *Akaniṣṭha* heaven. The third is causing the experience of retribution in the world down from the *Ākincanyā-yatana* and upto *Naivasamjnā-nāsamjnā-yatana*. The indeterminate action and the action of uncertain retribution are related to the world of desire. All the elements of the desire-world are resultants of the actions of the desire-world. Q. Then this will be the system of the heretics, viz. the happiness and misery that are to be experienced through actions are due to causes and conditions of the previous actions. Actions, meritorious and unmeritorious, with-retribution and without-retribution are all the resultants of the previous actions. Then there will be no purpose in making effort (for accumulating merits). The person who has vices, actions and retributions of the action cannot have release; for no retribution could possibly be exhausted. A. This is improper; for they maintain that happiness and misery, highness and lowness are all mere retributions of the previous actions, then there will be no need for the present causal efforts. We, on the other hand, actually experience that things are produced from the causes and conditions of the present moment, the sprout, e.g. from the seed, etc. It is improper to say that everything is governed by the previous causal conditions. Things are produced from the causes and conditions; e.g. the sprout, etc. are caused by the seed and conditioned by the earth, water, air, space, etc. The visual consciousness is caused by the previous action and conditioned by the eye, visible, etc. Therefore, our system is

not similar to that of heretics. It is our experience that one fruit produces another fruit as the rice-grains come from the rice-grains. It is to be understood, however, that the self-born sex-desire of a young man, the cataka and the Cakravāka birds and the fierce temperament of the cobra, etc. are all the retributions of the previous births' actions.

To accept that one retribution produces another retribution evolves no defect of infinity. For, we say that there are three-fold retributions: (1) good, (2) bad and (3) indeterminate; the first two produce retribution and the last one does not: For example, it is said, grains produce grains. There the sprout springs up from the seed and not from the husk, etc. Likewise good and bad retributions produce retributions but not the indeterminate retribution. Thus the folly of infinity is averted. You said that there will be no need for the present effort. True, the retribution arises from the previous action. Nevertheless, our effort will necessarily accomplish its fruit in future. Although grain-plants e.g. arise from cultivation, nevertheless it requires the seeds.

When one acquires the truth-knowledge he destroys all his actions (which cause his rebirth); hence he gets released. The burnt seed e.g. does not germinate again. Thus there is the accomplishment of the release. Things produced here are rooted in the action. In production of things there is some fixed requisite e.g. this thing invariably arises from the body of this person and not from that of the other person. This fixed division of the requisite needs the causal action.

Q. What harm will be there if we say that things come from their material causes alone; the black gram e.g. comes from the black gram. A. True, that also is rooted in the action. The black gram comes from the black gram only on the condition that there is already a suitable action-cause. This we infer from the fact that in olden days people were engaged in doing good actions alone and hence their supplies of rice and other

commodities were natural and spontaneous. Things counted as *sattva* and *asattva* are both rooted in actions. They are retributions of the common actions done by the living beings; e.g. earth and other things are formed due to common actions of *caṅkramaṇasthāna*, a place for walking round and round; the sun and the moon, etc. due to the common actions of providing light. Thus every product is rooted in the action. The pure manifest things (*anāsrava-saṁskṛta*) are also rooted in the action; because everything is governed by the force of charity, and good conduct of the previous birth. However this category of things (*anāsrava-saṁskṛta*) is caused by the knowledge of truth and conditionad by the action; on account of this it is termed 'unrelated to any sphere of existence' (*apratisaṃyukta*).

The person who practises ten un-meritorious actions in the desire, form and formless worlds is born in the desire-world. The person living in the form-and formless worlds also produces un-meritorious actions. The Sūtra says: The perverse view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*) is available there. The perverse view is unmeritorious and not indeterminants. So says the Buddha in the Sūtra: The perverse view is the cause of all sufferings and vices (*kleśa*). All the actions, corporeal, vocal and mental done by the person of perverse view are manifested in the form of retributions of suffering.For example, the four elements constituting the vegetable, *kāravella* become of bitter taste. The perverse view in the form-and formless worlds as in the desire-world is also-un-meritorious. For example, Brahmā, Baka by name, addressing another Brahmā says: Do not approach the Recluse Gautama. We shall get release from this world. Thus, the un-meritorious speech and mind are produced. Other gods of Brahmā world speak ill of such saintly person (like the Buddha), and the persons born in the form-and formless worlds say: This itself is Nirvāṇa: They consider at the end of their life-span that the desire-and the form-worlds will disappear and Nirvāṇa will be no other than this: this is the perverse view aroused there. It is un-meritorious because it negates the supreme-most dharma.

The un-meritorious action causes experience in the desire-world and therefore the un-meritorious wrong view is related to the world of desire.

The good action is (three-fold:) highest, moderate and lowest. The lowest has the retribution to be experienced in the world of desire, the moderate in the form-world and the highest in the formless world. Some masters say that the good action brought under four *dhyānas* has the retribution to be experienced in the world of form and the good action brought under four ārūpya-concentrations has the retribution to be experienced in the formless world. The other action produced by the distracted mind in any world has the retribution to be experienced in the world of desire. Just as the retribution of good action produced by concentrated mind in this world is experienced in the form-and formless worlds just so the action produced by distracted mind in the form-and formless worlds has the retribution in this world. Just as the retribution of good action produced in the form-and formless world is experienced in the world of desire, just so the good action of that world has retribution here in this world.

The person born in the form-and the formless worlds can produce the action related to the world of desire and there is no any rigid rule to the contrary. You have also accepted that the person born in the world of desire produces the indeterminate mind. When it is so, why not the meritorious mind? The Buddha spoke to Hastaka Devaputra: Towards the mind-dwelling conceive a concept of gross feeling (*sudārika-samjñā*). The concept of gross feeling is nothing but the mind related to the world of desire. This (person) with a devoted pure mind listens to Dharma, and worships the Buddha, —all this is a mind related to the world of desire. If it is not so, it would not be termed a "concept of gross feeling". There is a recollection-prayer (*anusmṛtiprārthanā*) a meritorious thing (*puṇya-vastu*). The Buddha says: Not content in this world with three objects (*vastu*), I shall at the end of my life take birth amongst *Anavatapta* gods,

with a view that I shall behold Tathāgata, listen to Dharma and worship the order. Here the recollection-prayer, a meritorious thing is the same as the mind related to the world of desire. Here (in the higher world) there is the recollection of the Buddha, but not a meritorious thing. Therefore, it is understood that there is a meritorious mind related to the world of desire (obtainable in the form and the formless worlds).

104. *Three-Fold Action-Retribution* (*Karma-Vipāka*)

The Buddha in the Sūtra says: Three-fold action: (1) Action with retribution to be experienced in this world: (2) action with the retribution to be experienced in the next birth and (3) action with retribution to be experienced in a (subsequent) future life. The action committed by this body is experienced in this body; that is the first type of action. The action that is committed in this world is experienced in the immediately next birth: that is the second type of action. The action that is committed in this world is experienced in the subsequent future world: that is the third type of action. The retribution of the action committed in the intermediary stage of existence (*antarābhayika*) is experienced in two realms. The action of the immediately intermediary state is experienced in the realm of next birth. The action of other intermediary states is experienced in the realms of future retribution.

Are these three actions *niyata-vipāka* and *niyata-kāla* ?

A. Some masters say that all these three are of definite retributions (*niyata-vipāka*). The action with retribution of this world has necessarily the retribution to be experienced in this world alone. So are the other two. Though there is such statement, its meaning is not proper. For, in that case the five *ānantarya* actions will not be of definite retribution. But it is said in the *Ṣaṭpādābhidharma* that five heavier actions (*ānantarya*) are *niyatavipāka*. The Lavaṇopama-Sūtra, however, says that they are *aniyata-vipāka*. Certain action is of the retribution to

be experienced in the hells. Certain person has purified his body, conduct, mind and wisdom: and his action is to be experienced in this world. This points out that the above three actions ought to be of limited time (*niyatakāla*). The first type of action is not necessarily experienced in this world. If at all to be experienced, it is experienced in this world itself. The same case is in regard to other two actions.

According to some master, the action treating the disease is experienced in this world itself. The good or bad action done in respect of Tathāgata, holy men and parents is experienced in this world. The action having not such at purpose, but heavier is to be experienced in the next birth (*upapadyavedanīyavipāka*), e.g. five *ānantaryas*. The purposeful and heavier action is experienced in the future birth (*ūrdhva-vedanīyavipāka*); e.g. the actions of Cakravartin and Bodhisattva.

Some masters say that all these three actions are experienced in accordance with one's own vow (*praṇidhāna*). When a person vows: I shall experience the fruit of this action in this life, he does so; e.g. the lady, Mallikā vows: as a result of doling out of my own food, I shall become queen. Or they are experienced in the order that they become matured. The accomplishment of full-fledged heaviness (*gurutva-lakṣaṇa-sampad*) is the maturation of action (paripāka); and that, too, is gradual; the sprout; e.g. springs from the seed only gradually (not immediately from the seed sowed).

The person remaining in the womb, the sleepy, or the insane person, etc. cannot accumulate action as they have no volition (*cetanā*). A desire-less person, nursing the soul-idea accumulates action; the same person having no soul-idea does not. Arhan, practising the meritorious salutation, etc. does not accumulate the action as he is free from the soul-idea and the sinful mind. The Sūtra says: Arhan has destroyed meritorious and un-meritorious actions. Hence he does not accumulate such and other indeterminate actions. He does not create new actions for the reason that they will necessarily end in new experiences.

The learner (*śaikṣa*) never accumulates the action. So says the Sūtra: Arhan having ceased the action does not commit it, does not accumulate it and the ceased action becomes no more accumulated. The Ābhidharmikas say that the learner accumulates the action as he has the sense of ' I " (*asmimāna*); however, he does not necessarily experience its retribution by virtue of his non-soul knowledge.

These three actions are manifested in all the three worlds. There are some actions known as *aniyatakarma* as its retribution is experienced either in this world or immediately next one or in some distant future birth.

The person who analyses these three actions arouses the right view. Otherwise he may form a wrong view (*mithyādṛṣṭi*), about the action and its resultant on observing the bad man enjoying the pleasure and the good man suffering misery. So it is said in the stanza (*gāthā*):—

Even the sinner meets with the good, till his sin matures not,
The moment the sin matures, the sinner meets with bad fruits
Even the good man meets with bad thing till his merit matures not,
The moment it matures, the good man meets with good fruits.

The *Mahākarma-vibhaṅga* Sūtra says: The person though not abstained from the killing is born in the heaven; for he having done in the previous period some merits produces a strong good mind (*kuśala-citta*) at the time of his death. One understanding this-wise raises the right view (*samyak-dṛṣṭi*). Therefore one should understand the characteristics of these three actions.

105. *Three-fold Action-Retribution-Experience* (*Trividha-Karma-Vipāka-Vedanā*)

The Buddha in a Sūtra says: Three-fold actions: (1) happiness-retribution-action, (2) misery-retribution-action, (3) neither

happiness-nor-misery-retribution-action. The good action has the first retribution, the bad action has the second retribution and the indeterminate has the third retribution. The third action is not necessarily to be experienced. If it is to be experienced, it causes happiness-retribution alone and not the misery-retribution. These actions are producing the matter-retribution also but only the happiness-retribution-experience, etc. are stated; because in production of retribution the experience (i.e. feeling) is prominent. In fact the experience alone is retribution. The matter, etc. are its instruments. The instrument of the experience is spoken of as experience (*vedanā*): e.g. they say that the fire is happiness or misery. Here the cause is spoken of as result. They also say that the donor of food (*anna*) provides the five things, and that the wealth is food, etc. The experience of the third retribution is obtained from the world of desire upto the world of the third *dhyāna*. It is the retribution of the meritorious action of inferior variety (*avarakuśalakarman*). The meritorious action of the highest variety gives the retribution of happiness-experience. In the fourth dhyāna-world and the formless world the experience of the third retribution is spontaneous and property of these realms. This retribution alone is available there and not others, because they are characterized as tranquillity (*upaśānta*).

Some masters say: Sorrowfulness (*daurmansya*) is not retribution (*vipāka*) because it is caused by a concept-constructive thought (*sañjñā-vikalpa*). A retribution will not be in the nature of concept-constructive thought. If it is so, that retribution will (be regarded) very light. The desire-freed person (*vitarāga*) has set aside that sorrowfulness. What is *vipāka* cannot be set aside. The author replies: You say that because sorrowfulness is caused by a concept-constructive thought, it is not *vipāka*, but happiness (*sukha*) is *vipāka*. *Sukha* is two-fold: (1) Happiness, *sukha* and (2) joyfulness, *saumanasya*. The latter also is caused by a concept-construction, and hence will not be *vipāka*. Your argument that this *vipāka* would then be

light is (contrary to the fact), this sorrowfulness is more oppressive than a suffering or misery. Misery is experienced by the ignorant person and not by the wise men. Sorrowfulness is difficult to ward off and causes much more burning. It is said (by Āryadeva) in the *Catuśśataka*: What is the corporeal uneasiness for the ordinary men that is the mental uneasiness (*mānasam duhkham*) for the wise men. That sorrowfulness which is to be abandoned by knowledge surpasses the corporeal easiness (*sukha*) and uneasiness (*duhkha*). It causes distress in all three times thus: I was previously suffering, now I am suffering and I shall be suffering in future. It is the resting place of all defiling forces. The Sūtra says: Eighteen mind's co-farers become as bases of defilements, but the five sensory consciousnesses do not produce the defilements. The Sūtra says: *Daurmanasya*, sorrowfulness is comparable to two arrows. It is so because it produces severer experience. For example, a person being struck by the sharper two arrows experiences more intensive pains. Or a patient being oppressed by disease becomes again much more oppressed by sorrowfulness and worries. Thus it is much heavier than uneasiness (*duhkha*). The ignorant are always in sorrowfulness, because they are distressed by separation from their beloved, association with the undesirable events and not obtaining what is prayed for, etc.

The sorrowfulness is produced from the two causes: joyfulness and sorrowfulness. When something desirable perishes, this sorrowfulness is born from joyfulness. The Sūtra says: The Buddha addressed king Prasenajit: Are you, O king, beloved in Kāśi and Kosala? The Sūtra again says: Gods are addicted to the visible and desirous of the visible. The visible being perished they are caught with sorrowfulness. This is born from the joyfulness. Born from the sorrowfulness means that which is produced by the undesirable thing. It is also born from jealousy and the like. The fetters, jealousy, etc. always oppress the mind of the person who is not freed from the desire. The Sūtra says: Gods are filled with jealousy and envy. Many living beings,

oppressing others by causing sorrowfulness obtain the retribution of oppression by sorrowfulness. It is said, e.g. that the fruit is produced in accordance with the kind of seed. Therefore it is clear that sorrowfulness is the retribution of action.

Your argument that it is a non-retribution, because it is set aside by the desire-freed person is not sound. For, the stream-winner, though not freed from the desire, has set aside the retribution of the hells and the like event. Is the resultants of the hells, etc. not a retribution (*vipāka*)? Therefore, it is not possible to say that what is set aside by the desire-freed person is a non-retribution.

Q. The indeterminate action (*āneñjya*) has the retribution of neither-happiness-nor-misery. If it is meritorious, its retribution will be happiness. Why is it said otherwise? A. This feeling, though said as indeterminate (*āneñjya*) is, indeed, happiness. It is termed "neither-happiness-nor-misery" because it is characterized as tranquillity (*upaśama*). The Sūtra says: In the happy feeling the lust remains as latent residue. Where in the desire lingers, in the feeling of that (desirable) the same (desire) remains as latent residue. Thus it is understood that this is happiness.

106. *Three Obscurations* (*Āvaraṇa*)

The Sūtra says: There are three obscurations: Action-obscuration, defilement-obscuration and retribution-obscuration. What obscures the path of Release is *āvaraṇa* and the above three are such *āvaraṇas*. Constant practice of charity, good conduct confines the man into three spheres of existence, thus it obscures the path of Release. The action of trance-retribution is also an obscuration. So says the Sūtra: The person who accumulates the action that has retribution to be experienced definitely in trance does not enter into the auspicious state (*Nirvāṇa*). This is the action-obscuration. If anybody has defilements very thick and intensive, and lingering in his mind, that is defilment-

obscuration. If one has defilements which could not be avoided, e.g sex-desire of a eunuch, *ṣaṇḍa* and others; this is also defilement-obscuration. Retribution-obscuration is that when a person falling in the hell and other such places of the sinful and unmeritorious birth could not contemplate the path as a result of his inauspicious place of birth.

Some people not understanding from their ignorant ancestors that charity (etc.) is meritorious, do not give charity (or some people do not give for this reason): if a person obtaining charity, commits some wrong, I shall then be party to that wrong doing, e g. the ascetic Brāhmaṇa, etc. Therefore an ascetic should not give charity lest that a new action should obstruct the path of Release.

This is not a sound argument. None would be party to the merit or demerit done by other person. If the indirect agent (*pratyaya*) is guilty of the sin or demerit, that would evolve enormous errors. For example, a living being is an indirect cause of the killing; in the absence of that being, who will be killed? Thus the victim of killing would turn to be sinner. Likewise the rich is the indirect cause of stealing, beauty of the illegitimate sex-intercourse; the enemy of false accusations. The false measurement, etc. are indirect causes of cheating: thus the buyers would be sinners. If the recipient an indirect cause of charity, is party to its merit, then the users of the well, tank, etc. all would be winners of the merits. Thus the donor will not obtain the merit.

If the recipient looses a portion of his merit, none would receive charity from others. Because the food and drink, etc. are purchased by his own merit, the donor will be of more sin and of less merits. Brāhmaṇas do not attempt on the meritorious contemplation. The donor of charity to them becomes sinner. Therefore the merit and demerit do not go to the indirect agent. Good conduct, etc. are beneficial to others. The abstainer from

the killing gives life to others. The man of good conduct would be a great sinner (for you). By abstaining from killing, if the saved person commits the sin, its share would go to the abstainer. Thus, an aspirant of merit must kill the living beings and should not abstain.

Suppose, a person preaches dharma. Then the listener practises good actions, and obtains huge wealth and because of the huge wealth he becomes negligent and commits bad actions. Then the preacher would be a party to it. Similarly one gives donation due to which the recipient becomes rich. Being rich he commits wrong and thus the donor would become sinner. Similarly Brāhmaṇas would not receive donation, nor would give it. Brāhmaṇas now-a-days only receive charity but do not give it to others. Therefore it is understood to be a wrong path. Kings protecting their subjects dutifully, would be sinners. The son committing the sin, parents would be sinners, then nobody would bring out the son. A physician treating the patients, would be a sinner. When god is raining, and all plants grow profusely. The god would be sinner. The donor of food would be sinner; for, the eater may die due to indigestion. The person other than the desire-freed-one sticks to the taste of things; hence his donor would be a sinner.

Q. The Sūtra also says: If an ascetic eating the food and putting on the robe given by a donor is engaged in the illimitable concentration, the donor, due to that, produces illimitable merits. If the donor obtains merit due to that, why does he not a sin? A. In that case, the donor's merit of the donation will increase of itself but the donor does not obtain the merit of concentration (from the recipient). The cultivated land e.g. being fertile, its produce becomes profuse; but the barren field has very little produce. Similarly the field of merit (recipient) being meritorious, the retribution of charity become abundant. When it is otherwise, the retribution is less. This does not mean that the donor takes share in the merit or the demerit of the recipient.

Q. The mind of the desirous person is not under control; so the ascetic should not give donation to him. A. In that case the idea that the ascetic taking up good conduct, etc. becomes meritorious would be given up. But it is not the fact. So charity is also not to be neglected. However, he should not donate for prosperity in the three worlds, but aiming at Nirvāṇa. He should avoid all the defiling elements and unmeritorious actions. They should be checked even at the initial stage. They cannot be done away with at the time of their giving fruition. That is why the Buddhas preach dharma in order to teach to abandon them even at the initial stage. They do not teach to modify them at the later fruition stage like the God of Death (*Yamarāja*) does.

Some masters say: Of these obscurations the third one is the heaviest as it cannot be modified. Others say: every obscuration is the heaviest in accordance with the individual. All of them can be turned back. What can be turned back is termed no more obscuration.

107. *Four-Fold Action*

The Sūtra says: There are four actions: (1) Black action with black retribution, (2) white action with white retribution, (3) black-white action with black-white retribution, (4) neither-black-nor-white action with neither-black-nor-white retribution. This last action turns into a destroying factor of all other actions. The first is the action through which one is born in an oppressive world like *Avaivartika* hell or some other place of unmeritorious retribution as animal, or ghosts. The reverse of this is the second action, through which one is born in an un-oppressive world like the form-formless and desire-worlds, e.g. the men or gods. The third is the mixed action through which one is born in an oppressive-non-oppressive world like the animal, ghost, god or men. The fourth is pure (*anāsrava*) action and destroys the other three actions.

The action that is censured here and hereafter; having done that action, the man falls in the dark and does not secure learn-

ing and fame; hence it is termed black. It is productive of the oppressive world because the person committing the sin in the order of fancied objects (*nimitta*) does not feel repentant in his mind nor does he undertake any good action to counteract his bad one in the meantime. The person having the wrong view, commits bad action in respect of his elderly persons, parents and other holy men. Having done wrong to the living beings he does not feel compassion, e.g. he kills them, snatches their wealth, imprisons them, does not provide food and beats them severely. All these actions cause immensely oppressive world.

The second action white with white retribution: A person accumulates absolutely good actions alone and not bad ones. The good actions excel all others. The black and the white actions cannot produce their retributions simultaneously because they become obstructional to each other. The white action being more powerful, excels the black one e.g. the stronger wrestler brings down his opponent to the ground.

The third action i.e. mixed one. Because it is mixed, its retribution is experienced simultaneously.

Some masters say: The first is the bad action that causes retribution in an unhappy realm of existence. The second is the good action related to the world of form. The third is the action causing a mixed retribution to men and gods and related to the world of desire. The fourth action is the seventeen-fold volition of the learner (*śaikṣa*) in the path of non-obscuration (*anāvaraṇa*).

A. The Buddha himself has described the nature of these actions. A certain person commits actions corporeal, etc. in an oppressive manner and accordingly is born in the oppressive world and feels the oppressive touches. This action is understood as causing the world of misery and darkness and it is the first one. In the form and formless worlds there is only the happy feeling. Certain gods and men in the world of desire are also

absolutely happy. Through what action things that are experienced by men and gods do not turn to be disagreeable to their heart, that is the second action. The mixed operation of the black and the white is the third action. All the non-obscuring (*anāvaraṇa*) actions are capable to destroy all (the above three) actions, that is the fourth action. Therefore, seventeen-fold volition of the learner alone is not the fourth action.

The pure (*anāsrava*) action is not the same as white action, but it is something differnt from it. For example, a Cakravartin king has the eye which is very superior to that of men and gods. Though it is human, it is termed superior to human because it excels other persons' eye. Likewise, the action also being superior to other white actions is termed 'non-white'.

Some masters say: The fourth action is to be termed "non-black with white retribution'. This is flawless. Nirvāṇa is not white, so that action is to be termed non-white. It should also be termed 'non-black and non-white' because Nirvāṇa is non-entity, *adharma*. That action being aimed at Nirvāṇa is non-black and non-white. The praiseworthy and tainted (*sāsrava*) good action is termed white in the world. The fourth one turns back that white action and hence becomes non-white. This action being non-black, becomes also non-white. The retribution being white, its productive action is termed white. This fourth action is bereft of its retribution; therefore it is said to be non-white.

108. *Five Ānantaryas*

It is termed *ānantarya*, because its retribution is experienced immediately after this body. If it is experienced in this world, its oppressive retribution becomes lighter. The action being heavier, causes gradually or immediately falling in the *Avaivartaka* hell.

Three *ānantarya*s are so termed on account of the fields of merits (*puṇya-kṣetra*) being greatly esteemed for their good

conducts; they are: (1) split of Congregation (*saṅghabheda*), (2) causing the bleeding in the Tathāgata's body and (3) the killing of Arhan, (4-5) the killing of parents is *ānantarya*, because of ungratitude. This is possible in the human world alone and nowhere else. Only men have discriminative knowledge (*vivekajñāna*). The killing of other holy men, though not (*ānantarya*), causes falling in the hells, but the killing of Arhan causes it necessarily. The person who beats Tathāgata but does not cause bleeding incurs the heavier sin.

The person committing more than one *ānantarya*, experiences the heavier sufferings for longer times as his sins are numerous. He, falling down from a hell, again takes rebirth there in the hell. If anyone, knowing *adharma* as *adharma* understands it by way of *dharma*, such thought is heavier sin. If anyone speaks *adharma* as *dharma* and also *dharma* as *adharma* this is not so heavy. If anyone, separating the Order (*Saṅgha*) from the Buddha praises his self: I am a great teacher and salutable by men and gods. This is also a heavier sin. The split of the Order is a heavier sin as it causes an obstacle to the progress of good *dharma*, Law.

The split of the Order is possible when the dharma, just newly founded has not yet passed even one night. The Brahmās and gods, Śāriputra and other great Recluses have again put it in order.

Some masters say: These five hundred ascetics in the previous period caused hindrance to others and now experience its retribution. Ordinary men being feeble-minded are prone to be split; but the person who has obtained the mundane non-soul-voidness (*anātma-śūnyatā*); even his mind cannot be disturbed; what is to speak of the pure mind (*anāsravaṁ-cittam*) of the noble men.

The split of the Order is created because of coveteousness (*abhidhyā*) lingering in one's mind. Therefore, a person wishing merit must give up *abhidhyā*, conveteousness.

109. *Five Morals* (*Śila*)

The Buddha says: A lay man has five *śilas*. The author thinks that he may take up restraints as many or as less as he is able to take up, but not necessarily five alone. The abstention from killing etc. is *śila*, but not the abstention from *Āpti*;* because one has a family, *parivāra*. The abstention from adultery alone is *śila*, but not the abstention from sexual intercourse is so; because in the white-clothed house-holder's dwelling place the world activity is hardly avoidable. The sexual intercourse with one's own wife does not necessarily cause the falling in the hells. For instance, the stream-winner and others also practice this thing.

The abstention from *paiśunya*, slander etc. is not *śila* because this is very difficult to observe. The slander (*paiśunya*), etc. are constituents (*aṅga*) of the false speaking. When one speaks falsehood, *paiśunya* is already spoken.

The drinking a wine is not sinful by itself (*prakṛti-sāvadya*), because it does not hurt the living being; but it is the cause of sins. The person drinking wine opens the gate of the sinful actions. The person ordering others to drink incurs a subsidiary to the sin. It also causes hindrance to the concentration and other good actions. Just as the group of trees is necessarily intended to cover up the wall, just so are these four dharmas innately sinful, and the abstention from them is innately meritorious. In order to observe their abstention, the restraint from the drink is included as *śila*.

110. *Six Actions*

The action is six-fold: (1) Action with the hell-retribution, (2) action with animal-world retribution, (3) action with the ghost-world-retribution, (4) action with human-world-retribution, (5) action with divine-world-retribution, (6) action with

* *Apti* may be buying of meet.

non-concentration-retribution. The first action is as it has been elaborated in the *Ṣad-pāda-abhidharma-Loka-prajñapti*. The hell is obtained by the sin incurred by killing. The Sūtra says: The person indulged in killing is born in the hells. If he is born amongst men, he will have very little span of life. So is to be said upto the wrong view.

Q. It is generally known that ten unmeritorious actions cause retributions in the animal, ghost and human worlds. But you say that one is born in the hells or amongst men. You must now say what action causes only the hell-retribution. A. The same action, being heavier, causes hells. If it is lighter then the result will be animal birth, etc. The person of three-fold perverse conduct will fall in hells. The person of other sins not fulfilled becomes animal, etc. Thus the heavier sinful action being committed, the birth in hells will be the result. The bad action done by the person of broken conduct and by the person breaking the other's opinion leads to hells. The action done by the person engaged in disturbing other's conduct and mind leads to hells. The person having done bad action, and pursuing it falls in hells. The person doing some wrong towards the holy men falls in hells. The person having done a sin, praises it afterwards and does not like to abandon it falls in hells. The person doing a sin for the wealth-sake, experiences some other retribution. Thus the author described several circumstances leading one to hells. One noteworthy point may be stated here: A person being forsaken to the state of carelessness, the bad action done by him will lead to hells. The person being protected by the wise man, is born amongst gods. When Vāsava, a *yakṣa* was going to die, Śāriputra visited him. He looking at Śāriputra, gently calling him in his front, sighed a great sigh. He beholding Śāriputra's lustrous personality thought this person must be a great soul and not to be killed. Thinking thiswise he looked at him, head and feet seven times. On account of this he was born seven times amongst gods and he obtained the path of Pratyeka Buddha. Another example: Aṅgulimāla, having

committed several criminal acts thought to kill even his mother. But the Buddha, realizing his innate good qualities led him to the path of Release. Again a donor (*dānapati*) thought to kill him in his house by giving some poisonous food; the Buddha, realizing his good qualities led him to the path of Release. These persons, even though having many unmeritorious actions, did not fall in hells, etc. etc.

Animal-world-retribution :—

The person doing the bad action mixed with good one falls amongst animals. On account of intensity of the residual forces (*anuśaya*) one is born so. One having intense greed for the sexual pleasure is born amongst the *caṭaka*, the pigeon and the *cakravāka* birds. One having intensive rage, is born as snake, scorpion etc. Due to intense infatuation, one is born as a pig, etc. Due to intense brutality (*mada*) one is born as lion, tiger, etc. Due to intense stoutness and unsteadiness (*auddhatya-cāñcalya*) one is born as monkey, etc. Due to intense envy and jealousy one is born as dog, etc. Likewise, when other vices are intense one is born as other animal.

The author has elaborated further the kinds of action causing the birth in the animal world.

Now the action causing the birth in the ghost....world: The person, having the jealousy and greedy mind towards the food and drink, etc. is born as ghost. When a man begs, the miser scolds him by not giving him anything; he is born as the ghost; the miser telling the beggar 'No' speaks falsehood, and for this reason he is born as the ghost. The miser hates the other donor saying that this beggar, being lazy begs habitually. Being accustomed to the habit of being miser for long he does not himself give and also prevents other from giving. The miser snatches for himself what wealth there is in the monastery, or any property of Brāhmaṇas earmarked for the sacrifice; so he is born as the ghost. The person destroying the food and drink of others is

born in a place of starvation. He also suffers there the suffering that is resulted from the scolding of the beggar. The miser, witnessing a person oppressed by hunger and thirst feels no compassion; so, he, being born in a place, suffers the same oppressions. As a person, due to his mercy is born as god, so a person, due to his indignation and scolding, is born in an unhappy place. A person being greatly attached towards his relatives, servants, friends and to a well-known locality, is born amongst the ghosts of *Kaliṅga*, etc. This has been elaborated in the *Karma-vipāka-Sūtra*.

The action causing the birth in heavens : The person, practising the restraints, charity and other good actions, and being superior (in his motive) is born as god. The same person, being inferior, is born as man. A person having sharp senses is born as man. A person doing mixed good actions, is born as a man. The action is three-fold, superior, moderate and inferior. It is also divided into pure or impure (due to) mind's one-pointedness or otherwise. This is because men of different categories have their own individual variations. The following is from a Sūtra: A killer has a very small span of life. In stealing one becomes poor. In committing adultery one becomes of inferior family. In telling lie one is always censured. Due to slanderous talk (*paiśunya*), one becomes despicable of the family. In speaking harsh words one hears the similar words. In talking frivolous and senseless words, one becomes unbelievable to people. In having greed and jealousy, one becomes full of sexual activities. In having rage one becomes full of bad dispositions. In having wrong view one becomes full of illusions; in pride (*māna*) inferior birth; in arrogance, dwarf, in envy, dull complexion, in jealousy, suffering by poverty; in hate, disfigured stature, in troubling others, becoming full of disease; in giving charity with mixed heart becoming desirous of unsweet taste; in untimely charity; not obtaining one's desirable objective; in repentance and disapproval, birth in the border-land; in impure charity obtaining the retribution with difficulty; in sexual intercourse by improper

manner, obtaining no manly stature. These are mixed-unmeritorious actions. The reverse of these are meritorious actions. Thus, amongst men there are several variations (in mode of actions and dispositions, etc.) Therefore, it is the retribution of the mixed actions.

One is born as a man by his vow. Some men stuck to carefulness (*apramāda*) do not become full of desires. The person inclined to the wisdom (= true knowledge) and making a vow for human birth is born as man. The person who is inclined to honour his parents and holy men, and also knows to respect ascetics and Brāhmaṇas is born as man. The person who is of pure action amongst men is born in the Uttarakuru. The person who dislikes his own field, house, hut and other belongings is born in Uttara. The person practising the white action earns the wealth in order to give charity, not to hoard it. He himself practises good conduct and causes not others to disregard it, he is born in the *Uttarakuru*. The person of good conduct somewhat inferior to the above said is born in the *Godānīya*. The person of still inferior conduct is born in the *Pūrvavideha*.

The action causing the birth amongst gods: One is born amongst gods as a result of having extremely pure charity and good conduct. The person, obtaining the subsidiary to wisdom, destroys all the fetters, and is born as god. It is further stated in the *Aṣṭapuṇya-Sarga-Sthāna*. The person, dwelling in compassion, joy, tranquillity is born in the world of Brahmās and upto *Bhavāgra*. Here dhyāna and trance are in an excellent form, their retribution also excellent. The person who has not destroyed indolence, slumber and arrogance, becomes of lusterless body. One who destroyed them, becomes of pure lustre. The person of most superior meritorious acton-retribution is born amongst gods, as he can secure all the desirable things in accordance with his wishes.

The person is dwelling in the formless concentration which is isolated from the forms (*rūpa*) he is born in the formless region. This and others are termed the actions of god-retribution.

The action with uncertain kind of retribution is the following: The inferior good or bad action is experienced in the hells and amongst ghosts, animals, gods or men. The good action is experienced in the hells in this way. A man released for a while from the hell of *arcis* witnesses from distance a green grove, getting delighted, he enters immediately it, and becomes happy a short while until knifes and arrows fall on his neck. Or witnessing a river of hot water thinks that this is pure cool and becomes happy a short while. Thus in the hell there is a bit of retribution from the good action.

111. *Seven Un-Meritorious Or Bad Restraints*

They are: killing, stealing, adultery, slander, harsh words, telling lie and frivolous and senseless talk. The whole or part of these seven is termed *akuśala-saṁvara*. One possessed of the bad action, killing is soldier, hunter, etc. One possessed of stealing is thief, etc. One possessed of adultery is hetaera, etc. who practise adultery in an improper manner (*amārgeṇa*). One possessed of telling falsehood is songster, actor, etc. One possessed of slander is a person delighted in reproach, and reviling political messenger. One possessed of harsh words is the guardian of the hells, etc. One possessed of frivolous talk is the jester, etc. by using joint words.

Some master says: Kings, while punishing their enemies, get this un-meritorious *saṁvara*. But it is not correct. The person who commits this sinful action-stream and does not cease to do it is considered to be possessed of this un-meritorious *saṁvara*. The kings do not continue that action.

This bad restraint is obtained when the bad action is committed. The restraint one obtains not only from the victim

of the bad action, but from all other creatures too. Just as a man of good conduct obtains the meritorious restraint from all living beings, even so is the un-meritorious restraint also. While an agent of killing obtains two-fold *avijñapti*, viz. (1) one brought under the sin of killing and (2) the other brought under un-meritorious restraint, he, at the same time, obtains also the *avijñapti* brought under un-meritorious *saṁvara* from other creatures.

One is always possessed of this restraint until he adopts an indifferent mind. This restraint is always obtained and every moment in accordance with one's mind and its defiling factors.

This seven-fold restraint as directed to every living being, is to be divided each into superior, moderate and inferior, thus making in all twenty-one kinds.

It is given up when one takes up the meritorious restraint, or at the time of death. When one takes vow that this sin I shall commit no more from today, he gives it up also from that time.

The Ābhidharmika says: One gives it up from the moment of his senses being affected. This is not correct. For, even incapables obtain this. So says the Vinaya: The ascetic whose senses are affected or modified, does not become of destroyed (unmeritorious) restraint. Amongst five places of birth man alone is possessed of this restraint and none else. Some masters say that animals, lion, tiger, wolf, etc. are always possessed of the cruel acts.

112. *Seven Meritorious Or Good Restraints* (*Saṁvara*)

Seven good restraints are: Abstention from killing and the abstention from uttering the frivolous talk. The restraint one obtains from all sentient and non-sentient beings although he takes it up from the sentient beings alone.

It is three-fold: (1) Śīle-restraint, (2) Dhyāna-restraint, (3) Concentration-restraint. The pure restraint, *anāsrava*-

saṁvara is included in the above last two, hence it is not stated separately. The Ābhidharmikas say: There is one *Prahāṇa-saṁvara* and a desire-freed person obtains it. It is so named because it causes to give up the un-meritorious action, breaking of śīla, etc. All the restraints are in fact, brought under the above said three restraints.

The heretics also have this śīla-restraint; for, they also take up the vow of abstention from bad actions and the time-limit of the vow. This restraint is possible in other places of birth also. So says a Sūtra: Nāgas, etc. also observe the *śīla* for one day.

Some masters say: This *śīla-saṁvara* is not observed by the incapable (*aśakta*) and others. A. This śīla-restraint is born in the region of mind. The meritorious mind is present also in the incapable persons. Why do they not obtain it? Q. Why do they not listen to initiative utterances of the ascetic? A. They, having very deep fetters and latent-vices, can hardly obtain the path. They do not further remain amongst the monks and nuns. Hence they do not listen to the utterances. The persons like the deaf, etc. who are prohibited there deserve also the meritorious restraint. Q. There are persons prohibited in the Vinaya like the excommunicated beings (*pātakin*), a man of very inferior livelihood and a violater of nuns and others. Do they also have *kuśala-saṁvara*? A. If he is white-garbed householder, he may sometimes obtain it. They are not prohibited in practising the good actions, charity, mercy, etc. Thus what harm will be there in their practising the mundane meritorious restraint? Since they are polluted by the bad acts, they are deprived of (receiving) the holy path. Hence they do not listen to the ordination, *pravrajyā*.

The meritorious restraint is obtained from all sentient beings. Otherwise that restraint would be parochial (*prādeśika*) and then it would be simliar to doctrine of Nāthaputras, viz. the abstention

from the killing, etc. is within five hundred miles, *yojanas*. This our restraint is not parochial. Therefore if anyone takes the vow that I shall abstain from killing this man alone and not the other person, he does not obtain this *śīla*-restraint.

Ābhidharmikas say: Even practising parochially the charity, and the compassionate mind, etc. one has some merit. Likewise *śīla* also would be parochial. Just as the practice of one śīla produces its merit, just so is restraint possible from one sentient being.

Q. Śīla-restraint is two-fold: (1) one covering the whole life-period and (2) the other covering one day and night. The first is for the monk or the lay man. The second is when a person observes for one day eight śīlas. How is this? A. There is no such limit as above said. One may take śīla for one day and night, one day alone or one night alone, half day or half night as it may suit one. The whole life *śīla* is for the person who has obtained ordination. One who takes *śīla* for a month, two months or one year, is not a monk. The five śīlas are also to be explained likewise.

One does not fall from the adopted śīla, however, his (subsequent) un-meritorious action (non-śīla) pollutes (his previous) śīla. This śīla-restraint ought to be obtained from the sentient beings of all three times. Just as one worshipping all the holy persons of the past time obtains merits, just so the restraint also from the sentient beings of all times. Therefore all the Buddhas are of one similar *śīla-skandha*.

This restraint is immeasurable: The restraint arises as seven-fold for one person. It arises from the roots of merit, non-greed, etc. It also arises from the types of mind, superior, moderate and inferior. Thus it becomes manifold. Just as the restraint is adopted from one sentient being, just so it is adopted from all sentient beings. Being obtained constantly and every moment (from new born sentient beings) it becomes immeasurable.

(The progressive increase of the restraint):— A person one day takes up one śīla: This is the first restraint. In the same day he takes up a lay man's *śīla*. This is the second. In the same day he takes up the ordination. This is the third restraint. In the same day he takes up the whole śīla, this is the fourth restraint. In the same day he obtains the dhyāna-restraint, this is the fifth restraint. He obtains in the same day the concentration of the formless world; this is the sixth restraint. He, in the same day, obtains pure restraint (anāsrava); this is seventh restraint. Following the gain of the path-fruit, he obtains again restraint. The restraint once deeply rooted does not perish, but it assumes the name "excellent". Thus the meritorious quality gets increased. Since this śīla-restraint increases every moment and constantly in relation to all sentient beings (including the new born ones) the four sources of jewels (four oceans) do not deserve comparison with the sixteenth part of the restraint of one day.

Dhyāna-restraint and pure (*anāsrava*) restraint operate in accordance with the mind. The śīla-restraint is not so. Some masters say: Dhyāna-restraint is available in the person who has entered into concentration but not in the person who has emerged from concentration. How is this? A. It is also available in the latter always. This person, possessed of the Truth does not commit any unmeritorious action that would break the śīla. Those who are not in the mood of committing any wrong ought to be active in the progressive growth of the meritorious mind. Q. If in the formless world (*arūpya*) dhyāna is not an anti-breaker of śīla, in whose contradiction it is named as 'the meritorious restraint'? A. This is the nature of the law (*dharmatā*) that all the sages and noble persons are possessed of meritorious restraints (in the formless world). If they have the restraint only in contradiction to a breaker of śīla, that restraint will be only from the sentient beings that may actually be victimised which idea is defective.

113. *Eight-Limbed Fasting-Śīla*

The eight-limbed fasting is prescribed for the lay man. The eight abstentions become gates (of merits) and through these eight one abstains from all sins. Amongst them four are substantially (*dravyataḥ*) unmeritorious. The wine-drink is the root cause of all sins. Other three are causes of carelessness. The abstention from the five bad actions is the cause of merits and the abstention from other three is the cause of the path. The good action of the white-robed man is in the major part inferior and renders only causality to the path.

The five vehicles are accompanied by these eight-abstentions.

These fasting-limbs may be observed all together or separately as one is capable to observe. Some masters say that they are to be observed in one fasting day and night. But this is improper. What harm will be there in observing one or many abstentions for half a day or upto one month? Some masters say that they are to be adopted from other person. This restriction is also not reasonable. The other person being absent, one may adopt them recollecting him and uttering: I shall observe eight fasting-śīlas.

There are five cleanings (*śauca*): (1) observance of ten meritorious actions, (2) a sense of suffering towards the previous and future periods of time (*pūrvānta, aparānta*), (3) not doing any harm to anybody with evil design, (4) continued observance of the restraints, and (5) inclination towards *Nirvāṇa*. The person who is capable of observing the fasting in this manner, the four sources of jewels (= ocean) do not deserve comparison with sixteenth part of that person's (merit). The meritorious retribution of the lord of gods Indra also does not deserve comparison. Śakra, Indra once recited this stanza (of fasting) but the Buddha rebuked him saying that the stanza should be uttered by one who destroyed passions (*āsrava*). The stanza says :

The person accomplished with six fastings in a month,
engaged in eight limbs (of fasting),
this person obtains merits,
he will be equal to me.

The person who observes fasting for a day, obtains its merit and also becomes equal to Śakra (= Indra). To the person observing this fasting Nirvāṇa will be its fruit. Therefore the stanza should be uttered by one who destroyed passions (*āsrava*). While taking up the fasting all the handcuffs and chains should be loosened and all the unmeritorious activities should be discarded: This is termed cleaning (*śauca*). Q. If a Cakravartin king wishes to adopt the fasting, who is to instruct him (in his adoption)? A. Bhadanta, gods, or the direct disciples of the Buddha instructed and helped him to adopt it.

114. *Eight-Fold Dispute*

Amongst eight disputes, four are impure and four pure. The four impure are: (1) A person seeing (an event) speaks: I did not see it; (2) Not seeing it he speaks : I saw it. (3) A person, having not seen (an event) speaks: I have seen it; but when he is asked (in the court) he speaks: I have not seen it; (4) a person having seen (an event) speaks: I have not seen it, but when he is asked (in the court) he speaks: I have seen it. Thus by speaking the reverse of the fact (the hearer's) mind is misguided and hence these speeches are impure.

The four pure are: (1) A person, having seen (an event) speaks: I saw it; (2) a person having not seen it, speaks: I did not see it; (3) a person, having seen something speaks: I did not see it; when he is asked (in the court) he speaks: I did not see it; (4) a person, having not seen (an event) speaks: I saw it, when he is asked (in the court) he speaks: I saw it. Thus by speaking the fact (the hearer's) mind remains in the fact; hence these speeches are pure.

The differences of *dṛṣṭi*, *śruti*, *buddhi* and *jñāna* are the following: Three-fold belief (*śraddhā*): (1) *dṛṣṭi* is the belief in the present things. *Śruti* is the belief in the speech of the trustworthy person; *jñāna* is an inferential knowledge. Buddhi is the wisdom discriminating (*vivecana*) the said three-fold belief. These three wisdoms are sometimes true or sometimes reverse of the true. The superior men do not utter impure speeches, but only pure ones. Therefore the speech spoken by the inferior men is termed impure; the same spoken by the superior men is pure.

Some masters say: The superior men are those who understand rightly the true import (of the above), and not merely those who gained the path. Therefore, even the ordinary men may be true-speakers.

115. *Nine Actions*

The action is nine-fold: The action related to the desire-world is three-fold: *vijñapti*, *avijñapti*, *na vijñapti na-avijñapti*. Likewise is the action related to the form-world. The action related to the formless world is two-fold and pure, *anāsrava*. The action done by the body and speech is *vijñapti*. On the basis of *vijñapti*, the accumulation of merit and demerit constantly happening is termed *avijñapti*, a mind's dissociate element. There is also *avijñapti* born of the mind alone. What is neither *vijñapti* nor *avijñapti* is the mind itself. This mind is the volition itself which is termed *karman*, action. Therefore what is designed by the mind then, committed by the body is the mental action, also termed volition (*cetanā*). It is done by the body after being meditated upon by the volition and hence it is termed action.

The action which is in the form of will becomes pure (*anāsrava*) volition. All parts of the body commit the overt action, and *avijñapti* accumulated on the basis of that action becomes greater and leads to a bigger retribution. When the

mind is stronger, *avijñapti* is obtained and when it is soft, *avijñapti* is not obtained. *Avijñapti* is produced from the vow (*praṇidhāna*). If any one takes vow: I shall surely give, and I shall build a shrine (*caitya*); he necessarily obtains *avijñapti*. It continues to exist till the object of *vijñapti* exists. As long as a gift of the shrine and the garden, etc. is not perished, so long *avijñapti* constantly continues. The mind also recollects it and does not cease to do so. When a person arouses the mind: This I shall have to do always or I shall give robe. This kind of thing that is entertained in the mind does not cease to exist. All along this time he obtains *avijñapti* always and remembers it just like one, obtaining the conduct of ordination continues to maintain it.

Avijñapti arises from *vijñapti* in the worlds of desire as well as of the form. For, gods of the form-world also preach Dharma and worship the Buddha and his Order just like the men. Some masters say that there is no *avijñapti* as dormant-indeterminate (*vinila-avyākṛta*). (But the author says);—dormant-indeterminate *avijñapti* is a heavier defilement. Accumulation of this defilement is termed latent residue (*anuśaya*). But *avijñapti* that is non-dormant-indeterminate does not exist; for the mind at this state being inferior and milder does not cause accumulation as for instance the flower renders the sesame (oil) fragrant but not the grass and the tree, etc.

Some masters say that higher up above Brahmā-world there is no *vijñapti* action productive of the (*avijñapti*) mind; for, *vitarka* and *vicāra* produce vocal action and there are no *vitarka* and *vicāra* there. The mind that enjoys the Brahmā-world, however, nullifies the vocal action. This is wrong. The sentient beings take their body in accordance with their action. The person who is born in a (still) higher world, would not enjoy the retribution of the Brahmā-world. Therefore, we understand that he produces the vocal action with (the help of) the mind of his own region. As to your contention that there

are no *vitarka* and *vicāra* in the Brahmā-world it will be refuted later on.

The holy men (who have not finished the destruction of their fetters) do not, in their innate nature, commit any blameworthy action (i.e. *vijñapti*, action). The sentient beings, like the dog, etc. though they do not speak, produce vocal sound. Since this arises from their mind, it is termed action. The sound, be it articulate, be it crying or be it a sound by means of flute, etc. is all termed action. These corporeal and vocal actions necessarily arise from the non-sensuous consciousness and not from the other consciousness. Therefore, men perceive the action born of their body and hear the action born of their tongue. The action born of the non-sensuous consciousness that is continued in succession men perceive and hear by themselves.

116. *Ten Un-Meritorious Action-Paths*

They are: violating the life, etc. Conglomeration of five groups of elements is termed *Sattva*. To cut short its life-duration is termed violation of life. The five groups of elements though momentary, appearing and disappeaing every moment continue in succession. The stoppage of their succession is termed the violation of life. The person obtains the sin of killing through his mind of killing.

Q. Some masters say: The person who kills the living beings through some servant or kills instantaneously with a sharp and heavy knife does not incur any sin. A. He also will incur the sin because the killing is effected through four factors: (1) the existence of a sentient being, (2) awareness of the above, (3) killing motive and (4) the actual cutting of its life-span. The person associated with these four will surely incur the sin.

(2) Stealing: some property belonging to some other person, to take that property from him by secret means (*caurya*) is stealing. Here also are four factors: (1) the property belong-

ing to another person, (2) awareness of that fact, (3) stealing motive and (4) to take it by stealing method.

Q. Some masters say: The unowned property (*nidhi*) belongs to king. The person who takes it incurs the sin from the king. A. The property found on the surface of the earth belongs to king. But there is no question about the underground property; for even the noble persons like Anāthapiṇḍada and others take it as their own.

Q. When all the properties come into existence by virtue of common actions of the living beings, how does one incur the sin on account of stealing? A. Though they are produced by the common action-causes, there is, nevertheless, a variation of superiority or inferiority in the causes for each individual. What property is governed by the supreme influence of the causal action of certain person, that propertv belongs to this person. The property of the shrine and of the monastery invariably belongs to the Buddha or his Order. To take that property without permission involves an unmeritorious mind.

(3) Illegitimate adultery (*kāma-mithyācāra*). A woman who is not one's wife, and to commit the sex-intercourse with her is *kāma-mithyācāra*. To commit the sex-action by wrongful means (*amārgeṇa*) with even his own wife is also *kāma-mithyācāra*. Every woman has her guardian (*pālaka*). Kings are the guardians of the wives of the persons who are gone out of the home. The hetaera is the wife of none. Nevertheless to commit sex-action with her is sinful; for the wife is younger in age according to the Vinaya. (The hetaera may be older and hence it is wrongful). If a woman, husbandless comes herself before a man and tells: I shall be your wife; and to commit the sex-action with this woman is not a wrongful sex-action. If an ascetic (*pravrajita*) who takes a woman as wife and commits the sex-action, he will not be free from the sin due to wrongful intercourse; for, there is no such thing, *dharma*, (heard before). It is the law (*dharma*) of the ascetic that he should abstain from

the wrongful sex-intercourse. He would incur the sin more despicable than that of committing the same with the other person's wife.

(4) Telling lie: If any one, cheating other person, speaks untruth, this is telling lie. He incurs the sin from the man aimed at by cheating. When a person tells other man that he informed certain person thiswise, and if this thing is not so, then there will be no case for telling lie. The idea of telling lie depends on some concept (*saṁjñā*). The person sees (things) but does not perceive the concept (suited to the context). If he, being asked, tells: I have not perceived it, he does not incur the sin. This is to be understood as in the *Vinaya*. Q. If anybody by misconceiving some object tells that he has seen it which is not really seen by him. Why does he not incur the sin? A. The conception of the merit and the sin is governed by the mind. Since that man has given rise to the idea of having seen on the unseen object, he does not incur the sin. For instance, a person has not formed the idea of a sentient being on a living object and he has the idea of a sentient being on the inanimate object, he does not incur the sin of killing. This sin arises relying on the mind that he has conceived the idea of an animate object. Therefore, even in the presence of a sentient being, a person having no conception of the sentient being does not incur the sin, as he has not that idea. In the absence of a sentient being, the person having that idea does not incur the sin, as there is no really the sentient being. If there is a sentient being and the person has that idea, then he will incur the sin of killing, because all the factors of killing are there. A person has the idea of having not seen about the seen object; if, being asked, he tells: I have not seen it, he does not cheat others as he presents no mistaken idea (*saṁjñā-viparyaya*). It is considered as truth even though the object varies. A person has the idea of having seen about the unseen object; if, being asked, he tells: I have not seen it, he cheats others as he presents a mistaken idea. It is considered as telling a lie even though the object does not vary.

(5) Slander (*paiśunya*): When a person utters some words with a view to breaking friendship, that speech is termed *paiśunya*. But when the speaker has not that motive, other person, however, having heard it breaks friendship himself, then the speaker incurs no sin. The person who, with the good intention of teaching moral conduct, breaks friendship with the wicked persons, even though friendship is broken, incurs no sin. A person having no malign heart utters such word he incurs no sin.

(6) Harsh speech: If any one speaks a pungent word not beneficial to anyone but simply causing disquieting mind; that is termed 'harsh speech'. When person utters harsh speech with the compassionate heart, he does not incur the sin. To pierce the body with a needle for treatment is not sinful ,though painful it is. The Buddhas and the noble persons also utter the harsh words, e.g. in advising their disciples and patients. A person has no mind influenced by the latent residues and fetters; the harsh words uttered by him cause no sin, just as those uttered by desire-freed persons. The person who speaks harsh words with evil mind incurs the sin at the very moment of arousing the evil mind.

(7) Frivolous and senseless talk: It is the same as the talk of untruth in an unstraightforward manner. Untimely truth-speaking is also frivolous talk. It is considered so because even the truth may cause malice. To speak truth in an unfavourable time, baseless and with no purpose and order is also frivolous speech. The speech uttered on account of the mind's distraction through illusiveness is frivolous talk. Un-straightforwardness of the body and the mind is a frivolous action. However, what is done orally is termed in the world as frivolous speech in general. The other three vocal actions are mixed up with frivolous speech and not separable from it. If there is telling a lie and also a harsh speech not distinguishable; then there are two kinds of vocal actions; telling lie and frivolous talk. If the above two

are with a view to breaking friendship, then there are three kinds of the vocal action: telling lie, slander and frivolous talk. If there are telling lie and harsh speech and a wish to break friendship, then there are four kinds of vocal action. There is a frivolous talk alone when there is no telling lie, and the harsh speech is not very distinct, but there is only untimely, unbeneficial and purposeless speech. The frivolous talk is very subtle and difficult to be dispensed with. The Buddhas alone are able to avoid it. Therefore only the Buddhas are to be trusted as well-known experts (in understanding) the speeches of the world-honoured Teacher Buddha.

Some masters say that merit and demerit are governed by the body and the speech not by the mind alone. Therefore we say that mind is also the action-path (*karma-patha*). From the strength of the three-fold mental action arise the corporeal and vocal actions of demerit. This three-fold mental action is very subtle and heavier (than the other two). This point will be discussed in future (ch. 119). Although all the defiling forces are the productive factors of the sinful actions, these three mental actions in particular are termed as unmeritorious action-paths because these are more disquieting to the sentient beings. The moderate or inferior lust (*rāga*) is not action-path. If the same is intense, then, being strengthened by the view of harming others it causes corporeal and vocal actions and hence the greed-jealousy becomes *karma-patha*. The same is the case with the indignation and infatuation (*pratigha-moha*). If it is the view that the infatuation alone is counted as an embodiment of all defilements, the same becomes three-fold as it causes distrees to others by means of the body and speech.

A particular variety of infatuation is the wrong view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*). All the illusive thoughts (*moha*) are not unmeritorious. A *moha*, infatuation which is dominating factor for arousing the wrong view is un-meritorious action-path. All the sins are governed by these three vices. The Sūtra says that

there are four factors of unhappy birth, viz. lust, hate, fear and infatuation. Here fear is not to be counted as a separate factor, because infatuation includes also fear. When it is said that something is due to fear, it is really due to infatuation. For the wise man never commits any wrong all his life even as a result of his (fear from) destruction.

When a full-fledged development of defiling forces brings out the corporeal and vocal actions, that moment is termed un-meritorious action-path. The mind alone is the action. What moves in it is termed *karma-patha*. In the last three the mind moves first and in the first seven the mind moves afterwards. The last three are the action-paths and not the action. The first seven are actions as well as the paths (*pathin*). Q. There are other un-meritorious actions like whipping, wine-drink, etc. Why are they not counted but only ten are counted. A. Because these ten are heavier sins, they are counted so. Others, whipping, etc. are subordinate and occurring previously or subsequently to them. The wine-drink is not sinful by itself (*prakṛti*). Nor it is harmful to others. The wine itself is not harmful even though its drink may be harmful.

These un-meritorious actions are obtainable everywhere in each of the five places of birth (*gati*) excepting the Uttara-kuru. The adultery is aroused by three things and is accomplished by the sexual pleasure-greed. Others are aroused by three things and accomplished by three things. Āryas, although they may have mental un-meritorious actions, never commit other un-meritorious actions such as corporeal or vocal. Of the mental actions, only avertion they may have but never the mind of killing. A person having destroyed intoxicants (*āsrava*) and the roots of defilements never arouses an un-meritorious thought and much less a cursing act. Āryas, wise men have adopted an abstention-restraint from the unmeritorious actions, hence they never commit any such thing. Therefore they never fall in the un-happy place of birth. The moment the knowledge of truth

arises in the mind of the Āryas, wise men all their previous un-meritorious actions become ineffective just like a burnt seed.

Three poisons (= *kleśa-mūla*) are two-fold: (1) some leading to the unhappy birth and (2) some not leading to it. The first kind is destroyed by the wise, Āryans (= stream-winner, etc.). They never fall in *durgati* as they have no defilements. Further, on the basis of the grand durable strength of three jewels they destroy all their un-meritorious actions just as a debtor being supported by the king is never annoyed by the creditor. They, having a very sharp wisdom and higher knowledge, destroy their bad actions just as the digestive power being increased in the body digests the un-digested food. They have several means to get released from the influence of the bad actions, viz. recollection of the Buddha, compassion or meritorious actions. A thief, e.g. by means of several tricks resorts to a secret place in the forest and never gets traced. These wise men reach the path of release by means of knowledge, just like a cow, to its lord or a bird to the path of sky. They never fall in the un-happy birth on account of their habitual practice of meritorious things for several days and nights. So says the Sūtra: A person who practises constantly the good conduct through the body and the wisdom through mind never meets face to face with the action to be experienced in the hells. The stanza says:

The person who moves in the illimitables
and uncovered compassionate mind
All the heavier actions never approach.

In the mind of the wise the un-meritorious action never gets room just as a drop of water on the red-hot-iron-piece. Their meritorious actions go a long way deep just as the roots of *khadira* tree. Their meritorious actions are many and numerous and their bad actions fewer which lose their weight in the midst of good ones; e.g. a small quantity of salt dropped in the Ganges-water never modifies the taste of the water. The wise are richer by means of merits and belief, etc. A poor man incurs the sin

for the sake of the small gold coin (*kārṣāpana*); but the richer never does so even for the sake of thousands of coins. The wise never enter into the hells even in the presence of the sin; e.g. of the animals, tiger, leopard, elephant, horse, pigs, etc. that are fighting one another the strongest gets victorious. The mind of the wise is occupied by the noble path, and the sins leading to the unhappy life never annoy him, e.g. the solitary room is occupied by a king, others cannot enter. The wise men tie their mind to four foundations of recollection, and hence the bad actions never get opportunity in them just as a round vessel placed on a branch of the tree. One falls in the hell on account of two-fold fetters; the wise men however, having destroyed one kind of the fetters, never fall in the hells. The wise men lack the factors leading to the hells as explained previously in the chapter (110) on "six actions" and hence never fall in the hells.

117. *Ten Meritorious Action-Paths*

They are: Abstention from killing, etc. upto right-view. These are brought under *śīla*-restraint and observable simultaneously. Dhyāna, meditation that is brought under *arūpa*-restraint is also simultaneously observable. The abstention is action-path and it is nothing but *avijñapti*, an unmanifest element. Q. There are other actions like worshipping and giving charity, etc. Why is it said only ten? A. The abstention being prominent, these ten are superior to the charity, etc. for, the retribution derived from charity ,etc. does not deserve comparison with that of observing of good conduct. For example, a man of ten years' life span increases it due to the abstention from the killing. The ten un-meritorious actions are themselves sins; the abstention from them is by itself meritorious. The last three good actions are the roots of other good actions. Therefore charity, etc. are also brought under the ten action-paths. The abstention from whipping, etc. is also included in this action-path. Thus all the good actions are to be brought under-the ten-fold action-path.

118. *Disadvantages* (*ādīnava*)

The defect of bad actions is the experience of suffering in the hells, So says the Sūtra: Due to violation of life one falls in the hells; if he is born amongst men, he dies pre-mature death; and due to bad actions he suffers for the longest time; he falls in the hell of *avīci* and passes on innumerable years and does not cut his life-span there. All the sufferings, insult, less and oppressions experienced by sentient beings happen due to the bad actions alone. Because the bad action creates undesirable (*anișța*) and is cruel to others, one should abstain from such actions. The Sūtra says: There are five blemishes in the violation of life: (1) un-reliability by the people, (2) illfame, (3) becoming a drift from the good actions and approaching nearer to the bad ones, (4) repentance at death-bed, (5) ultimate falling in the unhappy place of birth. Due to violation of life, one will have a trifling happiness and immence sufferings. The practice of bad actions distresses one's mind. The origin (i.e. ignorance) which is accumulated in each period (of life) becomes hardly treated for betterment. The observer of the bad action enters into darkness from darkness and is never released from the path of action (*pravrttimārga*). He renders his human body futile and comparable to an ignorant who brings some poisonous herbs from the mountain of snow which is studded with medical herbs. Thus, obtaining the human body as a result of good actions, he makes great harm by not observing the moral conduct and much more so by adopting the bad ones. He, though wishing to love his body, does not in fact love it; though wishing to protect it, he does not in fact protect it as he has adopted the bad actions causing suffering to himself. (The nature of) the bad action practice is not realized in the present moment, but it will be realized at the time of retribution. Therefore a disbelief should not be entertained even in the slightest degree e.g., even a small quantity of poison kills the man, or even a small debt increases gradually (into a big sum) by interest. One does not forget the harm done by the other. The observer of bad conducts

does not remain in happiness. One falls down from the happiness of men and gods as a result of one's bad conduct. The ignorant who is delighted in unhappiness is far better. The practiser of the bad action has deep sufferings and feels at present the misery of repentance and at the end the misery of unhappy birth. One does not get released from the fruit of the bad actions even travelling over the air and diving into the ocean, as e.g. Suvarnakhaḍga chased the Buddha. Every bad action arises out of infatuation; so the wise should not recollect it. The Sūtra says: Carelessness kills all good things like an enemy. The bad action is censured by all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, Arhans, noble men and sages who are adept in five supernormal powers as well as merits and demerits. Therefore one should not commit any bad action. We actually witness in the world persons unhappy and of varied facial complexions affected by several worries and sufferings as a result of the increased un-meritorious thoughts; what is to speak of the effect of corporeal and vocal actions when they are adhered to. It is evident from these and many other factors that un-meritorious actions evolve so many disadvantages.

119. *Three Actions Heavier and Lighter*

Of the three actions what is heavier, whether corporeal, vocal or mental one? Q. Some masters say: The corporeal and vocal actions are heavier and not mental ones, because they are invariably true, e.g. five *ānantaryas* are committed with the support of the body and speech which accomplish the actions. A person, e.g. deciding: I shall kill this being, accomplishes it with the assistance of the body and speech. He cannot accomplish it with his mental action alone. He can neither procure with the mind alone the Brahmic merit of constructing the shrine. In the absence of the body and speech mental action has no retribution. A person, e.g. raises the thought: "I shall give charity", but does not act upon it. He cannot have the merit of charity. Things are not accomplished by merely taking vow (*praṇidhāna*). A person, e.g. takes vow to give to the

Saṅgha a big donation but does not give it. He will not, then have the merit from Saṅgha. In case the mental action is heavier, he will have it. The Vinaya does not mention any mental fault (*āpatti*). If the mental action is heavier, how is not there the mental fault? The merit will be very easy for him who produces a thought for some purpose. Who will adopt the difficult corporeal and vocal actions leaving the easy mental one? He will then have an inexhaustible merit. None does any help to anybody by arousing the mind alone. The hungry and the thirsty persons, e.g. wish to eat food and drink water and raise no mere thought. The person wishing to acquire the merit would arouse the meritorious thought and then acquire it. But this is quite inappropriate. Accepting the mental action heavier, one would fall in the hells by arousing a killing thought. What use will be there of the good conduct so long accumulated? The merits of its observance would be uncertain; for one may incur the sin by mere arousing one sinful thought. The Sūtra says: The corporeal and vocal actions are grosser and hence one should abandon them first, and due to that the mind gets concentrated. When one arouses a thought for adultery, his good conduct would diminish for the reason of adultery. Every manifest action (*vijñapti-karman*) is done by the body and the speech and not by the mind. Ill-talk of others depends on the vocal action and leads to the sin of lying. From the four factors of the sin previously enumerated it becomes obvious that the mental action is not heavier. So says the Buddha: The person who cultivates compassion ever since his birth, what un-meritorious action will he produce or think of? Therefore, it is understood that he produces the corporeal or vocal action alone and not the mental.

Now the author replies: Your above contention is wrong; for, the Buddha says:

> The mind is the root of Dharma,
> It is the lord and the servant.
> It recollects the good and the bad,
> It is the speech and practice.

From this it is known that the mental action is heavier. The corporeal and vocal actions have some distinctions as a result of their association with the mind, e.g. superior, moderate and inferior. In the absence of the mind other actions are non-existent. It is from the Sūtra that one doing the *vijñapti* action experiences invariably retribution. It is said: The three-fold mental action alone is beneficial to seven purity-merits. These purity-merits are the most excellent amongst the merit-wealths. Compassion is a mental action. The Sūtra says: The compassionate heart causes retribution. A Sūtra again says: Because I have previously practised the compassion for seven years, I shall not return to this world for seven aeons. Therefore, the mental action is superior. That alone is capable to pervade the whole universe. As a result of the retribution of the mental action one has life-span for eighty thousand great aeons. The power of the mental action excels that of other actions. The observer of the good conduct, e.g. giving rise to the wrong view at his life's end falls in the hells. The observer of the bad conduct likewise giving rise to the right view is born amongst the gods. So it is evident that the mental action is heavier (superior). The Sūtra says: The wrong view is the heaviest of the all sins. It says: The person who nurses the ultra-mundane right view never falls in the unhappy state of existence even though he is roaming about in the world for hundred thousand of years. The *Upāli Sūtra* says: A sage told: By one mental action (*mano-daṇḍa*) I shall reduce to ashes whole Nalanda just like the Daṇḍaka regions became forests by force of *mano-daṇḍa* of the sages. Just as one enters into the *Avaivartika* hell on account of impure elements that are accumulated by the mental action, just so does he enter into *Nirvāṇa* on account of pure accumulated elements, dharmas. The corporeal and vocal actions get matured only because the mental action has retribution. They have no retribution in the absence of the mental action. What action good or bad one does through the mind taking support on the body and the speech that is termed corporeal or vocal action. Even without these body and speech the mental action has the

retribution and not *vice-versa*. Therefore the mental action is understood as heavier and not the others.

Your argument that the corporeal action, etc. are true, e.g. five *ānantaryas* is wrong; for, the volition is heavier and so is its object; thus the mental action is heavier but not so the body and the speech. The action is true because of the mind's presence. Just as one enters into *Saddharma-pada*, 'a spiritual status' because of the mind's strength, just so does one incur the *ānartarya* sin only because of the mind's strength. In the absence of the mind patricide is not sinful. Therefore the body and the speech have no such strength (as the mind). The argument on the basis of accomplishing factors is also not good. "Accomplishing" means the finishing of the action. One incurs the sin from killing after snatching away the life and not so much at the moment of committing the corporeal and vocal actions. To finish the action the mind's strength is necessarily required and not that of the body and the speech. The statement that there is no retribution by mere arousing a thought is not correct. The Sūtra says: One by mere arousing a strong thought, is born as god or falls in a hell. How do you say that there is no retirbutoin for mental action? To say that no mere taking vow accomplishes anything is also inappropriate. A deep meritorious mind exceeds the merit of the charity given to the Order (Saṅgha). Your remark that no mental fault is (mentioned in the Vinaya) is wrong. The moment one arouses the unmeritorious thought, he incurs the sin. So says the Buddha: There are three sins: corporeal, vocal and mental. Therefore, it is evident that the saying that the mere arousing of an un meritorious mind incurs no sin is not established. The absence of fetters alone is *Śīla*, because it is difficult to maintain. One removes the grosseer sin by means of holding fast to Śīla and the finer one by means of concentraion and others. Your further remark that the merit or demerit will then be an easier affair is to be replied that men of feeble mind give up the easier means and observe the difficult conduct. The compassionate heart, e.g. has numerous and

intense merits but not so charity. People having the inferior knowledge-strength are incapable of fostering the compassionate heart, a mental action; hence they observe charity, etc. In the midst of various materials for worshipping like the variegated flowers and fragrant things it is very difficult to secure a pure mind. With regard to your remark that the merit would be inexhaustible, we say that if the person has enough strength of Bodhi, enlightenment, he would definitely secure an inexhaustible merit. Your contention that the mental action does neither good nor harm to anybody is not quite good. The corporeal and vocal actions are brought about by the mental one and hence not important. Every benefit is governed by dwelling in a compassionate heart; for, although the wind and rains follow the season, the seeds are matured by virtue of compassionate heart. At the commencement of aeon, rice etc. were spontaneous. Every natural production came to an end when the people were reduced to ten years of life-span. The person dwelling in the compassion destroys all roots of demerits which create all the turbulence and sufferings. If every living being remains in the compassionate heart, all of them would be born in the happier place. But not all of them wish the meritorious way of life. The wise sometimes do good by compassion and charity and sometimes by mere compassion. If men touch or fall under shadow of the body of a person practising a compassionate heart, they definitely feel happy. It is, therefore, obvious that the merit of compassion is superior to charity-giving, etc. Your criticism that nothing is gained by the long accumulated good conduct etc. is already replied, viz. one does good or wrong by virtue of one's mind's strength. So the mental action is heavier. Your criticism that nothing results from the long accumulated good conduct etc. is incorrect; for the purity of good conduct results from the purity of the mind. The mind being impure, the conduct is too impure. It is said in the Sūtra on Seven Adulteries: A man of pure conduct secures immense retribution. A Sūtra says: What is aspired by a man of conduct accompanies

the mind. The good conduct being pure, the mind gets pacified and not otherwise. Your reference to the Sūtra to the effect that the corporeal action, etc. are grosser, and abandoned first is a mistake. The subtle meritorious conduct causes immense retribution as, for example, the volition (*cetanā*) in meditaion and trance. Your remark that the adultery thought being raised, one's good conduct will be damaged is also not quite good. In whom the mental action is impure, in him, moral conduct is also impure. When the merit and demerit are ceased the fetters and moral conduct are ceased. Your argument that the manifest action is accomplished by the body and speech has been generally replied. The cessation of the corporeal and vocal actions implies the cessation of the mental action. The former is necessarily accomplished by the latter. The sin of violating the life that is incurred by the four factors does not arise in the absence of the mental action. The men in the world say that the corporeal and vocal actions are un-meritorious, but not so the mental one. The latter is not conspicuously experienced amongst people. The characteristics of the merit and demerit have previously been described (Chs. 55, 96, etc.). Since the mental action is so characterized, it is heavier than the other two.

120. *Illumination of the Action-Cause*

The Śāstra says: The action has been described in brief and it is the cause of the body which is in the nature of suffering. Hence one should suppress it. With this object in view one should abandon the action. The cause being checked its fruit will be checked. A shadow appears in the presence of an object-form. It disappears in the absence of the same form. One must make effort to abandon the action with a view to putting an end to the suffering.

Some masters say: The body is formed from Prakṛti. Some others say: It is produced by Maheśvara. Still some others say that it is formed from Mahāpuruṣa and again some others say that it is created by the Nature. The author says: This

point has been criticized on several grounds. Things are of various kinds: so their causes also are of varied nature. We witness, e.g. the various plants, *Alaka*, *Sanduka* and *Kodrava*, etc. indicating their various seeds. But Maheśvara, and others are not of varied nature. Therefore they are not causes, it is to be understood. The action, on the other hand, is divided into innumerable kinds and gives rise to varied bodies. The wise men believe in the fact that the body is formed on the basis of the action. They constantly observe the good dharmas, charity, good conduct, perseverance, etc. and abstain from the sinful-acts, killing, etc. If the body is formed from the action, then the body should be turned back. The illusive knowledge is dispelled by the true knowledge. By dispelling of the former, the defiling forces, desire, anger, etc. are dispelled and by dispelling of this again, the action causing the higher birth becomes ceased; then alone the body is turned back. This will not be possible if Iśvara, etc. are causes because these Iśvara, etc. cannot be made ceased. We actually witness the fruit resembling with its cause; the rice, e.g. springs up from the rice. Likewise the undesirable retribution results from the unmeritorious action and the desirable retribution from the meritorious action. This accord is not found in the case of the causes, Iśvara, etc.

We witness in our front that things are produced from the actions. The people suffer the beating, etc. on account of their bad actions and obtain the fame, etc. on account of their good actions. The speaker of sweet words secures the sweet retribution. So it is understood that the body is adopted on account of action.

People themselves understand that things are produced from the actions and that is the reason why they undertake the cultivation of the field and engage themselves in the practice of charity-giving, etc. They do not sit idle in their house wishing their desirables from Iśvara, etc. People even speaking of Iśvara, etc. as the cause resort to the action and undertake the fasting, etc. thus troubling their own bodies. This shows that the

action is the cause of everything. In respect of things that lie beyond our senses we should follow the other's advice i.e. the holy men's practice and conduct. All the wise men take to the good conduct, etc. and it follows from this that the world exists due to the action-cause. The person who abstains from the good conduct, etc. is not a wise man. No wise man does any action contrary to the Dispensation. The wise men accomplish the *ṛddhi*-potency, super-human intellectual and the created beings only on account of observing good conduct, etc. So it is due to action-cause. In the unhappy births, hells, etc. the hate, bickering (*pradāśa*) and others are full indicating thereby that they are due to the hate and bickering, etc. For example, observing the fruits at the top of a tree, people understand that the tree is the cause of the fruit. In the unhappy places of birth infatuation, etc. are full; this fact indicates that defilements are their causes, because all the demerits are governed by infatuation. Sentient beings born in the unhappy places of birth are many and sentient beings born in the happy places of birth are a few. We witness in the world that men engrossed in sinful actions, killing, etc. are many and a few are those engaged in the meritorious actions. This proves that the practice of killing, etc. is the cause of the unhappy births. Good men censure the killing and do not practise it.

If they think that the killing etc. are not of bad fruit, why do they reject them? When in their mind any bad thought arises, they at once check it, because they are afraid of bad retribution. Thus it is evident that the killing etc. produce bad retribution. If it is not so, they may do anything at their will thinking that this alone is quite happiness. Then the flesh-eating, stealing and adultery: all these would form happiness. Good men being afraid of the future sufferings avoid far away from these sinful things.

By cultivating true knowledge the impure action is destroyed nd then the body is not formed. This shows that the action is

its root. Though Arhans have impure actions, nevertheless they do not accumulate them on account of their cultivation of true knowledge. Because of the knowledge about the four noble truths the defilements in relation to (and affacting) the truths never arise again; hence they do not become possessers of the body. The learned person, considering thiswise, desires to understand the four truths. This proves that the action is the cause of the body. The cause being absent, no body is formed. For instance, when the ground is dry and the seed is burnt no sprout germinates. Thus, when the field of consciousness-station is not moistured by the water of thirst and the seed of the *karman*, action is burnt by the fire of true knowledge, the sprout of the body arises no more. The learned person understanding this (process) strives to dry up the field of consciousness-station and burn the seed of the action. It is, therefore, evident that the action is the cause of the body-formation.

DEFILEMENTS

121. *Characteristics of Defilement, Kleśa*

Śāstra says: Actions were expounded and now the defilements are to be explained. The defilement (*Kleśa*) is an activity (*Samudācāra*) of the filthy mind. Here what is a leading factor of the continuity of the worldly life is termed filthy mind (*malina-citta*). Its varieties are: lust, hate and infatuaton, etc. It is also termed: *Kleśa, pāpadharma, parihāṇi-, tirobhavana-, paritapana-, anutapana-dharma*, etc. The habitual practice and accumulation of this filthy thought is termed latent residue *anuśaya* and not merely the emergence of the thought-moment is so termed. The defilements are lust, hate, infatuation, doubt, pride and five wrong views. Their varieties are ninety-eight latent residues (*anuśaya*).

The lust otherwise called joy-happiness is three-fold. The joy-happiness of non-becoming (*vibhava*) is also termed lust. So says the Sūtra: Sex-thirst, becoming-thirst and non-becoming-thirst. Non-becoming is the abandonment, sessation. The

sentient beings being struck by sufferings, and desiring to take the body of aggregate think non-becoming as happiness.

Q. Joy-happiness is characterized as feeling, not as delight-lust (*nandi-rāga*). The Sūtra says: joyfulness of this world and joyfulness of the other world indicate the pleasant feeling of this world and the pleasant feeling of other world respectively. Again it says: sorrowfulness of this world and sorrowfulness of the other world indicate respectively the un-pleasant feeling of this world and the un-pleasant feeling of the other world. It is said in the *Devatāpraśna*: Does a man possessed of sons rejoice with his sons? The Buddha replies: The man possessed of sons grives with his sons; etc.

A. The lust is subordinate to the delight (*nandi*). So says the Sūtra: Thirst is caused by feeling. In the pleasant feeling resides the lust as residue. In the edible food there is delight and there is lust. The delight being stopped the lust is stopped. This shows that the lust is subordinate to joy (*prīti*). It is obvious from this Sūtra: The origination-truth is the thirst-fulness (*tarṣaṇa*) which denotes a desire for rebirth (*punar-bhava*). It is characterized as a desire for plenty of gains (*vividha-lipsā*) on the basis of lust (*rāga*). The desire for plenty of gains, *vividha-lipsā* is the general characteristic of *tarṣaṇa* and the desire for rebirth is its specific characteristic. The former (*vividha-lipsā*) i.e. desire for the water, etc. may be necessary even for the desire-freed man; so it is not included in the *samudya-Satya.* The latter, i.e. desire for rebirth is brought under the *Samudaya-Satya*, origination-truth.

Q. If the thirst is also delight, *nandi* and the lust, *rāga* is also delight what is the necessity for stating: on the basis of a lust, etc.? A. Its emerging moment is *tarṣaṇa*, the same being developed is lust, *rāga*. Hence it is said that on the basis of this developed lust. The Sūtra says: The world is addicted to delight-fulness. So the latter is the same as the lust. In the statement of the Sūtra: "apart from the cessation, (*nirodha*) all others,

lust, sorrowfulness are un-meritorious things ", the lust is delight and sorrowfulness is hate. When hate is said to be sorrowfulness then the delight is also understood as lust. Therefore amongst eighteen mind's co-farers (*mana-upa-vicāra*) no defilements are included but only kinds of feeling. It follows from this that lust is subordinate (*aṅga*) to delight. The desire-freed person does not experience happiness and nor does the hate-freed experience the misery. The infatuation-freed person too experiences no indifferent feeling. This may be evident from the statement made in respect of the third feeling: The worldlings understand neither the origin of this feeling, nor its cessation, nor its taste, fault and removal. Hence in the third feeling there resides the latency of ignorance. These worldlings do not understand the above five dharmas, (origin, etc.) and hence they, in the third feeling, entertain constantly the latency of ignorance. The latency of ignorance is the same as the non-knowing of the nature of that feeling's co-farer (*-upavicāra*). Thus the happy and suffering mind's co-farers pertaining to the worldlings are the same as the lust and indignation (*rāga-pratigha*). The feeling (*vedanā*) is what contacts the mind for the first time. The same being felt as enlarged is termed defilement (*kleśa*). The mild and inferior mind is termed feeling and the same mind being intensified is *kleśa*.

122. *Lust-Trait* (*rāga-lakṣaṇa*)

The Śāstra says: Amongst nine fetters lust related to three realms of existence is termed thirst. The limb of seven latent residues (*anuśaya*) is two-fold: sensual pleasure-lust and becoming-lust. Some people conceive the notion of release towards the two upper realms of existence. Therefore the Buddha says: This region (a part of becoming) is *Bhava*, rebirth. In the absence of lust no rebirth is occurring. That is why rebirth-lust is also said separately and not merely the sensual pleasure-lust. Some masters say: The sensual pleasure lust alone is *kleśa*. The person freed from this kleśa is known as released. Therefore

the Buddha says: Even in the realm of non-form (*arūpya*) there is *bhava rāga*. The Buddha also makes it plain that even there a subtle becoming force continues. Hence it is said separately. In the ten un-meritorious action-paths and the four bondages the name *kāma-rāga* has been (made). It is also called "desire for other's property". Five hindrances and five fetters belonging to the lower region (*avarabhāgiya*) are called sensual pleasure-craving (*kāma-kāmanā*). It is a craving for five sensual pleasures. Three un-meritorious roots are given the name *akuśala-mūla-rāga* which means the accumulation (*upacayana*) of un-meritorious roots. If this lust is active about the un-meritorious (dharma), it is called *akuśala-rāga*; e.g. snatching away of other's property or that of the shrine or the monastery. And when one has the lust to eat the flesh of a creature alive or lust to commit adultery with his mother, elder and younger sisters, the wife of one's teacher or of the ascetic or in an improper manner (*amārgeṇa*), this is called (*akuśala-rāga*). When one does not like to give away his own property, it is termed *kārpaṇya* (to be a miser) which is no other than the lust. When one has no any virtue (*guṇa*) which may tempt others to speak of him as virtuous is *akuśala-rāga*. When one has a virtue, the desire to make others know of it is the arousing of the lust, *rāgotpādana*. The desire to gain many things and many donations is abundant lust, *bahu-rāgatā*. Having obtained a small donation one craves for a better agreeable thing, and does not rest content; this is termed *atuṣṭi*, discontentment. The attachment towards one's clan, family, relatives, fame, beauty, wealth, youth and long life, etc. is termed *mada*, self-admiration or complacency. The lust for four-fold reverence (*satkāra*) is termed four thirsts.

The lust is two-fold: sensual pleasure-lust and its instrument-lust (*upakaraṇa-rāga*). It is again two-fold: soul-lust and thing-pertaining-to-the-soul-lust (*ātmiya-rāga*). The first is conditioned by the internal elements and the second by the external ones. In two upper realms of existence the lust is solely conditioned by the internal elements. It is again five-fold : visible-

lust, form-lust (*saṁsthāna-rāga*), lust for touch, lust for the behaviour-talk, and the lust for everything. The lust for the colour, taste, odour, sound and touch is the lust for five sensual pleasures. The thirst that has arisen towards six touches is the lust for the six objects. In three feelings there is a lust. In the pleasant feeling there exist a lust for gaining it and the lust for protecting it. In the unpleasant feeling there exist a lust for not gaining it and a lust for avoiding it. In the feeling neither pleasant nor unpleasant there exists infatuation-lust. This lust has nine limbs (*aṅga*). The ***Mahā-nidāna Sūtra*** says: Relying upon the thirst one seeks things to his liking, a man, e.g. being distressed by certain thing seeks some other thing but the happy man does not seek. The distressed person on the other hand seeks much. The development of the lust is seeking (*paryeṣaṇa*). At the time of seeking what is obtained, that is thirst-gain. Relying upon the gain decision (arises). The mental determination: 'This is acceptable and that is not acceptable' is the decision. Relying upon it is *chanda-rāga*, wish-lust. Relying upon it (arises) conviction (*adhyavasāya*) which is an intensive and deep wish. Relying upon it (arises) acceptance (*parigraha*) which is no other than taking up. Relying upon it (arises) envy and relying upon it arises well guarding. Based upon it are resorting to the stick and resorting to the sword, etc. These are nine limbs. The lust is again made into nine: The lust in accordance with time, becomes inferior, moderate and superior, inferior-inferior, inferior-moderate, and inferior-superior, moderate-inferior, moderate-moderate and moderate-superior, superior-inferior, superior-moderate and superior-superior. The lust has ten mundane limbs: For Example, one, looking at a lovable beauty (*rūpa*) murmurs in his mind that this is (lovable thing), then he loves it, takes vow, recollects, declares it openly, forgets shame, presents himself before it, becomes intoxicant and then mad and then dies by swooning (*mūrchā-maraṇa*). These are the characteristics of the lust.

123. *Desire-Cause*

When one cherishes a false impression in regard to an object of the feminine beauty, form, touch or speech then he has the sensual-pleasure-lust (*kāma-rāga*). It arises when the doors of the eye, ear, etc. are not guarded. It also arises from the food when it is more than enough; or on the acquaintance of feminine form, or due to experience of the (worldly) pleasures (*sukhāni*) or through infatuation. The sensual pleasure-lust arises on account of cherishing a false notion of pure in regard to impure thing as well as a defective understanding. For example, a bleached cloth becomes very well dirty. That lust arises by force of co-dwelling with the men full of lust. A man having raised a false notion of the body, etc. that are formed of the four great elements, becomes carried away by the sensual pleasures like the flowers unstringed together, etc. If one does not cultivate the meritorious act on account of idleness, then the lust gets opportunity (to enter in him). Frequenting the places unworthy of visiting e.g. houses of hetaera, wine-dealers and butchers, etc. one becomes overwhelmed by the lust. Vulture and crow are examples. For him who looks at impure (part of the body) and does not check its mental picture (*ālambana*) the sensual pleasure-lust develops in a great speed. The latent residue of lust is accomplished on account of constant development of sensual pleasure-lust for long time. Then it is liable to easily arousing. One, being pleased with the object of feminine beauty forms a (suitable) concept (*nimitta*) and keeps on a definite thought thereof (*pariccheda*). To form a concept means: grasping conceptual things (*nimitta*) like the feminine-feet, hands, face, eye, speech, smile, angle of eye-glance, weeping and teers, etc. The definite thought-grasping means a constructive thought of the specific forms of woman and man. A man of the recollecting thought (*anusmaraṇa-vikalpa*) so kept on arouses a sensual pleasure-lust. A man of feeble investigating thought runs after the conceptual object (*ālambana*) but does not control it. Then sensual pleasure-lust arises in him. A man of the sensual

pleasure-lust aroused feels its impact, and does not give it up; then it gradually increases and raises it to a higher degree from its lower degree and *vice-versa*.

It arises in him who knows its taste only and not its disadvantage. It arises due to season like autumn, summer, etc. and due to a particular place, e.g. a place where the sex-intercourse is several times practised; and due to bodily status; e.g. perfectly healthy and wealthy youth, and due to bodily strength e.g. from drink and elixir, etc. It arises in him who has acquired beautiful five sensual pleasures like a lake full of flowers, a garden, a well and oblong pond of pleasant and pure water, newly formed cloud, lightning, fragrant breeze, and fan, etc. and who is listening to sweet voice of the birds, melodious jingles of woman's ornaments and poetical speeches (*subhāṣita*), etc. It arises also due to action; a pure donor, e.g. rejoices in pure five sensual pleasures whereas a sinner in the impure ones. It arises due to genus; e.g. a man likes a man. It arises due to extreme attachment to some nominality (*prajñapti*), a person, e.g. internally man and externally woman adorned with feminine dress and speech. It arises in him who has not acquired a concentrated mind and is looking at a sentient being in the internal and the visible (*rūpa*), etc. in the external. One whose lust-residue is not destroyed and the thirst-condition appears in his front, a false impression arises in him. Thus the sensual pleasure-lust arises by means of conditions above stated and others.

124. *Blemishes of the Desire* (*Kāma*)

The sensual pleasure-lust is really misery (*duhkha*). The worldlings through perversion conceive in it a false notion of happiness. The wise man, however, looks at it as misery and hence abandons it. There is no contentment in clinging to the sensual pleasures; drinking wine, e.g. increases craving for it, and on account of its increase none becomes happy. The un-meritorious actions are accumulated on account of clinging to the sensual pleasures. The sword and arrow, etc. are employed on account

of the sensual pleasures. The Sūtra says: The sensual pleasure, *kāma* is sinful, inferior and hardly abandonable, lighter than the grosser malevolence. *Kāma* is the cause of rebirth. Relying upon the thirst the body is formed. It says: The thirst is the cause of unrest. (The Sūtra) says: O Monks, consider why are these sufferings and understand them as caused by the body, which is also the cause of the thirst. (The Sūtra) says: In the edible food, O Monks, there is delight, there is lust and consciousness is situated herein. It is understood that the thirst is conditioning factor of body-experience. This lust always is operative in the impure thing, like woman, etc. The body and the mind of the woman are impure and create suffering by stinging like a scorpion, etc. etc.......

A man of sensual pleasure-thirst experiences all sufferings for the sake of pleasure, viz. suffering at the time of acquiring, at the time of protection, and at the time of enjoyment; the examples are: agriculture, trade, war, royal service and labour, etc. The Buddha says: The sensual pleasure-thirst has five disadvantages: Many sufferings with a little taste, kindling of fetters, discontentment until death, censure by the wise and non-accomplishing without resorting to un-meritorious actions. As a result of this lust the sentient beings move along with the stream of the worldly life and drift away from the Nirvāṇa. From these said innumerable blemishes and others, it is clear that the body is much more defective.

The defiling forces are formed on the basis of lust. The thirst residue being unrooted out one frequently experiences sufferings; a poisonous tree, e.g. being un-cut down kills the person. The Sūtra says: The sensual pleasure-thirst is a bondage. Just as a black-white cow, though un-bound by herself is, however, bound with the rope, just so is the eye not tied to the visible and the visible not tied to the eye; the sensual pleasure-lust nevertheless is tied to it. Being supported by this bondage one does not get released. The Sūtra says: No previous end is known to the

sentient beings who have ignorance-hindrance and the thirst-fetters and who are running and moving about in the whirlpool of the worldly existence. It says: By abandoning the lust, the matter, etc. upto consciousness are abandoned. This lust is abandoned by contemplation on impermanence, etc. When it is abandoned, the mind gets released. The lust for *rūpa* being abandoned, the *rūpa*, matter is abandoned. The matter, etc. upto consciousness being absent the suffering is ceased. Therefore the sensual pleasure-lust is a strong bondage.

It is comparable to a thief; men do not view it bad. It is extremely unmeritorious as it comes from the sweet face. The sentient beings are engrossed in the sensual pleasure-lust with a delightful heart; the mosquito, white ants and all other beings too are engaged in eating the food and having sex-intercourse. The sensual pleasure-lust binds the men's mind with various factors, viz. concepts of the mother, father, sister, wife and wealth, etc. The sentient beings having the mind hindered by the sensual pleasure-lust for the food and the sex-intercourse, etc. take rebirth. The person having lust for the meditation and trance is born in the higher region of existence. This sensual pleasure-lust makes them meet together. The people are of different taste. They meet together on account of their lust; the dry sands, e.g. are cemented together by means of water. They think the sensual pleasure-thirst as tasteful in the worldly life. It is said to be a conviction of the taste towards the *rūpas* when the happiness and joyfulness arise on the basis of the visible, *rūpa*. In the absence of lust no sense of taste exists and in the absence of the latter one abandons quickly the worldly life. The sensual pleasures-lust is an enemy to the final release. Since men are attached to the sensual pleasure as happiness and to the meditation and trance as happiness, the final release for them becomes an unhappy event. The abandonment of lust-factors (*rāgāṅga*) turns to be happiness. It is said: One who is freed from the lust, experiences immense happiness. It says: The person who wishes to gain the ultimate happiness, should abandon all the sensual pleasures and by

abandoning them one gains the ultimate and permanent happiness. The person wishing the great happiness, should do away with the trifling one, and by doing so, he gains illimitable happiness.

This sensual pleasure-lust kills good *dharma*; for no man of extreme lust respects good conduct, caste, moral code, proper behaviours and fame, nor does he take any advice, or perceive any disadvantage. Nor does he consider any merit and demerit. He does not understand what is ugly and what is beautiful like a mad man. Nor does he look at the gain of wealth like the blind. The Sūtra says: The sensual pleasure-lust does not view the benefit; nor does it understand the *dharma* like an ignorant.

The Sūtra again says:

The sensual pleasure-lust is the ocean endless,
fathomless and possessed of waves, whirl-pool, cruel creatures and demons.

Likewise all ditches are impossible to cross over by man.
The person having the boat of pure conduct and right view,
The navigator being the Buddha who guides through a good path
The man of prescribed meditation crosses it over then.

None has so much of taste of the conceptual thought in respect of defiling factors as a man of the sensual pleasure-lust has. This is very difficult to abandon. So says the Sūtra: Two things are hardly abandonable: Hope for gain and hope for life.

The characteristics of the person imbued with the sensual pleasure-lust are: He is delighted in the beauty of woman, fragrance of flower, garlands, dance, music, visiting the house of heteara, wine-party, having keen interest in the big assembly or association and (performance of) dharma, pleased in love-stories, having always a delighted heart, smiling face, wishing to talk an emotional, and querying and laughing speech, hardly enraged, easily enjoyable, having generally a merciful heart, with the body hasty, and struck by disease now and then much attached

to his own body. These and others are his characteristics tied by a natural bondage, and hence are difficult to abandon. All these sensual pleasures are extreme miseries. What is desired by the lust is necessarily separable and due to separation sorrowfulness necessarily ensues. The Buddha has censured this sensual pleasure-lust comparing it with several similes, viz. serpent, arrow, sword, burning touch, enemy, an internal thief, well grounded root, mire, obstacle, arrow pierced deep into the heart, etc. etc. Thus, because of the above and other innumerable and immeasurable disadvantages, the sensual pleasure-lust should be abandoned.

125. *Abandonment of Lust*

How could it be abandoned? One can check it by means of meditating on it as impure and abandon it by meditating on it as impermanent, etc. The person knowing everything as impermanent cherishes no sensual pleasure-lust. So says the Sūtra. The idea of impermanence, being meditated and advanced, cuts all the sensual pleasure-lust, all the visible-lust, all becoming-lust, all ignorance and all self-pride. The person realizing the world as suffering, and cause of suffering abandons this lust. Recollecting that he has to experience birth, old age, disease, and death, one abandons this lust. The pure happiness being secured, the impure one is given up, as the first dhyāna being obtained the sensual pleasure-thirst is abandoned. A realizer of the disadvantage of the sensual pleasures abandons them. By developing the wisdom of a man of much listening (*bahuśruta*) one abandons the lust, for the knowledge is in the nature of destroying the defilement. The lust for sensual pleasures is abandoned by a man who is accomplished in the factors of merit, viz. purity of conduct and other concentration-instruments. This will be detailed in the section on the path-truth (chs. 181-184). The means are the knowledge of *rūpa*, and *dharma*, etc. The Buddha is physician. His followers are the co-Brāhmaṇa-farers. Good law is medicine. The purgative (*virecana*) is the practice of the prescribed actions. Then the disease of the sensual pleasure-lust subsides.

Q. The Sūtra says: Put out your lust by meditating upon foul things. But you say that one should meditate on the foul object and impermanence as well. A. All teachings of the Buddha are destroying factors of the defilements. Nevertheless, each one has some special force. At first the lust is set aside through meditation upon the foul object and then it is destroyed through the impermanence-meditation. The grosser lust is removed through the foul-meditation; this is well-known to all. The subtler lust is removed through the impermanence (meditation). Only in this single Sūtra it is said in such fashion; in many other Sūtras other removing factors are also stated. In the presence of these factors the sensual pleasure-lust is abandoned.

126. *Malevolence* (*Vyāpāda*)

The Śāstra says: Ill-will is characterized as hate. The person who hates is desirous of doing harm, and designs to inflict on others, beating, binding and killing. He wishes completely to avoid (his enemy's) sight. This hate is termed *pratigha*, meaning a heavier hate. A person hating (others) wishes to censure and beat others with stick: This is termed *vihiṁsā*, moderate form of hate. Some hater does not like to avoid but simply hates e.g. his wife and sons etc. This his hate is termed *krodha*, an inferior form of hate. Some hater is always possessed of defiled and disturbed thought; this hate is called *mrakṣa*, immatured mental faculty. Some hater not abandoning something bad that is kept in his mind wishes again (his enemy) an (unpleasant) retribution; this is called *upanāha*; matured mental faculty. A hater noticing (a provocative) incident wishes not to abandon it for several reasons, like a lion which crosses over the river after picking up a conceptual object (*nimitta*) and never parts with it until death. This is called *pradāśa* i.e. *āgraha*. A hater watching another man who gains some benefit arouses envy in his mind. This is *irṣyā*, jealousy. Some hater is always pleased in quarrel and becomes aggressive in his speech and thought: this is *saṁrambha*, i.e. enraged quarrel. A hater, in spite of being instructed in the

good conduct by a teacher, acts in reverse of the advice. This is *dveṣa*, i.e. cruelty (*kraurya*). Some hater, on others obtaining some pleasant and desirable object, becomes perturbed in mind; this is *akṣānti*, i.e. impatience. A hater, having a rough speech and always being indulged in brow-beating, does not join the conversation with a full heart, this is *apakīrti*, i.e. inattentive mind. A hater is engrossed always in reproving his co-dwellers; this is *asauratya*, i.e. *non-subdued*. A hater, being affected by worries of the body, speech and mind (likes) to be of enough training. This is *jigiṣā*, i.e. touch of worries. A hater is always pleased in expressing blames and also pleased in the despised object; this is *todanatā*, i.e. censure.

This hate is two-fold: one is related to a sentient being and the other related to the non-sentient being. The former is a heavier sin, and becomes into nine: superior, moderate and inferior (dividing each one of these again into three). It is divided into nine taking into consideration the nine defilements. Hate without an object forms the tenth. This is the characteristic of hate.

Hate arises from the heart-rending miseries and worries. Malevolence (*vyāpāda*) arises on account of perverted knowledge of the nature of unpleasant feelings or from reproach, hurting and beating, etc. or, from the fact of co-dwelling with the wicked person, like soldier, hunter, etc. or by virtue of meagre knowledge, or from the contact with soldier, hunter, or from the recollecting of other's faults, or due to age-period as of the ten years old youth, or due to genus, as of the serpents, or due to locality as in the country of *Kānyakubja* or due to an adversity to the already existing lust-producing factor and due to many other factors.

Its defects are: The Sūtra says: It is heavier sin than the sensual pleasure-lust. It does not accompany the mind like the lust. It burns one's self at the outset, while others burn at the end. It leads one invariably to the hells. It destroys the merit

of charity, good conduct and perseverance which are born of compassion; for, it contradicts compassion. The action born of hate makes every heart burning at the end. A person of hate, having no mercy, is termed cruel, *cāṇḍāla*. The men being distressed always are again oppressed by hate, like the salt poured into the wound. The Buddha says: A man imbued with hate is despicable, dwarf in form, agitated in mind, timid and un-believable by the people.

The characteristics of malevolent man: he is arrogant in his speech and mind, inattentive, un-approachable as a result of his brow-beating behaviour, having an ugly facial complexion, easily enrageable, delighted in malevolence and ill-wishing, pleased in quarrel, putting on ornaments and weapons, siding with bad friends, hating good men, contemplating on the untruth in order to threaten the people, and having little shame and modesty. These characteristics cause displeasure to others.

By cultivating constantly compassion, joy and tranquillity the hate is abandoned. It disappears in him who gains the true knowledge. It is abandoned on account of perseverance. The person who endures the sufferings of others' insult acquires the merits of good actions. He who remains habitually in perseverance is termed *śramaṇa*, ascetic. Perseverance is the first gate of *mārga-satya*. Therefore a man of ascetic duty even while he is enraged, has no retribution of his rage; while scolding, he has no retribution, while beating, he has no retribution. This perseverance is the characteristic nature of the ascetic. The person who is monk in garb and gesture, but behaves differently and pursues hate in mind is not fit for release. The dweller in perseverance accomplishes his own benefit. The hater wishing to hurt others hurts himself. The bad actions that are directed against others result in hurting one's self by several thousand times. Therefore it is understood that the hate causes a great down-fall to one's self. The wise wishing to accomplish his own benefit, and not causing any harm to others, should practise perseverance.

Q. Who is capable of bearing the brunt of scolding? A. The person who meditates on impermanence and understands that everything is momentary, the scolder and the victim of scolding are all momentary arouses hate towards none. The person who perseveres through correctly practising the *Śūnyatā-citta*, notion of voidness considers thus: when things are really void, who is the abuser and who is its victim. If it is true, it should be endured; I am really guilty, and others speak the truth; why should I hate them? If it is untrue, others themselves will acquire the sin of speaking untruth, why should I hate them? Hearing the unhappy abuse one should consider thus: All the men are experiencing their own action-fruits. I previously committed this abusing act and I am now experiencing its fruit in return,, why do I hate it? Hearing the abuse one should attribute its fault to oneself. I experience this body due to my own action, the body is the victim of abuse and hence it should be endured. The dweller in perseverance should think thus: Things are dependently originated; this abusing act is heard by the auditory consciousness, non-sensuous consciousness and the sound, etc. Here two factors are in my person and the only one, the sound in the other. Thus the factors of the sin are many in me, why do I hate it? Because I grasp the conceptual idea (*nimitta*) of this sound, sorrowfulness and worries are experienced; hence I am alone guilty. A man of perseverance does not make others guilty; for, these sins of hate, etc. are not of the sentient beings. They are not controllers of the sins, as their mind is agitated by the disease. A ghost-magician, e.g. being determined to drive away the ghost hates only the ghost and not the patient. The person interested in a spiritual endeavour (*virya*) takes delight in accumulation of meritorious actions; hence he does not count others' (futile) talks. Recollecting the Buddhas and the holy order he does not realize the abuse. For example, Brāhmaṇas and others abuse very much the Buddha (*Gautama*); they also direct their ill-speaking to Śāriputra and others; what to speak of us having a meagre merit?

One should again contemplate thus: The people are imbued with demerits and act bitterly even without caring for their life; what is to speak of the abuse? He should again contemplate thus: The sense that there is no suffering for me by censure, etc. should be endured as the Buddha advised his disciples: Even if the body is cut into pieces by the saw, the painful feeling must be endured; what is to speak of the censure? The person acting thiswise gets disgusted with the worldly existence. Being aware of his deep and definite disgust towards the abuse that is made, one regards good action and disregards the bad one. Understanding that non-endurance of the abuse causes finally the experience of sufferings, one experiences even a greater abuse lest he may fall in the hells. Out of shame and shyness, he thinks: I am disciple of the great man, Buddha and treading on the path of Nirvāṇa and hence how can I raise the corporeal and vocal actions that are unworthy of doing. It is heard that the power of perseverance was gained by the Boddhisattvas and Śakra and others who were practising the perseverance. Therefore, perseverance must be observed.

127. *Nescience (Avidyā)*

The Śāstra says: To pursue nominalism is nescience. The worldlings follow the soul-terminology. There is no soul in fact, nor is there anything pertaining to the soul. Conglomeration of several things alone is spoken of as the soul in empirical world. The worldlings cherish the idea of the soul due to non-discerning knowledge; this is nothing but nescience.

The Buddha in a Sūtra says: Non-knowing of the past limit, etc. is nescience, because many are 'illusioned' in respect of the past limit, etc. Therefore he says that non-knowing of that is nescience. The Sūtra explains knowledge: Knowing of anything is knowledge. The matter is impermanent—to know this as it is, is knowledge; feeling, idea, formation and consciousness are impermanent—to know them as they are is knowledge. Nescience is a false knowledge, reverse of the true knowledge

(*vidyā*). Thus non-knowing of things as they are is *avidyā*, nescience.

Q. If non-knowing is nescience, the tree and the stone, etc. will be *avidyā* as they have no knowledge of things as they are (*-yathābhūta-vidyā*). A. But the tree, etc. having no mind, do not discriminate the past limit, etc. *Avidyā*, however, does so. It is not mere non-entity (*abhāva-mātra*), but it is a false and perverse knowledge of *pudgala*, soul in regard to the five aggregates of elemens. It is comparable to an illusion of gold at the sight of a piece of the copper pot. If it is a non-entity, how could it be a conditioning factor to the formation, *saṁskāra*? *Avidyā* is accepted in its own trait and not as contingent on other things. *Akuśala*, un-meritorious is said in its own character and not as expressive of an indeterminate. A granary, e.g. though it is in a human form is said to be non-human, *apuruṣa*, because it has no human movement (*gati*). Likewise nescience, *avidyā*, though discriminating, does not discern things as they are. The tree and the stone, are not of that nature.

Q. Why does *avidyā* not indicate something other than itself? e.g. *arūpa* is something non-material, etc.? A. Sometimes this principle is accepted. But in the case of *akuśala*, un-meritorious, etc. it is not accepted. Q. Some masters say: *avidyā* is non-existence of *vidyā* as the darkness is the non-existence of the light. A. People speak of it in two ways: it is a non-existence of *vidyā* and sometimes it is the false and perverse knowledge. Examples for the former is the blind person is *arūpa-darśin*, non-perceiver of a visible, etc. and for the latter is: an illusive notion of the man arising at the sight of a post in the night, or vice-versa. When one does not understand a thing as it is, that is nescience, *ajñāna*. A false notion is defilement. This is a causing factor of all the manifest forces (*saṁskāra*). Since Arhan has destroyed it he has no *avidyā*-conditioned forces. If *avidyā* is perverse: *na vidyā*, then Arhan has no knowledge about all the Buddha's virtuous characters, dharmas, and thus he would

be a man of *avidyā* and he will not be Arhan. Therefore, it is understood that there is something separate characterized as *avidyā*, which is a false and perverse mind.

All other defilements (*kleśa*) are constituents of this *avidyā*; because they all are in the nature of false and perverse conduct and behaviour. They are the mind's obscurations of men, and in the form of blind darkness; so it says: A man of the sensual pleasure-lust does not look into *dharma*, nor into the merit. Partaker of that pleasure is an embodiment of blind darkness. So are the anger and infatuation. All the defilements are productive of formations. So says the Sūtra: *Avidyā*-conditioned are formations, *saṁskāras*. Therefore all the defilements are *avidyā*. It persists always in him who does not understand *śūnyatā* and a man of no *śūnyatā*-vision has also a perverse *vidyā*, knowledge.

The genesis of *avidyā*: It arises to him who contemplates on the wrong cause after having heard it. It arises thus: There is substance, there is a whole (*avayavin*), there is a *cit*; things are not momentary, there is no rebirth, the sound and the soul are permanent, the tree and herbs are of *cetanā*, mind; from this and other perverted understanding *avidyā* arises. It arises when there are four bad factors present: (1) acquaintance with bad friends, (2) listening to wrong dharma, (3) wrong conception (*mithyā-manaskāra*), (4) wrong-activities (*mithyā-samudācāra*) and-others. The wrong conception is synonym of *avidyā*. On looking at a man the idea of the *puruṣa* arises immediately and then arises conviction (*niścaya*) and hence it is termed *avidyā*. These two things being respectively of the first and the second moment arise as mutually conditioned just as the fruit comes from the tree and the latter from the former.

Blemishes of *avidyā*: All the calamities and worries are governed by *avidyā*: for, from it arise the defilements, lust, etc. From them arises bad action; therefrom the expereince of the body and therefrom are obtained different calamities and worries. So says the Sūtra: This body has reached to the worldling who is

covered with *avidyā* and associated with thirst. The *Simhanāda* Sūtra says: *upādānas*, clingings are thirst-conditioned. The stanza says:

> All the un-happy states in this world and elsewhere
> are rooted in *avidyā* and developed by the desire and greed.

The worldlings experience as pleasure these five aggregates which are impure, impermanent, miserable, soulless and void. The wise men experience them as great miseries. Thus having a right understanding (*manaskāra*) they abandon them. The Sūtra says: The notion of the soul is a wrong perversion—one understanding this has no more *avidyā*. Hence the bondage is conditioned by *avidyā* and the release is conditioned by *vidyā*. The people, by force of *avidyā* and on account of attachment to a meagre taste do not notice many defects. Just like moths (*śalabha*) fall into the fire or the fish swallow the bait, just so do the sentient beings covetous of the immediate meagre taste not notice its many defects. Having the wrong view raised by (the study of) the treatises of heretics, men say that there exist no merit, etc.; this is *avidyā*. The path of bad men is the cause of demerits and such cause is all *avidyā*. Men fall into the hells on account of actions committed with wrong view which arises by *avidyā*. The Buddha is the world-honoured, omniscient, teacher of the three worlds, pure in his conduct, and trained by Āryas, etc.; this the heretics do not distinctly understand just as the blind person disregards a valuable jewel. These are the blemishes of *avidyā*.

Moreover, all sentient beings' calamities, worries, lamentations are all governed by *avidyā* and all the gains, achievements and advancements are governed by *vidyā*. A man of developed ignorance falls utterly in the hell. E.g. people at the beginning of aeon being not aware that the taste of the earth is futile entertained a lust-conviction towards it; hence their beauty, strength and life-span and all came to an end through their ignorance, *avidyā*. *Avidyā* is to be abandoned by the true knowledge alone

and not by lust (*rāga*), etc. In the mind of lust there is no anger and in the mind of anger there is no lust. But *avidyā* exists in every mind. Amongst *kleśas*, *avidyā* is most powerful. So says the Sūtra: *avidyā* is sinner, heavier, and hardly abandonable. It is the root of twelve *nidānas*, causal links. In its absence the actions are not accumulated. Arhan entertains no notion of the soul and hence accumulates no actions; on account of this (knowledge) the causal links, consciousness, etc. do not come into play again. This proves that *avidyā* is the root of all sufferings.

It is visible to us that there is attachment to this impure body and a notion of permanence about the impermanent. Just as the closed empty fist is tempting the children; the magic exhibits the mud as gold to the ignorants, just so are the ordinary men governed by their sins and tempted by terminology; and men, having looked at the impure thing become duped by it. The mental states are momentary and arise on account of grasping conceptual ideas (*nimitta*). They form that idea about the momentary matter through infatuation. So is the case with the sound, etc. Therefore it is hardly abandonable. These are the blemishes.

The characteristics of the person imbued with *avidyā* are:— The person moves fearless in a dreadful place and joyless in a good place, hater of good men; friend of bad people, takes a wrong view of things, unfavourable to his good friend, takes interest in useless things, having little shyness, not doubts anything, not pleases others as well as oneself, not serviceable to others as well as to oneself and roams about with a dirty cloth, walks in the impure and dark place avoiding the good one, boasts himself, takes pleasure in speaking others lightly, does not understand the advantage as advantage and the disadvantage as disadvantage, impure not liable to release, dull in conversation, joyful in displaying anger, and hypocrisy, takes other's advice in a perverse manner, practises difficult things, acquires what is easily abandonable, not understands the import of what is taught

and reverses what is understood; these and other characteristics are governed by *avidyā*. It should therefore be abandoned.

One, cultivating the true knowledge abandons *avidyā*. Q. True knowledge is the knowledge of aggregates, elements and bases, etc. Why does the Sūtra say: Dependent Origination or its meditation is the remedy for *avidyā*? A. Heretics 'illusioned' in respect of the ultimate cause say that God (Īśvara) etc. are causes of the world. They, being 'illusioned' also in respect of true nature of things declare that there is the substance and there is one whole (*avayavin*), etc. The person, cultivating the meditation on the Dependent Origination and true knowledge abandons it. Only the Dependent Origination is the remedy. Why it is said two things? It is said with a view to including the other, the knowledge; that is to say: one cultivating the knowledge of aggregates, etc. also abandons it. The heavier *avidyā* is the wrong view alone which is to be abandoned by the Dependent Origination. So are the lust and hate (to be abandoned by the same). The ordinary men are, in the majority, 'illusioned' in respect of the term, *ghaṭa*. The person hearing the term *ghaṭa* doubts in his mind whether *ghaṭa* is only the colour, etc. or it is something different from them, and doubts likewise whether *puruṣa* is only the five aggregates or he is something different from them. The person of concentrated mind does not fall into two ends of eternalism and nihilism, viz. the body and the soul are the same or different. The person who understands that the pot is originated dependently and in the nature of colour, taste, odour and touch and also understands that *puruṣa* is the same as the five aggregates, abandons the doubt born of the word which obscures the true nature of things. So says the *Devatāpariprcchā Sūtra*:

> The name is persistent in all periods.
> The name no more exists in fact
> Under the grip of this one dharma, i.e. the name
> all things, dharmas are rolling on.

Again it is said: One witnessing the origin of the world abandons the wrong view of nihilism, and one witnessing its destruction abandons the wrong view of eternalism. It says: They speak continuity of *saṁskāras*, elemental forces as the worldly life-continuum of five aggregates. And these defects of ignorance are suppressed by meditation upon the Dependent Origination. The Sūtra again says: One witnessing the Dependent origination witnesses dharma, and one witnessing *dharma* witnesses the Buddha. And one who abandons the doubt born of the word, witnesses the Buddha in his true form with no other man's aid. Therefore *avidyā* is destroyed by means of true knowledge and true knowledge is gained by rightly understanding the Dependent origination. It is said briefly in the *Caturaśīti-dharma-skandha*: Whichever is wisdom all that is the dispeller of *avidyā*. The knowledge of Dependent origination destroys *avidyā* which is the root-cause of all defilements.

128. *Pride* (*māna*)

Exalting oneself by a false idea (*mithyā-citta*) is *māna*. It is manifold. *Māna* is exalting an inferior self. The sense of equality amongst the equals is also regarded as *māna*, for the soul-idea is persisting there. Exalting oneself as high amongst the equals is *mahāmāna*. Exalting oneself as high amongst the superiors is *abhimāna*. The grasp of the soul-idea on five groups of elements is *asmimāna*. This is two-fold: one is to display the soul-idea and the other is the reverse of it. The first is when the ordinary men have the sense of the soul in this fashion: the matter is the soul; something possessed of the matter is the soul; in the soul there is the matter and in the matter there is the soul. The same formula is repeated in the case of the feeling, etc. upto consciousness. Thus *nimitta*, soul-idea is displayed in twenty kinds. The second *asmimāna* is noticeable in the trainees (*śaikṣa*). So says the elder Kṣemaka; I do not say, O friend, that I am the matter, feeling, idea, *saṁskāras* and consciousness. Nor do I say I am elsewhere from (the matter, etc.) but on the

five aggregates, O friend, I have *māna* that I am, *chanda* that I am, *anuśaya* that I am undestroyed. This is *asmimāna* (not displaying the soul-idea, *nimitta*).

When a person, not having secured the fruit of the stream-winner says that he has secured it, that is *adhimāna*. On obtaining a small taste in practising the dhyāna, one dispels some fetters and for this reason it becomes *māna*. By virtue of the wisdom of listening and thinking (*śruta-cintāmaya-prajnā*) one approaches a spiritual teacher, becomes delightful in spiritual activities, and having understood a bit the real characteristics of five groups of elements harbours therein the notion of the fruit of the stream-winner. This is *adhimāna*.

Its blemishes are: It culminates in an ultimate sorrowfulness and worries. So says the Sūtra: When an ascetic says: I have dispelled doubt and obtained the path, in his presence one should say that the Dependent Origination is very deep and transcendental law. If that ascetic has really not obtained the path, then, hearing this deep *dharma* he raises repentance-worry. Therefore one should with all effort cut off *Adhimāna*. Towards a man of *adhimāna*, though the Buddhas are compassionate, they avoid him far off and do not initiate him in Dharma. Therefore it should be cut off. A man of *adhimāna* remains in a perverse vision of *dharma*; hence he has no real character of virtue. A merchant, e.g. entering into a deep sea is interested in false gems. Likewise this ascetic entering into the sea of the Buddha's dispensation, and obtaining a small dhyāna-pleasure, raises in it a sense of true path. He at the end of his life does not realize the path. Therefore one should search for the true and absolute knowledge. A man of *adhimāna* destroys the heavens and increases the infatuation as he has a false sense of gain while he has not gained it. One should not deceive oneself and hence he should give it up.

When one declares a superior man as inferior; this is termed *ayathā-māna*. Though this man is superior, he is made inferior.

When some person having no characters (*guṇa*) exalts himself as having them, this is termed *mithyā-māna*. Through unmeritorious actions to exalt oneself high is also *mithyā-bhimāna*. When one shows disrespect towards a good and honourable person in his absence, it is *uddhata-māna*; etc. These are characteristics of *māna*, pride.

Genesis of the pride: It arises to those who do not understand the true characteristics of the five aggregates of elements. So says the Sūtra: Those Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas regard themselves as superior on account of their impermanent material frame to others who are equal or inferior. How is this? It is simply through non-vision of things as they are. The pride does not arise for those who understand the true characteristics of the aggregates. The person, cultivating the recollection of the body has not the pride: the cow, e.g. is cruel due to its horn. When it is removed it is no more cruel. This body is impure and the impurities are oozing out from their nine holes. Which wise man would think towards this body: I am superior? The wise man understands that every person, whether he is poor or rich, respectable or despicable, all is constituted of bone, flesh, sinew, vein, etc.; affected by birth, old age, disease, death etc. and possessed of lust, anger, merit and demerit, etc. and partaker in the hells and other unhappy places; how can he arouse the pride? The external things and internal mind are all originated dependently and momentary—a person aware of this fact has no pride. The person cultivating the mind's concentration has no pride. It arises only when there is a conceptual object (*nimitta*). The wise man does not have pride when he has good conduct, etc.; for the good conduct, etc. are destroyers of all defiling elements. Which wise man would arouse pride in regard to non-existing things? The pride is ceased in the person who meditates on the characteristics of impermanence, etc.; which wise man would arouse it on account of things that are impermanent, suffering and impure?

Blemishes of the pride: The body is brought out from the pride and from the body the suffering is experienced. So says the Buddha: When I was a student (*māṇavaka*) I did not understand the characteristics of the pride. The sense of 'I' is an expression of the feeling. It would arise relating to something else; becuase all other forms of pride are not destroyed. All the defiling elements are accompanying the grasp of conceptual things (*nimittagraha*). The sense of 'I' is the grossest of all concepts (*nimītta*). Therefore it is understood that body comes from the pride. It pertains to infatuation; for, one, seeing *rūpa* with the eye says "I witness it". It arises improperly (*anītyā*); for, all the world is impermanent, non-soul, and suffering. From this how could the pride arise? Therefore, lust, hate and infatuation are improprieties. The action that is arisen from the pride is very cruel and heavy. The action that is arisen from the lust is not so. The lust and others are increased by the strength of pride. The pride of clan, etc. obtained through this lust is much more increased. Due to *asmimāna* self-pride the inferior family (*nīcakula*) springs up and also one is born amongst lion, tiger, and wolf. For the same cause a man falls in the hells. The pride has this and other innumerable blemishes.

The characteristics of a man filled with the pride: This man is of assumed bravery, hardly conversationable, having an ill-respecting mind, fearless, delighted in his capricious acting, hardly controllable, himself boasting whichever is despicable, indulging in the ill-talk of others. These are his blemishes which are hardly suppressible. Therefore a man of right knowledge should not indulge in them. This pride acts as a hurdle to all virtues.

129. *Doubt* (*Vicikitsā*)

The Śāstra says: Doubt is indecision about whether there is release or not, whether there are merit and demerit or not and whether there are three jewels or not.

Q. There is doubt about the tree whether it is a post or a person, about a piece of mud whether it is a piece of mud or a

kokila bird, about the bee whether it is a bee or a jam-fruit, etc. These factors of doubt are causes of the visual consciousness. About sound a doubt may arise whether it is of peacock or an imitative sound of a man. About the odour it may arise whether the odour is of lotus, or of some other thing. About the taste also it may arise whether the taste is of some flesh or of some other thing. Doubt may arise about the touch whether it is of fresh yarn or of bleached one. Non-sensuous consciousness causes several kinds of doubts, viz. whether this thing is in possession of substance or it is constituted of simply *guṇa*s, characters and whether there is the soul or no soul. Are the above said doubts also (brought under the category of) *kleśa*s?

A. The doubts whether it is post or it is a person, etc. are not defilements; for they do not cause rebirth and may arise for the persons freed from *āsrasva*s, intoxicants.

The doubt arises from perceiving, hearing and understanding things of two contradictory characteristics. When one has seen previously (elsewhere) both the post and the person and then sees from distance some object resembling the person, etc. at that time he doubts whether it is a post or a person. Other examples are to be explained suitably. Hearing in two ways the merit and the demerit, and then he hears the reverse of it, at that time he doubts. When one understands that cloud raining, the river is full, and that the river is full also as a result of its dam being demolished, at this moment he doubts. When the cloud is ready to rain, the ants move carrying their tiny eggs. A man while digging the earth, can see the ants carrying the tiny eggs. The peacock produces its sound and some person also can produce the peacock-sound by imitation. Certain object is visible, e.g. pitcher; certain (imaginary) is invisible, e.g. fire-brand. Certain object is invisible, e.g. the root of the tree under the ground or under the water. Certain is non-object and invisible, e.g. second head, third arm, etc. etc. These are examples of doubts arising from seeing, hearing and understanding.

The doubt arises also from a careless sight, e.g. eight factors: very distance, etc. It arises on account of two-fold belief: e.g. one says there is another world (*paraloka*); another says there is none. Both these men being believable, doubt arises. On a disputed thing doubt arises until one does not notice its distinct characteristic and it subsides the moment its distinct characteristic is noticed. It is dispelled by a definite knowledge of what is seen, heard, or understood. The person who perceives in his own body the true characteristics of things in accordance with the dispensation of the Buddha becomes of completely dispelled doubts. The *Bodhisattva*, e.g. sitting in the seat of Bodhi declares: "I shall realize by my own effort the deep dharma as obtained by Brāhmaṇas" and having true knowledge-vision (*jñāna-darśana*) into the causal factors he becomes of the destroyed doubt-net. Or it is abandoned by the person through reasoning and wisdom; e.g. a wise man determines after hearing, and understanding the dependent origination of things that the world (*saṁsāra*) is beginningless, etc.

Its blemishes: The person filled with doubt does not accomplish anything mundane and ultra-mundane. A person of doubt cannot undertake any task. The Sūtra says: The doubt is the mind's weed; e.g. When in the field full of weeds, no other useful plants germinate; what would be the case with the rice and the like plants. Likewise, the mind smothered by the doubt is unable to become steady on ordinary things, what is to speak of the right concentration? The Buddha again says: The doubt is a heap of darkness. It is three-fold: past, future and present. The heap of darkness (doubt) is the birthplace of the soul-views. The person, even though concentrating, does it wrongly. We can say that there is no right concentration outside of the Buddha's dispensation. Many men are perished by the doubt kept up till their death; e.g. sages having super-normal powers and being polluted by doubt, like Aṣṭaka, etc. are doomed. If a person of doubt, gives charity, his merit is fruitless or less of fruit. For, then the merit-actions are born of the mind which is always

polluted by the doubt and hence no merit accrues. The Sūtra says: A person of doubtful mind giving charity experiences its retribution in the border-region. A person of doubt is not of concentrated mind; he does not give charity in time or does it by the hand; nor does he arouse a thought of respect. Therefore he is born in the border-region like the minor kings, Pāyāsi.

The doubt is not something real amongst the momentary elements. But it is a continuum of indecisive mind. The mind at the moment does not decide: This is a post or this is a person. The indecisive mind being continued is confused, and it does not believe whether " exists " or " not exists " as a result of its perverted vision (*mithyā-darśana*).

This un-belief is two-fold: (1) one born of doubt and (2) the other born of wrong insight. The former is lighter while the latter is heavier. The belief is also two-fold: (1) one born of right insight and (2) the other born of hearing. The former becomes firmer while the latter is not so.

130. *The Wrong View of Existent-Body* (*Satkāya*)

The soul-notion with reference to the five aggregates of elements is the wrong view of *existent-body*. As a matter of fact no soul exists but its notion has as its object the five aggregates. The body consists of five aggregates of elements and the view of the soul arising from them is termed *satkāya-dṛṣṭi*. It is called *dṛṣṭi* because it has grasped the concept of the soul upon the non-soul body.

Q. There may not be any harm in calling the five aggregates of elements as the soul, as one may say that the things, pot, etc. are each in their *svalakṣaṇa*. But it is folly to say that there is the soul apart from the five aggregates. A. Though the statement as you stated above is harmless, yet, it is faulty. For, the heretics say that the soul is permanent, as it experiences the retributions of actions committed in this period. For a person

accepting the five aggregates as the soul, the aggregates would be permanent. The advocate of the soul thinks that the soul is one. Then the five aggregates would be one. This is faulty.

Again the notion of the soul is faulty; for, when there is a sense of the soul, then there will be a sense of something pertaining to the soul (*ātmīya-buddhi*) in the presence of which all the *kleśas*, defilements, lust, hate and others arise. It is clear therefore that the sense of the soul is the birth-place of all defilements. Though they do not say that there is the soul apart from the five aggregates, they, nevertheless, have the soul-concept on the basis of the aggregates; hence they do not enter into the voidness (*śūnyatā*) of these things. Due to this arise defilements from which arises the action which causes suffering. Thus the continuity of birth and death becomes unbroken. These people, on account of imagining the soul, do not make even a gross analysis of the body, head, eye, etc. What is to speak of the analysis of the *skandhas*, as they have conceived that the soul is one and permanent. One who does not make analysis does not enter into *śūnyatā*. The advocate of the soul is afraid of Nirvāṇa lest the soul may disappear there. The Sūtra says: The worldling having heard the voidness non-soul (idea) entertains a great fear lest the soul may disappear there and hence nothing would be experienced there. Thus worldlings praying for the sick-striken body make no attempt for *Nirvāṇa*. The gainer of *śūnyatā*—knowledge, however, becomes fearless. So says the *Upasena Sūtra*:

The holy life (*brahma-carya*) has been well conducted
The path has been well meditated.
He becomes pleased at his life's end
As he is at the eradication of his disease.

The advocate of the soul-existence falls in the wrong view. If the soul is permanent, there would be no modification at the time of misery and happiness. In the absence of modification no merit or demerit would be there. If the soul is impermanent

there will be no other world. The person who is released naturally would have no merit and demerit. Therefore it is understood that the wrong view of the soul is a heavier sin. The person having the wrong view of soul is extremely foolish. The worldlings are distracted in their mind by the wrong view of the soul. Being attached to it they wander in the worldly existence. The person who realizes the non-soul view cuts at root their wandering to and from in it.

The man harbours the notion of the soul, as a result of *saṁjñā-vikalpa*, a concept-constructive thought from listening to the word-concept of " man ", " god ", " male " and " female ", etc. but not as a result of a real cause. The notion of the soul arises from a false reasoning, viz. in the absence of the soul who enjoys hapiness and suffering as well as the retributions resulting from the meritorious and un-meritorious actions. In the beginningless world the concept of the soul has been accrued for long and serves as a causal factor of its latent residues (*anuśaya*); e.g. the concept of the pitcher. The sense of the soul arises with reference to the aggregate of feelings and not from a single feeling. So it is said that wherein the sense of the soul arises therein the soul exists and not everywhere. It arises on account of *vyāmoha*, hallucination as, for example, a half blind man, looking at a brass piece conceives it as gold. The person who has not gained the knowledge of analysis through *śūnyatā* sees the soul as a result of illusion. His vision of the soul is comparable to magic, mirage, castle in air and the fire-brand, etc.

Some masters view the soul resembling in size *yava*, mustard-seed and residing in the cavity of heart. The soul of the Brāhmaṇa is white, of Kṣatriya, yellow, of Vaiśya, red and of Śūdra, black. So says a Vedic passage:—

In the dark beginning of creation there was a great person, the soul shining like the Sun, one who visualizes Him crosses over the worldly life, and there is no path other than this. The soul is subtler than the subtle and grosser than the gross and

seated in the cavity of heart like a gem in the string. One visualizes Him through meditation......

Likewise some masters say that the matter is the soul. Some others of gross mind say that feeling is the soul, as it does not exist in the tree and the stone, etc. The moderate-minded say that the idea (*saṁjñā*) is the soul, as one has the notion that the soul is of the idea even in respect of the past happiness and suffering. The subtle-minded say that the formation is the soul, as one has the notion that the soul is of *cetanā*, volition even in respect of the past pitcher. The very subtle-minded say that consciousness is the soul as one has the notion that the soul is of consciousness even in respect of the past *cetanā*, will. The person who has the soul-notion towards the five aggregates does not analyse the feeling, and other aggregates. The idea of the soul arises on the matter and mind put together, as one has the idea of a pitcher on the combination of four elements, ***rūpa***, colour, etc.

The soul is conceived in twenty kinds: the matter is the soul, etc. The dharma that is understood in the expression: ***rūpavān ātmā*** is the base (*āśraya*) of the feeling, etc. These things, feeling, etc. are tied to the matter and therefore it is said that the soul is with the matter. Some masters view the matter as existing in the feeling, etc. These dharmas, feeling, etc. are un-perceivable things and hence they are said to occupy the matter, Ether e.g. is an un-perceivable thing and that is why the earth, etc. are accepted as its base (*āśraya*). Thus twenty kinds of the soul-view arise as a result of illusion (*moha*).

Similar soul-view arises also in relation to the eye, etc. So says the Sūtra: To say the eye is the soul is not correct; for, the eye is perishable. If the eye is soul, the soul then will also be perishable. The eye and others have their own characteristic each. If the eye is the soul, the ear will not be the soul. If the ear, etc. are the soul, the eye will not be the soul. If the ear, etc. are the soul, then one soul will be many. Since *rūpa*, etc.

are each distinct, one can say that *Rūpa* is the soul but not the feeling, etc.

To say that the soul exists in the ultimate sense is *satkāya-dṛṣṭi* and to say that the soul does not exist in the empirical sense is the wrong view, *mithyā-dṛṣṭi*. But it is the right view (*samyak-dṛṣṭi*) when we say that the soul exists empirically and does not however exist ultimately. One so saying does not fall in the wrong view. Thus is to be understood the statement that soul exists and that it does not exist. As, for example, a tigress carries her cub in her mouth pressing neither very roughly nor smoothly. Likewise the view of the soul-existence is *satkāya-dṛṣṭi* and the view of the soul-non-existence is *mithyā-dṛṣṭi*. The loss what is acted upon, and the gain of what is not acted upon are both follies. The person accepting the soul-non-existence falls the victim of the first folly and the person having the soul-existence falls the victim of the second folly. Therefore, it is said in the Sūtra that these two extreme follies should be avoided. The person stating that the soul does not exist unlimately and that the soul exists nominally avoids the two extremes (*anta*) and hence he is termed as walking in a moderate path. The dispensation of the Buddha is above the dispute and above the elation. The wise does not become elate at the statement that the soul does not exist ultimately. The worldling does not dispute at the statement that the soul exists nominally. The dispensation of Tathāgata is free from eternalism and nihilism, pure and a moderate path. No eternalism is incurred by saying that it does not exist ultimately nor nihilism by saying that it exists nominally.

Q. The thing which does not exist ultimately does not exist at all. How do you say that it exists nominally? A. The men of the world talk of the action and its retribution, or of the bondage and release. All these ideas are born of illusion. For, the five aggregates of elements are void and resemble magic (*māyā*) and are brought out continuously like the flames

(*jvālāvat*). Nevertheless, they are spoken of as existing with a view to leading the worldlings to the other shore (of stream). If it is said that they do not exist, the worldlings being caught in hallucination, would fall in nihilism. Or they would not get trained (in the system of the Buddha). Then no bondage or release would be achieved by them as a result of the merit or demerit. One who destroys the doctrine of illusion (*moha-vāda*) about the soul will himself enter into *Śūnyatā*. Then all his wrong views soon disappear. That is why the absolute truth is preached in a later stage. For example, introspctive contemplation on the body is at first preached in order to dispel the concept of the male and female. Then the analysis of the body in terms of the hair, nail, etc. is preached to emphasize the five aggregates alone as existing and then by means of *Śūnyatā*-characteristic their suppression is preached. This suppression of five aggregates is termed *the absolute truth*. To state that (the soul) exists nominally does not require again to state that it does not exist ultimately. It is said in the Sūtra: The person who understands that all things are void of their self-beings enters into *Śūnyatā*. It is evident therefore that five aggregates are also non-existent. The *Paramārtha-Śūnyatā-Sūtra* says: The eye, etc. do not exist ultimately, but exist nominally. The *Mahā-Śūnyatā-Sūtra* says: When it is said that this old age-and-death or this man is of old age-and-death, or when the heretics say that the body and *jīva* are the same or they are different—all these mean the same thing but differ in expressions. To say that the body and *jīva* are the same or they are different is not a holy life (*Brahmacarya*). To deny that this person is of old age-and-death is the expression of non-soul doctrine, *nairātmya*. To deny this old age-and-death is its expulsion. It is therefore clear that old age-and-death does not exist ultimately but it is nominally said that due to the birth the old age-and-death comes into play. This is termed *moderate path*.

The *Rādha-Sūtra* says: Disintegrate *Rūpa*, blow it up and destroy it and be active in order to destroy the thirst just as a

sandy house which is liable to destruction. The aggregates are also liable to destruction as they do not exist ultimately. To the person who pursues after the characteristics of aggregates the sense of the soul is not utterly destroyed, as its causal factors continue. For example, a tree is cut with axe and reduced to ashes. Nevertheless, the idea of the tree continues there. But when the ashes are blown up by the storm or washed away by the water, the idea of the tree, then, disappears. Likewise when five aggregates are destroyed, disintegrated and blown up, then at that time characteristic of *Śūnyatā* is accomplished. The same Sūtra repeats the same idea in order to destroy the sense of the soul (*sattva*). This Sūtra speaks of five aggregates as impermanent, devoid of everything and non-existent, while the previous Sūtra passage speaks of five aggregates to be disintegrated, destroyed and void.

131. *Wrong View of the Extreme Limits*

Things are perishable or permanent—to state thus is termed the wrong view of the extreme limits (*anta-graha-dṛṣṭi*).

Some Ābhidharmikas say: When one says that the soul is eternal or non-eternal, this alone in the wrong view of extreme limit; but to say that all things are permanent or impermanent is not so. For, it is well-known that external things are perishable. The Sūtra says: To view things as existing for all time is eternalism and to view them non-existing is nihilism. To say that the body and *jīva*, soul are the same is nihilism. To say that they are different is eternalism. To say that the action does not exist after death is nihilism and to say that it exists after death is eternalism. In the phrase that it exists as well as not exists the first part, i.e. 'it exists' eternalism and the second part, i.e. it not exists is nihilism. The phrase: not that it exists and not that it does not exist is also to be likewise explained.

Things are devoid of Pudgala even from the worldly truth; hence that view is termed *dṛṣṭi*, wrong view. The four categories:

censured he gets angry and being honoured, becomes joyous. So there is none free from *āsravas*, intoxicants. In the Sūtra some masters say that no Arhan exists. This is perverted view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*). As to the defilement the body itself is the defilement; hence they say that it is causeless. So are the knowledge-vision and non-knowledge-vision (to be explained). There is no strength and no effort; for, we see that all living beings are caused by *prajñapti*. Some masters say that Īśvara himself does what is worthy to be done. We also see that they are all governed by the *karma*-cause and not independent. Therefore they say that there is no strength and no effort and no fruits, therefrom.

The notion of permanence towards impermanence: on what ground the doctrine of momentariness is criticized, on the same ground the view of eternalism is maintained. They further say that things being perished turn into atoms. Others say that they return to primordial *Prakṛti*. In spite of things being perished, the idea of elements continues in our memory and for this reason they experience happiness or misery and labours the view of eternalism. They further say: *jīva* is permanent and the sound also permanent. For these reasons eternalistic view is maintained.

The notion of happiness towards the misery: on what ground they say that there is happiness as stated previously in chapter (81) on the three feelings, on the same ground the notion of happiness is maintained. The notion of purity towards impurity (arises), because of their attachment to the body; they, having seen with their own eyes the impure things, raise the notion of pure. Some masters consider that the soul is characterized as *puruṣa*, but we see the body of *puruṣa* as impure. There is a *sattva* through which the impure body is made pure. For these reasons the notion of purity is conceived.

The notion of the soul towards the non-soul: (when) they witnessing the continuity of aggregates in succession, think it is one and it is the soul, the notion of the soul happens on the same

ground that has been stated previously as the ground of *satkāya-dṛṣṭi*. (ch. 130).

The notion of superiority towards inferiority: They entertain the notion of superiority towards the heretical teachers, *Pūraṇa*, etc. Brahmā himself says: I am a great Brahmā, lord of gods, creator of the world, etc. Some masters say: If any one is accomplished with the happy feelings from five sensual pleasures, he is superior. Some others say: If any person, free from desire, dwells in four dhyānas, he is superior. Some others say: Amidst the men that are seen before us Brāhmaṇas are worthy of reverence and amidst men not seen before us gods are worthy of reverence. This is the notion of superiority towards the inferiors. The notion of inferiority towards the superior: Amongst the men the Buddha is the most respectable. Some people have a notion of inferiority towards him, viz. he is Kṣatriya, practiser in the path of training a short period. His preaching is not comparable to poetry inducing defiling passions nor comparable to Vedas; they do not consider it superior. In the Order (*Saṅgha*) there are four groups of men and hence inferior. Thus the notion of inferiority towards the superior arises.

The notion of the purifying path towards impure path: Some masters say that man gets purified by the sacred ashes and the sacred baths. Some others say that cessation and the stoppage of birth and death is the path of purification, and they also say that one is engaged in pure conduct and holy life and worshipping god and having the grace of Īśvara, he gets purification. Some others say that destruction of *karman* by practising penance is the path of purification. (Some still others) say that by giving up the onion and eating butter and curds, etc. one gets purification. Again after bathing and reciting the Vedic texts one is to take food it is the path of purification. Thus, they say that through various improper paths above said the release is secured and not through the eight-limbed path.

The notion of non-existence towards existence: Those things though existing from the empirical standpoint are said to

be non-existent. The notion of existence towards non-existence: (when) they say that there exist substances, one whole (*avayavin*), qualities, number, dimension, etc. and that there exist general and particular characteristics and *Samavāya*-relation; and also say that there exist things like *Prakṛti* and time, etc.

The above said misconstrued ideas are perverted views. Of these the four in particular are wrong views.

They are abandoned thus: One abandons them by means of right view as preached by the Buddha. The right view arises when one is decided in his mind by perceiving and listening and inferential knowledge (*anvaya-jñāna*). It arises when one contemplates on the right *samādhi*. So says the Sūtra: A man of concentrated mind realizes things as they are.

The blemishes of the wrong views: All calamities and sufferings spring up as a result of wrong views. The man of wrong view says that there is no sin, no merit and no fruit of well-done and ill-done actions. Therefore in this very world there is no good conduct and what is to speak of the future one? Thus, the man having disregarded them is termed "a man of the destroyed-meritorious root". He falls in the *avici*-hell. So says the six-footed Ābhidharma. Killing of worms and ants is heavier than the killing of a man. The man of wrong view, talks ill of the world and is doing a greater harm to the living beings; as for example, a poisonous tree germinates only for doing harm. Every action done by this man results in bad retribution. So says the Sūtra: The person of wrong view's corporeal and mental actions, the will, prayer, vow and other formations all result in undesirable, unpleasant retributions. For example, seeds of *alābu*, *kośātakī* and *picumanda* plants, being sowed in the wet ground pertake the essence of the earth, water, heat and the air, but those plants tend to the tastes bitter, sour and unpleasant. For, the seeds are bitter (in taste). Likewise, the mind and mental states of the wrong-viewed person result in undersirable experiences, because his view is sinful.

Therefore the charity, etc. done by him do not produce the desirable fruit as they are impaired by the mind of the wrong view.

One can inhibit the bad dharma by means of restraints. But, for this person there is no good or bad action and he has no restraints from anything. He commits bad action, and having broken shame and shyness becomes equal to animal. The person who says that there is no good or bad action thinks always of the bad things. He has no any occasion for taking good dharma. For, he does not meet any holy person nor does he hear good dharma.

The person of wrong view is termed as 'entered in the un-happy place'. Just as the men of hells are not bent on gaining path, just so this man, being born in the central country and having the six sense-faculties with the power of discriminating the good and the bad, is not inclined to gaining the path. Doing even a small bad action he falls in the hells, as this action has been committed with the mind of heavier sin. He cannot exhaust his bad action as it exists always in his mind. His release from the series of the hells is hardly possible; for, when no good action arises in him, he cannot be released from the hells. Since he has wrong view in his mind, how could be arouse the root of good dharma? A man of wrong view cannot be treated like a patient having already a simptom of death. The physician, even though procurable, is incapable to treat him. Since he is bereft of other roots of *kuśala*, anybody including the Buddha even, cannot treat him. Therefore he necessarily falls in the *avici* hell.

133. *Two Parāmarśas*

To say in regard to an un-real thing that this alone is true and the other is untrue is termed *dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa*, contagion of a false doctrine. A decided notion of superior dharma towards the inferior one is also *dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa*.

Its blemishes are: A man having obtained some imperfect attributes thinks himself as perfect and exaggerates his own attributes; for, he assumes an inauspicious thing as extremely auspicious and makes efforts and for this reason he repents subsequently. He becomes a laughing stock of the learned men as he entertains the notion of superiority towards inferiority. The person who labours such notion is a childlike and a designated as ignorant. A half-blind, e.g. arouses a notion of gold towards a piece of brass and becomes easily a laughing stock of good-eyed men.

When a man is indifferent towards Bodhi and desires to gain purity (*viśuddhi*) by means of the sacred bath and other good conduct, that is called contagion of mere rules and rituals, *Śila-vrata-parāmarśa*. Purification can indeed be secured only through wisdom but the good conduct is regarded as the source of wisdom.

The blemishes of the *Śila-vrata-parāmarśa*: All the blemishes that are stated in regard to *dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa* are to be applied here also. Moreover, due to this *parāmarśa* one would experience immense sufferings, viz. the experience of extreme cold and heat, lying down on dirty ground and thorny places, dipping in the deep water, walking into the fire-altar and falling from the peak of the mountain, etc. In the other world also the retribution of extreme suffering is described. So said in the Sūtra: a man of accomplished cow-like conduct, after death will be born as one of co-inhabitants of the cow and the man of unaccomplished conduct will fall in the hells. He enters into darkness from darkness; for, he experiences sufferings here and afterwards. He incurs heavier sin; for, he destroys good dharma thinking it bad dharma. He, abusing good conduct makes many to fall in the hells. Having relegated it to the background and accumulated sins he experiences necessarily bitter retributions.

Therefore, restrain from the bad conduct; do not practise the wrong path. For, the person who does not practise the bad

conduct from the beginning, it is easy for him to practise the path. It is very hard to enter into the path for the man whose mind is overwhelmed by the wrong conduct. Even the enemy does not so distress the man as the wrong view. The man of wrong view falls from every kind of the worldly benefit and enjoyment. He not only falls from five sensual pleasures in this world, but also does so from a better rebirth and Nirvāṇa. Wishing to gain happiness he instead obtaines misery, and wishing to gain release, he instead obtains the bondage: thus he becomes a mad. The person, who becomes worthy of gaining rebirth in the heavens as a result of charity of food, does not get any benefit in spite of possessing the body and life for doing charity because of his wrong-conduct.

134. *Minor Defilements* (*Upakleśa*)

The heavy-minded man's desire for sleep (*svāpa*) is *middha*. Sleep (*svāpa*) is the stoppage of waking mind for the rest. The mind distracted towards several objects is *auddhatya*, sanguine temperament. To foster a sorrowful attitude towards an object that is wished for is *kaukṛtya*, repentance. A crooked mind deceiving the good dharma is *māyā*, deceit. Achieving a deceitful-mental state is *śāṭhya*, trickery. Not to cover up (*ahrepaṇa*) the bad action done by himself is the absence of shyness (*ahrīkyam*). Not to cover up the bad action done in the *Saṅgha* is the absence of shame (*anapatrāpyam*). A mind pursuing after the bad action is *pramāda*, carelessness. When a non-existent virtue is proclaimed and accordingly people believe in it, it is *kuhanā*, cheeting. Exhibiting some marvels with a view to gaining honour, one speaks so as to make people become delightful is *lapanā*. With a view to gaining other's property and concealing that intention, one speaks that this thing is excellent, etc. that is *naimittikatā*. When one, with a view to censuring the particular person speaks in praise of other person as: your father is industrious, but you are not so, that is *niṣpeṣikatā*. When one seeking some presentation in return of his own speaks: this object of

presentation was obtained from such border region, etc. that is *lābhena lābhajigṛkṣā* (a desire for gaining a presentation by offering a small one). To be merged in the disease of sleep is *tandri*. In spite of the accomplishment of a good place suited to the practice of the path one's constant eagerness for more is *arati*, displeasure. When the body is in the mood of yawning, uncontrollable and tending to indolenc and drowsiness, that is *vijṛmbhikā*, yawning temperament. When one is unaware of moderation in his meal, he is termed *adama*, untamed. One who does not make an intense effort is termed *vivartya-citta*, 'residient-minded'. One who does not respect the word of his chief man or superior and fearless is termed *abahumānin*, ill-respecting man. The person having taste for un-meritorious things is termed *Pāpamitra*, ill-friended.

These are minor defilements arising from major defilements.

135. *Roots of Demerits*

Three roots of demerits: covetousness, hate and infatuation. All other defilements are constituents of these three. The pride, etc. are the constituents of infatuation, and therefore not separate. These three defilements are in the mind of all living beings in the main and not the pride, etc. While there is lust, hate, and the root of demerits is present. When there is an obstruction to what is beloved, the hate ensues. The infatuation is the root of other two defilements. For, he who has no infatuation, has no lust and hate. So says the Sūtra. Ten un-meritorious actions are divided into three as born of coveteousness, hate and infatuation. Here it is not stated that they are born of the pride, etc. There are only three feelings and not the fourth one. In these three exist three residues. If the pride, etc. are accepted as the separate defilements, in what feeling will they exist as residue? Therefore, there are only three roots of demerits.

In the pleasant feeling lust exists as residue. So says the Sūtra: joy occurs in the gainer of the pleasant feeling-touch and,

sadness (*apriti*) occurs in the gainer of the unpleasant feeling-touch, because he does not understand truly the genesis, disappearance, taste, blemishes and expulsion of the feelings. In the indifferent feeling exist ignorance as residue. For, this person does not understand as it is (*Yathābhūta*) the stream of five aggregates of elements available in formless world. He at that time cherishes in it the notion of Nirvāṇa, release, the notion of neither-misery-nor happiness or the notion of the soul. Therefore it is said that in the indifferent feeling there exists infatuation as residue.

Q. Where do the residues reside, whether in the elements or in the creature? A. The idea of living being arises on the basis of elements (*dharma*) and the feeling is felt in the wake of the idea of living being and in the wake of feelings arise the defilements, greed, etc. Therefore it is understood that the residue that arises on the basis of elements is said to be residing in the living being. For, for what person (*sattva*) the residue ("the idea of sattva" a better reading) is not destroyed for that person it (=*anuśaya*) resides; for what person (*sattva*) it is destroyed for that person it does not reside. If it resides in the elements, the residues will be permanent, because the elements are existing permanently. Since the permanent cannot be destroyed the element known as *asattva*, will also be with residue. Then, in that case, because the man has the residue the wall, etc. also will be with the residue. This is not really true. Then there will be no Arhan; he will be of residue because other persons have the residues (Therefore the residue resides in the *sattva*).

Q. Residue being not destroyed, resides; and being destroyed, it does not reside.

A. The residue can reside in two ways: (1) by way of *ālambana*, support and (2) by way of *samprayoga*, association. This residue whether it is destroyed, or not destroyed (exists) by way of *ālambana* and by way of *samprayoga*. How is it said that it, being destroyed, does not reside? If it is so, a third way

of residing of the residue must be expressed. Since it is not stated, it (third way of residing) is not there. The residue does not reside in the support, *ālambana* of other rank (*bhūmi*). Therefore it is evident that the residue resides in the *sattva* alone and not in the elements.

Q. Residues reside in two modes: (1) by way of *ālambana* and by way of *samprayoga*. They reside in *sattvas* neither by way of *ālambana* nor by way of *Samprayoga*. How will they reside in the sattva? A. We have already explained this point, viz., the residues arising on the basis of elements reside in the *sattva*, living being. It is said in the *Abhidharmakāya*: How many residues are there for the *sattvas* in the world of desire? etc. This question makes clear that they reside in the *sattvas*.

Q. The Sūtra's statement that in the pleasant feeling the lust-residue resides, will be contradicted. A. The statement that the lust resides in the pleasant feeling is not a straightforward expression, but it should be explained as: the lust that has arisen in the presence of pleasant feeling resides in the *sattva*. Q. The lust arises on the basis of visible, etc. Why is it said that it arises merely on the basis of the pleasant feeling? A. True, but the lust, however, arises as a result of the concept-recollection-thought of joy, etc. (*prīti-ādi*), but not merely on the basis of the visible, etc. Q. Lust may sometimes arise on the basis of unpleasant feeling also; e.g. the people talk that a happy man does not pray much but the unhappy man prays much. Why it is said that it arises from the pleasant feeling alone? A. Lust does not at all arise from unpleasant feeling, because misery is in the nature of oppression. Therefore lust arises only from the pleasant feeling.

The indifferent feeling being in the nature of happiness, the man has lust in it. Hence it is said that lust resides in the pleasant feeling. In three feelings there exist three defilements as residues and hence only three defilements are stated.

136. *Miscellaneous Defilements*

The Sūtra says: Three *āsravas*, intoxicants, desire-intoxicant, becoming-intoxicant and ignorance-intoxicant. All the defilements of the desire-world omitting ignorance are called the desire-intoxicant. Likewise those of the form and formless worlds are the becoming-intoxicant. The ignorance-intoxicant is available in all the three worlds.

They get increased gradually by means of superior, moderate and inferior dharmas, elements and as a result of gaining the visible, *rūpa*, etc. as their distinguished *ālambana*. They become into two categories: some are abandonable by the vision of truth, and serve as the sources (*mūla-bhūta*) of the intoxicants, and some are abandonable by contemplation and become as the results of the intoxicants. There are five factors of *āsravas*: thus we have seven in all. They are defilements alone. The Buddha says thus eventually: There are three *āsravas*, four floods (*ogha*), four bondages (*bandha*), four clingings and four fetters.

Four floods: desire-flood, becoming-flood, wrong-view-flood and ignorance-flood. Omitting ignorance and wrong view, other defilements of the desire-world are termed desire-flood. The same of the form-and formless worlds are becoming-flood. All the wrong views are the wrong-view-flood. The ignorance itself is ignorance-flood. Amongst floods wrong view is stated separately because the heretics are swept away by wrong views. The term, *Ogha* means etymologically *cyutim vahatiti*, it executes falling down. *Bandha* means: it binds three worlds.

Four *upādānas*-clingings: desire-, wrong-view-, rule-and-ritual-, soul-doctrine-clingings. When no soul exists, to stick to that doctrine is the soul-doctrine-clinging. To accept the soul-existence evolves two extremities. It is either permanent or impermanent. Conceiving it as impermanent, one sticks to five sensual pleasures. He becomes engrossed in this worldly pleasure on the plea that there exists no other world. Conceiving it as

permanent, one, in expectation of other worldly pleasure, sticks to the rites and rituals. Being sharp-minded, he considers thus: if the soul (*jīva*) is permanent, he is free from the modification of happiness and misery as he is bereft of merit and demerit—this kind of wrong view he harbours. Thus four *upādānas* are possible on the basis of the soul-doctrine alone.

Four *granthas*, ties: covetousness as bodily-tie, malevolence as bodily-tie, pursuit of mere rules and rituals as bodily-tie, attachement to this alone true as bodily-tie. When one covets other's property, but the other does not give it, then he arouses a sense of hate towards the man, and takes it by using the whip and the weapon. This is the source of quarrels amongst the householders, and it is termed the pursuit of the extreme pleasure-end. The person is engaged in the pursuit of mere rites and rituals and thinks: I shall attain purification through this rite and ritual. For him arises a wrong view that this is only true and nothing else. This is the root-cause of dispute amongst the ascetics, and is termed the pursuit of the extreme sorrow-end. Five skandhas constitute the body. The above four ties are necessarily in the nature of the body and speech and hence are *kāya-grantha*, bodily-tie. Some masters say: these four dharmas are so named as they tie birth and death.

Five hindrances (*nivaraṇa*): sensual passion (*kāma-cchanda*) malevolence, sloth-and-torpor, distraction-and-repentance, and perplexity. Malevolence follows as a result of the man's attachment for sensual pleasures (*kāma*). The Sūtra says: From the thirst springs up malevolence and from the sensual passion arise the defilements, jealousy, etc. and other bad doings: whipping etc. When one's body and mind are distracted through lust and hate and get tired on account of too much activities the man wishes sloth-and-torpor. Taking rest a little through sloth-and-torpor and being distracted by the lust and hate he does not obtain *dhyāna* and trance. The distraction (*auddhatya*) arises as a result of the mind pursuing the external things as *ālambana*.

Sorrowfulness-and-repentance is always present in the mind of the person of impure action. His mind being distracted and repentant, he always doubts whether there is release or no release; the prince, (Jayasena) e.g. asked Aciravat, a *Śrāmaṇera* (about this).

They are termed *Nīvaraṇa* because the sensual passion and malevolence cover up the morality-aggregate; distraction and repentance cover up the concentration-aggregate and sloth-and-torpor cover up the wisdom-aggregate.

Some masters in order to avoid the said hindrances say that this is good and that is bad. One gets perplexed whether it is so or not so. This perplexity hinders three (said) aggregates. Of the five hindrances, three are very strong and called only *nīvaraṇa*. The other two are not so strong and hence they are contagious elements. They are called contagious (*sāṁsargika*) because they are associated with the cause of rebirth. There are five factors of sloth-and-torper: unsteadiness, displeasure, yawning, immoderation in food and mind's dejection. There are four factors of distraction-repentance: kinship-consideration, township-consideration, deathlessness-consideration and the recollection of the past sportfulness, joyfulness, conversation and humorousness. These are causes of rebirth. Their remedy also is similar. Wisdom is the remedy for sloth-and-torpor and the concentration for distraction-and-repentance. These two are contagious *nīvaraṇa*. The above five things are sometimes *nīvaraṇa* and sometimes *anīvaraṇa*. The five that are obtainable in the world of desire are termed *nīvaraṇa*. Those of other worlds are *anīvaraṇas*.

Amongst five fetters pertaining to lower region (*avarabhāgīya*), the sensual passion (*kāmacchanda*), malevolence and the pursuit of mere rites and rituals are (particularly) of the lower region because they tend to go downwards. For, a man of the cow-vow, having accomplished his vow, will be born amongst cows after death, and not accomplishing his vow he

completely removed. With regard to your argument that the soul-view is destroyed together with the residues (I may say that) your outburst (*paryavasthāna*) which is the mind's associate remains suppressed when it is not manifest. Similarly my residue remains suppressed in its unmanifestation stage. At the time of Āryan path a thing though non-existent, is said to be suppressed because it cannot be with its, contradictory element. The argument that the ordinary men would be Arhan is not sound. One is Arhan when he abandons his defilements. The ordinary men are not so. A person, e.g. who has not taken up the vow of not taking flesh is not spoken of as one who has given up flesh-eating even at the time of not eating flesh. The ordinary man has the ignorance, wrong recollection and wrong intention, etc. and therefore his defilements are not abandoned. But the Arhan has abandoned all of them and is not comparable with the worldling. Your contention that the residue that is stimulated by the outburst increases is not good. All the defilements increase by means of the superior, moderate and inferior dharmas, but not by the outburst. The fact that a person that remains in good and indeterminate state of mind is said to be of residue is also possible, because he has not abandoned it, and hence he is regarded as possessed of residue.

We can decide therefore that the residues, lust, etc. are the mind's associate. Eight wrong paths: wrong view and upto wrong concentration. The wrong livelihood which is not separate from corporeal and vocal actions is counted as a separate constituent of the path, because it is specially prescribed for the ascetics (*pravrajita*) and it is hardly abandonable. Wrong livelihood is that by which the five dharmas like deceit, etc. are nourished. To state in brief: an ascetic should not enter into king's service, or business enterprise or medical profesion etc. He should not receive wealth or property, etc. He should live by begging in accordance with the law. He should contemplate that to enter into the Buddha's dispensation is in order to practise it and not for livelihood. Therefore the person being interested in good dharmas should live a pure life.

137. *Nine Fetters* (*Saṁyojana*)

Nine fetters are thirst, etc. Amongst five *dṛṣṭis*, wrong views and two *parāmarśas* are stated separately for the following reason. The pursuit of mere rites and rituals (*śīla-vrata-parāmarśa*) is difficult to abandon. It is comparable to a boat drowned in the ocean that is difficult to rescue. The person pursuing this considers: I alone shall ascend the heavens through the good conduct and I shall suffer all the sufferings: dipping in the water, walking into fire and falling from the mountain-peak. The worldly men do not notice the futility of this practice. Therefore the Buddha says it is a fetter. Trusting on the observance of this *parāmarśa* the man neglects the Āryan path of eight constituents. It is a bond of the ascetics whereas the sensual pleasures of house-holders. A man of mere rites and rituals, though observing different ascetic duties, does not obtain any benefit out of them. He loses happiness here and hereafter, e.g. a man of cow-behaviour, *go-vrata*. ***Śīla-vrata*** is a source of hopes for the heretics; they assume that they would excel others.

This practice is gross and understandable and noticed by all; the wisdom-path, on the other hand, is very subtle and hardly understandable. The worldly men do not understand the benefit of its practice. The pursuit of mere rites and rituals is termed *dṛṣṭi*, wrong view as it runs counter against the right-path.

Pursuit of wrong view is a force whereby one adheres oneself to a bad doctrine, and is unable to avoid it. Due to this other fetters get strengthened. In the Query of Śakra only two fetters, viz., envy and jealousy are stated by the Buddha, because these two are very mean and despicable. We see in the world the people having the envy and jealousy at the sight of other man gaining something from some donor. Due to this they fall in the midst of very poor, low and dull-lustred men. This fetter oppresses several times the mind of Śakra, lord of gods. Therefore the Buddha says that these two are the source of heavier sins.

Amongst three poisons lust and indignation cause the heavier sin. The above said two fetters are produced on account of the developed lust and indignation. The person who contemplates calmly on the meritorious thought would completely destroy these two fetters. They are abandoned by practising charity. When a person, e.g. noticing his own son who has gained some excellent object, becomes displeased, what is to speak of him at the sight of his enemy of such gain. These fetters are hardly abandonable for the reason that they operate in relation to beloved and hated events. This is the reason why the Buddha has stated only these fetters.

138. *Miscellaneous Queries*

The Śāstra says: All the defilements are in the majority brought under ten residues. They are: lust, indignation, pride, nescience, perplexity and five wrong views. Q. There are ten universally obscuring elements present in every unfavourable moment of consciousness. They are : un-belief, laziness, forgetfulness, *vikṣepa*, ignorance, *asamprajanya*, improper attention, wrong inclination, distraction (*auddhatya*) carelessness. These ten are associated with all the defiled thoughts (*kleśa-citta*). Is this view admissible? A. The theory of association (*Samprayoga*) has already been criticized. Every mental state arises one by one and not together. For in certain unfavourable mind there is a bad belief and in certain other there is no belief. Therefore, it is understood that those ten elements are not present in every defiled mind. The contention that the torpor and distraction (*auddhatya*) are present in every defiled mind is not good. When the mind is in the stage of dejection the torpor may be present at that time, but not it is present in the distracted mind.

In the world of desire all the ten defilements are present and so also in the form and the formless worlds. The fact that the envy, etc. are present in form-world is evident from the Sūtra according to which the great Brahmā addresses the Brahma-

kāyika gods: Do not approach the Recluse Gautama. Here itself we shall make an end to old age and death. This is envy. Due to envy there is also hate. It is said in the Sūtra: The great Brahmā, taking the ascetic Kevadha to a corner disclosed: I also do not understand where these four great elements disappear utterly. This is *māyā*, deceit. Again he says: I am creator, builder, and superior, etc. This is *pramāda*, inattentiveness. These loop-holes are also there. Therefore the unmeritorious minds are also present there.

Some Ābhidharmikas say: love that is directed towards the mother, father, *upādhyāya* and Ācārya is good love. The same for other things is bad love. When neither good nor bad is done to any one that is indeterminate love. The hate for bad dharma and ill-learned is good hate. Hate towards the good dharma and the sentient beings is bad hate and the same towards non-living things is indeterminate hate. Basing on one pride, destruction of another pride is good pride. Ill-respect for other living being is bad pride. Some such thing may be said in regard to ignorance, etc.

Again the Ābhidharmikas say: What is good is not *kleśa*. The soul-doctrine in the world of desire is said to be *avyākṛta*, indeterminate. If it is bad (*akuśala*) all the men who harbour the soul-doctrine would fall in the hells. But the fact is not so. Therefore it is *avyākṛta*. Is this admissible? A. The soul-doctrine is the root-cause of all defilements. A man telling others that there is the soul falls in the hells; so how can it be *avyākṛta*? Likewise the wrong view of two extremities is to be explained. To cause other person to fall into perplexity by preaching a perverse view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*) is not *akuśala*, for he only makes to fall into perplexity but not into the wrong view.

Q. Some masters say: The defilements of desire-world are causes of the stream the elements in the desire-worlds and those of the form and formless worlds are so of the streams of

elements in those worlds respectively. How is this? A. the thirst alone is such cause. So says the Sūtra: Genesis of misery is the thirst. The saying of the Sūtra that the birth is due to pride is to be explained that the thirst preceded by pride is the cause.

The method of abandonment: Lust, indignation, pride and nescience are to be abandoned by two: vision of truths and contemplation. Other six defilements are abandoned by the vision alone. The self-pride is not a *dṛṣṭi*. What determines *nimitta*, concept is *dṛṣṭi*. So the self-pride may be present in the man under training. Some masters say: Envy, jealousy, repentance and deceit, etc. are abandoned by the contemplation alone. But the author says: they are abandoned by the vision as well as the contemplation. This is evident from the following incidents. Nāthaputra, etc. watched the disciples of the Buddha gaining honours and entertained an envious mind. This envy does not appear in a man of the vision of the path. Certain person being previously jealous towards the disciples of the Buddha did not give them the charity; when he obtained a vision of the path he gave charity. Here jealousy is abandoned by the vision. The repentance of Sunakṣatra and others is abandoned by the vision. The deceit of the stream-winner that is causing the hells is abandoned by the vision.

The above-said six defilements (lust, etc.) are abandoned by the vision of four truths. Other four defilements are in five ways: All the defilements are in fact abandoned at the time of the vision of *Nirodha*. So the idea of soul-doctrine, etc. is abandoned not merely by the vision of *duhkha*. The wrong view of the soul runs through all the four truths and abandoned in four ways. So also the wrong view of extreme ends is abandoned in four ways. For the ascetic watching *duhkh* as produced from *samudaya*, (thirst) gives up nihilism and realizing *Nirodha* secured by the path gives up eternalism. The pursuit of mere rites and rituals is also abandoned in four ways.

When there is a cause its fruit is also experienced. So one, experiencing the misery discerns that *Śila* is misery and the purification is not secured through this: this is what is abandonable by the vision of misery. He also discerns that *Śila* is the cause of misery and through this no purification is obtained; this is what is abandoned by the vision of the misery-cause. Nirvāṇa is negated by the wrong view as the purification is obtained through the wrong view: this is what is abandoned by the vision of Nirodha, cessation. The path is negated by the wrong view: this is what is abandoned by the vision of the path. The pursuit of the wrong view is abandoned in four ways as it is supported by the wrong view. The similar will be the case with the pursuit of mere rites and rituals.

All the residues are suppressed by the progressive stages (*bhūmi*) and not in the order of worlds (*dhātu*). No end there is to the number of residues such as ninety-eight residues.

Q. Lust, pride and four views omitting the wrong view are associated with three faculties of feeling omitting misery- and sorrowfulness-faculties. Hatred is also associated with three faculties of feeling omitting happiness and joyfulness, nescience with five faculties, perverse view and perplexity are associated with four faculties omitting misery. Hate, hypocrisy (*mrakṣa*), sinful envy and jealousy are associated with the faculty of sorrowfulness. How is this? A. It is previously criticized that there is no *Samprayoga*, association. The point will also be stated subsequently that in five sensuous consciousnesses there is no any defiling element. In your system lust is associated with the faculty of joyfulness, but envy is not so; we do not find any criterion for this discrimination. Envy is a limb of the lust. Likewise there is no any reason for stating that pride is not associated with the faculty of sorrowfulness. Therefore all your sayings are merely some constructive thought recollecting your own concepts (*svasaṁjñānusmaraṇa-vikalpa-mātra*).

Some masters say: Some residues are abandonable by the vision of misery, viz. five perverse views, perplexity, lust,

aversion, pride and ignorance and some are abandonable by the vision of *samudaya*, origin, viz. wrong view, pursuit of the wrong view, perplexity, lust, aversion, pride and ignorance. These are *Sarvatraga*, ubiquitous residues and others are not so (*asarvatraga*). The author replies: all the defilements are *Sarvatragas*; for, they are all mutually conditioned. (See the text for explanation.)

All defiling elements are in the sixth consciousness, but not in the five sensuous consciousnesses; for, the sixth consciousness alone is pursuing concepts and all the defilements are brought about by concepts (*saṁjñā*). Not accepting so, the soul-view and others would be in the sensuous consciousness. For, when one sees with his eye, he says: I see the object. Likewise pride and perplexity, etc. are in the sixth consciousness. Q. The Sūtra says: There are six thirst-bodies (corresponding to six consciousness-bodies). How can it be stated that no defilements are in the sensuous consciousness?

A. Just as the six mind's co-farers, *mana-upavicāras* exist in non-sensuous consciousness, but because they are brought about by the eye, etc. they are said six, just so are the six thirst-bodies (as they brought about by eye, etc.). The cause (*i.e.* capacity, *śakti* in Śāntarakṣita's terminology) of the discursive thought exists in the non-sensuous consciousness, and not in the five-fold sensuous consciousness. It is therefore evident that defilements do not exist in the five sensuous consciousnesses.

139. *Abandonment of blemishes* (*Doṣa*)

Some masters say: Defilements are divided into nine: inferior, moderate and superior, and each dividing into three: inferior-inferior, inferior-moderate and inferior-superior, and so on. Likewise is knowledge also nine-fold. Amongst defilements, the superior-superior is first abandoned and the inferior-inferior at the end. The inferior-inferior knowledge causes to abandon the superior-superior defilement and the superior-superior

knowledge causes to abandon the inferior-inferior *kleśa*. But the author does not accept this scheme of abandonment. According to him defilements are abandoned through innumerable thoughts. So says the Buddha in a Śūtra :A carpenter, *e.g.* uses his axe, *paraśu* for several years, and in so using the handle of the axe becomes decayed, even if he did not notice its gradual decay everyday. When he noticed it then he understands that this is decayed. Likewise, the ascetic also practising the path does not notice what *āsrava*s are abandoned today, what were abandoned yesterday; nevertheless, he knows them abandoned when they were abandoned. It is, therefore, understood that they are abandoned by means of innumerable thoughts and not by nine or eight.

*Kleśa*s are abandoned with the support of seven *pratiśaraṇa*s. The Buddha says in a Sūtra: The abandonment of *āsravas* with the support of the first dhyāna and upto *Ākiñcanyāyatana*. In the absence of these seven *pratiśaraṇa*s (i. e. first dhyāna, etc.) even one can abandon the *āsrava*s. So says the *Susima Sūtra*: One secures the abandonment of *āsrava*s even without seeking the support of seven bases (*niśraya*). It is clear, therefore, that they are abandoned even (without and) with the support of concentration pertaining to the world of desire.

Q. Defilements that are abandoned by the vision of truth are not abandoned with the help of the formless world-concentration; for there in the formless world exists no *rūpa*. A. This point has already been said that even the concentration in the formless world dependents on the *rūpa*, visible. The ascetic being freed from the desire towards first dhyāna takes up gradually the second and other dhyānas.

Since the defilements in the world of desire are ceased every moment, their abandonment is also gradual. For example, the gods of *Yama* world accomplish their sex desire by embra-

cing, the gods of *Tuṣita* world by touching the hand, the *Nirmāṇarata* gods by speech and *Paranirmita-vaśa-vartin* gods by seeing the female form. Likewise defilements of the desire-world are abandoned gradually.

Some masters say that these gods are born in such and such world as a result of their merits and not as a result of the abandonment of their defilements. Since the gods of *Yama* world are of the mild sense-organs they accomplish their sex by embracing and other gods having sharp sense-organs, do so by seeing the female form.

Some masters say: Defilements that are abandoned by contemplation are gradually abandoned; defilements of the desire world first and then those of the form-world. But the defilements that are to be abandoned by the vision of truths are simultaneously abandoned. How is this? A. All such defilements abandonable by vision of truths are abandoned by the vision of *Nirodha*: they are the soul-view, etc. The defilements that are abandonable originally by the contemplation on the five aggregates as impermanent etc. that is started from the *ūṣma*-stage are (finally) destroyed through the vision of *Nirodha*, cessation.

Q. (The ascetic) abandones the fetters of the desire-world through contemplation on the misery of the desire-world; so also through contemplation on its origin. Just as he abandons in the desire-world just so in the realm of *Naiva-saṁjñā-nāsaṁjñāyatana*. (But) he abandons the fetters pertaining to three realms of existence through contemplation on *Nirodha* of the desire-world. Is this True? A. The realizer of *Nirodha* abandons the defilements. So what you say is not correct. Q. The Sūtra says : The ascetic secures the fruit of the stream-winner, and up to that of Arhan by contemplating on the five aggregates as impermanent, etc. How do you say that he abandons the defilements by contemplation on the cessation-truth alone ? A. He, contemplating on these five aggregates discerns the contemplation leading to their cessation. Hence he abandons

the defiling residues. The Sūtra says: The ascetic contemplates: This is *rūpa*, this is the origin of *rūpa* and this is the cessation of *rūpa*. It is always said : The defilements are abandoned when one perceives and discerns the elements (dharma). It is understood that the extinction of defilements is through the vision of the cessation-truth. The five aggregates are misery and the defilements flow, therefrom. When one perceives the cessation, *nirvāṇa*, and putting out (*upaśama*) of the five aggregates, then the idea of misery is accomplished. Therefore it is evident that the defilements are extinguished by one who perceives the cessation of the aggregates. It says : On the basis of elements and relying upon one indifferent bodiless mind the abandonment is (secured). The cessation is the same as what is bodiless state. The ascetic who perceives *rūpa*, etc. as bodiless becomes the gainer of the ultimate separation (*visaṁyoga*). There are three channels of emancipation (*vimokṣa-mukha*) as factors of Nirvāṇa. With the help of those channels of emancipation alone the ascetic abandons the defilements. Thus we understand that the path relying on the un-manifest element (Nirvāṇa) as *ālambana* causes to abandon the defilements. Therefore the path of abandonment as stated by you is not reasonable.

The Śāstra says : The defilements are with innumerable discursive aspects (*vikalpa-mukha*); this is to be understood by the aspirants of the Release. For, one gets released by the strength of knowing the bondage of the defilements. One, e.g. being aware of his enemy present in a place avoids him,; or a man being aware of a dangerous road ahead avoids it. Likewise should one avoid the defilements. The defilement-bondage is very subtle and bound *Vemacitra*, a demon-king. The sentient being are bound by the defilements; it is so upto the top-most realm of existence. Thus one should understand their disadvantages.

The sentient beings upto the top-most realm of existence are fallen in the stream of to-and-fro wandering (*ājavañjava*) ;

for they do not notice disadvantages of the defilements. Since their fetters are not destroyed, their self-pride increases. Then their perverse thought (*vimati*) and repentance become inevitable. They should understand lest they may become victims of the defilements. They neglect the pure and ultimate happiness of Nirvāṇa and aspire on the other hand for a very trifling sensual pleasure and the pleasure of becoming. All this is the bad result of the defilements. When they abandon the defilements they obtain the great happiness. Therefore one should secure the knowledge-vision of the defilements. They are the elements hindering the Release. They are factors of the body; the body follows them. The misery pursues the body. Therefore a man aspiring for the separation from misery should endeavour to abandon the defilements.

140. *Causes of knowledge* (*Vidyā*)

Knowledge is (to know) that *kelśa*s are the basic causes of the body. Some heretics do not believe in this and say that body is causeless like wild herbs and plants; some say things are created by Maheśvara, etc.; others say that they are born of time or nature; and still others say that they are made of the accumulation of atoms. This is the knowledge for them. The author says that it is already stated that the body arises from the action which is acted upon on account of defilements. Therefore they are the basic causes of the body.

The defilement is the cause of action; for, ignorance is the mind merged in *prajñapti*, nominalism. A man of *prajñapt*-mind accumulates actions. But Arhan does not do so. It is thus understood that actions come from the defilement. The Buddha says in a Sūtra : Does the man who has abandoned ignorance and secured knowledge commit any bad, good or indifferent actions ? No sir. There is no any undefiled, *an-āsrava* action. So it is clear that the person who pursues nominalism (*prajñapti*) does the action. The undefiled, *an-āsrava* mind does not rely on *prajñapti*, and hence does no action.

There is no any *caryā*, practice for the learner (*śaikṣa*). The Sūtra says: The learner does not practise what is to come and also what is past. The practice is charactrised as action. The undefiled mind is not characterised by *caryā*, prctice. Therefore there is no undefiled action. All actions are resulted from the defilements. A man of the abandoned defilements does not experience rebirth. It is therefore evident that the existing body is rooted in the defilements.

The author does not accept the view that the living beings are born free from defilements which arise subsequently like the tooth. But they are bore together with them. It is well-known that all sentient beings take birth in (the soil of) the privy chamber and not on the stone-slab. They take birth there because of their attachment for odour, taste, etc. They take birth in the hells on account of delusion. At the moment of death, they, watching the hell from the distance, think that it is a lake of lotus, and therefore they are born in the hells. A Sūtra is cited to the effect that the person takes birth amongst different creatures according to the kind of his intention at his dying moment.

Q. If the body is formed on account of defilement, *kleśas*, the body would not be there for the person of abandoned defilements (i. e. Arhan). A. This is not correct. The body has been formed by the previous defilements. Though the present ones are abandoned, the body continues to exist by the force of the previous defilements like the potter's wheel continuing to revolve even when his stick ceases to operate. New body is not formed due to (some other) previous defilement. Consciousness necessarily continues as a result of concept-grasping (*nimitta-graha*). The person, having abandoned the previous action cultivates *non-concept-emancipation* channel and takes the body no more ; just as the seed does not germinate in the scorched stone, just so does the seed of consciousness not germinate when the consciousness-stations (*vijñāna-sthiti*) are burnt by the fire of knowledge. The stream of elements is

cut off due to the lack of *saṁskāras*, formations and no more it arises. The Sūtra says: Consciousness is the seed, the actions, *saṁskāras* are the field; lust and thirst are the water; and nescience is manure. Through these factors future body is formed. Arhan has none of these factors and takes no more his body. So the experience of the body is due to defilements. The stream-winner, though having the knowledge of *duḥkha* does not experience it at his rebirth-time. But Arhan's knowledge (of *duḥkha*) is very strong and his defilements do not prolong their forces. At the time of death the experience of new birth is suppressed. This is the difference between Arhan and the stream-winner.

Your contention that defilements arise subsequently like tooth is not proper; for, Arhan having burnt his defilements by his undefiled wisdom does not take rebirth like the burnt seed. That the body is born of defilement is known to all; the bodily complexion, e. g. gets modified as a result of sensual passion. It is also so as a result of hate. It is, therefore, clear that the five aggregates in future will also be born of the defilements.

Q. The food is also experienced as the cause of five aggregates, why do you say that the defilement alone is the cause of the body? A. The food is producer of *Rūpa*, etc., through *citta-prajñapti*, mind's conception, but the defilement is producer not through mind's conception. This fact can be demonstrated in the animal world (*Cp*. ch. 110, etc.). Birds like cataka, etc. filled with sexual passion, serpent, etc. with hate and pig, etc. with dulness. These creatures, therefore, have developed such habits for long since. This point has been explained in detail.

Q. If the body is caused by the defilement, then the life will be liable to no change in the world. One falls in the unhappy life due to his defilement. He, developing the defilement much more would get no release. Or if one being born in a happy life would not fall in unhappy life. Thus there would be no varied pattern of revolving in the worldly life. A. One, even though he is in unhappy life, may sometimes arouse a meritorious

thought likewise though one is born in a happy life, he may arouse a sinful thought. This is the reason why they change their place of birth. Their lust and other defilements being meagre they take their rebirth in a good place. When the defilements are many, they are reborn in an unhappy place, e. g. pig, etc. Giving charity, etc. one is reborn in any one of *kāma* gods. Abandoning lust for adultery one obtains happiness of a distinguished *dhyāna*. Abandoning passion for beauty one obtains happiness of a distinguished concentration. At the destruction of all fetters happiness of Nirvāṇa is secured. So the body is due to defilements.

We actually see people dwelling together with bad men and living miserably. It is clear that to be in the world is the result from attachment. For example, moths (*śalabha*) due to their greediness for lustre of colour (*rūpa*) are burnt by the fire. This attachment is due to ignorance; for they do not know the misery of the fiery touch. Therefore they fall into the fire. Likewise the living beings being entangled in the misery of rebirth take birth on account of sensual craving caused by ignorance. Fish, e. g. swallowing a bait and dear attracted by the sound all die finally. All this is due to defilement. Just as the root of the tree being not pulled out, germinates again and again just so the root of lust not being pulled out the tree of misery constantly grows. The same idea is expressed by the Buddha in a stanza.

The idea that the body is due to *kleśa* is explained by several illustarations and quotations.

Twelve links of causation is governed by *avidyā*. It is the mind pursuing the *prajñapti*, nominalism. Due to this three-fold *karma* follows : good, *puṇya*, bad, *apuṇya*, and indifferent, *āneñjya*. What is favoured by *kāma*, desire is *puṇya*. What is oppressed by misery, *duḥkha* is *apuṇya*. What is brought under loving heart, compassion and others is *āneñjya*. Consciousness pursuing the actions sticks to rebirth. On the basis of consciousness arise *nāma-rūpa*, six bases, touch and feeling. These

four links are resultant of the previous action. On the basis of this feeling arise thirst, clinging and becoming. These links, action and defilement cause rebirth, old age and death in future. Thus the stream of becoming constituted of twelve links is rooted in nescience, *avidyā*. The worldly existence is beginningless. For, the Sūtra says: Action-conditioned are the senses, eye, etc. The action is caused by thirst; the latter caused by nescience, the latter by incorrect thinking, and the latter again caused by the eye and conditioned by the visible and evolved from the infatuation. It is thus evident that the worldly existence is beginningless. This beginninglessness will not be possible for one who pleads for Īśvara, etc. as ultimate cause. Release is experienced at the utter cessation of defilements. Bodies of the creatures are various and manifold. This various character of the creatures will be impossible in the case of causality by Īśvara, etc. Since the defilements and actions are manifold the bodies of the creatures are various and manifold.

Amongst twenty-two organs, six senses cause six consciousnesses. There are two organs, female and male. The *jivita*-organ is non-stop continuity of all these elements. It is the organ of action which is the root-cause of all defilement. They are based on the feeling. Therefore five feelings become organs. Thus the stream of elemental continuity (*saṁsāra*) is conditioned mutually. Their discontinuity rests on the five organs of the faith, etc. Thus, by means of twenty-two organs one goes away from and comes in the worldy existence.

One who seeks after the release cultivates the aggregates of good conduct, concentration, wisdom, emancipation and the knowledge-vision. These aggregates help to abandon the defilements. The wise man knowing their advantages resorts to them. Therefore the body is due to the defilements.

Defilements are gradually abandoned. Abandoning threefold fetter one obtains the fruit of stream-winner. Reducing

passions, etc. to a lesser degree one secures the fruit of once-returner. Abandoning the fetters of the desire-world one secures the fruit of the never-returner. This order is to be understood in the *dhyāna* and concentrations also. Destroying utterly all (fetters and defilements) one secures the fruit of the Arhan. Since the defilements are abandoned gradually the body is also abandoned gradually. This order of abandonment would not be possible if the body, etc. are caused by Īśvara, etc. Good men pray for the abandonment of *kleśas*, lust, etc. It is understood that they suffer much fatigue and worry here and hearafter as a result of lust and other *kleśas*. Those who say that Īśvara, etc. are causes of the body, also pray for the abandonment of sensual desire. It is, therefore, evident that the body is caused by sensual desire. The wise man gets released as a result of supreme knowledge (*prajñā*). Hence it is clear that one is caught into bondage through ignorance.

The Buddha says in several Sūtras that one gets released on account of destruction of delight-lust (*nandirāga*). For, the eye, and the visible, etc. are not bondages, but the delight-lust is the bondage, and as a result of its destruction one's mind gets well released. So released mind enters into Nirvāṇa. One secures release by means of conceptless and formless (*animitta-anākāra*) *Śūnyatā*. It is, therefore, clear that the body is caused by defilements. For, the gain of *Śūn*yatā is nothing but the vision of voidness of all elements (dharmas). On account of abandonment of concepts (*nimitta*) one does no more take vow for coming again in the worldly existence. Therefore *Śūnyatā*, voidness is termed channel of emancipation, *vimokṣa-mukha*. In case of its reverse, the bondage (ensues). Thus it has been demonstrated that body is governed by defilements.

IV

Nirodha-Satya Skandha

141. *Setting up of Nominalism* (*Prajñapti-Sthāpana*)

The *Śāstra* says: *Nirodh-Satya* is the cessation of threefold thought, viz., *Prajñapti-citta*, the notion of nominal things, the notion of elements and the notion of *Śūnyatā*, voidness. The first notion is ceased through knowledge caused by much learning or hearing (*bahuśruta*), or it is ceased through knowledge caused by *cintanā*, contemplation. The second notion is ceased through discerning *Śūnyatā* of the elements like *Ūṣmagata*, etc. The last notion is ceased on entering into *Nirodha-Samāpatti*, or at the time of complete destruction of *Santāna*, stream of elements by entering into the residueless Nirvāṇa.

Prajñapti is the constructive thought of *Puruṣa* that arises on the basis of the five aggregates, or of the pitcher on the basis of colour, taste, odour and touch, and of other things. They are regarded *prajñapti* on the authority of the Buddha's saying;

Just as the term chariot is used in a collection of some constituents

Just so is the talk of *sattva*, sentient being on the aggregates being present.

The Buddha again says: Things are impermanent, unrest, void and non-soul; they are originated dependently, of uncertain character, mere names, mere memory and utilization. On the basis of these five aggregates different names arise, viz., *sattva*, *manuṣya*, *deva*, etc. In this Sūtra the really existing dharma being negated, it is termed mere name.

The Buddha says: There are two truths: *Paramārtha-Satya* and *Saṃvṛti-Satya*. The first ultimate truth is what are

(the separate elements) *Rūpa*, etc. and Nirvāṇa. The second one, i. e. conventional truth is what is mere *prajñapti*, nominalism, e. g. conception of a pitcher on the basis of *rūpa*, colour, etc. and the conception of *puruṣa* on the basis of five aggregates.

Utility of conventional truth: The worldly men are given its advantage. When it is said that fire is painted, the people believe in it. The Buddhas talk in the conventional way in order to lead them to the goal. The Sūtra says: I do not quarrel with the world, but the world quarrels with me.

People in ancient days, wishing to utilize things established the name, pitcher, *ghaṭa*, when things were made. This is not useful for the good *dharma*. Therefore, it is termed *Loka-satya*, worldly-truth. One, preaching the double truth does not fall in eternalism or nihilism, nor falls in a wrong view, *mithyā-dṛṣṭi*. All the system of *karman* and its result, etc. are not contradicted. The worldly truth is the source of the Buddha's discipline. The result of the charity and good conduct is rebirth in a happy place. Controlling the people's mind by this mode of teaching, and making them to adopt the path and then at the end the Buddha preaches the Absolute Truth. Thus the dispensation of the Buddha is very like the ocean. One who is accomplished fully in the knowledge about the path becomes fit for receiving the teaching in the Absolute Truth. Example is Rāhula, etc. Thus controlling the mind through the worldly truth, one destroys it through the Absolute Truth. The Sūtra says: *Nirvāṇa* is to be understood by means of analysis of things. The ascetic examines first whether the elements are nominal or absolute and then sees *Nirodha-Satya* before his own eyes. Defilements are abandoned gradually in order of gross, subtle, etc. For example, the concept of female and male, etc. is abandoned through the concepts of the hair in the head and of the hair in the body, etc. which again are abandoned through the concept of *Śūnyatā*, voidness. It is comparable to a wedge expelling another wedge.

the world is eternal, non-eternal, with end or endless are all *dṛṣṭis*. The Sūtra says: Six bases of touch disappear and others exist—this is eternalism and to say: others do not exist—this is nihilism. The view that the soul acted in the past and will act in future is eternalism and the view reverse of the above is nihilism. Again the *Mithyā-dṛṣṭi-Sūtra* says: There are seven bodies for the person: the earth, water, fire, air, happiness, misery and the life. The dying person's four great elements return to their original places and the sense-organs return to ether. It is said: With the knife and *krakaca*, a sharp-edged wheel one may kill living beings and make a heap of flesh, but there is no sin therefrom. This is the nihilistic view. The *Brahmajāla-Sūtra* has described the characteristic of the nihilistic view. To say that there is the other world, and that the doer and the feeler are one and the same is termed eternalistic view.

These two wrong views arise thus: For what reason they say that Tathāgata exists after death, for that reason eternalism arises and for what reason they say that Tathāgata not exists after death, for that reason nihilism arises.

These views are abandoned thus: The person who cultivates rightly the contemplation on *Śūnyatā*, voidness does not have the soul-view and in the absence of the soul-view no wrong views of two extreme limits he has. So says the *Yamaka-Sūtra*: Tathāgata does not exist in each of the aggregates, nor does he exist in the combined aggregates, neither does he exist in any place other than the aggregates. Thus Tathāgata is non-perceivable even in this world. How could it be said that Arhan will disappear after death. It is therefore clear that Pudgala is not perceived. Since it is not perceived, the soul-view, eternalism and nihilism are all improper. Things are dependently brought out —the person meditating on this does not incur two extremities. So it is said: To the person who realizes the origin of the world the non-existence-view disappears and to the person who realizes the disappearance of the world the existence-view disappears.

To the person who walks in the middle-path the view of two extreme limits disappears. To the person who realizes dharmas arising in succession the nihilistic view disappears, and to the person who realizes dharmas as momentary the eternalistic view disappears. Again it is said: Tathāgata is not five aggregates; nor does he exist anywhere else than *skandha*. Therefore, it is understood that there is neither nihilism nor eternalism. Since he is perceived as different from the body he is not identical with the body, and since he is perceived together (with it) he is not different. Five aggregates continue in succession and therefore it is not possible to say that the living being is born and dies. They go on in succession; hence it is not possible to say that they are different (from one another) as the *Santāna* is considered as one. Since these aggregates and these aggregates are said to be different, eternalism is not there and since they go on in succession, nihilism also is not there.

132. *Perverted View (Mithyā-dṛṣṭi)*

When things are really existing: to raise the idea of their non-existence is the false or perverted view; e.g. to say that four noble truths and three jewels do not exist. It is said in the Sūtra: *Mithyā-dṛṣṭi* is: no charity, no sacrifice, no fire-offering, no fruit of good and bad actions, no this world, no other world, no mother, no father, no apparitional beings, no Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas who understanding and realizing this and other worlds, feel that our birth is stopped, the holy life is well lived, every duty has been finished and there is no more to return here. Charity (*datta*) is what is given for the benefit of others. Sacrifice (*iṣṭa*) is a Vedic performance aiming at gods. Offering (*huta*) is the ghee, etc. offered for gods. Good is the gain of the desirable fruits of three good actions. Bad is the gain of the undesirable fruits of three bad actions. The good and bad actions' fruit and retribution are the good fame and ill-fame in this world, and devine bodies, etc. in the other world. This world is the present one and the other world is the future one. The mother and father are

parents. Apparitional being is one who has gone to other world from this world. Arhan is one freed from intoxicants (*āsrava*). To say that all these do not exist is the perverted view. The idea that defilement and purification of living beings, knowledge-vision, non-knowledge-vision and all these are causeless and that there is no strength and no effort, and no their fruit, etc. are all perverted views. To state in brief : whichever is misconceived in mind is a perverted view, *mithyā-dṛṣṭi*. For example, the notion of permanence towards the impermanent, notion of happiness towards misery, the notion of purity towards the impurity, notion of soul towards the non-soul things, the notion of superiority towards the inferiority, the notion of no-purification towards the path of purification, and its reverse and the notion of existence towards the non-existent things, and others are the misconstructed minds. The five wrong views of the Ābhidharma and sixty-two views of the Brahmajāla-Sūtra are all perverted views.

The perverted view arises from the infatuation. It arises because of improper attachment to a non-cause and a fallacious cause. They say there is no misery because of their attachment to happiness, and because of their being fallen from the path of *Śūnyatā*. When they say that the empirical things are fortuitous or caused by Īśvara, etc. and not caused by the thirst; this amounts to the denial of *Samudaya-Satya*. When they say that there is no *Nirvāṇa* or it is of other kind, this amounts to the denial of Nirvāṇa. When they say that there is no path for Nirvāṇa or there is some other path for the release, this amounts to the denial of the path (truth). There is no Buddha, an omniscient; because they say that things are innumerable; how can one man understand all of them? Or they think that the Buddha is respectable by all persons; but there is no such respectable person; hence there is no Buddha. Since defilements are not suppressible, there is no Dharma. Since there is none who gains that dharma by means of right conduct, there exists no *Saṅgha*, Order. Since the charity has no immediate fruit, they say that there is no charity.

It is said in the Sūtra: There is no charity. The inference for it is inconclusive. A man delighted in giving charity becomes poor and the miser becomes rich. With this and other reasons they say that charity is not there. So also are the sacrifice and the fire-offering. What is offered in the fire is reduced to ashes; what fruit will be there out of it? If the *jiva* is permanent, then there will be no well-done and ill-done (*sukṛta-duṣkṛta*). If *jiva* is impermanent, there will be no other world. Hence there is no fruit out of the well-done and the ill-done. There is no this world, for things being examined minutely, return to non-existence. There is no other world; for, after death there will be no dependent origination. There are no mother and father; for they also, being divided into minute parts, disappear. They say that worms appear out of cow-dung. But the cow-dung is not parent of worms. The parts of our body, head, etc. are not the same as those of parents. Things being momentary what will the mother and father do? There is no apparitional being; for, in the absence of *sattva*, soul there is no this world. What is to speak of the apparitional being which may enjoy the future body.

The living being (*sattva*) known as *cetanā* may either be in the form of the body or non-body. If the first alternative, then this body being buried under the ground becomes earth or being offered in the fire is reduced to ashes, or being eaten up becomes impurities (*puriṣa*). Therefore there is no apparitional being. The second alternative may either be in form of the mind or other than the mind. If it is in the form of the mind, then it will be a mental state which is perishing and appearing every moment and not stable. How can it reach the other body? If it is other than the mind, then no 'I'-notion would be there. When there is no 'I'-notion towards the other than the mind, what is to speak of it towards the substitute of the mind? Therefore there is no apparitional being.

Arhan does not exist; for, he, being hungry, begs everybody for food, seeks heat in the cold, and cold in the heat. Being

will fall in the hells. The perplexity is an obstacle to the desire-freedom (*vairāgya*). The soul-view is the root-cause of the four. These are five (fetters). The sensual passion and malevolence do not exceed the desire-world. The soul-view does not exceed the soul-notion. The pursuit of mere rites and rituals does not surpass the lower demerits. The perplexity does not surpass the ordinary manhood. Again the first two do not go beyond the desire-world and three others are confined to the worldlings. Therefore they are called pertaining to lower region.

Five elements pertaining to higher region: distraction, pride, ignorance, *rūpa*-lust, *arūpa*-lust. The distraction being harmful to *dhyāna* and concentration, the mind does not get pacified. The pride arises on account of the distraction pursuing the concept-grasps. The mind grasping the concepts arises from ignorance and hence there are lust for *rūpa* (world) and the lust for *arūpa* (world). These five elements pertain to higher region as they are applicable to the mind of the learners (*śaikṣa*) and not of the ordinary men. The distraction is conspicuous in the form-and-formless-worlds as well in the desire-world, because in the higher worlds no gross defilement is operative. It is called fetter because it is capable of obstructing the concentration. When it is cut off one can realize the release. Some persons may entertain the sense of release towards the form-and-formless-worlds. In order to negate that notion it is said that there are fetters pertaining to higher region.

Five envies (*mātsarya*): Envies of (1) dwelling place, (2) family, (3) gain, (4) praise and (5) scripture. The first, *āvāsamātsarya*, is this: I alone should live here and none else. The second, *kulam* is: I alone should enter this family and none else. The third, *lābham* is: I alone should receive charity here and none else. The fourth, *varṇam* is: speak in praise of me alone and none else. The last *Dharma-mātsarya* is: I alone understand the Buddha's preaching constituted of twelve branches.

Their blemishes are: The dwelling places, etc. are common to many persons. But this ascetic having left his own family

raises envy at common dwellings. This is one defect. He does not partake of release; for, he does not give up even common things, what is to speak of his own five aggregates. He falls in the hells as he has disregarded good men. He becomes poor as he obstructed the charity to others. The ascetic, envious of the scripture falls from the noble *garbha* and destroys the Buddha's scripture and the path. The Sūtra is quoted mentioning five blemishes of each of the five envies.

Five mind's pegs (*khila*s): An ascetic doubts the teacher, his scripture, morality, and training, and becomes offended when one praises the Buddha and some other great holy men. Doubting the teacher (Buddha) he considers whether the Buddha is great or Pūraṇa, etc. are great. Doubting the scripture he considers whether the Buddha's teaching is good or the *vrata*, religious rites of the dog, cow, etc. are good. Doubting the practice he considers whether the breathing exercise leads to *Nirvāṇa* or not. One, becoming offended asperses the good people. One having the mind effected by these five elements does not hold fast to the various meritorious organs. Therefore they are called *khila*, pegs.

One doubts the Buddha because of his being unlearned, *abahuśruta*. A conversant in *śruta*s, scriptures does not doubt so. The ignorant does not distinguish the Buddha's teaching and the teaching of others; hence he doubts. He has no taste for dharma and hence he doubts it. He does not study even the Vedas, but simply hearing what is said by others thinks that they are superior. One having false doubts and polluted mind doubts the Buddha, e.g. *Sunakṣatra* who was an attendant of the Buddha. One doubts the Buddha because he is confused in his mind after studying the Vedas and *Vyākaraṇa*, grammer, etc. One doubts him because he is content with understanding the surfaced meaning of the Sūtras and is not capable to go deeper into the intention of the Sūtra-composer.

Five mind's *vinibandha*s, bonds: The person loving his body adheres to it. The person loving the sensual pleasures adheres

to them. From the association of the ordained person with the house-holder, his mind does not rejoice in the noble speech. Having obtained a small beneficial thing, he thinks himself as full. The four *vinibandhas* arise on the basis of sensual passion (*kāma-rāga*). The person who loves the internal body adheres to the external sensual pleasures, etc. Hence he wishes the combination of these two. He does not rejoice in the noble speech and the Dharma of pacification as he is influenced by desires. Therefore, having gained a small benefit in the good conduct, much learning (*bāhuśrutya*), *dhyāna* concentration and others, he thinks himself as fully accomplished; On account of this he forgets the higher benefit. The wise man will not do this. He secures a human body devoid of eight inopportune moments; hence he should make endeavour with one-painted mind. The ordinary manhood is not trustworthy. He might have dispelled all his adverse conditions; yet there may happen some other condition preventing him from entering into the holy path. If he does not wish a smaller benefit he will gain the retribution of ordination fruit. Thus while dying he does not repent. He succeeds in his own benefit as well as other's. He does not even adhere to the virtuous things, what is to speak of un-meritorious things? Therefore he is termed "of right conduct". The defects of one being worldling do not pollute him.

The worldling's disadvantages: A Sūtra is quoted enumerating about twenty such things.

Seven *anuśayas*, latent residues. They are so called because they constantly follow the living being like a nurse does the child. Nine more similes are cited here showing their constant relation with and their gradual increase in the sentient beings.

The residue is related to the mind (*citta-samprayukta*); for, lust etc. are characterized as latent residues, and related to joyfulness (*saumanasya* or *prīti*). This joyfulness being present in the pleasant feeling is termed *rāgānuśaya*. *Rāga* means attachment, *āsaṅga*. This characteristic would not exist in the mind's

dissociate dharma. Therefore they are *citta-samprayukta*, mind's associates.

Q. They are not mind's associates. The Sūtra says: Children have no mind for the sexual intercourse, what is to speak their capacity to do it? Nevertheless they are latently caught under the grip of lust-residue. Again the Sūtra says: (For children) there is no will (*cetanā*) and there is no constructive thought (*vikalpa*). But, however, there is *ālambana*, object situated in the consciousness. Another Sūtra says: At the destruction of the soul-view the residues are immediately destroyed. The Āryan path does not exist together with defilements. Therefore, the genesis of the Āryan path is the destroyer of the mind's dissociate residues. If it is not so, what will the Āryan path destroy? If there is no residue as the mind's dissociate, the ordinary men and the learner (*śaikṣa*) would be Arhan when they are in possession of the meritorious and indeterminate thought. *Anuśaya* is the cause of outburst of defilements, that is, the outburst flows from residue. It increases when it is stimulated by the outburst of the defilements. It is therefore clear that the residues are the mind's dissociate elements. When a person, even though he remains in the good and the indeterminate state of mind is said to be of residue, how can he become so in the opinion of one who does not accept the residue as mind's dissociate?

Now the author replies: This is not proper. Your contention that in the absence of lust there is the residue of lust in children is not correct. They have not abandoned their lust because they have no medicine to dispel it. A person haunted by a ghost, e.g. is said to be so even when the fit of the ghost haunting is not manifest, because it is not completely driven out by the application of charm and medicines. Or a patient suffering from the four days fever is said to be patient even when the fever is not felt manifestly. The poison of the rat being an incurable disease manifests itself at the cloud's thundering sound. Likewise the mind to which medicine is not applied for dispelling its residue, is said to be of unabandoned residue. The other Sūtra that there is no will, etc. is possible because their residue is not

completely removed. With regard to your argument that the soul-view is destroyed together with the residues (I may say that) your outburst (*paryavasthāna*) which is the mind's associate remains suppressed when it is not manifest. Similarly my residue remains suppressed in its unmanifestation stage. At the time of Āryan path a thing though non-existent, is said to be suppressed because it cannot be with its, contradictory element. The argument that the ordinary men would be Arhan is not sound. One is Arhan when he abandons his defilements. The ordinary men are not so. A person, e.g. who has not taken up the vow of not taking flesh is not spoken of as one who has given up flesh-eating even at the time of not eating flesh. The ordinary man has the ignorance, wrong recollection and wrong intention, etc. and therefore his defilements are not abandoned. But the Arhan has abandoned all of them and is not comparable with the worldling. Your contention that the residue that is stimulated by the outburst increases is not good. All the defilements increase by means of the superior, moderate and inferior dharmas, but not by the outburst. The fact that a person that remains in good and indeterminate state of mind is said to be of residue is also possible, because he has not abandoned it, and hence he is regarded as possessed of residue.

We can decide therefore that the residues, lust, etc. are the mind's associate. Eight wrong paths: wrong view and upto wrong concentration. The wrong livelihood which is not separate from corporeal and vocal actions is counted as a separate constituent of the path, because it is specially prescribed for the ascetics (*pravrajita*) and it is hardly abandonable. Wrong livelihood is that by which the five dharmas like deceit, etc. are nourished. To state in brief: an ascetic should not enter into king's service, or business enterprise or medical profesion etc. He should not receive wealth or property, etc. He should live by begging in accordance with the law. He should contemplate that to enter into the Buddha's dispensation is in order to practise it and not for livelihood. Therefore the person being interested in good dharmas should live a pure life.

137. *Nine Fetters* (*Saṁyojana*)

Nine fetters are thirst, etc. Amongst five *dṛṣṭis*, wrong views and two *parāmarśa*s are stated separately for the following reason. The pursuit of mere rites and rituals (*śīla-vrata-parāmarśa*) is difficult to abandon. It is comparable to a boat drowned in the ocean that is difficult to rescue. The person pursuing this considers: I alone shall ascend the heavens through the good conduct and I shall suffer all the sufferings: dipping in the water, walking into fire and falling from the mountain-peak. The worldly men do not notice the futility of this practice. Therefore the Buddha says it is a fetter. Trusting on the observance of this *parāmarśa* the man neglects the Āryan path of eight constituents. It is a bond of the ascetics whereas the sensual pleasures of house-holders. A man of mere rites and rituals, though observing different ascetic duties, does not obtain any benefit out of them. He loses happiness here and hereafter, e.g. a man of cow-behaviour, *go-vrata*. *Śīla-vrata* is a source of hopes for the heretics; they assume that they would excel others.

This practice is gross and understandable and noticed by all; the wisdom-path, on the other hand, is very subtle and hardly understandable. The worldly men do not understand the benefit of its practice. The pursuit of mere rites and rituals is termed *dṛṣṭi*, wrong view as it runs counter against the right-path.

Pursuit of wrong view is a force whereby one adheres oneself to a bad doctrine, and is unable to avoid it. Due to this other fetters get strengthened. In the Query of Śakra only two fetters, viz., envy and jealousy are stated by the Buddha, because these two are very mean and despicable. We see in the world the people having the envy and jealousy at the sight of other man gaining something from some donor. Due to this they fall in the midst of very poor, low and dull-lustred men. This fetter oppresses several times the mind of Śakra, lord of gods. Therefore the Buddha says that these two are the source of heavier sins.

Amongst three poisons lust and indignation cause the heavier sin. The above said two fetters are produced on account of the developed lust and indignation. The person who contemplates calmly on the meritorious thought would completely destroy these two fetters. They are abandoned by practising charity. When a person, e.g. noticing his own son who has gained some excellent object, becomes displeased, what is to speak of him at the sight of his enemy of such gain. These fetters are hardly abandonable for the reason that they operate in relation to beloved and hated events. This is the reason why the Buddha has stated only these fetters.

138. *Miscellaneous Queries*

The Śāstra says: All the defilements are in the majority brought under ten residues. They are: lust, indignation, pride, nescience, perplexity and five wrong views. Q. There are ten universally obscuring elements present in every unfavourable moment of consciousness. They are : un-belief, laziness, forgetfulness, *vikṣepa*, ignorance, *asamprajanya*, improper attention, wrong inclination, distraction (*auddhatya*) carelessness. These ten are associated with all the defiled thoughts (*kleśa-citta*). Is this view admissible? A. The theory of association (*Samprayoga*) has already been criticized. Every mental state arises one by one and not together. For in certain unfavourable mind there is a bad belief and in certain other there is no belief. Therefore, it is understood that those ten elements are not present in every defiled mind. The contention that the torpor and distraction (*auddhatya*) are present in every defiled mind is not good. When the mind is in the stage of dejection the torpor may be present at that time, but not it is present in the distracted mind.

In the world of desire all the ten defilements are present and so also in the form and the formless worlds. The fact that the envy, etc. are present in form-world is evident from the Sūtra according to which the great Brahmā addresses the Brahma-

kāyika gods: Do not approach the Recluse Gautama. Here itself we shall make an end to old age and death. This is envy. Due to envy there is also hate. It is said in the Sūtra: The great Brahmā, taking the ascetic Kevadha to a corner disclosed: I also do not understand where these four great elements disappear utterly. This is *māyā*, deceit. Again he says: I am creator, builder, and superior, etc. This is *pramāda*, inattentiveness. These loop-holes are also there. Therefore the unmeritorious minds are also present there.

Some Ābhidharmikas say: love that is directed towards the mother, father, *upādhyāya* and Ācārya is good love. The same for other things is bad love. When neither good nor bad is done to any one that is indeterminate love. The hate for bad dharma and ill-learned is good hate. Hate towards the good dharma and the sentient beings is bad hate and the same towards non-living things is indeterminate hate. Basing on one pride, destruction of another pride is good pride. Ill-respect for other living being is bad pride. Some such thing may be said in regard to ignorance, etc.

Again the Ābhidharmikas say: What is good is not *kleśa*. The soul-doctrine in the world of desire is said to be *avyākṛta*, indeterminate. If it is bad (*akuśala*) all the men who harbour the soul-doctrine would fall in the hells. But the fact is not so. Therefore it is *avyākṛta*. Is this admissible? A. The soul-doctrine is the root-cause of all defilements. A man telling others that there is the soul falls in the hells; so how can it be *avyākṛta*? Likewise the wrong view of two extremities is to be explained. To cause other person to fall into perplexity by preaching a perverse view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*) is not *akuśala*, for he only makes to fall into perplexity but not into the wrong view.

Q. Some masters say: The defilements of desire-world are causes of the stream the elements in the desire-worlds and those of the form and formless worlds are so of the streams of

elements in those worlds respectively. How is this? A. the thirst alone is such cause. So says the Sūtra: Genesis of misery is the thirst. The saying of the Sūtra that the birth is due to pride is to be explained that the thirst preceded by pride is the cause.

The method of abandonment: Lust, indignation, pride and nescience are to be abandoned by two: vision of truths and contemplation. Other six defilements are abandoned by the vision alone. The self-pride is not a *dṛṣṭi*. What determines *nimitta*, concept is *dṛṣṭi*. So the self-pride may be present in the man under training. Some masters say: Envy, jealousy, repentance and deceit, etc. are abandoned by the contemplation alone. But the author says: they are abandoned by the vision as well as the contemplation. This is evident from the following incidents. Nāthaputra, etc. watched the disciples of the Buddha gaining honours and entertained an envious mind. This envy does not appear in a man of the vision of the path. Certain person being previously jealous towards the disciples of the Buddha did not give them the charity; when he obtained a vision of the path he gave charity. Here jealousy is abandoned by the vision. The repentance of Sunakṣatra and others is abandoned by the vision. The deceit of the stream-winner that is causing the hells is abandoned by the vision.

The above-said six defilements (lust, etc.) are abandoned by the vision of four truths. Other four defilements are in five ways: All the defilements are in fact abandoned at the time of the vision of *Nirodha*. So the idea of soul-doctrine, etc. is abandoned not merely by the vision of *duhkha*. The wrong view of the soul runs through all the four truths and abandoned in four ways. So also the wrong view of extreme ends is abandoned in four ways. For the ascetic watching *duhkh* as produced from *samudaya*, (thirst) gives up nihilism and realizing *Nirodha* secured by the path gives up eternalism. The pursuit of mere rites and rituals is also abandoned in four ways.

When there is a cause its fruit is also experienced. So one, experiencing the misery discerns that *Śīla* is misery and the purification is not secured through this: this is what is abandonable by the vision of misery. He also discerns that *Śīla* is the cause of misery and through this no purification is obtained; this is what is abandoned by the vision of the misery-cause. Nirvāṇa is negated by the wrong view as the purification is obtained through the wrong view: this is what is abandoned by the vision of Nirodha, cessation. The path is negated by the wrong view: this is what is abandoned by the vision of the path. The pursuit of the wrong view is abandoned in four ways as it is supported by the wrong view. The similar will be the case with the pursuit of mere rites and rituals.

All the residues are suppressed by the progressive stages (*bhūmi*) and not in the order of worlds (*dhātu*). No end there is to the number of residues such as ninety-eight residues.

Q. Lust, pride and four views omitting the wrong view are associated with three faculties of feeling omitting misery- and sorrowfulness-faculties. Hatred is also associated with three faculties of feeling omitting happiness and joyfulness, nescience with five faculties, perverse view and perplexity are associated with four faculties omitting misery. Hate, hypocrisy (*mrakṣa*), sinful envy and jealousy are associated with the faculty of sorrowfulness. How is this? A. It is previously criticized that there is no *Samprayoga*, association. The point will also be stated subsequently that in five sensuous consciousnesses there is no any defiling element. In your system lust is associated with the faculty of joyfulness, but envy is not so; we do not find any criterion for this discrimination. Envy is a limb of the lust. Likewise there is no any reason for stating that pride is not associated with the faculty of sorrowfulness. Therefore all your sayings are merely some constructive thought recollecting your own concepts (*svasaṃjñānusmaraṇa-vikalpa-mātra*).

Some masters say: Some residues are abandonable by the vision of misery, viz. five perverse views, perplexity, lust,

aversion, pride and ignorance and some are abandonable by the vision of *samudaya*, origin, viz. wrong view, pursuit of the wrong view, perplexity, lust, aversion, pride and ignorance. These are *Sarvatraga*, ubiquitous residues and others are not so (*asarvatraga*). The author replies: all the defilements are *Sarvatragas*; for, they are all mutually conditioned. (See the text for explanation.)

All defiling elements are in the sixth consciousness, but not in the five sensuous consciousnesses; for, the sixth consciousness alone is pursuing concepts and all the defilements are brought about by concepts (*saṁjñā*). Not accepting so, the soul-view and others would be in the sensuous consciousness. For, when one sees with his eye, he says: I see the object. Likewise pride and perplexity, etc. are in the sixth consciousness. Q. The Sūtra says: There are six thirst-bodies (corresponding to six consciousness-bodies). How can it be stated that no defilements are in the sensuous consciousness?

A. Just as the six mind's co-farers, *mana-upavicāras* exist in non-sensuous consciousness, but because they are brought about by the eye, etc. they are said six, just so are the six thirst-bodies (as they brought about by eye, etc.). The cause (*i.e.* capacity, *śakti* in Śāntarakṣita's terminology) of the discursive thought exists in the non-sensuous consciousness, and not in the five-fold sensuous consciousness. It is therefore evident that defilements do not exist in the five sensuous consciousnesses.

139. *Abandonment of blemishes* (*Doṣa*)

Some masters say: Defilements are divided into nine: inferior, moderate and superior, and each dividing into three: inferior-inferior, inferior-moderate and inferior-superior, and so on. Likewise is knowledge also nine-fold. Amongst defilements, the superior-superior is first abandoned and the inferior-inferior at the end. The inferior-inferior knowledge causes to abandon the superior-superior defilement and the superior-superior

knowledge causes to abandon the inferior-inferior *kleśa*. But the author does not accept this scheme of abandonment. According to him defilements are abandoned through innumerable thoughts. So says the Buddha in a Śūtra :A carpenter, *e.g.* uses his axe, *paraśu* for several years, and in so using the handle of the axe becomes decayed, even if he did not notice its gradual decay everyday. When he noticed it then he understands that this is decayed. Likewise, the ascetic also practising the path does not notice what *āsrava*s are abandoned today, what were abandoned yesterday; nevertheless, he knows them abandoned when they were abandoned. It is, therefore, understood that they are abandoned by means of innumerable thoughts and not by nine or eight.

*Kleśa*s are abandoned with the support of seven *pratiśaraṇa*s. The Buddha says in a Sūtra: The abandonment of *āsrava*s with the support of the first dhyāna and upto *Ākiñcanyāyatana*. In the absence of these seven *pratiśaraṇa*s (i. e. first dhyāna, etc.) even one can abandon the *āsrava*s. So says the *Susīma Sūtra*: One secures the abandonment of *āsravas* even without seeking the support of seven bases (*niśraya*). It is clear, therefore, that they are abandoned even (without and) with the support of concentration pertaining to the world of desire.

Q. Defilements that are abandoned by the vision of truth are not abandoned with the help of the formless world-concentration; for there in the formless world exists no *rūpa*. A. This point has already been said that even the concentration in the formless world dependents on the *rūpa*, visible. The ascetic being freed from the desire towards first dhyāna takes up gradually the second and other dhyānas.

Since the defilements in the world of desire are ceased every moment, their abandonment is also gradual. For example, the gods of *Yama* world accomplish their sex desire by embra-

cing, the gods of *Tuṣita* world by touching the hand, the *Nirmāṇarata* gods by speech and *Paranirmita-vaśa-vartin* gods by seeing the female form. Likewise defilements of the desire-world are abandoned gradually.

Some masters say that these gods are born in such and such world as a result of their merits and not as a result of the abandonment of their defilements. Since the gods of *Yama* world are of the mild sense-organs they accomplish their sex by embracing and other gods having sharp sense-organs, do so by seeing the female form.

Some masters say: Defilements that are abandoned by contemplation are gradually abandoned; defilements of the desire world first and then those of the form-world. But the defilements that are to be abandoned by the vision of truths are simultaneously abandoned. How is this? A. All such defilements abandonable by vision of truths are abandoned by the vision of *Nirodha*: they are the soul-view, etc. The defilements that are abandonable originally by the contemplation on the five aggregates as impermanent etc. that is started from the *ūṣma*-stage are (finally) destroyed through the vision of *Nirodha*, cessation.

Q. (The ascetic) abandones the fetters of the desire-world through contemplation on the misery of the desire-world; so also through contemplation on its origin. Just as he abandons in the desire-world just so in the realm of *Naiva-saṁjñā-nāsaṁjñāyatana*. (But) he abandons the fetters pertaining to three realms of existence through contemplation on *Nirodha* of the desire-world. Is this True? A. The realizer of *Nirodha* abandons the defilements. So what you say is not correct. Q. The Sūtra says : The ascetic secures the fruit of the stream-winner, and up to that of Arhan by contemplating on the five aggregates as impermanent, etc. How do you say that he abandons the defilements by contemplation on the cessation-truth alone ? A. He, contemplating on these five aggregates discerns the contemplation leading to their cessation. Hence he abandons

the defiling residues. The Sūtra says: The ascetic contemplates: This is *rūpa*, this is the origin of *rūpa* and this is the cessation of *rūpa*. It is always said : The defilements are abandoned when one perceives and discerns the elements (dharma). It is understood that the extinction of defilements is through the vision of the cessation-truth. The five aggregates are misery and the defilements flow, therefrom. When one perceives the cessation, *nirvāṇa*, and putting out (*upaśama*) of the five aggregates, then the idea of misery is accomplished. Therefore it is evident that the defilements are extinguished by one who perceives the cessation of the aggregates. It says : On the basis of elements and relying upon one indifferent bodiless mind the abandonment is (secured). The cessation is the same as what is bodiless state. The ascetic who perceives *rūpa*, etc. as bodiless becomes the gainer of the ultimate separation (*visaṁyoga*). There are three channels of emancipation (*vimokṣa-mukha*) as factors of Nirvāṇa. With the help of those channels of emancipation alone the ascetic abandons the defilements. Thus we understand that the path relying on the un-manifest element (Nirvāṇa) as *ālambana* causes to abandon the defilements. Therefore the path of abandonment as stated by you is not reasonable.

The Śāstra says : The defilements are with innumerable discursive aspects (*vikalpa-mukha*); this is to be understood by the aspirants of the Release. For, one gets released by the strength of knowing the bondage of the defilements. One, e.g. being aware of his enemy present in a place avoids him,; or a man being aware of a dangerous road ahead avoids it. Likewise should one avoid the defilements. The defilement-bondage is very subtle and bound *Vemacitra*, a demon-king. The sentient being are bound by the defilements; it is so upto the top-most realm of existence. Thus one should understand their disadvantages.

The sentient beings upto the top-most realm of existence are fallen in the stream of to-and-fro wandering (*ājavañjava*) ;

for they do not notice disadvantages of the defilements. Since their fetters are not destroyed, their self-pride increases. Then their perverse thought (*vimati*) and repentance become inevitable. They should understand lest they may become victims of the defilements. They neglect the pure and ultimate happiness of Nirvāṇa and aspire on the other hand for a very trifling sensual pleasure and the pleasure of becoming. All this is the bad result of the defilements. When they abandon the defilements they obtain the great happiness. Therefore one should secure the knowledge-vision of the defilements. They are the elements hindering the Release. They are factors of the body; the body follows them. The misery pursues the body. Therefore a man aspiring for the separation from misery should endeavour to abandon the defilements.

140. *Causes of knowledge* (*Vidyā*)

Knowledge is (to know) that *kelśas* are the basic causes of the body. Some heretics do not believe in this and say that body is causeless like wild herbs and plants; some say things are created by Maheśvara, etc.; others say that they are born of time or nature; and still others say that they are made of the accumulation of atoms. This is the knowledge for them. The author says that it is already stated that the body arises from the action which is acted upon on account of defilements. Therefore they are the basic causes of the body.

The defilement is the cause of action; for, ignorance is the mind merged in *prajñapti*, nominalism. A man of *prajñapt*-mind accumulates actions. But Arhan does not do so. It is thus understood that actions come from the defilement. The Buddha says in a Sūtra : Does the man who has abandoned ignorance and secured knowledge commit any bad, good or indifferent actions ? No sir. There is no any undefiled, *an-āsrava* action. So it is clear that the person who pursues nominalism (*prajñapti*) does the action. The undefiled, *an-āsrava* mind does not rely on *prajñapti*, and hence does no action.

There is no any *caryā*, practice for the learner (*śaikṣa*). The Sūtra says: The learner does not practise what is to come and also what is past. The practice is charactrised as action. The undefiled mind is not characterised by *caryā*, pretice. Therefore there is no undefiled action. All actions are resulted from the defilements. A man of the abandoned defilements does not experience rebirth. It is therefore evident that the existing body is rooted in the defilements.

The author does not accept the view that the living beings are born free from defilements which arise subsequently like the tooth. But they are bore together with them. It is well-known that all sentient beings take birth in (the soil of) the privy chamber and not on the stone-slab. They take birth there because of their attachment for odour, taste, etc. They take birth in the hells on account of delusion. At the moment of death, they, watching the hell from the distance, think that it is a lake of lotus, and therefore they are born in the hells. A Sūtra is cited to the effect that the person takes birth amongst different creatures according to the kind of his intention at his dying moment.

Q. If the body is formed on account of defilement, *kleśas*, the body would not be there for the person of abandoned defiements (i. e. Arhan). A. This is not correct. The body has been formed by the previous defilements. Though the present ones are abandoned, the body continues to exist by the force of the previous defilements like the potter's wheel continuing to revolve even when his stick ceases to operate. New body is not formed due to (some other) previous defilement. Consciousness necessarily continues as a result of concept-grasping (*nimitta-graha*). The person, having abandoned the previous action cultivates *non-concept-emancipation* channel and takes the body no more ; just as the seed does not germinate in the scorched stone, just so does the seed of consciousness not germinate when the consciousness-stations (*vijñāna-sthiti*) are burnt by the fire of knowledge. The stream of elements is

cut off due to the lack of *saṁskāras*, formations and no more it arises. The Sūtra says: Consciousness is the seed, the actions, *saṁskāras* are the field; lust and thirst are the water; and nescience is manure. Through these factors future body is formed. Arhan has none of these factors and takes no more his body. So the experience of the body is due to defilements. The stream-winner, though having the knowledge of *duḥkha* does not experience it at his rebirth-time. But Arhan's knowledge (of *duḥkha*) is very strong and his defilements do not prolong their forces. At the time of death the experience of new birth is suppressed. This is the difference between Arhan and the stream-winner.

Your contention that defilements arise subsequently like tooth is not proper; for, Arhan having burnt his defilements by his undefiled wisdom does not take rebirth like the burnt seed. That the body is born of defilement is known to all; the bodily complexion, e. g. gets modified as a result of sensual passion. It is also so as a result of hate. It is, therefore, clear that the five aggregates in future will also be born of the defilements.

Q. The food is also experienced as the cause of five aggregates, why do you say that the defilement alone is the cause of the body? A. The food is producer of *Rūpa*, etc., through *citta-prajñapti*, mind's conception, but the defilement is producer not through mind's conception. This fact can be demonstrated in the animal world (*Cp.* ch. 110, etc.). Birds like cataka, etc. filled with sexual passion, serpent, etc. with hate and pig, etc. with dulness. These creatures, therefore, have developed such habits for long since. This point has been explained in detail.

Q. If the body is caused by the defilement, then the life will be liable to no change in the world. One falls in the unhappy life due to his defilement. He, developing the defilement much more would get no release. Or if one being born in a happy life would not fall in unhappy life. Thus there would be no varied pattern of revolving in the worldly life. A. One, even though he is in unhappy life, may sometimes arouse a meritorious

thought likewise though one is born in a happy life, he may arouse a sinful thought. This is the reason why they change their place of birth. Their lust and other defilements being meagre they take their rebirth in a good place. When the defilements are many, they are reborn in an unhappy place, e. g. pig, etc. Giving charity, etc. one is reborn in any one of *kāma* gods. Abandoning lust for adultery one obtains happiness of a distinguished *dhyāna*. Abandoning passion for beauty one obtains happiness of a distinguished concentration. At the destruction of all fetters happiness of Nirvāṇa is secured. So the body is due to defilements.

We actually see people dwelling together with bad men and living miserably. It is clear that to be in the world is the result from attachment. For example, moths (*śalabha*) due to their greediness for lustre of colour (*rūpa*) are burnt by the fire. This attachment is due to ignorance; for they do not know the misery of the fiery touch. Therefore they fall into the fire. Likewise the living beings being entangled in the misery of rebirth take birth on account of sensual craving caused by ignorance. Fish, e. g. swallowing a bait and dear attracted by the sound all die finally. All this is due to defilement. Just as the root of the tree being not pulled out, germinates again and again,just so the root of lust not being pulled out the tree of misery constantly grows. The same idea is expressed by the Buddha in a stanza.

The idea that the body is due to *kleśa* is explained by several illustarations and quotations.

Twelve links of causation is governed by *avidyā*. It is the mind pursuing the *prajñapti*, nominalism. Due to this three-fold *karma* follows : good, *puṇya*, bad, *apuṇya*, and indifferent, *āneñjya*. What is favoured by *kāma*, desire is *puṇya*. What is oppressed by misery, *duḥkha* is *apuṇya*. What is brought under loving heart, compassion and others is *āneñjya*. Consciousness pursuing the actions sticks to rebirth. On the basis of consciousness arise *nāma-rūpa*, six bases, touch and feeling. These

four links are resultant of the previous action. On the basis of this feeling arise thirst, clinging and becoming. These links, action and defilement cause rebirth, old age and death in future. Thus the stream of becoming constituted of twelve links is rooted in nescience, *avidyā*. The worldly existence is beginningless. For, the Sūtra says: Action-conditioned are the senses, eye, etc. The action is caused by thirst; the latter caused by nescience, the latter by incorrect thinking, and the latter again caused by the eye and conditioned by the visible and evolved from the infatuation. It is thus evident that the worldly existence is beginningless. This beginninglessness will not be possible for one who pleads for Īśvara, etc. as ultimate cause. Release is experienced at the utter cessation of defilements. Bodies of the creatures are various and manifold. This various character of the creatures will be impossible in the case of causality by Īśvara, etc. Since the defilements and actions are manifold the bodies of the creatures are various and manifold.

Amongst twenty-two organs, six senses cause six consciousnesses. There are two organs, female and male. The *jīvita*-organ is non-stop continuity of all these elements. It is the organ of action which is the root-cause of all defilement. They are based on the feeling. Therefore five feelings become organs. Thus the stream of elemental continuity (*saṁsāra*) is conditioned mutually. Their discontinuity rests on the five organs of the faith, etc. Thus, by means of twenty-two organs one goes away from and comes in the worldy existence.

One who seeks after the release cultivates the aggregates of good conduct, concentration, wisdom, emancipation and the knowledge-vision. These aggregates help to abandon the defilements. The wise man knowing their advantages resorts to them. Therefore the body is due to the defilements.

Defilements are gradually abandoned. Abandoning threefold fetter one obtains the fruit of stream-winner. Reducing

passions, etc. to a lesser degree one secures the fruit of once-returner. Abandoning the fetters of the desire-world one secures the fruit of the never-returner. This order is to be understood in the *dhyāna* and concentrations also. Destroying utterly all (fetters and defilements) one secures the fruit of the Arhan. Since the defilements are abandoned gradually the body is also abandoned gradually. This order of abandonment would not be possible if the body, etc. are caused by Īśvara, etc. Good men pray for the abandonment of *kleśa*s, lust, etc. It is understood that they suffer much fatigue and worry here and hearafter as a result of lust and other *kleśas*. Those who say that Īśvara, etc. are causes of the body, also pray for the abandonment of sensual desire. It is, therefore, evident that the body is caused by sensual desire. The wise man gets released as a result of supreme knowledge (*prajñā*). Hence it is clear that one is caught into bondage through ignorance.

The Buddha says in several Sūtras that one gets released on account of destruction of delight-lust (*nandirāga*). For, the eye, and the visible, etc. are not bondages, but the delight-lust is the bondage, and as a result of its destruction one's mind gets well released. So released mind enters into Nirvāṇa. One secures release by means of conceptless and formless (*animitta-anākāra*) *Śūnyatā*. It is, therefore, clear that the body is caused by defilements. For, the gain of *Śūn*yatā is nothing but the vision of voidness of all elements (dharmas). On account of abandonment of concepts (*nimitta*) one does no more take vow for coming again in the worldly existence. Therefore *Śūnyatā*, voidness is termed channel of emancipation, *vimokṣa-mukha*. In case of its reverse, the bondage (ensues). Thus it has been demonstrated that body is governed by defilements.

IV

Nirodha-Satya Skandha

141. *Setting up of Nominalism* (*Prajñapti-Sthāpana*)

The *Śāstra* says: *Nirodh-Satya* is the cessation of three-fold thought, viz., *Prajñapti-citta*, the notion of nominal things, the notion of elements and the notion of *Śūnyatā*, voidness. The first notion is ceased through knowledge caused by much learning or hearing (*bahuśruta*), or it is ceased through knowledge caused by *cintanā*, contemplation. The second notion is ceased through discerning *Śūnyatā* of the elements like *Ūṣmagata*, etc. The last notion is ceased on entering into *Nirodha-Samāpatti*, or at the time of complete destruction of *Santāna*, stream of elements by entering into the residueless Nirvāṇa.

Prajñapti is the constructive thought of *Puruṣa* that arises on the basis of the five aggregates, or of the pitcher on the basis of colour, taste, odour and touch, and of other things. They are regarded *prajñapti* on the authority of the Buddha's saying;

Just as the term chariot is used in a collection of some constituents

Just so is the talk of *sattva*, sentient being on the aggregates being present.

The Buddha again says: Things are impermanent, unrest, void and non-soul; they are originated dependently, of uncertain character, mere names, mere memory and utilization. On the basis of these five aggregates different names arise, viz., *sattva*, *manuṣya*, *deva*, etc. In this Sūtra the really existing dharma being negated, it is termed mere name.

The Buddha says: There are two truths: *Paramārtha-Satya* and *Saṃvṛti-Satya*. The first ultimate truth is what are

(the separate elements) *Rūpa*, etc. and Nirvāṇa. The second one, i. e. conventional truth is what is mere *prajñapti*, nominalism, e. g. conception of a pitcher on the basis of *rūpa*, colour, etc. and the conception of *puruṣa* on the basis of five aggregates.

Utility of conventional truth: The worldly men are given its advantage. When it is said that fire is painted, the people believe in it. The Buddhas talk in the conventional way in order to lead them to the goal. The Sūtra says: I do not quarrel with the world, but the world quarrels with me.

People in ancient days, wishing to utilize things established the name, pitcher, *ghaṭa*, when things were made. This is not useful for the good *dharma*. Therefore, it is termed *Loka-satya*, worldly-truth. One, preaching the double truth does not fall in eternalism or nihilism, nor falls in a wrong view, *mithyā-dṛṣṭi*. All the system of *karman* and its result, etc. are not contradicted. The worldly truth is the source of the Buddha's discipline. The result of the charity and good conduct is rebirth in a happy place. Controlling the people's mind by this mode of teaching, and making them to adopt the path and then at the end the Buddha preaches the Absolute Truth. Thus the dispensation of the Buddha is very like the ocean. One who is accomplished fully in the knowledge about the path becomes fit for receiving the teaching in the Absolute Truth. Example is Rāhula, etc. Thus controlling the mind through the worldly truth, one destroys it through the Absolute Truth. The Sūtra says: *Nirvāṇa* is to be understood by means of analysis of things. The ascetic examines first whether the elements are nominal or absolute and then sees *Nirodha-Satya* before his own eyes. Defilements are abandoned gradually in order of gross, subtle, etc. For example, the concept of female and male, etc. is abandoned through the concepts of the hair in the head and of the hair in the body, etc. which again are abandoned through the concept of *Śūnyatā*, voidness. It is comparable to a wedge expelling another wedge.

The middle path is accomplished through the worldly thruth. Five aggregates move in succession-this evolves no nihilism. They are momentary-this evolves no eternalism. Free from these two is the middle path. As per worldly truth, all the Buddha's teachings are true, viz. there is the soul and there is no soul; all these are synonyms. There is no fault to say that there is the soul in the worldly truth. There is no soul in the Absolute Truth-this is the real. The counter criticism is from the viewpoint of worldly truth and the reply (to the question) is from the viewpoint of Absolute Truth. The view that there is really soul is a great delusion. To say that it does not exist (empirically) is to fall in the darkness of delusion; for these two views are in the nature of *ens* and non-*ens*, evolving eternalism and nihilism. Due to this, one existing from the viewpoint of the extremity of *ens* falls into the extremity of non-*ens*. If one, not having the knowledge of *Śūnyatā*, says that there is no *sattva*, it is wrong view. If one having that knowledge says so, there is no fault. So says the Sūtra :

What do you understand by *Sattva*, it is within the view of Māra.

This is only a collection of pure manifest elements, and there is nothing like *Sattva*.

Two more verses are cited to the same effect.

The person who has not gained the true knowledge of *Śūnyatā*, harbours the notion of the soul. So, he, hearing that there is no soul, becomes frightened. The Buddha says that the worldling becomes frightened when he hears that the soul is void, and that it does nothing. He not gaining the knowledge of *Śūnyatā*, is afraid of *Nirvāṇa* because of his conviction that there is the soul. Then he incurs a wrong view. A man of *Śūnyatā*-knowledge, on the other hand, understands that there is no originally any coming (and going) and hence fearless. If a person, not understanding the *Śūnyatā*-truth harbours the view that

there exists nothing, he, on this account falls in a false view of Nihilism. A person, on the other hand, knowing that there is the soul from the worldly truth believes that there is *Karman* as well as its fruit; then contemplates that the manifest elements are impermanent, and characterized as birth and eath and then perceives before his eyes their cessation. His sense of desirable subsides in the absence of soul-notion. If he says that there exists nothing, he incures no folly.

Some heretics blame the Recluse Gautama that he criticizes the soul absolutely. Therefore the Buddha says: I declare from the view-point of the worldly truth that the soul exists. I declare it right view, that the sentient beings are running and transmigrating. The worlding wrongfully thinks as substantial what (Buddha) states as non-substantial (*nissatva*). This statement is a criticism of that wrong thinking (*mithyā-manaskāra*), but not about the *sattva*, soul (i.e. substance). The pitcher, etc. are spoken of in *Prajñapti*, nominalism. The visible, *rūpa*, etc. are not the same as *ghaṭa*, pitcher. Nor is it other than colour, etc. Likewise, are the aggregates, *rūpa*, etc. not the same as *sattva*. Nor is it different from the aggregates. Taking into account the colour, *rūpa*, etc. the ascetic surpasses *prajñapti*, nominalism (pitcher, etc.). Likewise, does he surpasse the colour, etc. by means of *nirodha-lakṣaṇa* (Nirvāṇa). The sense is amplified by an example : Just as a painted lamp, though spoken of as such, does not discharge the lamp's function; just so is the pitcher not substantially existing though it is stated as such. The five aggregates though spoken of as such are not real things.

142. *Characteristics of nominalism (Prajñapti-Lakṣaṇa)*

Empirical things like pitcher, etc. are nominally existing but not substantially. For, (i) in the world of nominalism concepts come into play but not in the world of absolute ; people, e.g. say this colour is the colour of the pitcher, but do not say it is the colour's colour. Nor can it be said as the feeling's colour.

(2) they say that lamp shines on account of association with colour, and burns on account of the association of the touch. The absolute thing is not so; for, the sensuous consciousness cognizes not on account of other's association. (The feeling is not on account of other's association.) Therefore this association (*sahabhāva*) is nominally existing. (3) Nominal thing is achieved depending on the other thing ; e. g. *ghaṭa* is depending on the colour, etc. (*rūpādi*). The absolute thing is not so, e. g. feeling. (4) The nominal thing discharges different functions, lamp, e. g. illumines as well as burns. The feeling, e. g. feels and does not cognize. (5) The term, cheriot is employed in an assemblage of the wheel, etc. but the term, *rūpa*, etc. is not employed in any such object (*padārtha*). The constituents of chariot are factors of chariot and the term chariot is not there. Thus the character of chariot is nomial. (6) *Rūpa*, etc. that are spoken of by the term *Rūpa*, etc. are found but the pitcher, etc. spoken of by the term, pitcher, etc. are not found. Therefore, the pitcher, etc. are nominal. (7) In respect of *prajñapti*, the mind wavers ; e. g. a man seeing the horse says: I see the horse. Another man says : I see the body of the horse; still another says: I see the skin. One man says: I hear the sound of lute, another says : I smell fragrance of the flower. One man says : I drink the wine; another says : I drink the taste of wine. One man says : I touch the man; another : I touch the hand of a man; still another; I touch the finger of a man. Likewise, non-sensuous consciousness wavers in regard to *sattva*, etc. whether the body is the *sattva* or the mind is so and also in regard to a pitcher whether the visible, etc. are the pitcher or it is other than the visible, etc. The mind does not waver in regard to the absolute thing. One can say : I see the visible, but he cannot say: I hear the visible. (8) Amongst the knowable objects what is unspeakable is accepted as existing. What is speakable is nominal, e. g. pitcher, etc. Therefore pitcher, etc. are nominal. The visible, etc. are inexpressible amongst the knowable; hence they are unspeak-

able. They are speakable in their own characteristics; but are not so the pitcher, etc. Therefore these are nominal. (9) Some masters think that *prajñapti* has *sva-lakṣaṇa*, but the fact is otherwise. The Sūtra says: The action is the characteristic of the learned as well as the unlearned. The person who does good action is the learned and the person who does bad action is unlearned. The action of the body and speech depends on the four great elements and that of the mind depends on the mind. So how can these three actions be characteristics of the learned and the unlearned. Therefore *prajñapti* has nothing of its own characteristics. (10) The characteristics of *prajñapti* are not uniform. The Sūtra characterizes *rūpa* as *rūpyate* and *vedanā* as *vedayati*. The characteristic of *vedanā* means the man. So says the Buddha : The learned and unlearned both feel happiness and misery, but the learned does not arouse pleasure in happiness and aversion in misery. Grasping the concepts of many, etc. is the characteristic of *Saññā* meaning the man, e.g. one says : I see the lustre and I see the visible. Characteristics of *saṁskāra* (*saṁskaroti*) and *vijñāna* (*vijānāti*) also mean the man. The Sūtra says : This *pudgala* commits good, bad and indifferent acts. It says again: The learned quickly cognizes dharma as the tongue does the taste of the soup. These different characteristics occuring in other than their own places are *prajñapti*-characteristics. But the self-characteristic is not found elsewhere, *nor* does it vary. (11) What element, dharma is causing the defilement to all is nominally existing. The absolute dharma does not cause defilement. The defilements are makers of the man. (12) The genesis of knowledge is not in *prajñapti* (thing), but it is in the real visible, etc. that are present before our eyes. Next moment the false mind constructs : I see the pitcher. Its cognition necessarily depends on the visible, etc. for the talk of the pitcher is made taking account of the colour, odour, taste, and touch. Cognition of the absolute dharma does not depend on any other thing. (13) In *prajñapti* the doubt arises whether it is a pillar or a man. But in the case of visible, etc. no doubt arises whether it is colour, or it is sound. The doubt may arise

e.g. *Śilāpuruṣa's* hand and foot. They are not separate from Śilāpuruṣa. Likewise there may not be the earth separate from the colour, etc. Nevertheless what harm will be there in saying that it is expressed by its own form? A. To say that the earth is expressed by *rūpa*, etc. is not proper. For, the example of Śilā-puruṣā's hand indicates that there is Śilāpuruṣā's body other than the hand, etc. Even in the case of Śūnyatā the expression " it exists " is employed there just like *Śilāpuruṣa's* body. This indicates *Śilāpuruṣa* itself and not anything separate. The Buddha, e.g. says: In this body there are hairs, blood, and flesh, etc. There is no body other than the hairs, etc. Though the body is non-existent apart from the hairs, etc. It is, neverthless, expressed as existing and as the base of the hairs, etc. It is, therefore, evident that the expression of *Śilā-puruṣa* as exiting is a false one. You may plead for the earth with the example of Śilā-puruṣa; nevertheless, the earth is not there. Your Sūtra says: the earth is possessed of the colour, taste, odour and touch. But the earth itself is not there like the body. Therefore it is understood that there are only colour, taste, odour and touch and not this earth separate. No definition can be given to qualities as the colour is not possessed of odour, etc. though one may say that the earth is possessed of them (qualities). Therefore, they are not identical with earth. The idea of colour and the idea of the earth are different. Therefore, the colour, etc. are not the earth. Their nomenclatures are also different. If the idea of difference is possible on account of conjunction with their nomenclature, then the conjunction would be mere a nomenclature. Thus the earth exists merely in the name; hence there will be no doctrine of identity.

The earth is cognizable by all sense-organs. The man says: I see the earth, I smell it, I taste it, I touch it. If the colour, etc. are the earth, the earth-idea: " I see the earth ", will not be in the colour alone. The empirical idea is expressed in its cause, single part; e.g. when one cuts a branch of the tree, he says: I cut the tree, I cut the forest. The substance (*dravya*) is the

border of the qualities and is different. Therefore, if there is anything as the cause, the doctrine of identity will not thereby be established.

The Sāṅkhyas say: Five qualities are the earth. It is not correct; for, it is stated before that the sound is separate from the colour, etc. and it is momentary and continues in succession, and not the central factor of four great elements. It is, therefore, clear that all the elementary things are not in possession of the sound.

144. *Criticism of Diversity*

The defect in this doctrine is this: There is no earth apart from the colour, etc. because no idea of earth arises in their absence. It arises only on the basis of colour, etc. If it is separate from the colour, etc. its idea will arise even in their absence. The rise of the visible-idea does not depend on the visible-characteristics beacuse there is no visible-characteristic apart from the visible itself. This will be detailed later.

There is no any sense-organ cognizing the earth, etc. as separate elements. Q. They are cognized by the eye and touch-organ. A. They can then be cognized through four sense-organs; for, nose can smell the mud and the tongue can taste it. Q. The nose and tongue cannot discriminate in the dark whether the pot is smelt or its piece, and whether the pot is tasted or its piece. A. They do not discriminate so, nevertheless, there arises the cognition in regard to mud through the nose smelling it and through the tongue tasting it. Again, if the pot is buried with its neck alone above the ground, then, seeing and touching it one cannot discriminate whether it is a pot or its piece. Therefore the eye and body cannot cognize it. Nor do they discriminate it in the dark whether it is of gold or silver. The nose and the tongue cognize the flower, fruit, milk and wine, etc. but not so the eye and the body. The eye sees the flower but not discriminates its odour whether fragrant or otherwise and its taste whether

sweet or otherwise. Therefore your view that we cognize the substance (i.e. earth) through the eye and the tactile faculty but not through the nose and the tongue is not proper. Just as the nose and the tongue do not discriminate the substance (*dravya*) just so the eye and the tactile faculty do not discriminate it.

The five sense-organs have no capacity to cognize any empirical things. The sixth one has that capacity as the non-sensuous consciousness can have as its object all things. If the eye sees the colour as well as non-colour, i.e. the sound, etc. then other sense-organs, the ear, etc. would not be necessary. Your opinion that the pot is perceived through the colour, is not proper; for, the maker of its colour is only conjuction. If an invisible becomes visible through a visible thing then the colour will become invisible because the colour is experienced through the invisible pot, etc. The pot also will be two-fold: visible and invisible; the visible is meant for the purpose of perceiving the invisible. If because the colour is perceived the pot is cognized by the eye, then your definition of the colour as cognizable by the eye will not be achieved. For in your system the colour is perceived by the sense-organ with the support of colour (*rūpam upādāya*). This definition of colour is not at all a definition. Thus the characteristic of colour will be un-perceivable.

If, because the colour is perceived, the pot is visible, then all the sense-organs would cognize their basic substances. The ear would cognize the ether because it hears the sound. The sense of touch would cognize the air because the touch is felt by it. This is not proper in tour system. Your contention that the only colour is maker of perception and no other dharmas is not good; for there is no any proof to that effect. You have stated: the perception of the pot is possible because of the colour and because of the gross thing consisting of more than one substance. Thus the colour is perceived with the support of the

colour; through perception of the colour characteristic the colour is subsequently to be perceived. Therefore the colour alone is not the maker of perception.

The moment of the colour-perception and the moment of pot-perception are quite different, e.g. a man being acquainted with the dimension of the pot, even after losing his eye can recognize the pot through the touch. Therefore, no colour alone is the factor of perception. The blind understands the air with the help of the tactile-faculty. The definition that the air is of un-perceived sign (*liṅga*) is also not good. The blind even experiencing the air does not know whether it is visible or invisible. The men (according to you) sees number, dimension, etc. through the exp?rience of colour and there is no colour experienced in number, etc.

Q. If the experience of the colour is not the cause of perception, number and dimension, etc. would be invisible and the air visible. A. In our system, apart from the colour there is no any visible thing. Therefore, according to our system, the eye sees where the colour is present. The idea of pot arises only to the person that has seen the colour with his eye. Where the colour is not present, there the person even in possession of the eye does not arouse the idea of the pot. Therefore it is illogical that there is the pot apart from the colour, etc.

145. *Criticism of Un-speakability*

The defect in this opinion: The absolute thing is not unspeakable as indentical or different. For, no reason and example are there to prove it. Elements, colour, etc. are absolute and hence not un-speakable. Elements are each self-characterized (*sva-lakṣaṇa*). Due to distinction in consciousness elements are distinct; e.g. visual consciousness cognizes the colour and not the sound, etc. The colour is brought under *Rūpā-yatana*, colour-base, and not under the sound, etc. It is sp?akable; this is *rūpa*, etc. Things are in order and are num-

bered. If they are unspeakable, they would be numberless; for there will be no distinction in the nature of things as: this is first, and this is second, etc. Therefore, it is understandable that things are not absolutely unspeakable. Since identity and diversity are expressed in respect of empirical things alone the unspeakable is also spoken of (in *prajñapti*).

146. *Criticism of Non-entity*

The defect in this doctrine: If every thing is *abhāva*, non-entity, all things: merit, demerit, release, will be non-existent. If one opines the existence as non-existence, this opinion itself will be non-existent, as there is no speaker or hearer. The opinions of existence and non-existence are expressed through faith either in perception or in the inference or in the scripture. To state that there is nothing does not come under any one of the above three categories. The intention of the Sūtras is hardly understandable. Sometimes the Sūtra says: things exist and sometimes it says they do not exist. The inference cannot be trusted as it arises through the perceptive knowledge. The pot, etc. are perceived by us and are productive of our knowledge. What is productive of knowledge is an entity and not a non-entity.

The pot and all things are perceived as of distinct characters. Your opinion is that they are of distinct character owing to a perverse conception. Why do you not discriminate among the sky the pot, etc.? You think that the idea of things arises as a result of delusion. If everything is non-existence, your delusion also will be non-existence. How will one act? If you think that all things are non-existence, this knowledge arises on what bases? No knowledge arises due to a non-entity. That which knows things is the knowledge. This knowledge cannot be said as non-entity. If things are in the nature of absolute non-existence, then people would do anything they like. But the wise men are interested in charity, and other good conduct, and refrain from the sinful acts. The pot, etc. are cognized by the perceptive faculty, but you think that every perceived thing is non-entity.

None will have the faith in the Sūtras as they teach the non-existent things. By what proof do you then say so? If you do not set up any sound argument, the opinion accepted by the opponent will naturally become proved. The opponent's opinion being proved, your dharma will perish. A thing that is proved by the cause is not considered to be a non-entity.

147. *Establishing the Non-existence*

The advocate of the non-existence pleads: Though you criticize *Śūnyatā*, by your speech, things are nevertheless absolutely non-existence, because the sense-faculties cannot experience them. There is no a cognizable *avayavin*, a separate whole found amongst things. Therefore they are not cognized and hence non-existence. The opinion that the parts (*avayava*) are then cognized is not good; for, only the gross pot, etc. are cognized but not parts. No parts make the whole; for, the parts are conceived on the score of the whole. When the latter is non-existent the former is also non-existent. The substance and qualities being not accepted the parts are not obtainable. The person who perceives the subtle parts will have only the idea of parts but not that of the whole, i. e. pot. To the person who recollects the parts constantly, the idea of the pot would not at all arise. If you say that the idea of the pot arises after the part-idea, then the idea of pot would arise slowly. But in fact it does not arise slowly. Hence no parts are recollected. Looking at the pot not to make any constructive idea of parts that is the idea of the pot.

All the parts being analyzed again and again are reduced to atoms which again being broken become non-existent. All things culminate necessarily in the idea of *Śūnyatā*. Therefore parts are in the nature of non-existence from the absolute view-point. For the advocate of the mere parts, the past, future, vision, abandonment and such actions will not be accomplished. Thus the system of double truth venishes. Therefore the opinion of mere parts as existing does not lead to the double truth.

The thing which is worthy of discord is non-existent. The whole is discorded taking into account its parts and their parts are discorded taking into account the letter's parts. Therefore, this doctrine of parts becomes non-existent. The colour, etc. are also non-existent for, no eye can see the subtle colour, nor does the non-sensuous consciousness cognize the the present colour. Therefore, the colour is not cognizable. The visual consciousness does not conceive; this is colour, and the non-sensuous consciousness rests on the past but not on the present colour. Therefore there is nothing to conceive colour, and for this reason the colour is not cognizable.

Q. The visual consciousness first grasps the colour and then the non-sensuous consciousness recollects it. So it is the conceiver of the colour. A. The visual consciousness seeing the colour disappears and then the non-sensuous consciousness appears. It does not see the colour. How can it recollect without seeing the colour ? If it recollects without seeing, the blind also would recollect it. You may say that the non-sensuous consciousness arises from the visual consciousness and hence recollects it. This is also not possible; for, in that case all consciousnesses of the last moment that have arisen from the visual consciousness would recollect and never forget it as the former has arisen from latter. Therefore the non-sensuous consciousness does not recollect the colour. All things are non-existent and falsely grasped.

Then the point that the colour is in fact invisible is discussed in detail on the argument that the eye does not see it either coming into contact with it or otherwise, etc.

If the eye consists of four great elements and sees the colour, the ear, etc. also will see because they are similar in consisting of four great elements. Likewise, the *rūpa*, visible also would see. The question is asked whether the visual consciousness is together with a base or without it. Both alternatives are defective.

When it is situated in the eye, then it is together with the base. If a thing is without the base, then the fact that it is situated in something is not achieved. If you think that consciousness arisen in a small part of the eye, or in the entire eye or simultaneously in both eyes, then it becomes together with the base. In case it is with the base, it becomes in possession of parts. Thus with the help of many consciousnesses one (whole) consciousness is accomplished. This is one defect. There is another defect, viz. several consciousnesses being simultaneous each consciousness-part does not cognize, but the whole cognizes it. In fact, there is no a separate whole (consciousness); this is still another defect. If it is without the base then it will not be situated in the eye.

148. *Criticism of the Sound*

The advocate of the non-existence continues : There is no idea of unity in the word, for the mind as well as the sound i. e. word are momentary. When they say, '*puruṣa*', the unity (of one word) is inaudible. Consciousness hears *pu* and then disappears; it does not hear *ru*. Hearing 'ru' it disappears and does not hear '*ṣa*'. Thus there is no single consciousness hearing three letters. Therefore the word is inaudible. A man of distracted mind hears the word but a man of concentrated mind does not hear it. Therefore the word is not audible. It is audible neither coming into contact with the ear not otherwise. Both alternatives are defective.

Some masters say: The ear is in the nature of ether. Since the ether is in the nature of non-existence of things, it is termed *ākāśa*. Hence there does not exist the ear. Because of no ear, the sound also is not there. The sound does not exist because there is no cause of it. Its cause is the contact, *saṁśleṣa* of the great elements. This contact is not experienced; for, things of different nature do not mingle together. Things that have no different nature, how can they mingle of their own accord. They are momentary even when they are situated in one place. Therefore the contact is not experienced.

149. *Criticism of Odour, Taste and Touch*

The odour is not cognized. No olfactory consciousness conceives: This is *campaka*'s odour, and this odour is different. The non-sensuous consciousness also does not smell it; hence it does not conceive of it. If you say that though it does not conceive of it, it nevertheless grasps it, this is not correct; for, a man, e. g. without seeing the tree of *campaka* may arouse through delusion a notion of *campaka* tree; likewise, without the odour he may arouse through delusion a notion of the odour. As stated before the odour is grasped neither coming into contact with the nose nor otherwise. Both alternatives are defective. Therefore, there exists no odour. Likewise the taste also does not exist. The touch also does not exist; for, the knowledge of touch does not arise from subtle parts of things.

150. *Criticism of Non-sensuous Consciousness*

The non-sensuous consciousness does not grasp dharmas; for it does not grasp the colour, taste, odour and touch in the present moment. What is past and what is future do not exist; this is already stated (chs. 20-23). If you say that it cognizes its self, no nay dharma can cognize its self. No self-cognition is possible in the present moment. The sword's edge does not cut its self. The past and future things are non-existent and therefore there is no any other mind (to cognize it). Hence the non-sensuous consciousness does not cognize its self.

Q. If any body knows the other's mind, then the non-sensuous consciousness also will cognize the mental states. A. When, e.g. one's mind does not know its self, even then a thought arises in him: my mind knows its self. The same thing is to be said in the case of knowing other's mind (that is to say even without knowing other's mind one thinks that he knows it). A future thing, though it is non-existent, is also regarded as a causal factor of the knowledge; other's mind may also be likewise. What harm is there? The opinion that the mind is relied on

dharmas is faulty in several respects. For example, the mind relies on consciousess either coming into contact with it or otherwise; (both these alternatives have been criticized). The mind will not recollect the colour, etc. In the presence of these defects (it is proved that) the non-sensuous consciousness does not cognize dharamas.

151. *Criticism of the Cause and Its Fruit*

The advocate of the non-existence aruges: The fruit being accepted, it should either be latently existent already in its cause or non-existent in its cause ; both these alternatives are faulty. For example, the sound that is previously non-existent is produced from the two hands ; the curds previously non-existent in their cause are formed. Therefore the quality (*guṇa*) that is previously existent in the cause does not produce it.

If it is your view that the non-existent quality produces the fruit, then a small particle of the air (*vāyu*) that is devoid of colour would produce the colour, and then the air will be possessed of the colour. It is our experience in the world that the white yarn produces the white gearments and the black yarn produces the black garments. Therefore the previously non-existent quality does not produce the fruit.

Since these two illustrations are faulty, the fruit is not proved. If you accept *satkārya*, the fruit that is already existent, would not appear again. If it is non-existent, it would never appear because of its non-existence. The criticism of *satkārya* and *asatkārya* is very minutely elaborated.

The cause may be either before the fruit, or after it or simultaneous with it. If the first alternative is pleaded, when the cause disappears how will the fruit appear ? If the second is alternative, the cause being non-produced by itself, how can it produce the fruit? In the last alternative it is not logical to say that one is the cause and the other fruit; e. g. two horns

appearing at the same time are not regarded as mutually caused. Thus all these three conclusions are wrong and hence no fruit exists.

If you say that the cause and the fruit are either one or different, both are wrong. If they are different, the garments may appear without the threads. If they are one, the garments and the threads will not be distinguished.

The accepted fruit may be created either by the self, by the other, by both or not by any cause. All these are wrong: for nothing is known as self-made. It is not done by the other; for the eye and the colour do not discharge any function in respect of the consciousness-production. Since none of the elements has any idea of agent (*kartṛ-Sañjñā*) they are agentless. For example, the seed does not think: I produce the sprout. The eye and the colour also do not think: we both produce the consciousness. Therefore, all dharmas are devoid of the agent-idea. The alternative that it is done by both is not correct. It would evolve the defects said in both cases. The last alternative, i.e. the fruit is done not by any cause is also not proper. In the absence of the cause the fruit is said to be non-existent. If the fruit is not accounted in the said four ways, how can it be proved as existing ?

The fruit may be either preceded by the mind of function (*kriyā-citta*) or not preceded so. In the first case, who makes in embrio, the child's limbs, the eye, etc. as possessed of the mind? No Īśvara, etc. do that. The previously done action has also not the functional mind. The action is past, how can it have the mind ? In the second case how does one inflict the suffering to others and get it in return ? When the action is intended at the moment, the mind constructs : This is thiswise to be done and not thatwise. If there is not functional mind, how will that discrimination be possible ? Thus the said two alternatives are not appropriate. Therefore all things that are believed as cognized by senses are not traced in our experience.

152. *Empirical Truth*

The author now replies : The statement that you have made on different arguments that all things are void is not appropriate. I have previously remarked that if everything is non-existence, this Śāstra will also be a non-existence, etc. Your argument that there is no sense-organ and no causal factor has been replied by us. The Buddha himself prohibits in a Sūtra this, viz. there are five things unthinkable. They are : *Lokavastu*, *Sattvavastu*, *Karmapratyayatā-vastu*, *dhyānaniṣṭhā-vastu* and *Tathāgata-vastu*. The ordinary person cannot determine their nature by his guess. Tathāgatas alone are adept in the analytical knowledge of elements, dharmas. The disciples and *Pratyeka Buddhas* have understood deeper the knowledge (leading to) Nirvāṇa and have gained a partial analytical knowledge of things. Tathāgatas, on the other hand, are capable to penetrate into the original non-substantiality of all things in all aspects and their characteristics both unique and general. Concepts of *puruṣa, ālaya* are liable to destruction and hardly conceivable. Likewise *Śūnyatā*-knowledge is easy, but the analytical knowledge is hardly obtainable.

Though the Buddha has preached all things, dharmas, he has not preached them in all aspects (*sarvākāra*) because that preaching is not conducive to the release. For example, the Buddha has preached in general that all thindgs are originated dependently but he has not stated what the cause is for each thing. He preaches what is needed for destruction of the misery. There are several things like multi-coloured pictures, music, dance, etc. colour, taste, odour, touch and other innumerable particles, but they are not worthy of preaching. Therefore the Buddha does not preach them. His non-preaching does not imply that they are non-existent. Just as a man being ignorant of painting picture, etc. says that such thing does not exist, just so you having not proved any thing say that this thing does not exist. It exists when one knows it, and it does not

exist when one does not know it. A born-blind e. g. says that there is no black or white as he has not seen it. It is not proper to say that colours are not there because they are not seen by the blind. If so, one can say that all things do not exist because they are dependently originated.

We must trust Tathāgatas are omniscient. Tathāgata says: There are aggregates. Therefore, we understand that all things, *rūpa*, etc. exist just as the pot, etc. exist empirically.

153. *Cessation of Dharma-idea*

You have previously stated that *Nirodha-Satya* is the cessation of three-fold mind (or idea). The cessation of conceptualism (*prajñapti*) known as the relation of cause-and-condition-fruits is understood. What is *dharma*-idea and how is it ceased? The idea of five aggregates as really existing is *dharma*-idea. When the ascetic contemplates well on five aggregates as void, he secured the cessation of that idea. Q. The ascetic sees five aggregates as void this-wise: there is no any permanent thing, stable thing, indestructible thing, un-modifying thing, like the soul or anything pertaining to the soul. Since there is no such thing in them, the aggregates are termed void. It is not that the ascetic does not see them at all. A. The ascetic does not see them at all. For, he, having given up the mind that rests on the manifest things, secures the mind that rests on the un-manifest thing (*asaṁskṛta*). Therefore he does not see the five aggregates, but he sees only their cessation. When he sees them (existent), they cannot be termed void. When they are not void, the knowledge of Śūnyatā would be imperfect (*vikala*).

Q. The ascetic sees the matter as void by way of non-soul. So says the Sūtra: The ascetic sees this matter as void and sees this consciousness as void. It does not say that five aggregates are non-existent. A. There is the Sūtra like this, but it is not aimed at the purpose of purification. The *Dharma-mudrā-*

Sūtra says: The ascetic sees elements, *rūpa.* etc. characterized as impermanent, distractive, destructible, despicable and magic. Though this may be termed *Śūnya*, it is not in the nature of purification. When the person visualizes at the end the cessation of all five aggregates, that vision is in the nature of purification. It is therefore evident that he visualizes their cessation.

The ascetic does not secure purification through the knowledge rested on the manifest things because the idea of conceptual things (*prajñapti-citta*) may recur in the ascetic who is active in the concepts of five aggregates. But that idea will never recur in the ascetic who visualizes before himself the cessation of five aggregates. The idea of conceptual things does not follow him because the cause of conception has been ceased. A tree, e. g. is cut and reduced to ashes. Then no idea of tree arises there again. The Buddha addresses Rādha; Destroy the idea of *Sattva* in such a way that it would never recur. Another *Sūtra* also supports the same idea. Therefore we understand that the destruction of *Sattva* is the voidness of *prajñapti*, conceptual thing and the destruction of the (basic) matter is the voidness of elements (*dharma*).

Contemplation is two-fold: *Śūnyatā*-contemplation and non-soul-conptemplation. The former is not to conceive the empirical *Sattva*. As, per example, one sees the pot empty since there is no water in it. Likewise, there is no *pudgala* in the five aggregates and for this reason one sees them void. When he does not see elements (as true) this is non-soul-ness. The Sūtra says: The gainer of non-soul knowledge gets perfectly released. Therefore, we understand that the cessation of the matter and the feeling, etc. is termed non-soulness (*nairātmya*) which is the same as non-susbstantiality (*naissvābhāvya*). Then, do the five aggregates not exist truly? No, they do not exist truly; however, they exist empirically. The Buddha says : *Saṁskāras* exist empirically like a magic and apparitional being, but never from the absolute view-point. The Sūtra saying that they are void from the absolute

truth indicates that they are void from the objective truth (*artha-satyatah*) and not empirically. The absolute truth is that the matter is void and *akiñcana*, non-thing, consciousness is void and non-thing. Therefore, to view things, matter, *rūpa*, etc. as void is termed the vision of the absolute voidness.

Why is it then stated that things, *rūpa*, etc. are the absolute truths (ch. 141)? They are stated so for the good of the ordinary men. There are certain persons harbouring the notion of the absolute truth towards the five aggregates. Is it not said in the Sūtra that there is action and there is fruit, however, no agent, *kāraka* is experienced ? This saying that the cause known as creator of things is not experienced is the expression to mean that the conceptual things are void. The Sūtra says : Things are mere conceived ideas (*prajñapti-sañjñā*). Such ideas are : Ignorance-conditioned are formations (*saṁskāra*). It is evident from this saying that five aggregates are non-existent from the absolute view-point. The *Mahāśūnyatā* Sūtra says : The saying : This is old-age-death and his old-age-death and the saying : *jīva* and the body are indentical and *jīva* and the body are difffferent : These two sayings mean the same idea, but expressions are different. Those who hold this view are not my disciples and not Brahman-farers. When ' his old-age ' is denied, it is the criticism of *prajñapti*, a conceptual thing (*sattva*) and when 'this old-age' is denied, it is the criticism of five aggregates. It is stated : 'Birth-conditioned is the old-age', this is termed the middle path. That is to be understood that there is no old-age from the absolute view-point. However, it says from the empirical view-point that birth-conditioned is the old-age. When, e.g. the idea of the pot disappears there is no pot from the absolute view-point ; likewise at the disappearance of elements, *rūpa*, etc. there is no *rūpa* from the absolute view-point. The Sūtra says: What thing is *māyā*, magic-like, is false, and what is otherwise, i. e. no *māyā* is the absolute thing. Here all the manifest elements are termed *māyā* as they are under-

going modifications. As they are *māyā*, they are unreal. As they are unreal, they are not absolutely existing. So says a Stanza:

This world is tied up with un-reals,
yet it appears as though it is definite (and real).
The non-existent is perceived as if it is existent,
It is indeed, non-existent, when viewed through higher wisdom.

It is, therefore, evident that the aggregates are also void.

Vision of *Nirodha-Satya* is termed the gaining of path. Therefore, the cessation, *nirodha* is the absolute truth and not the aggregates. If they are absolute things, the ascetic so veiwing would also be gainer of the path, but it is not so in fact. Therefore, the five aggregates are not absolute things. The cessation of the aggregates is the truth. Therefore the aggregates are not the truth. It is not possible to say that the aggregates and their cessation are both truth. The every visible thing is formed out of delusion. For example, none without being deluded in his mind witnesses the magically created thing. One who is not of deluded mind does not witness the aggregates. Therefore, the aggregates are not the absolute things. The Sūtra says: Where there is 'I am', there is 'nodding' (*iñjitam*). There is 'I am' in the aggregates. Ananda says: The sense 'I am' is accomplished on the basis of things, viz. the aggregate of matter and the aggregate of consciousness. The Elders spoke to Kṣemaka : Do you say : I am ? Kṣemaka replied : No sirs, I do not say : I am *rūpa*, nor do I say : I am other than *rūpa*,. . . However, on the five aggregates, sirs, the sense : 'I am' is obtained (*adhigata*). (I do not really witness : 'This I am'). The purport of this Sūtra is this : The learners, sometimes, on account of the distraction of their mindfulness arouse the sense of I; however, for the person of undisturbed mindfulness, the sense of I towards five aggregates is utterly ceased, like the flower. The flower is not the same as the root, stem, branch, and leaves, nor is it

somewhere else. Likewise, I do not say : *rūpa*, etc. I am ; nor do I say ; I am other than *rūpa*, etc. Thus due to the cessation of 'I' the sense : 'I am' disappears. Therefore the five aggregates are also void (non-existent).

The ascetic should suppress all the concepts and bring before himself conceptless state (*animitta*). If the concept is really existent, why does he not recollect it ? It is not similar to the heretic's way of thinking, that at the time of the cessation of *rūpa*, *rūpa* is really existing, but not recollected. The ascetic necessarily witnesses the cessation of five aggregates, and due to this, he enters into the conceptless state (*animitta*). It is, therefore, evident that *rūpa* and others are not absolute things. In the *Phena-Sūtra* the Buddha says ; If a man watches the foam and examines it correctly, he will understand it as nothing (*tucchaka*), similarly if the ascetic examines closely the aggregate of material things, he will understand it as empty, non-thing, essenceless and distractive. If he examines the feeling that it is similar to buble (*budbuda*), idea, that is similar to mirage, formations, similar to the plantain tree and consciousness similar to magic (he will understand them as empty, etc.). These five similies point out to their emptiness and voidness. Therefore, the aggregates are not the absolute things. The disciples of the Buddha who are disgusted with the worldly life observe things originally un-produced and non-entities. Those who observe them impermanent (experience) the suffering of distraction and destruction. Those who observe them non-substantial fulfil the practice of suffering. The fulfilment of this three-fold suffering leads to the Release.

Voidness is the Channel of emancipation. The voidness is not merely the *sattva*-voidness, but is also *dharma*-voidness. So says the Sūtra : The eye, while arising does not arrive from somewhere else and while disappearing does not pass into some-where. Thus one understands that the eye past and future is void. The present eye also void as it is conceived

of four great elements. The Buddha says : In the fleshy eye-ball what is hardness that is the earth element. The person who gains the view of voidness, says that it is nothing whatever. It is said again : All manifested things are abandonable and hence they are in the nature of abandonment they are separable; hence they are in the nature of separation; they are suppressible; hence they are in the nature of cessation. Therefore we understand that all the manifested things become ceased. The cessation is non-existence. Thus all things are non-existent from the absolute view-point, but existent from the empirical view-point.

154. *Cessation* (*Nirodha*)

What is rested on Nirvāṇa is termed *Śūnya-citta*, void-idea. This mind takes support (*ālambana*) on non-existence of anything (*yat-kiñcana-abhāva*). It is ceased in two stages : (1) When one enters into the concentration devoid of the mind and (2) When one enters into Nirvāṇa without residue. In the mindless trance, the mind is ceased as a result of *ālambana*-cessation. When the stream of elements is cut off, it is ceased from the absence of *karman*.

Śāstra says : In the person of the Yogin who has abandoned these three minds the action and defilements do not operate. For, he has accomplished (the fact of) non-soulness. A lamp, e. g. burns when there is support. In the absence of the support, it does not burn. Similarly in the presence of the support, i. e. idea of soul the action and defilements operate and in its absence not operate. The *āsrava*-freed right view burns all concepts without leaving any reminder, just as the fire at the end of aeon burns all the earth, etc. In the absence of concepts (*nimitta*) the action and defilements do not surge up again. They surge up in the person who harbours the sense of 'I'. They do not operate in the holy man, Arhan who has advanced in the knowledge of *Śūnyatā*, voidness.

The Arhan, having destroyed his old actions through the right wisdom will not experience any new resultant. The burnt

seed, e. g. will not germinate again. In the absence of the thirsty mind actions do not mature just like the seed sowed in a waterless field does not spring up. The Yogin's consciousness remains supportless in all consciousness-stations (*vijñāna-sthiti*) when all the concepts are ceased. Hence no rebirth-base remains for him. The seed, e. g. does not germinate without the ground. In the abundance of actions and defilements the body is formed and in their absence it is ceased.

In the absence of defilement the action is incapable of yielding fruit. When the body is formed due to defilement the actions bring out the fruit. When a debtor is under protection of a superior, the creditor could make him no harm. Similarly the Yogin, not living in the empirical world the actions could yield him no resultant.

Since the Yogin, dwelling in the practice of void-conduct has no idea of the self-characterstics of things, the action yields him no resultant. The adopted son, e. g. is not entitled to receive the share from his original father's property. Actions take effect by force of defilements. When the defilements lose their velocity actions become impotent. The wheel, e. g. though revolving a short while stops at the loss of its velocity. The blood in the mother's breast turns into milk because of mother's love towards her son. Likewise, the action returns its resultant by force of defilements. When the defilements lose their force the action becomes ineffective. This man has purified his body by means of good conduct, concentration, wisdom and other virtues and due to their influence actions could take no hold of him. Therefore the old previous action even it is there, does not produce its resultant. Thus his certain old action alone yields its resultant in this period (and not all). He does not commit a new one. Just as the fire becomes extinguished when the fuel is reduced to ashes, just so does this person also become extinguished as a result of no more anything to be experienced. Thus, on account of the cessation of three-fold mind, he gets released for ever from entire sufferings. Therefore the wise person should stop the said three minds or thoughts.

V

Marga-Satya Skandha

SAMĀDHI, CONCENTRATION

155. *Cause of Concentration* (*Samādhi-hetu*)

The Śāstra says : Now *Mārga-Satya* is to be investigated. The path (*mārga*) is the Noble Path constituted of eight constituents : right view, etc. and right concentration. It is in brief two-fold : (1) Concentration with its preliminary (*parikara*), (2) Knowledge.

Now concentration : It is characterized as the mind resting steadily and solely on one object. The mind rests on one object by contemplating upon it several times. If one does not contemplate several times, then his mind would quickly distract from it. One should contemplate in an easy manner. Uneasiness (*duḥkha*) is the turbulent state (*dauṣṭhalya*) of the body and the mind. When that turbulent state is dispelled by *praśrabdhi*, serenity, easiness is secured. The serenity is felt when the body and the mind become calmed on account of joy (*prīti*), which arises from the mind's delightfulness (*prāmodya*) through recollection of three jewels and listening to scripture, etc. The mind's delightfulness again arises when the mind does not repent and as a result of holding fast to good conduct.

The cause of concentration is described. Of what is the concentration the cause ? It is the cause of knowledge of things as they are, which is the same as the knowledge of *Śūnyatā*, voidness. It is said : The Yogin, having the concentrated his mind, pure mind, hindrance-freed mind and steady mind, understands truly the misery, origin of misery, cessation of misery and the path leading to the cessation of misery. Hence wishing to gain the true knowledge the Yogin should endeavour to cultivate the con-

centration. A man of distracted mind could not gain any advantage from the secular scripture on painting (*śilpa*) and others and what talk would be there of ultra-mundane advantage? Therefore, we understand that the advantages both the mundane and the ultra-mundane can be secured by the man of concentrated mind. All the merit is governed by the right knowledge and all the demerit by the wrong knowledge. So says the Sūtra : Nescience is the fore-runner of the approach of unmeritorious dharmas and at once follows the absence of shame and shyness; the knowledge is the fore-runner of the approach of the meritorious dharmas and at once follows the right knowledge. Hence we understand that all the good merit arises on the support of concentration. Therefore the endeavour should be made for the cultivation of the concentration.

156. *Characteristics of Concentration*

It is stated just before that the mind's resting steadily on one object is the concentration. Q. Are the concentration and the mind identical or different? A. They are identical. Some masters say that they are different, (for) the mind that is secured in concentration rests on one object. This statement is improper. If the mind being secured in concentration remains on the object (*ālambana*), this concentration also remains on the obejct by the support of another concentration. Thus it evolves infinity. If the concentration is a stay in its own nature, the mind also would stay in its own nature, not by the support of concentration. Therefore, to say that the mind is other than the concentration is valueless. The mental states, feeling, idea, etc. also remain on their objects. You must state : They do so on the basis of which dharma? If they have their own concentration each, there will be the same folly as stated before. It is simply said in the Sūtra that the mind's one-pointedness is the concentration and not that the mind being secured in the concentration remains on the object. The mind's one-pointedness does not mean

something different (from the mind itself). The mind's concentration is not separate from the mind.

A steady remaining on an object as long as the (capacity of) one's mind permits is termed concentration.

This is two-fold: *āsrava*-tainted and *āsrava*-freed. The concentrations of the worldly men are *āsrava*-tainted and those of one who has reached a spiritual status (*dharmāvasthā*) are *āsrava*-freed. This moment is termed a knowledge-vision of things as they are and has two names: *Samādhi* and *Prajñā*. The former is because of the mind being concentrated and the latter is because of knowing things as they are. The mind's concentration is three-fold: good, bad and indeterminate. *Samādhi* takes place through what is good but not through what is bad or indeterminate. The mind's concentration is two-fold: One is the cause of release and the other is otherwise. The first is named *niyata-mūla*, rooted in release. Some Ābhidharmika says that the only *āsrava*-freed concentration is *niyata-mūla*. This opinion is not good. If the *āsrava*-tainted and *āsrava*-freed concentrations contribute the cause of the release, both of them should be termed *niyata-mūla*.

From the view-point of its object, it is divided into three: narrow (*paritta*), wide (*vipula*) and un-limited (*apramāṇa*). If the mind being concentrated for sometime perceives a small object, it is named narrow. Others are also so named because of their varied objects. It is also divided into three on account of time: composing (*pragraha*), waking up (*vyutthāna*) and slackening (*tyāga*).

When the mind is low-spirited, the act of waking up should be applied; when it is distracted, the act of controlling should be applied and when it is too subdued the act of slackening should be applied. The goldsmith, e.g. melts the gold, heats it, waters it and keeps it on timely. If it is always heated it becomes fluid; being always watered, it becomes thickened and being always kept on, it becomes expanded. The Yogin's mind is also likewise. The shaky mind being uncontrolled,

any concept, hence it is conceptless. As it is conceptless it is aimless. As it is aimless, the ascetic experiences no body and because of this he gets freeed from all sufferings. All these advantages he obtains by contemplating on the void. Therefore they are three.

Some Ābhidharmikas say : The concentration which is in the form of void-non-soul is termed void. It is aimless (*apraṇihita*) when its form is by way of impermanence, misery, cause, origin, productive, conditioning path, practice as per prescription and avoiding. It is conceptless when its form is by way of cessation, pacifying, fineness, and separation. How is this? A. You say that the form by way of impermanence and misery is aimless; that is not correct. The Buddha always says : What is impermanent is misery and what is misery is the same as non-soul. The man discerning the non-soulness asperes for no aim. Therefore, we understand that he makes no aim on account of voidness. If it is your view that it is so when its aspect is by way of cause, origin, productive and condition, it would verily be so. For, the Sūtra says : whichever is characterized as origin, (*samudaya*) is all characterized as cessation: the ascetic perceiving thiswise gets disgusted. In respect of the path there would be no 'aspiration—free aspect'; for, aspiration (*praṇidhāna*) is a subsidiary to the thirst. It is said in the Sūtra : *Praṇidhāna*, inferior, moderate or finer does not cause inclination towards the path. Therefore there would be no 'aspiration-free' aspect. The Sūtra again says : cessation is so termed because the five aggregates are ceased. It is to be understood as void wherein no five aggregates exist. What is void is termed cessation. No *praṇidhāna*, aspiration exists therein. Aspiration is made through the thirst for the body. We, therefore, understand that these three are of the same purport, and not of any difference.

The Sūtra says : Three concentrations : (1) *Śūnya-Śūnya*, (2) *apraṇihita- apraṇihita* and (3) *animitta-animitta*. The first one is when the Yogin sees the five aggregates as void, and

again makes the void by another void. The second is when the ascetic becomes disinterested in five aggregates by one aimlessness and again becomes disinterested in the aimless by another aimlessness. The third is when the Yogin sees the five aggregates as quiet by one conceptlesseness and does not cognize that conceptless by another conceptlessness.

Some Ābhidharmika masters say that these three concentrations are *āsrava*-tainted. But in fact it is not so. The concentration has the void as the main purport, how can it be *āsrava*-tainted ? If the void concentration, etc. are as a matter of fact embodied in wisdom, how are they termed concentration ? Because concentrations are distinguished. The concentration brings home to the ascetic a knowledge-vision of things as they are ; and hence the latter is termed concentration. Here the effect is spoken of as the cause.

Some Ābhidharmikas say that three concentrations, void-void, etc. are obtainable by the learning-ender alone. How is this ? A. The learners also would obtain them; for, the cessation of all elements, *āsrava*-tainted as well as *āsrava*-freed must be reached by the ascetic. Therefore even by the learners the cessation of the *āsrava*-freed elements ought to be reached.

158. *Four Concentration-Cultivations*

(1) There is one cultivation of concentration fit to become a happy strolling (*vihāra*) in this world ; (2) one cultivation of concentration fit to secure knowledge-vision ; (3) one cultivation of concentration fit for the mindfulness and *samprajanya* and (4) one cultivation of concentration fit for destruction of *āsravas*.

The first kind is leading to happiness in this life, viz., the second dhyāna, etc. The first dhyāna is tainted with *vitarka* and *vicāra*, which are distracting the mind and hence is not termed as happiness in this life. In the second dhyāna because the mind

is composed the cessation of all *vitarka*s, the joy, etc. are termed happiness; however there is suffering in a subtle degree. In the first dhyāna the suffering is gross and in the second, etc. it is subtle. It is, however, termed happiness on account of its having suffering in a subtle degree.

Q. The second-dhyāna etc. are also termed other worldly happy dwellings. Why are they stated to be the present life happy dwellings alone ? A. The fruition of the recluse life has been preached to the king *Ajāta-śatru*. Its present life happiness is stated there by way of proximity. The *dhyāna*, etc. are stated there as aiming at present life happiness with a view to checking the five sensual pleasures. Certain man being engrossed in the sensual pleasures is not able to secure dhyāna-happiness. For this reason it is said: At the separation of five sensual pleasures you will obtain the supreme present life happiness. The Buddhas do not extol the experience of the body in the other world. Therefore they do not speak of the other worldly happiness. The man in the world say that the householder alone has the happiness and not the ascetic. The Buddha, therefore, says that the ascetic (alone) has this present life happiness. All those four concentration-cultivations are all leading to present life happiness, though the first alone is declared so by name. They are, however, divided so for this reason : The benefit is two-fold, mundane and ultra-mundane. The second concentration-cultivation leads to the mundane benefit, viz. knowledge-vision. Knowledge is the benefit of eight emancipations (Ch. 163) and ten *kṛtsnāyatana* (Ch. 172). Vision is the benefit of five *abhijñās*, supernormal powers. Since it is perceived by the eye this benefit is termed *darśana*. Since it is accomplished with the support of the ray-grasp, it is termed *jñāna-darśana*. It is ray-characterized. This second is the ultra-mundane benefit.

What discerns well the five aggregates is *samprajanya*. So says the Sūtra that ascetic being mindful and of self-possession discerns well the feeling, *vitarka* and *sañjñā*. The well discerning

of the feeling means: The contact-conditioned is feeling; but there is no agent who feels. The discernment of *vitarka* means the consideration of 'I'. *Sañjñā* is to discriminate : the idea of woman and man, etc. *Vitarka* does not arise when the *sañjñā* of empirical things is inhibited. The Sūtra says ; Of what origin is *vitarka* ? It has its origin in speech, ideas and numbering. Therefore, *smṛti-samprajanya* is that which inhibits empirical ideas, and through this *smṛti-samprajanya*, the destruction of *āsravas* is effected. The Sūtra says : ascetic, observing the origin and destruction of five aggregates visualizes their cessation. Therefore, we understand that all the benefits, mundane and ultra-mundane are included in the four.

Q. Some Ābhidharmikas say that in the fourth *dhyāna* the ascetic reaches the fruit of Arhan, and his immediately preceeding path is termed *āsrava*-destruction. How is this ? A. There is no any special reason for saying so.

The cultivation of concentration leads to three-fold benefit ; (1) the present life-happiness (2) knowledge-vision and (3) the destruction of *āsravas*; or it leads to two-fold benefit. The Buddha preaches the path for these purposes : (1) utter destruction of *āsravas* (2) full purification (3) destruction of empirical life and (4) the analysis of the varied characteristics of things. The first three are expressions of abandoning (*prahāṇa*) and the last is the expression of knowledge. The present life happiness, the Buddha has not stated here in this context.

159. *Four Illimitables* (*Apramāṇa*)

They are : (1) *Maitri*, love, *karuṇā*, pity, *muditā*, delightfulness, (4) *upekṣā*, equanimity.

Love is a good thought which is contrary to malevolence. A man of good understanding e.g. wishes constantly good to a man of good understanding. Likewise the ascetic wishes constantly good to all living beings.

Pity is a compassionate mind that is contrary to the harmfulness (*vihiṁsā*). The difference between *dveṣa* and *vihiṁsā* is this: when one, mindful of his enmity wishes to beat or hurt the living beings, his action corporeal and vocal is termed *vihiṁsā*. Hate (*dveṣa*) is the cause of doing harm, *vihiṁsā*.

Delightfulness is the loving mind that is contrary to the jealousy. The jealousy is envy (*asūyā*) and malevolence that are aroused by a man when he watches other's success and but could not appreciate it. The ascetic having noticed the good success of a man feels a great joy as if at his own success.

These three are varieties of one loving mind. For, love is non-malevolence. None having a hateful mind pities on the suffering people. When one exercises a kind heart towards the sentient beings as he would do to his own distressed son, at that time it is termed compassion (*karuṇā*). Or one may have compassion on other's suffering ; he does not, however, become delighted at other's success. The ascetic on the other hand watching all living beings prosperous become delighted. This is *muditā*, delightfulness. It is clear therefore that compassion and delightfulness are only varieties of the loving mind.

Equanimity is this : The ascetic first disregards his love towards his friend and disregards his enmity towards his enemy and equalizes his mind towards both. Then he extends his equanimity towards all living beings. *Karuṇā* and *muditā* are also to be practised likewise. The Sūtra says : Cultivate equanimity in order to abandon lust and aversion. The loving mind becomes three-fold by virtue of its three-fold object (*dharma*) superior, moderate and inferior. The equanimity of these three is *upekṣā*.

The cultivation of loving mind : One cultivates it fully understanding the disadvantages of aversion and also noticing the advantages of the love. The Sūtra says : The dweller in the loving mind sleeps happily, acts happily and does not see any

unhappy dream. Gods protect him, he becomes lovable to all men and gods, no fire, poison or weapon harms him, etc. Having heard these advantages he cultivates it. The ascetic recollects : I, causing malevolence, will have to reap it myself. He considers : having done a small harm to others, I shall suffer much; hence one should avoid the bad actions (This is further elaborated at a greater length).

The ascetic, cultivating the love should not hate but tolerate all the undesirables; so says the Buddha :

Just as a well-tamed tusker endures all the arrows and weapons

Just so I shall endure all the sinful and unhappy events. The stanza again says :

An inferior man will not tolerate any ominous and malicious word, calumny or hate just like a bird which endures not the hailstones.

The great soul on the other hand tolerates all of them
Just like a tusker does the shower of flowers.

The cultivation of compassion : The ascetic notices men having little happiness and full of sufferings and hence pities them ; he thinks : How should I cause suffering to the already suffering being. Noticing also the very happy people he thinks : Why should I deprive them of their benefits ? Therefore he pities them. He pities them because all living beings who are suffering or happy in this life are all equally in the world of suffering and will not get release now or at the end.

The cultivation of delightfulness : The ascetic notices that to be jealous towards other's advantages is the characteristic of the ordinary man and hence he cultivates the delightfulness. He thinks further that he should cause happiness to sentient beings. To have jealousy makes no good, it does not harm

others ; on the other hand, it kills oneself. The Sūtra says : Jealousy is a fetter. One becomes delighted in order to avoid it.

The cultivation of equanimity: Noticing blemishes in the mind of partiality the ascetic practices equanimity. He cultivates it noticing the blemishes in the lust and aversion.

This illimitable mind is obtainable in all three worlds. Some Ābhidharmikas say that above the third dhyāna, there is no faculty of joyfulness. How is this ? A. I do not say that *muditā* is in the nature of the joyfulness-faculty, but I say that it is non-dirty-mindedness (*akaluṣa-cittatā*) at other's gain. All these four illimitables are embodiments of wisdom.

They are obtainable in the formless world also. So says the Sūtra : He cultivates the love that will culminate in the gain of good resultants; he cultivates the compassion that will culminate in the gain of *Ākāśānantyāyatana* ; he cultivates *muditā* that will culminate in the gain of *Vijñānāntyāyatana*, and he cultivates *upekṣā* that will culminate in the gain of *Ākiñcanyāyatana*. This proves that in the formless world also these illimitables are there. It is further stated that they are confined to the formless bases. In the *naiva-sañjñānā-sañjñā-yatana* they are present, but in a very subtle form. These illimitable minds rest on the sentient beings and hence they are conspicuous by their resultant feelings.

Q. The Ābhidharmikas say : The four illimitables have as the objects only the living beings belonging to the world of desire. A. Why is it so ? You must state the reason here. The Buddha says in the *Apramāna-Sūtra* : The ascetic here dwells filling up one quarter with his loving mind, then the second quarter, the third and the fourth quarters, higher, lower and all quarters. The living beings belonging to the form and formless worlds are also impermanent and liable to the unhappy rebirth. This is the reason (for saying that those living beings also become the objects of the four illimitables.).

Q. Ābhidharmikas say : The ascetic of the desire-world alone cultivates the four illimitables. How is this ? A. The ascetics of all bases cultivate them. There need not be any objection on the ground that there would be no end of rebirth on account of undestroyed merits. For, the ascetic even practising *dhyāna*, and other good actions in those bases gets released therefrom. Likewise he will do so even practising the illimitables. He does not get released immediately on account of some other action cause.

The poison, weapon, or the fire does not harm the ascetic practising the four illimitables ; for he is protected by the gods.

Q. The Sūtra says: He cultivates the mindfulness-enlightenment-constituent together with the love. Here one is *āsrava*-freed and the other *āsrava*-tainted. How is their combination possible ? A. The love is accompanied by the mindfulness. The Sūtra says: One listens to the scripture attentively and then abandoning the five hindrances cultivates seven enlightenment-constituents. Even while not listening to the scripture he cultivates them. Again the Sūtra says : Cultivate, O Monks, the loving mind, you will obtain the fruit of non-returner, I swear. The loving mind does not dispel the fetters; however, through loving mind the merits are accumulated whereby the ascetic secures the wisdom in the noble path and dispels the fetters. Therefore, it is said that by cultivating love he secures the fruit of non-returner. Likewise, by cultivating the love, the enlightenment-constituent (is possible).

The Arhan has abandoned the idea of soul, *sattva*; yet he cultivates the loving mind. He does not, however, accumulate the results of that action, as he lacks in the rebirth-experience (*upapatti-vedanā*).

The Buddhas do not harbour an investigating and enquiring thought. They discern the utter voidness of things; nevertheless they keep up the great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) towards the worldlings, but never harbour the soul-idea.

The difference between compassion and great compassion is this : the former is simply a mind of mercy (*krpā-citta*) while the letter is engaged in discharging function. For, the Bodhisattva watching the sufferings of the people makes endeavour to alleviate them. Because he has to accomplish it in the innumerable aeons (*kalpa*) it is termed great compassion. Watching their sufferings through his faculty of knowledge (*ājñendriya*) he arouses the thought: I shall alleviate them; this is *mahākaruṇā*. It is *mahākaruṇā* as it is filled with doing good without hindrence. The compassionate mind noticing the other's bad actions, may have aversion, while the great compassion cannot be checked in its functioning even towards the various and exteremely wicked men. The former is sometimes thick and sometimes thin, but the latter is uniform towards all. The latter even at the expense of one's own advantages does only good to others ; hence it is great compassion. The compassion is not so. This is the difference between them.

160. *Five-limbed Noble Concentration*

It is stated in the Sūtra: Five limbs of the noble concentration are: joy, happiness, purity of mind, illumination and meditation (*bhāvanā*). Joy is uniform in the first and the second dhyānas, hence it is one limb. In the third dhyāna, no joy is there; therefore, happiness is a separate limb. In the fourth dhyāna, the purity of the mind is the third limb. With the support of these three limbs arise the illumination and meditation. Of these two, the first serves as the cause of the second and destroys five aggregates. To meditate on five aggregates as void is *bhāvanā*. It is noble, because it leads to *Nirvāna*.

The Sūtra says: There are five noble concentration-knowledges. These are in the words of the Buddha: The ascetic thinks: This my concentration is noble and free from flesh; this is his first knowledge. Then he thinks: this is practised by non-ignoble person; this is his second knowledge. Then

he thinks: it is quiet and subtle and secured with joy and carenity; this his third knowledge. Then he thinks : this is happy in this life, and in the future it is causing happy resultant; this is his fourth knowledge. He further thinks: I shall enter into it mindful and emerge from it mindful. This is his fifth knowledge. This passage proves that there in the concentration the knowledge persists. However, there is no mental retention (*citta-dhāraṇā*). If the defilements arise in the ascetic while cultivating it, then the knowledge dispels them. The first knowledge is this: I wish the noble and flesh-freed concentration. " The noble and flesh-freed" means it is practised by the non-ignoble men. This means that it is so extolled by the wise men. The noble man is non-ignoble person. What destorys the empirical ideas is the second knowledge. Since the thin defilements, lust, etc. are ceased, it is quiet and subtle (*praṇita*). What is secured as a result of the separation from the defilements is termed *visaṁyoga-labdha*, secured on the separation. This is the path of desire-freed man, and the third knowledge. Because of visualizing the abandonment of defilements he takes possession of quietude and welfare. Happiness in this life is freed from defilements and the same in future is the happiness of *Nirvāṇa*. This is the fourth knowledge. The ascetic constantly dwells in a conceptless mind ; he mindfully enters into and mindfully emerges from the concentration. This is the fifth knowledge. If this fifth knowledge is not arisen, it ought to be aroused. If it is already arisen, the fruit of the concentration is already obtained.

161. *Six Concentrations*

The Sūtra says : Concentrations are six : There is a meditation (*bhāvanā*) characterized as one and becoming into oneness (*ekalakṣaṇatva*) ; there is a meditation characterized as one and becoming into many (*nānātva*) ; there is a meditation characterized as one and becoming into one as well as many. The meditation characterized as many is also to be multiplied likewise into three. 'Characterized as one' means the *dhyāna-*

concentration as it dwells on one object with pointed attention. 'Characterized as many' means knowledge-vision, as it discerns the different natures of things. One meditation becomes into one when the ascetic takes to the concentration and again arouses it. One meditation becoming into many is when he takes to the concentration and arouses the knowledge-vision. One meditation becoming into one as well as many is when he takes to the concentration and arouses *dhyāna*-concentration as well as the five aggregate-device. Likewise manifold meditation (is to be explained).

Some Ābhidharmikas interpret : One meditation becoming into one is when the ascetic taking to the fourth *dhyāna* and realizes the Arhan-fruit. One meditation becoming into many is when he taking to that *dhyāna* and acquires five *abhijñās*. One meditation becoming into one as well as many is when he taking to the fourth *dhyāna* acquires Arhan-fruit as well as the five *abhijñās*. The manifold meditation becoming into many is when he taking to five-limbed concentrations acquires the Arhan-fruit as well as five *abhijñās*. The other two also to be explained likewise.

Now the author remarks : The reason must be stated why the fourth *dhyāna* and the Arhan-fruits are one-characterized, and the five-limbed concentration and five *abhijñās* are many-characterized ? The Arhan-fruit is secured on the support of (any) one *dhyāna* or sometimes even on the support of illumination (*prakāśalakṣaṇa*). Therefore there is no any reason (for the Ābhidharmika interpretation).

Some masters say: Six attainments of concentration : (1) progressive attainment (2) regressive attainment (3) progressive-regressive attainment (4) progressive skip (*vyutkrānti*), (5) regressive skip (6) progressive-regressive skip. The Ābhidharmikas answer here : The ascetic is desirous of entering into *Nirodhasamāpatti* and therefore his merging and emerging are gradual. For this reason, there is no possibility for progressive, or regressive or progressive-regressive skip, etc. If the ascetic has attained a

higher region (*bhūmi*), how will he come to the lower one. None would be interested in a childish play. A man of high culture, e. g. would not be engaged in playing with an ignorant.

In the Sūtra it is said that the attainments of *dhyāna*, etc. are gradual. If the ascetic skips to third (*dhyāna*), why does he not do so to the fourth or to the fifth. If you say it is similar to a man ascending the ladder. He can skip one step not two, this example is not conclusive, a skilful person can skip four or even hundred steps. Although the Sūtra says that the Buddha on the occassion of entering into *Nirvāṇa* attained *dhyāna*-concentration progressively and regressively. This Sūtra is contrary to right meaning (*artha*), hence not trustworthy. Or it should be interpreted differently. If the ascetic desires to enter into the cessation-trance he will do it (gradually) but not in one moment. If he desires to feed his mind in *dhyāna*-concentrations he can progressively skip or regressively skip. A man on the horse, e. g. is beseiged by the enemy's force. He does not return back necessarily. Or if he desires to have a control over the horse, he can practise (the progressive and regressive skipping).

(The author does not favour the Abhidharmikas' opinion). the ascetic can come down to the lower region, as he has not yet conquered it. As to your statement that none would be delighted in the childish play, I may say that in some cases the start (of the art) looks like childish play. An elder actor always dances and never becomes content with for the training-sake. Likewise the wise skips progressively and regressively in *dhyāna*-concentrations with a view to showing marvels to men and gods. The sages also do that as they have mostly overcome them. The Buddha on the occasion of entering into *Nirvāṇa*, involuntarily entered into them and skipped progressively, regressively or both combined. The person who watched the Buhdha entering in the *Nirvāṇa* without residue become disgusted with the all bad forces (*saṁskāra*). Thus the Buddha by this marvel exhibited his wonderful love (towards his followers).

Your opinion that the Sūtra is contrary to a good meaning is not correct. You asked : Why does one not skip upto the fourth ? In the *Bodhisattva-piṭaka*, the characteristics of skipping are stated: The ascetic enters into *Nirodha-Samāpatti* skipping from the first *dhyāna* and skipping from *Nirodha-Samāpatti* he enters into the state of distracted mind. He is able to do this by virtue of his mind's strength.

162. *Seven Concentrations*

The Śāstra says : There are seven abodes (*niśraya*). (The ascetic) dwelling in the first *dhyāna* secures the extinction of *āsravas* and upto dwelling in *Ākiñcanyāyatana* secures the extinction of *Āsravas*. *Niśraya* is seven abodes, residing upon which he secures the noble knowledge. It is said : The true knowledge flashes up for one who has concentrated his mind. The people talk of one as accomplished man when he has simply secured dhyāna-concentration. But the Buddha does not speak of him as accomplished man ; he further advises that one, securing this concentration should aspire for the distinguished dharma known as the destruction of *āsravas*. Therefore it is termed *niśraya*.

How does one secure it ? The Buddha says : The ascetic enters into the first dhyāna with what object in what form, that object and that form he does not remember. He, however, observes in the first dhyāna, matters, feeling, idea, formations (*saṁskāra*) or consciousness as a disease, abscess, arrow, flood, impermanent, suffering, void and non-soul. (V. ch. 166 end). While observing thus, his mind becomes disgusted and seeks for emancipation from *āsravas*. It is to be said so upto *Ākiñcanyāyatana*. The last three concentrations *ākās'ānantyāyatana* etc. are obtained in the *Ārūpya* world. The ascetic being deluded by the desire-world thinks the first dhyāna as Nirvāṇa. The Buddha, therefore, says : Do not consider the first dhyāna as Nirvāṇa-happiness but look at there in the first and other dhyānas eight

blemishes of five aggregates (as stated before). The *Susīma-sūtra* says : Passing beyond the seven abodes there is also an abode for securing the noble path. It is thus evident that there is the abode also related to the desire-world.

Some masters say that one can secure Arhan-fruit residing even in the *Sāmantaka-bhūmi*, a preceding moment to the first dhyāna. But this is not correct. If anyone before reaching *bhūmi* is able to obtain the fruit why in he not able to attain to the first dhyāna ? *Naiva-Sañjña-nā-sañjñāyatana* is not termed *niśrava*, abode, because there is no an element of *sañjñānam*, ideation. In (this) concentration in the main the wisdom is very slight in degree. So it is not stated as abode (*niśraya*). The seven idea-concentrations (*Sañjñā-Samādhi*) become seven abodes. The seven abodes are named seven "idea-concentrations", because the Heretics (*Sāṅkhya*) adhere to *Sañjñā* alone as a result of their ignorance about the truth. All these abodes are polluted by the idea or concept (*sañjñā*) and not intended for release. Therefore they are termed the idea-concentration. The noble men on the other hand breaking the idea, *Sañjñā* and taking to this concentration realize the destruction of *āsravas*. Hence they are named "*niśraya*", abode. It is said: The ascetic observes the elements as disease, abscess, etc. *Naiva-Sañjnā-nāsañjnā-yatana* is not an idea (*Sañjñā*,) concentration as it is not designated with Sañjñā, idea.

163. *Eight Emancipations* (*Vimokṣa*)

The Sūtra says : It is said in the Sūtra : Eight Emancipations.

The ascetic having the matter-idea towards the internal material elements observes the external material elements (as void) : This is the first emancipation. The ascetic by this overcomes material elements. This is evident from the second emancipation which is described: The ascetic having non-matter-idea on the internal elements observes the external material elements

(as void). Therefore we understand that the ascetic in the first emancipation overcomes gradually the internal corporeal matter. The second emancipation being reached the internal matter is overcome already, there is only the external matter. In the third emancipation the external matter is also overcome. Therefore he does not see the internal as well as external matters. This is termed void of the matter.

The *Pārāyaṇa-Sūtra* says: Destroying the matter-characteristic, abandoning all the desires.

Not seeing anything, internal and external,
I ask this thing.

In the next four emancipations, it is said, the mind is void of consciousness. The *Ṣaḍdhātu-Sūtra* says : The monk who is entirely displeased with five dhātus, has only the knowledge. It is evident that in the four emancipations he experiences the consciousness. In the eighth emancipation every thing is destroyed. The matter being ceased and the mind also being ceased, all manifest elements are utterly ceased : This is Arhan-fruit. These are eight emancipations.

Some master says: The first two emancipations are impure and the third one is pure. This is not proper. The emancipation is obtained through meditation on the void alone and not through meditation on something impure or pure. The heretics gain the meditation on the pure or the impure but not gain the emancipation.

Q. The heretics also destroy the matter-characteristic. How is this ? A. They do so through their faith in emancipation (*vimokṣa-adhimukti*) but not through the void-meditation. They notice as per their faith and practice of meditation, the body that is dead and thrown out (in the forest) is eaten up by the worms of the crematory. Q. They gain the formless-concentration that is freed from the matter (*rūpa*). So they would

also obtain formless-emancipation. A. Though they practise the formless-concentration, they entertain an attachment towards it ; hence it is not an emancipation. The noble men, on the other hand, dwelling in that concentration observe the four aggregates in eight aspects, disease, etc. Therefore, it is termed emancipation.

Q. You pleaded : *Nirodha-Samāpatti* is the Arhan-fruit. This opinion is not good, for the learners (*Śaikṣa*) have eight emancipations (which include the destruction of *Āsravas*). The cessation-trance is in the nature of *Āsrava*-destruction, this you have said. Thus they will also gain the āsrava-destruction without the *nirodha-samāpatti*, a factor of *āsrava*-destruction. A. The Sūtra describes *nirodha* in general terms but does not specify: This is the mind's cessation and that is the defilement-extinction. The Sūtra says : Cessation is two-fold : Extinction-cessation and gradual-cessation. Nirvāṇa is two-fold : Nirvāṇa of this life and the ultimate Nirvāṇa. Again it says : Welfare (*kṣema*) is two-fold inferior and superior. Its gain also two-fold: inferior and superior. Therefore the cessation gained by the learners is not ultimately true one. The Sūtra says : The monk that has entered into *Nirodha-Samāpatti* has accomplished what is to be accomplished. If the cessation-trance is not the Arhan-fruit, the Sūtra would not say that the monk has accomplished what is to be accomplished.

The Sūtra says : The learner, *Śaikṣa* gains the nine gradual concentrations but does not say that he gains the extinction-cessation. If an ascetic, gaining the extinction-cessation does not enter into dhyāna-concentrations, he is then designated the Released through wisdom, *prajñā-vimukta*. If he enters into them, but not gains the extinction-cessation, he is *kāya-sākṣin*. If he gains both, he is *ubhayato-bhāga-vimukta*. For the defilement is one part and the elements hindering the dhyāna-concentration is another part. As he is released from these two parts, he is designated *ubhayato-bhāga-vimukta*. The term '*nirodha*' found

in connection with the gradual concentration and *nirodha* found in connection with *vimokṣas* have quite different imports, viz. the first usage of the term denotes the cessation of the mind and the mental states, while the second usage denotes the cessation of defilements. So says the Sūtra : In the first dhyāna the speech is ceased, in the second, *vitarka* and *vicāra* ; in the third, joy, in the fourth, happiness ; in the *Ākāśa*, the idea of matter ; in the *Vijñāna*, the idea of the previous *samādhi*, *Ākāśa* ; in the *Ākiñcanya*, the idea of the previous *vijñāna* ; in *Naiva-Saññā-nā-Saññā*- the idea of the previous *Ākiñcanya*, and in *Nirodha Samāpatti* the idea and the feeling are ceased. In these several *nirodhas* the sense of *nirodha* is distinguished, viz. the ascetic being disgusted with them gets released from the lust, hatred and infatuation.

Nirodha in gradual concentrations and the same in the emancipations is to be distinguished. Cessation of the idea and the feeling (*vedayita*) is meant in the gradual concentrations while that of ignorance, feeling (*vedanā*) and touch in the emancipations. For, the feeling (*vedanā*) arises from *prajñapti*. When *prajñapti* is checked, feeling is ceased. There is this distinction also in the Sūtras. When it expresses that the ascetic is the gainer of the extinction-cessation, he is then accomplished in his duty. Thus it is evident that in Nirvāṇa [of this life] all defilements are ceased ; it does not, however, say that mind and mental states are ceased.

Q. If the eight emancipations are in the nature of defilement-cessation, all the Arhans would always be in its possession. A. They are always in its possession, but not absorbed in it. Q. If the yogin is not possessed of concentration, how does he obtain the voidness of the body and the mind and destroy the defilements? A. He may be in possession of concentration ; he does not, however, realize (the defilement-cessation). There is a concentration known as "comparable to the lighting" on the support of which he gains the defilement-extinction. The Sūtra says : The defilement is manifest when I am desirous of receiving a

robe. After receiving it the defilement is no more manifest. For, the true knowledge which is comparable to the thunder-bolt (*Vajra*) destroys all the defilements. This idea is expressed by the Buddha in the third *bala*, power, viz. a true knowledge in regard to *dhyāna*, emancipation, concentration, trance, pollution, and purification and their distinctions. Here *dhyāna* is four *dhyānas* emancipation-eight emancipations, concentration (*Samādhi*), one moment's concentration similar to lightning, *samāpatti*; absorption = gaining the strength of mastery over the above. So says Śāriputra: I maintain mastery over merging into and emerging from the seven Enlightenment-constituents. Therefore Arhan who is released through wisdom (*prajñāvimukta*) has dhyāna- concentrations, but he is not absorbed in them. As a result of advancement in his exercise he gains mastery over the trance.

The Arhan does not exercise very well dhyāna-concentrations, because he has fulfilled his duty and is quite indifferent to it. When he gives up that mood he enters into the concentration. Thus there is no any defect in my proposition.

It is said in the Sūtra : The Yogin exercising the four *rddhi*-steps blows up even the king of mountains, *Himavant* to atoms and what is to speak of his death and nescience. Therefore we understand that the defilement-extinction-cessation is stated in the eight emancipations ; and not that he is absorbed in the cessation-trance. The Sūtra says: There are (self-beings, i.e.) the knowledge-self-being, void-self-being, *Ākāśānantyāyatana*-self-being, *Vijñānā-nantyāyata-na*-self-being, *Ākiñca-nyāyatana*-self-being, *Naiva-sañjñānāsañjñāyatana*-self-being and cessation-self-being. The knowledge-self-being is on the support of nescience, the void-self-being on the support of non-void ; *Ākāśānantyāyatana*-self-being on the support of the matter, *vijñānānantyāyatana*-self-being on the support of *Ākāśānantyāyatana*-self-being. *Ākiñcanyāyatana*-self-being on the support of *Vijñā-nā-nantyāyatana*-self-being. *Naiva-sañjñānā-Sañjñāyatana*-self-being

on the support of *Ākiñcanyāyatana* (self-being) and the cessation-self-being on the support of the five aggregates. The person who has not destroyed the concept-characterized aggregates has nescience. When he destroys them, he has the knowledge-self-being. The Buddha commands a monk : When all *Saṃskāras*, elements are void, meditate on them as void and control your own mind. As, e.g. a person entering an empty room finds the room as such with the help of a lamp; likewise the ascetic taking into account the matter experiences that this is (void =) ceased ; this is the void-self-being.

Cessation-self-being on the basis of aggregates : The ascetic thinks that whichever attention there is and whichever is discharging its duty, the cessation of them all is blissful (*Śreyas*); this is the cessation-self-being on the basis of the aggregates.

Q. Relying on what concentration these self-beings are experienced ? A. The Sūtra says : They are all experienced as a result of dwelling on their own concentration-trances, viz. the mundane path (*Saṃskṛta-mārga*). For, the first knowledge-self-being is relied on the matter-knowledge. The second void-self-being also is on the basis of matter and analyses the matter as void. Likewise are the concentrations upto *Naiva-Sañjñā-nāsañjñāyatana*. Through the cessation-trance (meditating that) all the manifest elements are void, the (ascetic) experiences their cessation. Since all the manifest elements are ceased here by extinction (*kṣaya-nirodha*), the cessation that is spoken of here is to be understood as the extinction-cessation, *kṣaya-nirodha* i.e. Nirvāṇa. Q. On what region (*bhūmi*) are the eight emancipations happening. A. The ascetic, wishing to break the matter resorts to the concentration either related to Desire-world or to the form-world and experiences the matter as void. He experiences also the mind of all regions as void. All the eight emancipations are *āsrava*-freed as they are of the void self-being.

164. *Eight Overcoming Bases*

An ascetic, having the matter-idea towards the internal matters visualizes the external matters as lesser and good-and-bad-coloured ; having overcome them he knows and perceives (so) and becomes of thiswise idea. This is the first overcoming base. Having the matter-idea towards the internal matters he sees the external matters as larger and good-bad-coloured, etc. this is the second. Having non-matter-idea towards the internal matters he sees the external matters as lesser etc.; this is the third. Having non-matter-idea towards the internal matters he sees the external matters as larger, etc. ; this is the fourth. Having non-matter-idea towards the internal matters he sees the external matter as blue and blue-coloured like *umaka* flower or the *Vārāṇasi* garments, etc. this is the fifth. In the sixth he sees them as yellow. In the seventh he sees them as red. In the eighth he sees them as white. Thus the ascetic sees innumerable colours ; because there are not only these four colours, blue, etc. To put them in brief; when the ascetic penetrates into the (matter) colours as void, it is then termed overcoming base.

The Buddha's disciples alone can obtain (*pratilabha*) them. They may be obtained in desire-world. They at first are *āsrava*-tainted but the matter being penetrated through voidness, they become *āsrava*-freed. They are bases eagerly adhered to by the disciples. The Buddha for their sake, says that it is *abhibhū-āyatana* in order to show that their objects are to be over-come.

165. *Nine Gradual Dwellings (vihāra) : First Dhyāna*

They are : Four dhyānas, and four formless concentrations (*Samādhi-Samāpatti*) and *Nirodha-Samāpatti*. The first dhyāna is stated in the Sūtra : The ascetic attains to and dwells in the first *dhyāna* which lies in joy-pleasure born of seclusion, freed from the sensual pleasures and freed from the unmeritorious elements and having in its vicinity *vitarka* and *vicāra*. In this description, the statement " freed from the sensual pleasures"

is necessary for this reason: some people say that there is no place freed from *kāma*. All the men in the world are always engrossed in the five sensual pleasures (*kāma-guṇa*); none is capable to resist his sense-organs seeing the visible, or hearing the sound, smelling the odour, tasting the taste or touching the tangible. *Kāma* means: pleasure-mind (*kāma-citta*) not *rūpa*, etc. So it is said : Things, *rūpa*, etc. are not *kāma*. It is evident from the fact that a man of spiritual endeavour abandons sensual pleasure only remaining in the midst of *rūpa*, etc. The Sūtra says : *Rūpa*, etc. and their parts are not *kāma*. Here pleasure-mind is *kāma*. The person who has pleasure-mind seeks for pleasures (*kāma*). Due to that, lust, aversion, killing, and harming are all accompanied. The *Mahānidāna Sūtra* says : Seeking (*paryeṣaṇā*) is conditioned by thirst or craving. Some masters say : "freed from *kāma*" is freed from the five sensuous things, *rūpa*, etc. "Freed from bad dharmas" means freed from five hindrances.

The first dhyāna is tainted with *vitarka* because it is nearer to distraction (*vikṣipta*). Since the ascetic who has not accomplished the concentration-strength is liable to the mind's distraction it is tainted with *vitarka*. The Sūtra says : I dwell in an abode (*vihāra*) which is tainted with *vitarka* and *vicāra*. We understand thereby that Buddha meant the distracted mind as *vitarka*. This *vitarka* tending gradually to the stability (*samādhāna*) becomes *vicāra*. When the stability being accomplished, mind no more is distracted, then it is *vicāra*. This *vicāra* following the ascetic leads him into the centre of *dhyāna*. When he gains the joy after being freed from *vitarka* and *vicāra* it is termed the joy born of seclusion. This joy reaching him for the first time eases his body, and hence becomes happiness, *sukha*. The joy being situated in one object is termed dhyāna. This dhyāna being polluted by *vitarka* and *vicāra* the ascetic gains another body-resultant. This resultant being graded into three : superior, moderate and inferior, there are three grades of gods : *Brahmakāyika*, *Brahma-purohita* and *Mahā-Brahmā*.

Q. If the joy born of seclusion from *vitarka* and *vicāra* is the first dhyāna, it will not be five-limbed. It will not be different from the second dhyāna. The joy is different and serenity-happiness (*praśrabdhi-sukha*) is different. If the joy and happiness are the same, enlightenment-limb known as serenity would not be stated separately. A. Five limbs are not stated as the self-beings of the first dhyāna. *Vitarka* and *vicāra* are in a region closer to the first *dhyāna* and therefore they are called limbs. Five sensuous objects (*kāma-guṇa*) are not in a closer region and hence are not its limbs; for it is already freed from them. In and after the first dhyāna, no pleasure-mind arises. The sensuous objects are not its limbs. What is the limb is the cause (*kāraṇa*); the limbs of the noble paths that are accumulated are causes. Likewise, *vitarka* and *vicāra* are causes of the first dhyāna. When the ascetic is concentrated on an object (*ālambana*), at his distraction from it the image of concentration is again set up; and concentrating his mind on that *ālambana* he gains in his mind the original image. These are (the functions of) *vitarka* and *vicāra*. They are, therefore, causes of the first dhyāna. In the second dhyāna, mental concentration is accomplished and hence they are not its cause.

Vitarka and *Vicāra* being in close touch with it, they are named together with it, as, e. g. a pupil walking at some distance behind his teacher is spoken of as "together with him." Again a man is called "afflicted by ghost" even at the time when the ghost is not actually at work. Joy is nothing but a pleasant feeling though these two are named separately. Happiness is sometimes spoken of separately from *praśrabdhi*. So says the Sūtra : A man of serene body feels happiness.

The first *dhyāna* is said to be five-limbed on taking into account the time-differences just as the seven enlightenment-limbs become fourteen by virtue of time-difference. The corporeal serenity and mental serenity are spoken there separately ; but in fact there is no corporeal serenity separate. Only when the

mind becomes happy (*sukhita*) the body also feels it. Likewise the joy reaching the body for the first time is termed *prīti-sukham*, joy-happiness. Joy being obtained for the first time becomes happiness and subsequently it is termed joy. There is no any separate *dharma* like *praśrabdhi*. As soon as joy arises the body and mind become undisturbed, easy and calm; hence it is designated *praśrabdhi*. This term sometimes indicates pacification (*praśamana*) so said in the Sūtra : *Saṁskāra*s are gradually ceased, viz. in the first dhyāna the sepeech is ceased etc. upto in the last concentration the idea and feeling are ceased. Therefore there is no separate *praśrabdhi-dharma*.

The opinion that the first dhyāna is associated with *vitarka* and *vicāra* is not good; for, according to the Sūtra in the first *dhyāna*, the ascetic ceased the speech. *Vitarka* and *Vicāra* are causes of the speech. How is there the cause of speech but the speech is ceased. To say that talk (*vyavahāra*) alone is ceased incurs this fault : When a man in the (mind of) desire-world does not speak, you must say his talk is ceased.

The first dhyāna is not the noble speechless state (*ārya-tūṣṇīm-bhāva*) because it is in close vicinity with *vitarka* and *vicāra* and not because it is associated with them. The Sūtra says: The sound is a thorn of the first dhyāna. So it is not a speechless state. The sound is thorn, because the mind in the first dhyāna is soft like a water-drop on the flower while the same in the second dhyāna is very strong like *Sarjararasa* tree. The contact etc. are also thorn of the first dhyāna, because the touch (*sparśa*) is the rousing factor of the dhyāna, but it is not so of the second dhyāna, etc. In the first dhyāna five consciousnesses are not put out while they are put out in the second dhyāna, and onwards.

166. *Second Dhyāna*

The ascetic again attains to and dwells in the second dhyāna which lies in joy-pleasure born of concentration, freed from *vitarka*

and *vicāra*, in the one-pointed state of mind (*ekotibhāva*) and inwardly serene (*samprasādana*) as a result of *vitarka* and *vicāra* being stilled. The statement that the " *vitarka* and *vicāra* are stilled " does not imply that the first dhyāna has them. For, this is just like the saying that even though there exists no faculty of pain (*duḥkhendriya*) in the first dhyāna, its appeasement in the second dhyāna is expressed. In the first dhyāna, though the five consciousnesses are there they do not, however, exist as sources of sorrow-faculty. If you say that the sense-consciousness in its nature is a source of sorrow and hence the first dhyāna would be with the pain. then the faculty of sorrowfulness is born of nonsensuous consciousness and therefore it would exist in all (meditative states). The first dhyāna is in the vicinity of the unconcentrated mind which rouses the sense-consciousness related to the desire-world. Hence there exists the sorrow-faculty (*duḥkhendriya*); for this reason its appeasement is not stated there. But there is no sorrowfulness-faculty (*daurmanasya-indriya*); for, it is the source of the sensual pleasures and causing the sensual joy. The person who secured the pure joy abandons the impure joy, i. e. sensuous pleasure. Therefore, there is no sorrowfulness-faculty in the first dhyāna. The sorrow-faculty arises on the support of non-concentration (*asamādhi*), because the first dhyāna is in the vicinity of distracted mind. Thus the appeasement of sorrow-faculty is not stated there. E.g. in the third dhyāna there is no sorrow-faculty; the fourth dhyāna is stated as freed from happiness and sorrow.

The ascetic in the first dhyāna is constantly distracted by *vitarka* and *vicāra* and hence their appeasement is expressed in the second dhyāna. The above expression that "inwardly serene" (*adhyātmaṁ-samprasādanam*) denotes that in the second dhyāna the mind being steady and well-balanced, the distraction (*vikṣepa*) gains no room. This is the form of the second dhyāna. The "one-pointed state of mind" means the mind abiding in one path, and it is termed dhyāna. This itself is "inwardly serene". Due to the force of this *samādhhi vitarka* and *vicāra* operate

of the first dhyāna, matter, feeling, idea, formation and consciousness as disease, absesses and... non-soul (*v*. ch. 162). The first four of the said characters are other names of *duḥkha* and therefore *āsrava*-freed. Does a learner also not have *āsrava*-freed joy ? One who entered into the path-mind has no that joy, but one remaining in common parlance has it. The learning-ender has never. Q. But there is one Sūtra saying that one realizes four dhyānas with joy and happy mind. Why do you say that there is no *āsrava*-freed joy ? A. Only the non-soul -idea is *sukha*. The ascetic realizing the non-soul-idea dispels all his perversions. His mind becomes delighted as a result of his knowledge of the absolute truth; hence there is no separate joy. Moreover the Sūtra elucidates that one does not gain the knowledge of the absolute truth through the joy.

167. *Third Dhyāna*

The Yogin is neutral as a result of his being detached from the joy, abides mindful and watchful and experiences happiness with his body when the noble men declare that he happily abides neutral and mindful; thus he attains to and dwells in such third dhyāna.

The Yogin becomes detached from joy on the plea that the joy is born of a discursive thought unsteady, a mental activity and accompanied by sorrow from the start. Attaining to the clam third dhyāna he abandons the second dhyāna. Happiness born of the joy is shallow while the same born of the absence of the joy is very deep. A man, e.g. is not always pleased by his son, wife, etc. because the joy is born of concept-discursive thought (*saṁjñā-vikalpa*). The happiness is not born of the discursive thought and it is always there. Likewise the Yogin also thinks that the joy that is felt for the first time is happiness. Then, subsequently he becomes disgusted with it. In the second dhyāna the joy is produced from unsteady concepts and for this reason the Yogin, being oppressed by this joy, forms the idea of happiness in respect of joyless (3rd) concentration. If a

man in the presence of terrible heat thinks cold as happiness; when, however, he is freed from the heat, he thinks the cold no more as happiness. The Yogin on the other hand, being freed from the joy arouses the idea of happiness on the third dhyāna; why ? The second dhyāna may be a factor of happiness because of the presence of sorrow, e.g. for a man suffering from heat, the cold may become happiness. And it may be a factor of happiness as a result of freedom from sorrow, when, e.g. one is freed from his disliked (person). The Buddha, being freed from the monks of Kauśāmbī says : I am now happy. Likewise the Yogin being freed from the unsteady concept (*cala-saññā*) thinks that the third dhyāna is happiness. The first dhyāna, for example becomes happy, because it is freed from the five sensuous objects.

" Neutral ". The Yogin being previously much attached to the joy was variously distracted but now his mind being detached from it becomes quiet. Therefore, it is said that he is neutral. " Mindful "—he recollects the disadvantage of the joy; "watchful " -he sees it actually. " Experiences happiness with his body " means that he is detached from the joy and neutral; hence his happiness is neutral-state itself. This happiness is not born of the concept-construction. That is said as: he experiences happiness with his body. " When the noble men declare that he is neutral ", this declaration is their talk of happiness following the ordinary men. Because he has a detached mind, he is neutral. " He happily dwells mindful " means this person acquires true neutrality because he becomes detached after seeing the disadvantage of the joy. Recollection of its disadvantage is an auspicious memory. Here " watchful " is to be repeated to suit the context of *smṛti*, mindfulness. Happiness is an ultimate one, *paramasukha*. Therefore the noble men say that he is neutral.

In the third dhyāna there is an experience of happiness and joy, why do you say it is the neutrality-happiness ? I do not state in this Śāstra that there is a neutrality-happiness other

than the feeling (*vedanā*). The experience of happiness itself is neutrality-happiness. In the fourth dhyāna also there is the experience of happiness-joy as there is neutrality. However, abandonment of happiness is stated there because the happiness of the third dhyāna is abandoned. There is the joy in the first and the second dhyāna as a result of the presence there of concept-construction. Because of its absence in the third dhyāna, it is termed happiness. It is said so further because the activity (*pravṛtti*) in this dhyāna is stilled. The noble men, e.g. say that an activity and a greedy mind are sorrow (*duḥkha*). The activity (*iñjana*) is a designation of *vikalpa*, a mental act of discursion. Its absence is the happiness.

168. *Fourth Dhyāna*

The Yogin attains to and dwells in the fourth dhyāna which is pure in neutrality and pure in mindfulness and which is of no sorrow and no happiness because of sinking down already of joyfulness and of sorrowfulness (*saumanasya-daurmanasya*) and because of abandoning happiness and sorrow (*sukha-duḥkha*). If sorrow has already been abandoned, why is it stated here ? The fourth dhyāna is free from *iñjana*, activity; in order to prove this it is stated that there is no fourth feeling. For, *iñjana* means shaking. The mind of Yogin being oppressed by happiness and sorrow is shaking. When it shakes the lust and hate arise. Because of abandoning happiness and sorrow his mind does not shake.

This dhyāna being most advantageously felt, why do you not say it is the (embodiment of) happiness? It is of no sorrow and no happiness because of sinking down of the feeling. Wherein the mind recollects and discerns: " this is happiness ", that is termed happiness. The fourth dhyāna is acquired by the Yogin when he is freed from the third dhyāna-happiness and therefore it is not considered to be happiness.

Here neutrality is pure as it lacks in *iṣaṇa*, liking. In the three previous dhyānas there is liking: " this is happiness ". Here

(in this dhyāna) mindfulness is also pure. In the third dhyāna, it is polluted as it attaches itself to happiness. Reaching fourth dhyāna the lust for happiness being abandoned the mindfulness is pure.

Though *samprajanya* is not expressly stated it is implied in the expression: *smṛti-mān*, "mindful", because these two are invariably associated with each other. Another reason for not stating it expressly is this: this is the dhyāna-path and not *samprajanya*-path. *Samprajanya*, watchfulness is a sort of discerning knowledge (*prajñā*). In the later portion of the third dhyāna *Samprajanya* is not mentioned. This mindfulness accomplishes dhyāna-concentration, that is, when one's concentration is not fully effected, the mindfulness again taking notice of the thought (*sañjñā*) accomplishes it. When one attains to the neutrality the highest quality, the attention (*manaskāra*) i.e. watchfulness (*samprajanya*), a lower quality is no more needed for him. Therefore it is not stated here.

Then the reason given by other masters for not stating *samprajanya* is refuted.

In the fourth dhyāna breathing is stopped because it is supported on the body and mind. When the mind is very subtle, the breath is also subtle. The mind here is unshaky; hence the breathing is stopped. It is stopped because the mind here is pacified on account of steady concept. Some masters say that since the Yogin's body has changed into one constituted of four great elements pertaining to this dhyāna, and its skin-pores are closed, his breath is stopped. This is wrong; for the flood of food-juice covers the whole body. If the skin-pores (*romakūpa*) are closed, the body will be no more active. Therefore the mental force of this dhyāna alone is the factor suppressing breath.

In this *dhyāna* there is no pleasant feeling, how can there be thirst-residue ? There also exists a subtle pleasant feeling.

The dhyāna is, however, said to be of no sorrow and no happiness because of the cessation of gross happy feeling. A lamp, e.g. is shaken by a strong wind, when it is placed in a closed chamber, it does not shake. But there is in the room a subtle air moving about, though it is not strong enough to shake the lamp. Likewise in the fourth dhyāna there is happiness in a subtle degree, but because a grosser degree of the happiness is ceased, it is said to be of no sorrow and no happiness.

169. *Ākāśānantyāyatana*

Because all *rūpa*-ideas are passed over in all aspects, all the obstacle-(*pratigha*) ideas are set down and all other variety -ideas (*nānātva-sañjñā*) are not conceived, ether is limitless-thus thinking the Yogin attains to and dwells in *Ākāśānantyāya tana*.

Here *Rūpa*-idea means the idea of colour, taste, odour and touch; *pratigha*-obstacle (*antarāya*) which the above rūpas (colour, etc.) create; *nānātva-sañjñā* the idea of bell, and the idea of drum, etc. These three-fold ideas are causing factors of various defilements, various actions and various sufferings. Therefore the Yogin passes them all over. One who passes over *rūpa*-ideas ceases the osbtacle-idea and due to this the variety-idea does not appear.

Some masters interpret: The *rūpa*-idea is the idea related to visual consciousness. *Pratigha*-idea is the idea related to auditory, alfactory, gustatory and tactile consciousness. Variety-idea is the idea related to non-sensuous consciousness. This interpretation is not correct. When it is stated that the obstacle-idea is suppressed, *rūpa* is also included. Apart from the *rūpa*-idea and the obstacle-idea there is no separate *rūpa* related to non-sensuous conciousness. Therefore there is no need to state 'variety-idea' separately.

The Yogin meditates on *ākāśa* as he is tired of *rūpa*-ideas and their oppressions. He grasps the ideas of inward *ākāśa* of the eye, nose and neck and of outward *ākāśa* of the well, house-entrance and within the grove, etc. He sees that this body is prone to death and to be burnt by the fire or the birds and animals will eat it up or being rotten it will turn into worms. It is therefore understood that this body was previously with *ākāśa*.

This *samādhi* takes *ākāśa* as its object; it also takes as its object his own aggregates as well as other's. For the compassionate Yogin thinks: The living beings are oppressed by the *rūpa*-concepts and hence pitiable. They become the objects of his meditation. Though he relies on *rūpa* he is not much interested and attached to it.

Q. *Ākāśa* is in the nature of matter base, how does the Yogin relying on such *ākāśa*, pass over the matter-idea ? A. Since this *samādhi* relies on the unmanifest *ākāśa*, it passes over *rūpa* matter. Q. The inward *ākāśa* i.e. within the eye, etc. is stated above as object. That is the manifest *ākāśa*. The Sūtra defines only that *ākāśa*: *Ākāśa* is wherein no *rūpa* exists. A. *Ākāśa* is not in the nature of *rūpa*. So says another Sūtra: *Ākāśa* is non-*rūpa*, invisible and non-obstructive *apratigha*. Q. There is another Sūtra: *Ākāśa* is cognized on the support of light (*āloka*). There is no any other than *rūpa* that is so cognizable. A. *Ākāśa* is an absence of the *rūpa*, matter. With the help of light *rūpa* is cognized. Therefore the absence of *rūpa* is cognized on the support of light. But no *ākāśa* exists (as an entity).

Ākāśa is understood in the dark also. The blind knows it with the help of his hand as well as his stick. Therefore it is of no *rūpa*-character. *Rūpa* is obstructive, whereas *ākāśa* is non-obstructive. It cannot be destroyed by the fire like *rūpa*. Q. At the appearance of *rūpa*, *ākāśa* disappears. When, e.g. a wall is erected, *ākāśa* is no more there. A. But here *rūpa* is raised; nothing thereby is destroyed, because the absence of *rūpa* is *ākāśa*. Therefore a non-entity cannot be turned into another

non-entity. If you say it is cognized by our eyes as e.g. at the door-entrance of the house. It is already criticized that *ākāśa* is not perceivable by our eyes.

Therefore it is a non-existent element. Wherein there is no rūpa, there *ākāśa* is. Q. The *Ṣaḍdhātu* Sūtra counts *ākāśa* as one of the six elements of the body. And it is said: *Ākāśa* is invisible, non-matter and non-obstructive. A non-existence cannot be described thiswise. The horn of the hare is not spoken of so. A. True, what is substantially existing, is situated in a place. Non-material elements (*nāman*), e.g. are situated in the matter and *vice-versa*. But *Ākāśa* is not situated anywhere; therefore it is a non-existent element. Your quotation about *ākāśa* as one of the corporeal elements is not correct; for, when there is one matter another matter is hurt. In the absence of one contrary matter another matter increases. In this sense the Buddha says that the man's body is constituted of six elements (including *ākāśa*). Your illustration of the hare-horn is not apt. The artificial things past, future and all exist absolutely in the space (*ākāśa*). This kind of statement cannot be made in the case of hare-horn. If you say that mind also is non-matter and non-obstructive; and hence it must be stated as non-existent, I would reply that the mind is the maker and something which clings to *ālambana*. *Ākāśa*, on the other hand, has no any action. It is an *abhāva-dharma* non-existence. since all the manufactured things can be accommodated on its being mere non-existence. Therefore this *Samādhi* from the beginning relies on (the unmanifest) *ākāśa*.

This *Samādhi* is obtainable is all regions and in the cessation-path. Some masters say: The trances of the formless world rest on the cessation of the inferential knowledge and not on that of the perceptive one. A. It rests on the cessation of every thing. Through the perceptive-knowledge it rests on the cessation pertaining to its own present region and through inferential knowledge on the cessation of other regions.

The sentient beings of the formless world can arouse the mind of other regions as well as the *āsrava*-freed mind. They do not thereby fall from that formless world as they are born there as a result of their actions. A Yogin living in the desire- and form-worlds may ascend to the other region of mind by virtue of his super-normal powers, *abhijñā*; he never falls down from his own region. Then *ākāśa*-concentration, *ākāśa*-base and *kṛtsnāyatana* are distinguished.

170. *Three Concentrations of the Formless World*

The Yogin, passing over *Ākāśānantyāyatana* in all aspects (and thinking that consciousness is limitless) attains to and dwells in the *Vijñānānantyāyatana*. He being much disgusted with the matter attains to *Ākāśa* and now he disregards even this element that serves an antidote to the matter. A man, e.g. crossing over the river by means of a boat disregards it, or a man driving out a thief from his house wishes to turn him back. Likewise the Yogin breaking the matter, *rūpa* on the support of *ākāśa*, wishes to eliminate that *ākāśa* also.

The Yogin taking in his consciousness the limitless *ākāśa* as *ālambana*, takes at the same time the limitless consciousness also as *ālambana*. Then disregarding *ākāśa* the yogin rests on consciousness. Just as being tired of the matter he rests on *ākāśa*, just so being tired of *ākāśa*, he rests on consciousness alone.

Being tired of consciousness, and breaking it the Yogin attains to and dwells in *ākiñcanyāyatana*. He thinks that wherein consciousness exists, there is the suffering; if I have the limitless consciousness, there ought to be suffering ultimately. Therefore he controls his mind that is rested on consciousness. This mind, being extremely subtle is termed *ākiñcanyāyatana*. "Base of Nothingness".

Again he thinks: *Ākiñcanyam*, this is an idea, *Sañjñā* which as a disease and boil leads to the suffering and worries. One

who has no *sañjñā* becomes dull, *mūḍha*. When I see nothingness (*ākiñcanya*) that is something. So no emancipation from *sañjñas*, (conceptions) is obtained. The Yogin sees *sañjñā* as calamity and no-*sañjñā* (*āsañjñika*) as swoon. (Therefore he enters into *Naiva-Sañjñā-nā-sañjñā-yatana* and ceases his mind). That which is calm and fine (*praṇīta*) is termed *naiva-sañjñā-nā-sañjñā-yatana*. The worldlings being frightened think *no-sañjñā* as a swoon. Therefore, they are not able to cease utterly their mind.

The *Asañjñi* gods (of the form-world, *Rūpa-loka*) also are (capable of) ceasing their mind :-Say some masters. But it is not correct; for, if in the form-world they are (capable of) ceasing the mind, why not in the formless-world ? Q. The form-world is dominant in the form and hence they cease their mind. In the formless world *rūpa* is already ceased, but now the mind is to be ceased. For one who visualizes the simultaneous cessation of both *rūpa* and mind there will be a frightening and puzzling. A. Thing (*rūpa*) which exists there (in form-world) is not suppressor (of any thing=mind). But something that is produced there in the meantime would be suppressor, as in the *Nirodhasamāpatti*. Q. The fruit of the mind's cessation is the freedom from conception (*asañjñika*) and hence the cessation of both *rūpa* and mind becomes blameworthy. A. The possession of the mind is also the fruit of the Cessation-trance. When the fruit is not stopped, then, it is said as resting in the fruit. *Rūpa*, e.g. of the magically created beings produces again its effect (fruits) in their mind. Therefore the mind is not absolutely ceased to exist. Thus cessation of the mind should neither be declared in the form-world nor in the formless-world.

In the *Asañjñi*-trance (i.e. *Asañjñi* gods) also the mind does not cease; for, if the Yogin gets disgusted and detached from the mind, then he would cease it. If any one tired of the mind would not be born in the formless-world, what is to speak of his birth in form-world ? The worldlings entertain the *Ātman*-

notion towards the mind. The Sūtra says: This is a decided notion for several years of the unlearned worldling "This is a mine, this is 'I am' and this is my soul". Therefore he is not utterly disgusted with and detached from (the mind). The Sūtra again says: The heretics preach as cessation the destruction of the three clingings (*upādāna*), but not of the soul-doctrine-clinging. So they cannot cease the mind. The *Markaṭa-upama-*Sūtra says: The unlearned worldling would feel detached from the body, but never from the mind. He may better take this body constituted of the four great elements as the soul, but never the mind as the soul. Why? This body is experienced continuing for one year, ten years, or hundred years at best. But what is stated as thought (*citta*) at times, mind (*manas*) at times and consciousness (*vijñāna*) at times arises as something new at day time and ceases as something new at night. A monkey, for example, roaming in the forsest, leaping from one tree to another tree catches hold of one branch and leaves another branch. Likewise one mind arises in day time and another ceases at night. The learned noble disciple conceives well and rightfully (*yoniśaḥ*) its dependent origination and discerns that it is only impermanent. The ignorant of the dependent origination discriminates the knowledge of a particular feeling etc. (as a stable ultimate). All the heretics cannot cease their mind because they have always an indiscrimination-conditioned knowledge. The worldlings, though they feel detached from the matter, do not feel so from the mind; thus they cannot afford to cease the mind. Those who can cease the mind simultaneously (with the matter), why, "cannot they realize it?".

The worldlings out of fear from ceasing the mind are incapable of considering the Nirvāṇa as calm and auspicious. The Sūtra says: the thought: "This I am not and this is not mine" is the source of frightening (*uttrāsa-pada*). When considering no-*sañjñā* as a swoon the worldling does not harbour Nirvāṇa as calm and auspicious, how can he be able to cease the mind utterly? This is the characteristic of the worldlings that they

leave the lower sphere on the support of the higher sphere. Therefore there is no any sound ground for complete cessation of the mind (in the *asañjñi* world). Bringing before himself a very subtle concept by force of his *Samādhi* he enlivens his mind and says that there is no concept (*sañjñā*). The moment he raises a gross mind, he falls down from that sphere. He is named *asañjñi* free from *sañjñā* concept, as one, e.g. is said to be *ajña*, ignorant, even though he has a bit of knowledge or one is called toothless even though he has one or two, or like the frozen and hibernated fish and snail which appear completely dead-like; or as a sphere is termed *Naiva-Sañjñā-nā-Sañjñā-yatana*. Likewise there also exists really a very subtle *sañjñā*, and it is, however, termed empirically *asañjñin*.

171. *Nirodha-samāpatti*, *Cessation-trance*

The Yogin, surpassing in all aspects *Naiva-Sañjñā-nā-Sañjña-yatana*, dwells contacting with his body in the cessation of *Sañjñā* and *Vedayitā*. In the above dhyāna formula the expression "surpassing in all aspects" is not made and in the formless trances also the expression '*astangama*', setting down not found, because as we have already stated all such elements like *vitarka*, *vicāra*, *prīti*, *sukha*, etc. persist (in a subtle degree) in all dhyānas and trances. In the *Ākāśa* trance the yogin is freed from the *rūpa*-idea, but not from the *vitarka*, *vicāra* and other dharmas.

Some masters think that 'surpassing', 'stilling', setting down' all mean the same thing though expressions are different. In the formless trance the mind remains steady and in the lower sphere it is unsteady and shaky. Therefore "surpassing in all aspects" is not stated. Q. You have already stated that there is a thorn, i.e. matter-notion in the *Ākāśa*-sphere. How do you say that the mind remains steady there ? A. True, there is thorn, nevertheless the fourth dhyāna is said to be unshaky; in the formless trances it is said to be firm by virtue of the trance-force.

Cessation-trance is two-fold: (1) destructive of the defilements and (2) non-destructive of the defilements. The first is amongst eight emancipations and the second is in nine gradual dwellings (*vihāra*). (1) Because of cessation of defilements there is a cessation-trance and (2) because of cessation of the mind and mental states there is a cessation-trance. The first is the eighth emancipation which is the same as Arhant-fruit. This state is what is pacifying all concepts (*sañjñā*) and does not revive them again. Here (i.e. in this trance) in spite of the assuagement of all concepts there are other fetters ; hence there is a possibility to revive them.

Cessation that is found in nine gradual dwellings is a magnificent one. If any one well exercises dhyāna-concentration he will secure this cessation-trance as a result of his path-mind-force. One who has not that force, will have only the cessation (of mind) and not this magnificent strength. Therefore nine gradual dwellings are set forth. There is the cessation of mind also elsewhere, in the fourth dhyāna, e.g. one, ceasing the mind and mental states enters in the no-concept state (*asañjñāyām*). The Sūtra says: Stream-winner and others realize the cessation. The cessation is the ceased mind alone and there is no any separate element known as cessation. Therefore, we understand that there is (no) mind's cessation apart from these nine spheres.

In this trance all the mind and mental states are ceased. Why are there *sañjñā* and *vedayitā* alone stated ? All the minds are termed "experienced" (*vedayita*). It is two-fold (1) *Sañjñā*-experienced and (2) *prajñā*-experienced. (1) The first is the mind that relies on manifest things (*saṁskṛta*) because all conceptual forms are within *prajñapti*, nominalism. Two-fold nominality : nominality of the cause-aggregate and that of its constituent elements (*dharma*). Therefore the mind that relies on all manifested elements (*sañskṛtālambana*) becomes *sañjñā*. (2) *prajñā*-experienced is the mind that relies on un-manifested elements. Thus in the expression " cessation of *Sañjñā* and *vedayita* " are included all the mind and mental states.

Q. *Sañjñā* and *vedayita* are most important of all the mind and mental states and that is why they alone are specified. Defilements have two parts: thirst-part and wrong-view part. The first part arises from *vedayita* and the second one from *sañjñā*. In the desire-world and form-world *vedayita* is important while in the formless world *sañjñā* is important. In the consciousness-stations also *sañjñā* and *vedayita* alone are stated. Since they all come up from the mind, they are named *saṁskāra*. In the cessation-trance *sañjñā* and *vedayita* include all the mind and the mental states as the latter is invariably connected with the form. A. It is not correct to say that they are stated by way of importance. In that case the mind alone is to be stated. It is stated in the Sūtra: The mind is the lord and the abode of two-fold defilements, and *sañjñā* and *vedayita* are stated in dividing the mind alone. So the mind alone is to be stated. Thus your argument by way of importance is impossible.

It is said that yogin dwells in this trance contacting with his body, etc. because this cessation-*dharma* is inexpressible and to be experienced inwardly within the body; and the eight emancipations may be stated as dwelling in contact with the body. A man, e.g. who touches the water experiences its coldness and not one who hears the sound. Likewise, because this cessation is a mindless state the yogin contacting with his body dwells in (=realizes) the cessation-this is said.

Q. Your opinion that this cessation-trance is a mindless state is not proper. For, the man who enters into this state is only a living being. There is none in the world who is freed from the mind. The Sutra says: Life-force (*āyus*), temperature and consciousness: these three elements are mutually inseparable. Therefore there is no any living being freed from the mind. All living beings live on food. But the man that has entered into the cessation-trance has no food as he has no edible food, etc. The mind arises from another mind. When this mind ceases there is no another mind arising. In the absence of

samanantara-pratyaya, the preceding mind-factor, how can a prospective mind arise ? Moreover, the moment the mind enters into Nirvāṇa without residue, it ceases with its continuity stopped and it ceased to exist nowhere else. So says the Sūtra: The yogin surpasses the sensuous objects by means of four rūpa-dhyānas, i.e. the form world, the latter by means of formless world, and all volitions and attentions by means of cessation. In a person who enters into Nirvāṇa with residue the defiled mind ceases and in him who enters into Nirvāṇa without residue the undefiled mind ceases. This is the right interpretation of Tathāgata's dispensation. The person that enters into cessation-trance is not termed dead person. Death is when the mind ceases to exist. If the ceased mind takes birth again, the dead person also may revive to the life. Then it will not be death. If the ceased mind again comes into life, the person that enters into Nirvāṇa would be revived. Then there will be no absolute release. Therefore the mind does not cease absolutely.

The author replies: You conclude that there is no living being who is freed from the mind (I may state here that) though this person and the dead person may appear as one, but one is different from the other. The Sūtra asks the same question: The person who is dead and the person in the cessation-trance: what is the difference between them ? In respect of dead person these three elements: life-force (*āyus*), temperature and consciousness are all utterly ceased; but in the case of the person, who enters into the cessation-trance the mind alone ceased but the life-force and temperature are there as unseparated from the body. Therefore it is plain that there is a living being freed from a normal mind. This person's mind has gained a stagnant state. Due to this stagnant state he is termed as possessed of the mind, *sacitta*. He is not, however akin to a tree or stone. You have stated that three elements: life-force, etc. are mutually inseparable elements. This is said in respect of the living beings of the desire-world and the rūpa-world. In the arūpa-world there is life-force and there is consciousness but not the temperature

there. In the cessation-trance there is life-force and there is temperature but not the active consciousness there. The above Sūtra also says that consciousness is separate from the body. Therefore the fact that they are mutually inseparable elements is not applicable everywhere.

You said that in the absence of food how can the body live? The body lives in the present period on the food of the volitional activity pertaining to the mind of the previous moments. You argued that one mind arises from another mind. (I hold that) one mind is the causal factor of another mind. One mind being ceased produces another. If you ask how can a ceased thing produce its result. The eye, e.g. being ceased does not produce its consciousness. Nevertheless the ceased mind produces its result, mind like the ceased action produces its resultant. The mind and its consciousness are so clossely mutually related and are not on a par with the eye and its consciousness. Therefore your example of the eye is not a proof (*ahetu*). Your contention that at the stoppage of its flowing stream the mind ceases utterly, is not correct. Cessation is three-fold: (1) matter-cessation, (2) mind-cessation and (3) the cessation of both. The first cessation is in the formless world, the second one in the cessation-trance and the third at the time of death.

The difference between the dead person and the person in the cessation-trance is this: for the latter life-force and temperature do not cease while for the former all the three utterly cease. In the case of the latter the mind revives on the support of the life-force and the temperature but not so in the former's case. Your accusation that the ceased mind having the possibility of reviving, there will be no final release is not proper. For, when one enters into Nirvāṇa, his life-force, temperature and consciousness which are the results of the previous actions ceased and do not come back again, but when one enters into the cessation-trance, his previous mind revives as a result of his life-force and temperature which are operating. So is said in the

section on the cessation-trance (in *Saṁyukta*) : The person that has entered into the cessation-trance wakes up again on the support of six bases and the bodily animation (*kāya-jīvita*). Therefore his mind comes back to operate again while that of the Nirvāṇa-entered person does not. We, therefore, understand the cessation-trance is a mindless state.

The charity given to the person that has returned from the cessation-trance causes the result in this life; for his mind is extremely calm. The Sūtra says that his mind pertains to Nirvāṇa. His meditative power is very strong and due to that his wisdom too is magnificent. By virtue of his magnificent wisdom the donor gains an extraoradinary result. The seed, e.g. that is sowed in a well tilled field produces necessarily a good harvest. The man that has returned from this trance is extremely detached from the world and hence the homage to him is an extraordinary act. He is freed from the defiled mind even empirically. He remains always in the absolute truth whereas others are in the empirical truth. He is always situated in the *Saraṇa-dharma*. *Saraṇa* is the mind which is rested on the manifest elements. A *gāthā* says:

The field is infested with weeds
The people are infested with lust.
Therefore the charity given to the
lust-freed person brings about an immense fruit.

The empirical thought (*prajñapti-Sañjñā*) is conditioned by lust. The man of cessation-trance rests in Nirvāṇa and hence he is freed from the empirical thought. The Sūtra says: The donor whose charity the Yogin receives and enters into an illimitable concentration, gains an illimitable merit. When the Yogin rises up from the cessation-trance his thought rests in Nirvāṇa; hence it is termed "Illimitable". The charity to him causes its fruit in this very life.

Some masters say: The cessation-trance is a mind's dissociate element, and also a mundane dharma. The author replies:

As it has already been pointed out that the Yogin who has returned from the cessation-trance has some qualities such as a superb tranquillity and others; these qualities cannot be mundane. If you say it is a mind's dissociate element serving as a check not letting any mind arise on the analogy of a red hot iron-piece allowing no dark colour at the time; but the dark colour appears again when it is cooled down, then Nirvāṇa also will be a mind's dissociate element, because on the support of Nirvāṇa other aggregates do not arise. If Nirvāṇa is not a mind's dissociate element, the cessation-trance also will not be so.

The Yogin enters into this trance gradually and wakes up gradually. In waking he has three-fold contact (*sparśa*): *āninjya*, *animitta* and *apraṇihita*. Those three contacts are present in the mind which rests on an immutable element. What is void (*śūnyatā*) is *āniniya*. The mind which rests on the manifest element, being light, can have *injana*, i.e. the cognition of *rūpa*, feeling, etc. When the mind is void, it is objectless (*animitta*). In the objectless mind there is no lust, etc. or any other thing. This mindless state has at first Nirvāṇa as its object and then takes the manifest element as its object; therefore it is said that the said three contacts are felt at the time of waking.

Q. Some masters say: The mind of the person in the cessation-trance is *āsrava*-tainted, and when he wakes up, his mind is at times *āsrava*-tainted and at times *āsrava*-freed. How is this ? A. It is not *āsrava*-tainted. The Yogin having broken all the manifest elements enters into the trance. When he wakes up, only the mind that is rested in Nirvāṇa appears before him. Therefore it is *āsrava*-freed by all means.

The Sūtra says: The Yogin while entering does not think: I enter into the cessation-trance and while waking, he does not think: I wake up from the trance. Nevertheless he enters into it because his trance-force is very strong as he has cultivated constantly the trance. The yogin enters into the trance after breaking the manifest elements. If his mind is

not controlled and he still lingers in the manifest object, then he is not considered to have entered into the trance. That is why the Sūtra says: His mind has already been trained in such manner that it could approach the trance spontaneously.

Q. If there is no anything other than the void that is to be experienced, what good will be out of this trance? A. The trance being strengthened on account of its cultivation for long time, his knowledge-vision becomes firm and well-grounded.

172. *Ten Entire-bases* (*Kṛtsnāyatana*)

Mind's mastery (*citta-bala-vaśitā*) strong enough not to shake off its previous object is named *kṛtsnā-yatana*. The Yogin has taken a limited symbol, *nimitta* (for meditation). He deepens it by the strength of *adhimukti*, a strong faith. For, when he enters into the truth because of his concentrated mind's strength everything appears to him as void. When he enters into *adhimukti*, the symbol previously grasped follows. What is (objective) character of this *adhimukti* ? The colours, blue, etc. are innumerable. Their originals in brief are four. The four great elements, earth, etc. and four original colours: these are eight. The space is that which is divided by these elements. Consciousness which grasps the unlimited space is also unlimited. For, no limited thing grasps the unlimited thing. These are ten.

Q. The earth consists of other elements, water, etc. How does the Yogin meditate on the earth alone ? A. Meditating on it for long time he grasps the earth-symbol, then he perceives the earth alone and nothing else. Is the earth-symbol perceived by the Yogin existent substantially or not ? It is not a substance, it becomes earth by the strength of faith, *adhimukti*. The magically created thing is accomplished by the force of concentration (*samādhi-bala*) and hence it is an artificial thing, viz. light (*prabhā*) water, and fire, etc.

Q. Some Ābhidharmikas say that the eight *kṛtsnāyatanas* are obtainable only in the fourth *dhyāna*. A. If they exist

in the world of desire and three *dhyānas*, what harm will be there ? The last two *kṛtsnā-yatana* are present in their own spheres. These ten are all *āsrava*-tainted as they are shaken by their objects. Is the ether (*ākāśa*) here the same as that which is not obstructing any material thing? The Yogin, by virtue of *adhimukti* views as void that space which is limited within the cavity of eye, ear, etc. but he does not penetrate directly into the really substantial *rūpa*. Therefore it is termed accomplished by a faith (*ādhimuktika*).

Q. The Sūtra says: To one who enters into the all earth-consciousness this thought arises: I, myself, am the earth and the earth itself I am. How is this ? A. It is possible because the Yogin sees his own mind pervading everywhere and hence considers that everything is myself. This concentration takes as the object all the earth available in the world of desire and other elements by way of *prajñapti*. There is no harm in saying so. The earth meant here is an unreal earth. It is not true that everything in this world is the earth. So this concentration participates in a bit of perversion as it gives rise to *ātman*-notion. The foul-meditation is not an absolute truth; nevertheless it serves as a favourable condition to the detachment. But this meditation does not serve such purpose. Hence there is a bit of perversion in it.

The Yogin does not contemplate on the feeling, etc. as unlimited as he does in respect of consciousness; because the earth, etc. are cognizable things and consciousness is cognizer. Feeling, etc. on the other hand, are only certain modes of the mind. Hence the Yogin does not see them as pervading everywhere as the pleasant and unpleasant feelings are not present everywhere. The Buddha's disciples dwell in this *samādhi* in order that this object should not perish. For, the object of this concentration is a base formed by the Yogin's *abhiniveśa*, a strong obsession. If that object perishes, the meditator becomes parallel to worldling.

173. *Impermanence-Notion Amongst Ten Notions*

Ten notions: Impermanence-notion, sorrow-notion, non-soul-notion, notion of offensiveness of material food, notion of displeasure towards all the world, foul-notion, death-notion, abandonment-notion, detachment-notion and cessation-notion. The impermanence-notion is when one having concentrated (his mind) on the impermanent things as impermanent, he understands so. All things are impermanent because they are produced due to causes and conditions.

Then the author elaborates the Sūtra that the sacrificer, Śakra, Brahmā, Dīpaṅkara Buddha, Pratyeka-Buddha, king Mahāsammata and all are impermanent. The Buddha says in brief: whichever has origination is all perishable. *Gomayapiṇḍi-Sūtra* is cited to the same effect.

It is believed as impermanent through three modes of faith. In the perceived things there is nothing permanent, nor is anything in the words of a trusted person (*āpta-vacana*) nor by inferential knowledge which is based on perception. If there is anything permanent, who, a wise man will aspire for a complete release? It is further to be said that things that have origin are all momentary and never remain even for a short while.

What is the benefit of believing in the impermanence-notion? It destroys the defilements. So says the Sūtra: the impermanence-notion cultivated and enlarged cuts the lust for the sensual pleasure, cuts the lust for *rūpa* and cuts the lust for becoming, cuts the self-pride and cuts all ignorance, etc. Q. That notion will increase instead the lust for the sensual pleasures. A person, e.g. understanding that day of prosperity is not lengthy becomes much attached to the sex-pleasure, etc.

A. The wise, foreseeing the sorrow of separation on account of impermanence of things gives up happiness, wealth and pride, and he does not become happy with it. In the absence of such

happiness no desire for the sex-pleasure arises in him. Craving arises on account of pleasant feeling. At the cessation of the feeling the craving is ceased. Therefore we understand that the notion of impermanence destroys the lust for sensual pleasure. What is impermanent is selfless. To the Yogin meditating on this aspect, non-soul-consciousness arises in the absence of which no idea of anything pertaining to the soul springs up. The Yogin, meditating on this notion perceives his as well as other's body as momentary and of dying character. How can he arouse the lust for pleasure ? The wise, recollecting rebirth and falling, etc. in future does not attach himself even to heavenly pleasures; he aspires only for the complete release.

A man of unceased I-notion laments that the external is impermanent. The worldling in spite of his being deprived of sensual pleasures aspires for the same pleasure. A child, e.g. even though beaten by his mother returns to his mother again. The wise nevertheless gives up the causes of suffering, viz. five-aggregates. He keeps on the non-soul-idea in order to break up the internal aggregates and has no lamentation at the destruction of external things. What will he aspire for ? The man of impermanence-notion also aspires for nothing.

It is said in the Sūtra: One should meditate with one-pointed mind on five aggregates as impermanent. The person who, not breaking up the internal aggregates perceives the external thing as impermanent, laments as he has kept on the soul-idea. Then this meditation is imperfect and wrong one. No detachment arises in him; e.g. butchers. If one does not meditate so constantly; lust for sensual pleasure returns to him at the end. So it is said "with one-pointed mind". The defilements are many; therefore one should meditate on the notion several times, as a small dose of medicine e.g. does not kill several complicated diseases.

The knowledge that things are impermanent is truth-knowledge. When one has this knowledge he does not have defilements, lust, etc.; for, they are conditioned by ignorance

(*avidyā*). This notion of impermanence assuages all the defiling elements. When the Yogin understands that this is impermanent, he will be no more desirous of it. A man knowing that some one is to die, would not hate him. As a result of the knowledge that things are impermanent none would have illusion about them. In the absence of illusion no perplexity etc. come into operation. Therefore, we under-stand, the impermanence-notion is the enemy and destroyer of all defilements.

174. *Sorrow-Notion*

What is oppressing is termed *duḥkha*. It is three-fold: Sorrow-in-sorrowful things (*duḥkha-duḥkha*), sorrow through modification (*vipariṇāma-duḥkha*), formation-sorrow (*saṁskāra-duḥkha*). What is really sorrowful (even) in the present moment, viz. sword, weapon, etc. is termed *duḥkha-duḥkha*. At the bereavement of one's own beloved wife, son and others what sorrow one may have, that is *vipariṇāma-duḥkha*. When one secures the void-and-non-soul-knowledge, a thought arises in him that all manifest things are oppressive (*viheṭhanā*) or hurting, that is *saṁskāra-duḥkha*. The notion of sorrow is the mind that pursues the said *duḥkha*s (by recollection).

The advantage of this notion. When one meditates on this notion, a detachment from the action-fruit arises in him; for, no meditator on this notion resorts to the joy from the sensual pleasures. In the absence of this joy no craving for that pleasure arises. If the Yogin understands that things are sorrowful, he does not experience any formation (*saṁskāra*). When things are impermanent and non-soul but not sorrowful, they are then not to be abandoned. They are abandoned because they are sorrowful and by abandoning them one gets released. Whoever may be whether he is young or old, whether fool or wise, and whether rich or poor, all they know this is sorrowful; they all would get detached. They all would be practising meditation and would arouse the idea of tranquillity and peacefulness (*śānta-upaśama*) towards Nirvāṇa, as they cherish the sorrow-notion

towards the empirical life. The living beings who are oppressed by the sorrow of the desire-world arouse an idea of tranquillity towards the first dhyāna, likewise the persons being oppressed by the sorrow of the world upto the top-most sphere of existence arouse the idea of tranquillity towards Nirvāṇa.

In the empirical life there is definitely a folly, viz. sorrow. So says the Sūtra: *Rūpa* is impermanent, sorrowful, and of modified character. This is its disadvantage. This sorrowful thing is adhered to on account of ignorance. For, living beings cherish the idea of happiness towards the sorrow. They get detached when they arouse the idea of an ultimate sorrow. Therefore the Buddha says : I shall expound the noble truth of sorrow to those who understand it. This the Buddha says taking into account the empirical truth. Whereon all the men and gods have the idea of happiness, towards that thing my disciples arouse the idea of sorrow and having aroused this idea get detached. To cherish the idea of the happiness towards the sorrow is a source of extreme passion. Only on account of this idea the sentient beings wandering in this empirical world feel tortured mentally. Those who secure this notion of the sorrow get released.

One secures the future body by virtue of four-fold food. He abandons it as a result of his sorrow-notion towards the food. He abandons it like the flesh of his own son, or of a skinless cow, or a fire-ball, or licking the edges of several *śakti*-weapons. One who cultivates the sorrow-notion does not dwell happily in any one of the four consciousness-stations as he visualizes sorrow everywhere. The ignorant moths (*śalabha*), e.g. fall in the fire thinking it as pleasant. The worldlings also, likewise fall in the fire of future life due to his ignorance. The wise, on the other hand gets released by virtue of his sorrow-notion. The entire three worlds are sorrow and origin of sorrow. The sorrow is sorrow-feeling. The producer of the sorrow is the origin of sorrow. Thus one should meditate that everything in the world is the sorrow; though not sorrow in the present

moment, it produces sorrow in the long run. Those who nurse a disgustful mind towards everything gets released.

175. *Non-Soul-Notion*

The Yogin perceives that all things are characterized by the modification of perishing. To what element one adheres as the soul, that element has the characteristic of modification. On account of this knowledge he forsakes the soul-thought. The same is to be said in respect of feeling, etc. just as one being carried away by the flood of the mountain stream, takes hold of some object and is saved from it, just so, does the Yogin conceive something as the soul, and perceiving it of the modified character resolves that it is the non-soul. Therefore he cultivates the non-soul-notion towards what is non-soul.

Advantages of this notion: The practiser of non-soul-notion fulfills the sorrow-notion. The worldling on account of the soul-notion does not look at truly sorrowful things as sorrowful. But as a result of non-soul-notion even at a small sorrow one realizes its oppressiveness; and for the same reason an indifferent mind is operating in him. When one has the soul-notion he fears that the soul would be hurt. When one understands the truth, then he abandons it that it is sorrowful, non-soul and perishable. Then his indifferent attitude comes into play. When one contemplates on the fact that there is no soul and nothing pertaining to the soul, he does not have any sorrow on things being perished.

On account of the non-soul-notion the meditator's mind becomes purified. For, all the defilements arise from the wrong view of the soul. The lust for sensual pleasure arises from the idea that this thing is beneficial to the soul and the aversion arises from the idea that this thing is harmful to the soul. Thus all the defilements arise from the idea of the soul alone. They all disappear on account of the non-soul-notion. At the disappearance of defilements the mind gets purified. Due to purified mind one

considers as equal all things like the gold, and the stone, sandal and the knife's edge, and the praise and the calumny. The mind freed from the desirable and the undesirable becomes well comfortable and tranquil. There is no any path other than the non-soul-notion that would lead to the Release.

Q. Sometimes the non-soul-notion produces sex-desire, e.g. affection towards feminine beauty. Persuing; that notion one accumulates no merit and demerit, for there is no merit or demerit in doing good or bad to one's own body. A. A man of soul-mind raises lust for sensual pleasure; he cherishes the idea of man towards his body and the idea of female towards the other's body and adhere to them. This adherence is due to conceptions (*prajñapti*) and that is the characteristic of *prajñapti*. Therefore non-soul-notion never gives rise to the mind of sensual pleasure. A man of non-soul-mind never accumulates action, e.g. Arhan, This non-soul-notion is the destroyer of all defilements and actions. Therefore one should cultivate it.

176. *The Notion of Offensiveness towards the Material Food*

All the sorrow arises from the desire for plenty of food and therefrom again arises the sex-desire. Whichever suffering is met with in the world of desire, all that arises on the condition of food, drink and sex-desire. In order to check the desire for the food one should cultivate the notion of offensiveness towards it.

For example, at the commencement of aeon the sentient beings descending from the heavens became apparitional beings. They were of lustrous body, travelling over the sky and being independent ate at first the juice of the earth. Being filled with that food they became deprived of their excellent lustre. Thus gradually they became under the grip of old age, disease and death became oppressed for several years by sufferings. Due to the adherence to the food they all were fallen from such prosperous lives. Therefore one should meditate on the food rationally (*yoniśaḥ*). The lust for the sexual act arises from the same adherence to

the food, and from the lust for the sexual act arise other defilements and on that account they commit bad actions. Three vices increase on account of bad actions and lead persons to do harm to men and gods. Therefore the defilements and calamities spring up from the desire for the food. The Buddha says: one should take the food with purified and tamed mind, and one should not get oppressed by sufferings on account of the food-pleasure. Some heretics observe the fasting ceremony. Therefore the Buddha says: One does not get separated (from impurities) by the stoppage of food; but having a right attention one should take food. Those who have stopped their food, their defilements do not cease. They suffer on the other hand from severe pain of death. Therefore the Buddha says that one should cherish the notion of offensiveness towards the food and thereby no fault would incur.

How one should cultivate that notion has been detailed in the remaining portion of the chapter.

177. *Displeasure-Notion towards all the Worlds*

The Yogin perceives in the world everything as sorrowful and nothing as happy in his mind. He practises the concentration freed from the joy, such as the impermanence-notion, sorrow-notion, non-soul-notion, etc. Then his mind does not get delighted in the entire worlds. Again he perceives what is desirable is promoter of the lust for sensual pleasures and what is undesirable is promotar of aversion and hate. Therefore he is not delighted in the both. More factors causing this displeasure are elaborated. The Sūtra says: Insignificant persons are born in a better place and the prominent persons are born in a worse place. The wise perceiving these disadvantages, aspire for Nirvāṇa alone. Two more quotations from *Saṁyukta* are made to show why the Yogin is displeased with the world. Advantage of this notion: Yogin's mind does not adhere to the various characteristics of the world; he, contemplating on this notion gains quickly the Release. In his mind no defiling forces spring up. Even

when they spring up, they quickly subside like water-drops in a red-hot iron plate. The person who is detached from the world gets delight in the supreme tranquillity. Therefore one should medidate on the displeasure-notion towards all the world.

178. *Foul-Meditation*

The Yogin perceives that this body is accomplished through impure things, viz. the digested impurities within the body. Its place of birth, viz. the mother's womb is impure. The place where the dead body is burnt becomes impure and inauspicious, etc. This idea is detailed at a greater length.

The advantage of this notion: Lust for sensual pleasure arises on account of a hand-some-notion towards men and women. Due to that lust the door of sinful actions is opened up. The lust subsides when one cultivates the foul-notion. He eliminates the body by means of the bluish-and-bloody-notions towards it and thereby he does not have lust for pleasure. How does the Yogin perceive as bluish what is truly not bluish ? He does so on account of his *adhimukti*-strength.

This meditation is not perverted one, because this body pertains to what is bluish and bloody. The Sūtra says: There is purity in this tree. One contemplating on the bluish and bloody characteristics overcomes other colours; e.g. the lustre of blue-coloured jewel hides the white cristal-colour. Likewise one contemplating on the bluish and bloody characteristics for long time fulfills the foul-notion. That notion being fulfilled, no lust for the sex-act arises and on account of this the person turns his face back from all the empirical entanglements and pursues towards Nirvāṇa alone. This is the advantage of the meditation on the foul-notion.

179. *Death-Notion*

The Yogin on account of this notion becomes impermanence-minded towards the life and hence one should contemplate upon

it. He becomes extremely delighted in good elements and abandons the bad ones. By virtue of mindfulness of this notion one's lust-thirst towards his relatives becomes thinner, he accumulates merits and quickly gets released.

How should one meditate on this notion ? It is stated previously in general that everything is impermanent. How one should meditate only on that this body is impermanent, more impermanent than the external things. If it remains for the longest period, it will not exceed more than one hundred years if well preserved. It is confronted with numerous enemies both animate and inanimate. Therefore one should meditate on the notion, etc. etc.

The ignorant says that if anyone pleases Yama (god of death) he may get release from the death. But Yama is not the master of animate beings in their birth and death. He simply considers whether a particular bzing has done good act or bad act. The person dies when his experience of the resultant fruits is exhausted. Therefore the Yogin, perceiving that this body is not reliable, but prone to death recollects the death-notion.

The notions of old age, disease, etc. are not stated for meditation, because the person being overscome by them is not destroyed. The disease takes away his strength; old age the youthfulness, and kinsmen, wealth and others. The body, however, remains in spite of the diesase, etc. Death, on the other hand, takes away everything. Old age, disease, etc. are the causal factors of the death and hence they are not stated separately. Everyone fears from the other world due to death which is universal but not to the old age and disease.

The death-notion is closely linked with the living bzings and these beings are mere nominal. Why does the yogin meditate on this notion ? The person who has no knowledge that the living bzing is characterized as pzrishable fears from death but one who meditates on the death notion does not fear. The

impermanence-notion, etc. are in the close vicinity of the path, but the other notions, viz. foul-notion, etc. are remote from the path. Therefore the person who does not secure the path should subdue his mind through this notion.

180. *Last Three Notions*

The abandonment-notion: It is said in the four rightful endeavours (or abandonments): In order to abandon the unmeritorious and sinful elements that have already arisen, one desires, endeavours, makes the effort and subdues his mind and abandons them. These sinful and unmeritorious actions are the causing factors of the hells and other sufferings. Therefore one should abandon them. They are abandoned when they are rationally (*yoniśaḥ*) viewed and valued. The advantage of their abandonment: no sinful acts follow him. The person does only what is worthy of doing, avoids eight inopportune moments. The Yogin being delighted in contemplation on the abandonment-notion makes the spiritual offering to the Buddha.

The detachment-notion and the cessation-notion: The lust being not aroused one becomes detached. The recollection of that detachment alone is the detachment-notion. There is the opinion that the abandonment-notion is the same as the detachment-notion. Why is it stated again? The detachment one gains from the abandonment, which is the same as curtailing of the lust for the sensual pleasure. So says the Sūtra: Five aggregates are abandoned on account of abandoning *kāma-rāga*. The abandonment-notion is the same as the detachment-notion; for, a thing for which one has no lust (or love), is abandoned. Therefore for one who has gained the detachment-notion all the suffering and defilements are ceased. The Sūtra says: The person freed from passion gets released. The gain of release is the same as the abandonment. The cessation is obtained by one who enters into the Nirvāṇa without residue. The Sūtra says: There are three self-beings: The abandonment-self-being, detachment-

self-being and the cessation-self-being. The first two are gained by the Arhan, who, being detached from the three worlds remains in Nirvāṇa with residue. The last one is obtained at the end of his life.

The release is two-fold: wisdom-release and the mind-release. What is said as the abandonment is that which abandons ignorance: thiswise the wisdom gets released. What is said as detachment is that which avoids the thirst (or craving): thiswise the mind gets released. The fruit of these releases is the cessation. What is said as the abandonment-notion is another expression of the abandonment of the ignorance-*āsrava*. What is said as the detachment-notion is another expression of the abandonment of passion-*āsrava* and of becoming-*āsrava*. What is said as the cessation-notion is the same as the fruit of these two. So says the Sūtra: The abandonment is on account of abandoning of all *saṁskāras*, manifest elements; detachment is on account of disinterestedness (*virāga*) towards every manifest element (*saṁskāra*) and the cessation is on account of all *saṁskāras* being ceased. Thus these three self-beings are different expressions of one and the same thing. The person who cultivates these ten notions does what is worthy of doing, puts to cessation all defilements and enters into the Nirvāṇa without residue.

181. *Concentration-Preliminaries* : *The First Five Preliminaries*

The concentration has been described. Its preliminaries are to be described now. They are eleven: (1) pure conduct, (2) right-knowledge-gain (*abhisambodhi-pratilābha*), (3) protection of sense-doors, (4) awareness of the limit in food, (5) to be awake in the first and the last parts of the night, (6) possession of good *vitarka*, consideration, (7) possession of good faith (*adhimukti*), (8) possession of endeavour-limb, (9) possession of release-base, (10) non-obscuration (*anāvaraṇa*), (11) non-attachment.

(1) Pure conduct:—abstention from un-meritorious actions three corporeal and four vocal ones is *śila*. To pay

homage, to receive and to accompany the holy men, and other good acts are also *śīla*. A goldsmith cleans first the gross impurities, likewise the ascetic first dispels the gross blemishes by adopting good conduct and then finer blemishes through concentration. Dhyāna and concentration become easier on account of good conduct. The Sūtra says: The good conduct is the root-cause and the ladder of the path. It says: It is the first chariot (in the long journey) and through the first chariot the second chariot is reached. Again it says: the good conduct is a level ground and setting up the levelled ground (and standing upon it) one visualizes the four noble truths. It is said: There are two forces: knowledge-force and contemplation-force. The first is the same as the adoption of *śīla* and the second is the path. One investigates through knowledge (*pratisaṅkhyā*) the harm of breaking the conduct and the benefit of its maintaining and adopts the good conduct; then gaining the path he refrains from the sins. It says: *Śīla* is the root of the Bodhi-tree. In the absence of the root there will be no tree. So the pure conduct is necessary. It is the law of nature, viz. in the absence of *śīla* dhyāna-concentration is not possible. e.g. the medicine is necessary for the treatment of disease; likewise there is no medicine for the treatment of the defilement-disease in the absence of *śīla*. It says: A man of the pure conduct does not repent in his mind and a desire-freed gets released. This is the reason why it is stated a preliminary of concentration.

There are three obscurations: (1) *karma*-obscuration and (2) *kleśa*-obscuration and (3) the fruit of these two, the resultant-obscuration. These three obscurations do not effect the person of pure conduct, and the mind that is not obscured gets concentrated. A man of pure conduct does not distract and hence he necessarily approaches Nirvāṇa like a log caught in the stream of the Ganges. The pure conduct curbs the corporeal and vocal sins and the meditation-concentration curbs the mental sins. Thus by curbing the defilements one gains the knowledge of the truth and secures the absolute abandonment.

It is said in the section on the path that the good conduct is the pillar-like and serves as a ditch of the city of the dhyāna-concentration-mind. It is the bridge to cross over the flood of the empirical life and it is royal permit to enter into the assembly of good men and a boundary of the field of the noble eight limbed path. In the field having no boundary the water does not remain; likewise the water of concentration does not remain in the absence of pure conduct. He is a man of pure conduct who is not delighted in the sinful actions and is afraid of other world and ill-fame, etc. The Yogin becomes of pure conduct in order to purify his mind. The *Sapta-rāga-maithuna-Sūtra* says: Even when the body is not affected by crimes (*āpatti*), the conduct becomes impure because the mind is impure. All the defilements are conditioned by the break of good conduct. At their restraint, one becomes of pure conduct. The disciples' conduct is aimed at Nirvāṇa. A man seeking for Tathāgata's path by virtue of the great compassionate mind for living beings may not respect much the good conduct. He maintains his conduct in such a way that it may lead to the Bodhi-self-being. This is the pure conduct.

(2) *Abhisambodhi*:—The Sūtra says: There are two factors of right view: (1) voice of scripture from the other, i.e. a teacher and (2) correctly (*yoniśaḥ*) understanding it. The *abhisambodhi* is the same as the voice of the scripture from the other. Here *Abhisambodhi* alone is stated as per the Sūtra which says: A monk said to the Buddha: It appears to me the possession of *abhisambodhi* is an imperfect factor of the path-gaining. The Buddha replied: Do not say so, it is a perfect factor of the path. For, the living beings who are affected by birth, old age, disease and death, after gaining the *abhisambodhi* get released from the birth, etc. They multiply the five elements, *śīla* etc. with the help of *sambuddhi* like a *Sāla* tree does with the help of the mountain, Himavant. The Buddha was interested in *sambodhi* by himself. When he obtained the path for the first time (he thought to himself): If anyone is teacherless, he then will be fearless and arrogant,

and always perverted and not walking in the path of tranquillity. And whom shall I choose as teacher? Thinking thiswise, he surveyed all other teachers who are not superior to him. Then he got this recollection: I have obtained the Dharma, on the support of which I become *Abhisambuddha*. Therefore I shall take refuge in it. Brahmā and other gods also praised that there is none superior to the Buddha and all the Buddhas have good dharma as teacher. *Abhisambodhi* is a lamp-like. Just as a man even having the eye does not see without the lamp, just so the Yogin, even though in possession of merits and sharp faculties is not much benefited without *abhisambodhi*. It is *abhisambodhi* whereby the person increases good dharma. All the good men are enchored in the good dharma and hence it is *Abhisambodhi* in the worlds of men and gods.

(3) Protection of the sense-doors: It is the right mindfulness. The Yogin not protecting one's self does not view (things) rightly. He should do so only placing himself in front the mindfulness whose another name is the self-possession (*samprajanya*). Through this self-possession he cuts the object present before him, and on account of this he does not seize the concept, *nimitta*, and by not doing so he does not follow nominalism (*prajñapti*). The sense-doors being not protected, *nimitta* is grasped due to which act the defilements induce the five-senses to act and at once he destroys the good dharma, morality, etc. The person who is protected in his senses, strengthens them.

(4) Awareness of the limit in food: The food is not for the sake of beautifying, sex-act or for the tasting the sensual pleasure, but entirely for the sake of maintaining the body. The person who deviates from the good dharma does not gain the path and in the absence of the path he does not get separated from misery. If one does not eat the food in order to cultivate the merits, he nurtures simply his murderer, he destroys the merits of the donor as well as spoils the offerings given by the people.

The limit in the food is that whereby the body is kept just active. He should take such food which does not accelerate the growth of cold, heat, disease, lust and anger, etc. The food should be taken in a proper time.

The heretics say that the person who takes pure food gains the pure merits. That which is sprinkled with water and sanctified by the sacred charms (*mantra*) is considered to be pure. But the author remarks: There is no any definite purity in food. If the food becomes impure on account of tasting it by others, no food is left untasted by the others. The milk is tasted by calf, the honey by bees, the water by worms, the flower by flies and the fruit by birds, etc. The body is impure, and filled with impurities. The food which is already impure, becomes further impure when it enters into the body. The people say by perversion that it is pure. The ascetic makes the food pure and suitable by the (observance of) restraints from killing, stealing and false livelihood, etc. and then takes it as sprinkled by the water of wisdom viewing it at the same time as offensive.

(5) To be awake in the first and the last parts of the night:—The ascetic understands that the accomplishment of the objective is governed by the effort and hence does not sleep. He realizes that the sleep is futile and nothing is achieved thereby. He controls the sleep by gaining the joy and high spirit in the dispensation of the Buddha: When the person recollects the blemishes of the old age, disease and death in the empirical life, his mind fears from them and hence he does not sleep. Moreover, the Yogin realizes: The human body as well as the sense-organs are obtained; the dispensation of the Buddha is invaluable, the discrimination between the good and the non-good is difficult to make; if I do not seek the crossing over (the life-sea), on what occasion I shall get released? Therefore one should make endeavour in order to do away with drowsiness.

182. *Unwholesome Considerations*

Possession of the wholesome consideration. If anyone, even though not sleeping, arouses considerations like *kāma*-con-

sideration, etc. (as described below) it is better to have a sleep but not those considerations. He should recollect the wholesome considerations like *Naiṣkramya-vitarka*, etc.

(1) *Kāma-consideration*:—When, on the support of passion, *kāma* one arouses consideration in respect of five sensuous objects and perceives that this is beneficial and happiness, that is *kāma*-consideration. The consideration that is aimed at harming the living beings is malevolence (*vyāpāda*) consideration, and harm-causing (*vihiṁsā*)-consideration. The ascetic should not memorize these three considerations; for, to do so is a heavier sin.

Infatuation-consideration is not stated separately. For, the above said first three (*kāma, vyāpāda, vihiṁsā*) are appearing one after another; but other defilements are not so. The ascetic sometimes arouses *kāma*-consideration as a result of recollecting the five sensual pleasures. Not obtaining them, he harbours malevolence and then harmful thought (*vihiṁsā*). Malevolence is the result born of infatuation. The said three considerations are causal factors of unmeritorious actions. The Sūtra says: This ant-hill is emitting the smoke at night and the flame in day-time. When an ascetic committing action in the day considers and investigates it at night: this is emitting the smoke at night; when an ascetic considering and investigating at night commits the action in day-time: this is emitting the flame in day-time.

(2) *Kinsman-consideration*: Recollections arise on account of kinsmen. Grief arises when one recollects his kinsmen's destruction and distress. When one recollects his doings along with his kinsmen, that is kinsman-consideration. The ascetic who left his home as well as his kinsmen should not recollect them again. In meeting with the kinsmen no good action increases. He should recollect that there is no kinsman or non-kinsman amongst men who are carried away by the flood of the birth and death. Why should he get attached to them? People love mutually only for the sake of some purpose, and

there is no any fixed code in their mutual friendship. For this and other reasons he should not recollect their consideration.

(3) *City-consideration*: Certain ascetic considers: Such and such city is prosperous and pleasant; going there I shall be happy and care-free. This consideration the ascetic should not entertain. There is one or other defect in every city. Certain is very cold and certain very hot, etc. One who is unsteady thiswise falls from his dhyāna and concentration. It is an attractive (*ramaṇīya*) place wherein the good *dharma* is increased. What use will be there by visiting several cities? Every city need not be visited; it may be appreciated from its report. To roam in every place causes fatigue. This body is the cause of suffering. Wherever he goes with this body, he suffers much more. So there is no need to visit everywhere.

(4) *Immortality-consideration*. The ascetic considers that the path is to be practised in a later stage; at the beginning the *Piṭakas*: *Sūtra*, *Vinaya*, *Abhidharma*, *Kṣudraka* and *Bodhisattva-piṭaka* ought to be studied and also other Scriptures are to be studied: many pupils must be mustered; the teacher is to be served, four shrines (*stūpas*) are to be worshipped, many men are to be exhorted to give charities, and then at the end the path is to be practised. This is immortality-consideration. The ascetic should not do this consideration. The time of death is uncertain and cannot be known in advance. The person engaged in some other duty cannot cultivate the path. At the time of death he is distressed by repentance. The worldling would reflect thus: The Yogin is in possession of different garbs and forms and yet gains nothing. The wise does not commit the unworthy act. The Dharmapada says:

> Those who have the mindfulness and self-possession never commit unworthy acts; their intoxicants set down while they are mindful and self-possessed.

Another stanza says: A non-gainer of the four truths would endeavour to achieve the sensual pleasure and much more so

to protect them. The immortality-consideraton is the culmination of ignorance. Who, a wise, knowing the life impermanent like a dewdrop on the blade of grass would reckon: I shall live for a moment. The Sūtra says: The Buddha addressed: You, monk cultivate the mindfulness of death. One of his disciples spoke: It appears to me that I may not live for seven years. Another disciple spoke: I may not live for six years, and still another: I may not live even for the moment. Now the Buddha scolded them: You are careless and dull: You (do not) cultivate the death-mindfulness. Certain monk then spoke to the Buddha: It appears that I may not live for the duration of breathing even. The Buddha said: Good! Good! You cultivate the death-mindfulness. Therefore one should not arouse the immortaility-consideration.

(5) *Other-gracing consideration.* When one wishes to convey his grace to a non-relative. He considers: I shall exhort certain person to give charity of wealth, of homage and of pleasures, but certain person does not approach. This consideration the ascetic should not make. For, none is benefitted by this recollection, but on the other hand, he distracts his mind. He should consider the ultimate and true benefit, viz. impermanence-teaching, etc. There may be a bit of merit; there may be a small advantage in putting aside the practice of the path; the blemishes however are many, because the concentrated mind distracts. The person who, on account of distracted mentality recollects others' advantage does not perceive the disadvantage of attachment to sensual pleasures.

(6) *Other-disrespecting consideration*:—The ascetic should not consider thus: This person is not equal to me in respect of clan, family, personality, beauty, wealth, honour, skilfulness, good conduct, sharp-faculty, dhyāna, concentration and wisdom, etc. because all of them is impermanent. There is no distinction among the men like the superior, inferior, etc. Their body, etc. are all equally impure. The worldlings' abundant wealth is

caused by sins and not everlasting. They would become again poor. Therefore one should not arouse the other-disrespecting-consideration. This pride is a constituent of ignorance, and how could the wise arouse this consideration.

183. *Good Considerations* (*Vitarka*)

Aloofness-consideration: It is the state of the mind desirous of the aloofness which is a separation from five sensuous objects as well as the worlds of form and non-form. A desire for this aloofness is *Naiṣkramya*-consideration.

Amongst considerations (*vitarka*), two considerations are pleasant, viz. non-malevolence-consideration and non-injury-consideration. These two are welfare-considerations. It is said in the Tathāgata-section: Two considerations are constantly attending Tathāgata, viz. welfare-consideration (*yoga-kṣema*) and aloofness-consideration. The first is the same as non-malevolence-consideration and non-injury-consideration and the second, aloofness-consideration. The person effecting these three considerations increases merit and his mind is concentrated and purified. The person engaged in these three considerations check the outburst of the defilements and due to this he realizes their abandonment. The ascetic through the desire for aloofness accumulates the plenty of good merits and hence gets released.

Eight great men's considerations: This is the law, dharma of the little-desired man and not of great-desired one; this is the law, dharma of quite content man and not of discontent one; this is the law of aloof man and not of company-addicted one; this is the law of industrious man and not of idle one; this is the law of mindful man and not of forgetful one; this is the law of concentrated man and not of distracted one; this is the law of wise man and not of fool; this is the law of elaboration-freed man and not of one eager for elaboration.

The ascetic of little desire desires what is necessary to practise the path. The content man: A man takes a little for some

reason but not becomes content. But one who takes a little and becomes content is 'content man'. The ascetic accepts his requisite with detached heart while the worldlings take plenty and for the sake of fame and ornamentation. The ascetic is content because he notices the disadvantage of protecting things. The fool accumulates unnecessary things and that is his characteristic. The ascetic should not be on a par with the white-garbed by seeking huge wealth. He must be of little desire and content. The ascetic goes from home in order to seek the happiness of aloofness; he would forget it if he is eager to gain wealth. If he does not forsake the external things, how can he do so internals. The profit-motive is the cause of danger and harm; e.g. the shower of hail-stones destroys all the plants. It is forsaken by the Buddha and other wise men. The Buddha says: 'I pursue no gain and honour and let them not pursue me. The ascetic forsakes them as he is content with his good law.' The Buddha says: 'Even gods have not obtained the happiness of homelessness, aloofness, tranquillity and true knowledge that I have obtained. Therefore I abandon the gain and honour.' Śāriputra says: Meditating on the conceptless trance through the void concentration, I observe all things as comparable to *kheṭa-piṇḍa*, a lump of vomited phlegm. The ascetic observes that one is not satisfied by enjoying the sensual pleasures; e.g. the saltish water does not quench the thirst. A man seeking much gets a little and hence he gets distressed. We notice in the world that a man, begging too much gets insulted and not respected by the people unlike a man of little desire. It is an unworthy act that an ascetic seeks too much. It is better not to accept what is offered by people. Hence the ascetic should observe little-desiredness and contentment.

Aloof man: The householder and the ascetic both act in physical aloofness (in respect of corporeal activities) and mental aloofness in respect of defilements. This is *praviveka*, aloofness. The ascetic, though he has not obtained the path, is pleased in *praviveka* while the man of white-garb being attracted by the

beauty of women of the place is not happy; but in the solitary place his mind becomes quite calm and peaceful. This *praviveka dharma* is spoken of very highly by all numerous Buddhas. This is evident from this incident. The Buddha once saw one monk sitting in the vicinity of a village, and was not much pleased; but seeing a monk redining in an empty place he was pleased. The reason for this is: the former monk cannot get his mind concentrated nor can he realize what is to be realized; while the latter can control himself and get released. The defilements, lust, etc. come into play on the support of *nimitta*-grasping. In the empty place no objects (*nimitta*), *rūpa*, etc. are there and therefore defilements are easily abandoned; the fire, e.g. is extinguished by itself in the absence of fuels. The Sūtra says: The ascetic who is engaged in the affairs of people does not secure even the temporary release, what is to speak of the unshakable release? The ascetic on the other hand, dwelling in a solitary place realizes both the releases. A lamp freed from the strong wind well shines; likewise the ascetic on account of dwelling a lonely place secures the truth-knowledge (*tattva-jñāna*).

Industrious man: When the ascetic making right effort abandons bad actions and accumulates good merits, he is termed the "industrious man". He increases the merits daily like a lotus plant grows to the level of water daily. Thus he obtains the advantage in the Buddha's dispensation. The idle man, on the other hand, decreases merits daily like a dead log. The advantage of making right efforts and the disadvantage of idleness are further elaborated.

"Mindful man":—He sets up his mindfulness in respect of his body, mind and feeling and elements and for this reason the sinful elements do not approach his mind. A miscreant e.g. could enter into an empty well-guarded place; but a pot, full of water, does not receive more water; likewise the bad dharmas do not encroach upon the person full of good dharmas. When one tastes a portion of the water of the ocean all the waters become

tasted as all the waters are within the ocean. The practiser of this mindfulness is said to be dwelling in the place of an independent activity. The defilement-death (*kleśa-māra*) does not disturb him like the crow does the owl (in day-time). His mind becomes well anchored and hardly shaky, like a round-shaped pot placed in a rope-swing (*śikya*). This ascetic realizes his objective very quickly. The *Bhikṣuṇī*-Sūtra says: Nuns addressed Ānanda: We dwell in the four foundations of mindfulness and discern some excellence more than ever. Ānanda replied: It is really so.

'Concentrated men':—For a person practising the concentration the supreme objective is accomplished. He becomes in the possession of a dharma surpassing the mankind, that is to say, he walks over the water and the fire and also flies over the sky. He obtains such happiness which gods, Brahmā, Sahāmpati, etc. cannot obtain. For a man of concentration good element increases constantly. He secures the fruit of renunciation, *pravrajyā*. He does not accept in vain the honour like an ordinary person. He alone makes the charity-merit mature. The concentration was practised by all Buddhas and noble men. He becomes fit for all good dharmas. If the concentration becomes successful, then the path is secured. If it is not successful, the person is born amongst the auspicious gods, viz. of the form-and the formless worlds. This kind of the result, viz. absolutely not-committing the sinful acts is not effected by the charity, etc. The Sūtra says: A young man cultivates the loving heart from the time of his birth; does he arouse a sinful thought? No, sir; because, this is the influence of concentration. The concentrated mind is a precondition to the truth-knowledge. The knower of the truth extinguishes all the formations (*saṁskāra*) and due to this all his sufferings and fatigue subside. The Yogin should act mindfully on the duties mundane and ultra-mundane.

Wise man:—In the mind of the wise defilements do not occur. If they occur, they at once subside like the water-drops

fallen in a red-hot iron plate. In his mind no idea (*saññā*) arises; if it arises, it, at once, subsides as a dew-drop fallen on the blade of grass dries up at the sun-rise. The wisdom-eyed person perceives the Buddha's dharma. He is a partaker of this dharma, just like a new-born child has the claim to his father's property. The wise man alone is stated as a living person while others are considered dead. He tastes the juice of the Buddha's dharma-nectar. Being concentrated in the Buddha's dispensation he is unshaken like a mountain. The wise is said to be a believer and the Buddha's body-born son while others are outside worldlings. So it is said: The wise secures his objective.

Elaboration-freed man:—Elaboration is the doctrine of identity or diversity. So Ānanda asks Śāriputra: Is there anything other than the entire and desire-freed cessation of the six bases of contact? Śāriputra replied: No, do not say so. By saying that there is something other than the said cessation of the six bases of contact you elaborate what is not to be elaborated. To reply the question: there is no anything, or both that there is and is not something, or not both that there is and there is not something elaborates what is not to be elaborated.

The question is about the true soul: Is it identical or non-identical? Therefore he did not reply. The soul is not something definite and it is talked of empirically in taking account of five aggregates. If he replies that there is something other than or is not something other than them, he will fall in the extreme limit of eternalism or of nihilism. When there is a talk of the soul through the medium of dependent origination, that talk is free from elaboration. If anyone perceives *sattva* as void and its constituent elements also (*dharma*) as void, he is elaboration-freed man. Therefore the man delighted in non-elaboration secures the supreme truth (*artha*) in the Buddha's dispensation. This is the possession (or wealth) of good consideration (*kuśala-vitarka-sampadā*).

184. *The Last Five Concentration-Preliminaries*

(7) The auspicious reaffirmation (*adhimokṣa*)-wealth. When the ascetic being delightful towards Nirvāṇa becomes detached from the empirical life, that is the auspicious reaffirmation (*kalyāṇa-adhimokṣa* or *mukti*). His mind adheres to nowhere; he has no fear, like the worldling who is afraid of utter cessation of his personality. The ascetic perceiving the world as impermanent, suffering, void and non-soul raises the notion of tranquillity and peacefulness towards *Nirvāṇa*. When a person hears a reciter of the *Nirvāṇa* (*Sūtra*) his mind becomes resolute in Nirvāṇa; or when he hears the blemishes of the empirical life from his auspicious friend or the study of the Sūtras, Buddha's discourses like *Anavarāgra*-Sūtra and five *Deva-dūta-Sūtra*, he becomes detached from the world and resolute in Nirvāṇa.

(8) The endeavour-limb-wealth (*Pradhānīyāṅga-sampad*): The Sūtra says: There are five-endeavour-limbs (*pradhānīyāṅga*): The monk becomes (a) believer, (b) trickery-freed, (c) little-distressed, (d) endeavour-maker and (e) wisdom-possessor. (a) He is believer who does not doubt three jewels and four noble truths; he secures immediately the concentration. The believer is full of joy and he secures concentration quickly. Q. If the wisdom arises through concentration and then the doubt is dispelled, how is the doubt-dispelling said before concentration? A. The doubt-dispelling is effected on account of much listening (*bahuśrutya*) and not through the concentration-strength. A person being born in the clan of resolute-minded men and living together with the believer cultivates the resolute mind and dispels the doubt even though he has not yet practised the concentration.

(b) Trickery-freed, *aśaṭha*: For a man of upright mind there is nothing to be kept secret. Just as a man approaching the physician tells the nature of his disease and gets well-treated just so car it easily be crossed if there is anything to cross. (c) Little-distressed: He does not cease doing endeavour in the

fore and later parts of the night. The distress (*ābādha*) is an obstacle to the practice of the path. (d) The endeavour-maker: As a seeker of the path he constantly makes endeavour. (e) Wisdom-possessor: One being possessed of wisdom secures the fruit of four limbs (above stated), viz. the fruit of the path.

Mindfulness-elements are also endeavour-limbs. Nevertheless, the above stated five limbs are more important requisite for the ascetic. To restrain from the sinful actions and to accumulate all the good actions are also pre-requisites of the ascetics as stated in *She-ni-sha-Sūtra*.

(9) Release-base-possession: Five Release-bases: The teacher (Buddha) or an elderly co-*brahmacārin* preaches the law, the pupil becomes realizer of *dharma* as well as its *artha* in the same manner as they are preached. Due to this realization he has the joy which causes corporeal serenity and this again causes a happy feeling. The mind of happy feeling gets concentrated. This is the first release-base in which the monk being attentive and dwelling gets his mind released, *āsravas* get reduced and the supreme welfare (*yoga-kṣema*) accompanies him. The second release-base is the study of Sūtras in all details. The third is to preach the law to others. The fourth is the suitable searching and the suitable decision in respect of elements in a solitary place. The fifth is the well-choosing of the *nimitta*, objects of concentration, viz. nine nimittas, etc. as stated before.

The teacher or the elderly co-Brahmacārin preaches the law because he gains immense benefit by inducing others to adopt it. Co-Brahman-farer who has gone forth from home taking refuge in the Buddha preaches it in order to make his sense-faculties mature. The teacher-like co-Brahman-farer? preaches the law as he is of equal behaviour. The monks will necessarily listen to the law and therefore he preaches the scripture.

There are three wisdoms: The realization of the laws, *dharma* is the wisdom born of much listening (*bahuśrutamayī*).

The realization of *artha* is the wisdom born of thinking (*cintā-mayī*). From these two arises the joy, then bodily serenity, then happy feeling and then concentrated mind which gives rise to true knowledge of things as they are. This knowledge is the wisdom born of contemplation (*Bhāvanā-mayī*). These three wisdoms produce three fruits respectively: *Nirveda*, disgust, *vairāgya*, desire-freedom and *vimukti*, release. Listening to and studying the law one teaches it to others: this is the wisdom of much listening. Then he searches and decides the dharmas: this is the wisdom of thinking. Then he chooses the concentration-*nimitta*—this is the wisdom of contemplation.

The difference between the mind's release (*citta-vimukti*) and passion-destruction (*āsrava-kṣaya*) is this: the former is the dispelling of passions or defilements by means of concentration while the latter is utterly abandoning them. Good conduct, etc. are also the release-bases but only the above five are stated here for the reason of their being immediate cause of release. Good conduct, etc. are its remote causes. For, the ascetic listening to the scripture understands the (5) aggregates, (12) bases and (18) elements and that there are only congeries of these elements and no soul etc. and hence the conceptual things (*prajñāpti*) are broken. This breaking itself is termed *vimukti*, release. Therefore, listening to the scripture is immediate cause. The advantages of much listening are stated in the Sūtra, viz. he does not follow others' teachings and his mind gets well concentrated, etc. In the dispensation of the Buddha there is an immense gain, viz. ceasing the defilements and entering into Nirvāṇa, etc. The listener in this pacifying law or its student or its contemplator gets immediately released. Therefore, the much listening is immediate cause. One gains great merit by charity, honour through good conduct and wisdom through much listening. He gains through wisdom the destruction of *āsravas*, passions, but not merit or honour. Therefore, we understand that it is the immediate cause. Śāriputra and others are

said to be profoundly wise because of their much listening (*bāhuśrutya*).

If much listening causes the mind's concentration, why did Ānanda not gain the release in the first and last part of the night? Ānanda (later on at the subsequent occasion) gained it by the time he placed his head on the pillow. So he was in a marvellous dharma. Why did he not gain it quickly (on the first occasion itself?). His effort was somewhat defective. As he was much fatigued at the moment he failed to gain the release. He then made a resolute vow: I shall secure the destruction of *āsravas* in this period of the night just like the Bodhisattva did on the seat of *Bodhi*. Who will be of such strength as Ānanda? All this is (the result of) the strength of much listening (*bāhuśrutya*).

(10) Non-obscuration: There are three obscurations: action, resultant—and defilement-obscurations. The person of no such obscurations falls in no unhappy place. The person being freed from the inopportune moments becomes fit to adopt the path, and is said to be in possession of four wheels: dwelling in a congenial place, living under the protection of a good person, right-self-resoluteness and good merit previously accumulated. He also accomplishes four constituents of the stream-winning, viz. living together with good men, listening to a good scripture, right attentiveness and the practice of *dharma* and *anu-dharma*. He also forsakes three elements, lust, etc. The Sūtra says: Not abandoning these three elements one does not cross over the old age, disease and death.

(11) Non-entanglement. (He) neither approaches this shore or other shore, nor lingers in the centre, nor perishes on the ground, nor becomes catch of men, of non-men or of whirlpool, nor becomes rotten under the water.

"This shore" means six internal bases; "other shore"—six external bases; "lingers in the centre": *nandi-rāga*, delight-passion; "perishes on the ground": I-sense: "catch of men": a monk

dwells in association with the householders; " catch of non-men ": a monk leads *brahmacarya* aiming at certain god; " catch of whirlpool ": five sensual objects; " becomes rotten under the water ": a monk is of bad conduct, sinful, and impure, of suspicious activity and non-*brahmacārin*.

One who has the self-grasp in respect of the internal bases, will have the grasp of something pertaining to the self; from these internal and external bases arises delight-passion. So he becomes immersed therein, and then arises self-pride (*ahaṁkāra*). If anyone, being affectionate to his body feels happy, other monks may approach and calumniate him lightly, then he will have pride. Thus the sense of ' I ' and the affection to a thing pertaining to the ' I ', delight-passion and the self-pride and all distract his mind and also bring other vices in their train.

The eight-limbed noble path is meant here as stream. Just as a wooden log being freed from the eight inopportune moments reaches the ocean just so does the monk being freed from the inopportune moments and following along with the eight-limbed noble path enter in the ocean of Nirvāṇa.

The master of the Śāstra says: Just as the stream of the Ganges reaches the great ocean definitely just so does the eight-limbed noble path lead definitely to Nirvāṇa. Thus eleven concentration-preliminaries have been described in brief.

185. *Respiration*

The respiration has sixteen forms: being mindful, he exhales and being mindful he inhales. Inhaling a long breath he discerns: I inhale a long breath. Exhaling a long breath he discerns: I exhale a long breath. Inhaling a short breath he discerns: I inhale a short-breath. Exhaling a short breath, he discerns: I exhale a short breath. Experiencing the whole body, he trains himself: I shall exhale and inhale. Calming the bodily formations he trains himself: I shall exhale and shall inhale. Experienc-

ing joy he trains himself: I shall exhale and shall inhale. Experiencing happiness, he trains himself: I shall exhale and shall inhale. Experiencing the mind's formations he trains himself: I shall exhale and shall inhale. Calming the mind's formations he trains himself: I shall exhale. Calming the bodily formation he trains himself: I shall inhale. Experiencing the mind he trains himself: I shall exhale and inhale. Gladdening the mind he trains himself: I shall exhale and inhale. Concentrating the mind he trains himself: I shall exhale and inhale. Releasing the mind he trains himself: I shall exhale and inhale. Discerning impermanence he trains himself: I shall exhale and inhale. Discerning cessation he trains himself: I shall exhale and inhale. Discerning renunciation he trains himself: I shall exhale and inhale.

Q. How does the respiration become long or short? A. Suppose e.g. a man ascends the hill; or if he carries a load, then being fatigued he breathes a short breath. Likewise the ascetic dwelling in a gross thought breathes a short breath. The gross thought means the mind which is shaky and distracted by the disease. "He breathes a long breath" means: if the ascetic dwells in a subtle mind, then his breathing out and breath in become long. For, such breaths which accompany the subtle mind become subtle. As per example, of the same person who is fatigued and given rest the breath become subtle. Then, at that time his outgoing breath and incoming breath become long.

"Experiencing the whole body" means: The ascetic being convinced of his body as trifling perceives the air moving in and out of skin-pores. "Calming the bodily formation": when the ascetic is peace-minded and physically strong, his gross breathings become pacified. Then at that time the ascetic becomes possessed of the foundation of body-mindfulness. "Experiencing (*pratisaṁ-vadin*) Joy": out of this concentration he has a great joy in his mind, at that time he is termed "experiencing joy". "Experiencing happiness": happiness arises from joy. So says

the Sūtra: The body of the joyous-minded becomes serene and the serene body feels happiness.

"Experiencing the mind's formation": The ascetic sees the blemish in the joy as it causes lust which is a mind's formation. Lust arises for feeling and hence the ascetic sees the feeling as a mind's formation. "Calming the mind's formation": The ascetic sees that lust arises from feeling, and calming that, the mind becomes peaceful. He calms also the gross feeling. "Experiencing the mind": calming the taste of feeling the ascetic sees his mind as appeased, not depressed and not distracted. This mind sometimes becomes depressed, then at that time he makes it joyous. If it becomes distracted, then at that time he makes it concentrated. If it becomes free from the said two faults, then at that time he lets it free. Therefore, he is termed as releasing the mind. Thus, the ascetic being concentrated arouses a sense of impermanence aspect whereby he abandons the defilements. This is the cessation aspect. As a result of abandoning defilements, his mind gets disgusted: this is the desire-freedom-aspect. Because of his desire-freed mind he secures the complete renunciation of everything. This is the renunciation-aspect. In thiswise he gradually approaches towards the Release. These are sixteen aspects of respiration.

The Respiration is designated as abode of the noble, of gods, of Brahmā, of the learner (*Śaikṣa*) and of the learning-ender (*aśaikṣa*). These are explained. Utility of this respiration:—When the ascetic does not obtain detachment through foul-meditation, his body and mind become deluded. To a man, e.g. on taking an improper medicine, the disease recurs. Through the foul-meditation one may gain an improper detachment and commit suicide by taking poison and so on. The respiration-exercise does not create such a wrong detachment. It breaks all the defiling forces whereas the foul-meditation destroys only the sex-passion. This is the distinction of respiration from the foul-meditaion.

The respiration pertains to a developed body as well as to an operative mind. Since the embryo has no respiration, we understand, it pertains to the body; since it is absent in the person of no mind, viz. in the fourth dhyāna, etc. it pertains to the mind. The inhalation and exhalation operate due to the totality of causes and conditions. They operate when the mind is present and they do not operate when the mind is inactive. Hence they are governed by the mind. They differ as per mind, viz. the gross-minded has a short respiration and the subtle-minded has long one. The respiration is governed by the sphere as well as the mind. The person remaining in the respiration-sphere has that sphere as well as the mind. The respiration-sphere is: the desire-world and the first three *dhyānas*.........

The birth starts with the outgoing breath and the life ends with the incoming breath. Merging into and emerging from the first *dhyāna* are likewise to be said (viz. merging with exhalation and merging with inhalation). When the ascetic completes the respiration in sixteen aspects, then, at that time the respiration becomes fulfilled.

Some masters say: It is fulfilled by means of six factors; Counting, continuous practice (*anubandhana*), *Śamatha*, *Vipaśyanā*, engaging the body and the mind (*nivartana*) and purity. Counting is from one to ten. It is three-fold: equal more and less. The equal is to count ten as ten: to count eleven as ten is more and to count nine as ten is less. The continuous practice is the ascetic's mind supplementing the respiration exercise. *Vipaśyanā* is when the ascetic perceives breathing as related to the body as the string running through the gems. *Śamatha* is to fix up the mind on the respiration-exercise. Engagement is the function of the body and the feeling with the support of the mind. Purity is when the ascetic's mind being released from every defilement and inopportune moments gets purified.

The author says: These six are not definite; because the Yogin engaged in respiration cuts all his considerations. One

who is capable of doing it in sixteen aspects is said to have fulfilled.

The Sūtra describes the respiration as food for this reason: The body of person merged in the Respiration-exercise becomes happy as that of the person eating the sweet meal. This exercise is said to be an instrument to put an end to five aggregates. When the five aggregates are done away (through other means) what use will be there of this exercise? This is the same as the mindfulness of the body. It is termed the mindfulness of the body since it contemplates the body in four manners.

Q. Recollection is related to the past things; but the respiration is concerned with present breathings. How is it recollection? A. It is given the designation *Smṛti*, recollection. Speaking truly it is a sort of knowledge which breaks up the conceptual ideas. Names of mental states are exchangeable. Ten notions (*saṁjñā*) e.g. are termed *anusmṛti* as they are to be contemplated through memory. This respiration serves as the contemplation of the body....It is in the first stage an instrument-path; and since it leads to the purity ultimately, it is termed in the later stage the abandonment-path. There is an impermanence-aspect in this respiration but not stated in this Sūtra. It is stated in some other Sūtra: The ascetic remaining in the respiration-exercise dwells watchful of the body, of its origin and of its destruction, etc. It is said somewhere: He perceives it impermanent, etc.

186. *Concentration-Pollutions (apakṣāla=āvaraṇa)*

This concentration being freed from its pollutions leads to immense advantage (*hita*).

(1) Gross joy is the concentration-pollution. The ascetic should not give vent to it; because lust and other defilements distract the concentrated mind.

The ascetic recollecting the voidness of everything does not have joy-buoyancy (*prīti-prāmodya*). It arises when one has the notion of *sattva*. He should recollect thus: Things spring up due to causes and conditions. What is there for joy-buoyancy? It ceases when the ascetic notices that all such things being sought cause distraction. The ascetic seeks after the magnificent purpose which is not accomplished by the sun's heat and the light etc. hence joy-buoyancy does not arise. Since he is perceiving the gain of cessation, he does not have the joy-buoyancy through the sun's heat and the light etc. Because he meditates on tranquillity and wishes the extinction of defilements, joy-buoyancy is not cherished.

(2) Timidity is a concentration-pollution. One raises up timidity on the support of I-notion (*ahaṁkāra*). The ascetic watches all the dreadful places in the world. He, examining them all as impermanent and distractive, does not run after them. Timidity disappears when he contemplates that everything is unreal and void like the magic, etc. The ascetic is much interested in the practice of the path and hence he is regardless of his body and life. Wherefrom should he fear? His mind always is anchored in the mindfulness and hence timidity does not get opportunity in him. He becomes fearless as a result of recollecting the characteristic of the brave man. Thiswise he does away with his timidity.

(3) Non-taming is a concentration-pollution. The ascetic becomes sick on account of cold or heat, etc. or becomes of untamed body due to the extreme fatigue and other causes. *Dhyāna*s and concentrations are spoilt when the ascetic's mind is untamed on account of defiling lust, thirst and jealousy, etc. Therefore he should tame his body and mind.

(4) Un-suited characteristic is a concentration-pollution. It is the same as dirtiness. A certain non-dirty thing also is distracting the dhyāna-concentrations, e.g. giving charity, etc.

(5) Imbalance is a concentration-pollution. When the effort is applied wrongly or with lack of spirit the body and the mind become much fatigued. The ascetic does not grasp the concentration-object (*nimitta*). He falls from the concentration in both cases. The youngling, e.g. of *Vartaka* bird being firmly caught becomes much fatigued, and loosely caught falls from the grip of the bird. Or strings of the lute being tied too widely or too loosely do not accomplish the desired tune. The Buddha addresses Anuruddha: A man of too energetic effort will have lethargy (*kausidya*). Or a man of depressed spirit will also not accomplish his objective. Therefore, imbalance is concentration-pollution.

(6) Inattention is a concentration-pollution. It is a lack of attention towards good dharma. Not to be attentive to the object of concentration but to be attentive to some other external thing is also inattention. The ascetic having made an effort with one-pointed mind should attend to an element worthy of experience (*vedanīya-dharma*) just as a man carrying an oil-pot on his head.

(7) Unsuitability is a concentration-pollution. A man full of lust adopts a compassionate mind (for contemplation) and a man full of indignation (*dveṣa*) contemplates on the foul object. These two men should meditate on dependent origination. The mind being too subdued contemplates on quietude and the same being too arrogant makes effort. In both cases one should adopt neutrality. This is unsuitability.

(8) Talkativeness is a concentration-pollution. It is the same as an abundance of *vitarka* and *vicāra* because those two give rise to talkativeness. (Due to this) the mind does not firmly stick to nor becomes delighted in the object of concentration.

(9) Non-grasp of the characteristics: The characteristic is three-fold: quietude (*śamatha*), making an attempt, and in-

difference. It is again three-fold: Entering into concentration, sustaining and waking from it. The ascetic, not adept in distinction of these characteristics falls from it.

(10) Pride is a concentration-pollution. It is this: The ascetic may have the pride: I alone enter into and abide in concentration and none else. *Adhimāna* is when he, not obtaining concentration, says: I have obtained it. *Mithyā-māna* is when he arouses the notion of superiority (*praṇīta*) towards an inferior concentration.

(11) Lust and other elements are also concentration-pollutions. The Sūtra says: The monk who is possessed of one dharma, viz. lust (*rāga*) does not see the eye as impermanent. All the persons not freed from lust, do they not see the eye as impermanent? It is to be expressed thus: The person having lust for the object of present moment does not see it as impermanent. There is some distinction in the lustful person also. There are certain men who have the lust, etc. very strong which always haunt their mind and obstruct the concentration. When the lust, etc. are thin and weak, they do not haunt their mind and do not harm the concentration.

Thirteen black elements are stated in the Sūtra as concentration-pollutions and thirteen white-elements as concentration-favourable. The Buddha says: One does not cross over the old age-disease-death without abandoning three elements, viz. lust hate and hallucination. One does not cut these three elements without abandoning three, viz. the soul-view, contagion of mere rules and rituals and perplexity. Then there are three: irrational thinking, wrong action and mental dejection; then three: forgetfulness, lack of self-possession, distracted mind: then three: Lack of modesty (*auddhatya*), non-protection of sense-doors and moral deterioration; then three: distrust, unmorality and lethargy; then three: displeasure towards the good man, aversion to the listening to the good dharma and joy in announcing other's ills; then three: disregard, blasphemy of one's colleague and serving

the ill-witted person. One does not abandon the last three without abandoning the three, viz. lack of shyness (*ahrikya*), lack of aversion to objectionable things (*anapatrāpya*) and carelessness. To put reversely: one, abandoning the last mentioned three, abandons the previous three: viz. disregard, etc. and so on, upto: one abandoning the second three: soul-view, etc. abandons the first three: lust, etc. and abandoning these three, one crosses over the old age, etc.

Here crossing over old age-disease-death is Nirvāṇa without residue. To root out the lust, hate and hallucination is the arhant-trait, Nirvāṇa with residue. To root out the wrong view, contagion of mere rules and rituals and perplexity is the Śrāmaṇya-fruit. To root out irrational thinking, wrong action and dejection is the *kuśala*-root of *Nirvedhabhāgīya*, *Ūṣma*, etc. To root out the forgetfulness, lack of self-possession, and distracted mind is the cultivation of four-fold foundation of mindfulness. To root out the lack of modesty, non-protection of sense-doors and moral deterioration is adoption of the ascetic's moral conduct. To root out displeasure towards good man, aversion to listening to the good dharma and joy in announcing others' ills, distrust, unmorality and lethargy, disregard, blasphemy of one's colleague and serving the ill-witted person is the purity of the householder.

Āhrīkya is when a man having committed a wrong (*pāpaka*) in camera, does not feel shy. The man subsequently commits some wrong even in the midst of *Saṅgha* and does not get ashamed; that is *anapatrāpya*. *Pramāda* is a constant practice of bad actions by one who has fallen from the good dharma-root and two white elements (i.e. shyness and shamefulness). The person, possessed of the above three elements does not adopt what is taught by the teacher—that is disregard. To do reverse of what is advised by the teacher is blasphemy of one's colleague. Leaving one's teacher one serves the wicked person–that is serving the ill-witted person. The lack of shyness that results from the above is disregard. Blasphemy of one's colleague arises from

the lack of shamefulness. Serving the ill-witted person comes from carelessness. Hence he, becoming a faithless and adopting unmoral conduct, becomes lethargic. Serving the wicked person one does not believe in the teacher's dispensation and says that there is no resultant of the bad conduct....Hating listening to a good scripture one says that the good conduct is false doctrine. Because of his mind's pollusion (*kaṣāya*), one becomes joyous in announcing others' ills and says that the other person has, by doing dharma, gained nothing equal to his own. Thus defilements being not checked, one's mind becomes proud (*uddhata*). Because of being proud, he does not control his senses with the result of moral deterioration. Because of this his mindfulness vanishes. A man not in self-possession becomes distracted in his mind. He will have also irrational thinking due to which he will tread on the wrong path. Treading on this path, he gains not his objective. Hence his mind becomes dull and dejected. Because of the mind's dullness he does not root out three fetters. Because of this he does not abandon the lust, etc. and hence all the calamities, disease, etc. spring up. Converse of these (bad elements) are white elements.

(12) Grief a concentration-pollution: The ascetic will have grief when he thinks: I could not gain certain concentration on such a year, month or season.

(13) Adherence to the taste of joy is also concentration-pollution.

(14) Lack of delightfulness is also concentration-pollution. Even after having a suitable country and an auspicious teacher, one's mind does not become delighted.

(15) Hindrances, sensual pleasure, etc. are also concentration-pollutions.

In brief all things, robe, food and others and what decreases the wholesome (*kuśala*)-roots and what increases unwholesome (*akuśala-*) roots and all such things become concentration-pollu-

tions. Understanding thus, one should diligently seek to dispel those pollutions.

187. *Calmness and Insight* (*Śamatha-Vipaśyanā*)

The Buddha addressing his disciples says: A monk repairing to a forest, or beneath the tree or an empty house should meditate on two elements, viz. *Śamatha* and *Vipaśyanā*. Here *Śamatha* stands for concentration and *Vipaśyanā* for wisdom (*prajñā*). These two are stated because all the good elements come into being through meditation (*bhāvanā*). The wisdom that is born of listening and contemplation is also included in the expression. The path element is accomplished by these two elements. *Śamatha* dispels the fetters and *Vipaśyanā* cuts them.

To make clear this idea the author employs different similes, the most important of which are the following: the first element is similar to the catch of grass and the second to cutting them; the first is similar to sweeping the ground and the second to cleaning it with cow-dung-water; the first is similar to putting into water and the second to heating; the first is like the abscess and the second its surgical operation; the first is like subduing the mind and the second awakening the low-spirited mind and so on.

All the worldlings adhere to two extremeties: happiness and suffering. *Śamatha* gives up happiness and *Vipaśyanā* avoids the suffering. Again, of the seven purities moral purity and mind's purity are *Śamatha* and other five are *Vipaśyanā*. Of the considerations of the eight great men, the first six considerations are *Śamatha* and other two *Vipaśyanā*. Of the four foundations of mindfulness, the first three are Ś. and the last one is V. The four steps to *Ṛddhi*-potency are Ś. while the four supreme efforts V. Of the five faculties, the first four are Ś, and the last one V. The same case with five forces also. Of the seven factors of Enlightenment, three are Ś, and three V, while mindfulness is in the nature

of both. Of the eight factors of the path, three are morality, two are Ś. while the three are V. Morality (*śila*) also pertains to Ś. Ś. roots out lust while V. dispels ignorance. The Sūtra says: Ś. being cultivated cultivates the mind; the mind being cultivated abandons the lust. *Vipaśyanā* being cultivated cultivates the wisdom; the wisdom being cultivated abandons ignorance. The mind gets released because it is separated from sensual pleasures and the wisdom gets released because it is separated from ignorance. There remains nothing (to be done) for him who has secured release from both.

Q. It is said that *Śamatha* having cultivated the mind, abandons the lust and that *Vipaśyanā* having cultivated the wisdom, abandons ignorance. Why is this distinction made? A. Because the mind's streams of the distracted person operate on the objects, *rūpa*, etc. this flowing mind obtains calmness (*Śamatha*) and because of this calmness it is said that *Śamatha* cultivates the mind. Wisdom springs up from the calmed mind. Hence it is said that *Vipaśyanā* cultivates the wisdom. After *Vipaśyanā* being arisen, whichever is cultivated all is said to be a cultivated wisdom. The wisdom in the first stage is *Vipaśyanā* and in the later stage it becomes *prajñā*.

It is said in the Sūtra: "*Śamatha* being cultivated, abandons the lust", this is the abandonment of what is known as *vighna*, impediment. For, the lust arises for the external objects, *rūpa*, etc. It arises no more when one obtains the medicine of *Śamatha*. The Sūtra says: The ascetic obtaining the fleshless joy abandons the fleshful joy. What is said as abandonment of ignorance that is the ultimate abandonment. For, as a result of abandoning the ignorance the defilements, lust, etc. are abandoned, ceased and remain no more. The Sūtra also says: The mind's release results from the detachment from the lust. This is the abandonment of what is known as *vighna*, an impediment. Detachment from ignorance results in the wisdom-release: this is the ultimate abandonment. There is two-fold release: temporary release and

unshakable release. The first release is the same as the abandonment of what is known as impediment. The second one is the ultimate abandonment.

Q. The temporary release of the five Arhans is *āsrava*-freed. Why is the first release alone stated here? A. The temporary release is not the *āsrava*-freed one; for a temporarily released person by virtue of his superior power renders the fetters inoperative for some time but does not abandon them ultimately; the fetters will spring up again later on. Therefore, it is not the *āsrava*-freed release. This is a temporary release from the craving. The Arhan of destroyed *āsravas* has nothing to be desired. The learners may have the soul-idea as their *āsravas* are not destroyed. They, therefore, may have morality as a desirable element, but the Arhan who has abandoned absolutely the soul-idea will never have anything as desirable.

Q. Arhan Godhika fell six times from the temporary release and lest he may fall for the seventh time he cut his throat by a knife. If he has destroyed his *āsrava*, he would not kill himself. It is, therefore, understood that his temporary release is not an *āsrava*-freed one. A. He fell from the concentration after having experienced the abandonment of fetters. He did so for six times. Having touched or felt his concentration for the seventh time he wished to commit suicide. Just at the moment he experienced the Arhan-path as he aimed at. Māra, the killer, with a view to proclaiming to the four quarters of the world that he is dead, arrived at where the Buddha stayed and addressed:

> Your disciple, O Mahā-vīra, wishes and wills to die.
> Deter him (from doing so) O, Bright-facultied one.

Then the Buddha recognizing that it is the Māra spoke thus:

> The brave men do thiswise and not relish the life,
> Godhika, having uprooted his craving,
> has already attained to Nirvāṇa.

Q. The destruction of lust is the abandonment of impediments. The Sūtra says: Release from the lust is of the mind and the release from the hate and hallucination is of the wisdom. It is again said: The mind's release is because of abandonment of the delight-lust. It says: the mind gets released from *kāmāsrava*. Thus it will be an impediment-release but not ultimate and supreme-release. A. In this context ignorance is also said to have been abandoned. Therefore we understand that this is the ultimate release. If you think that the lust-abandonment is sometimes impediment-abandonment and sometimes the ultimate abandonment, then (this alternative may be put thiswise) the impediment-abandonment is in the case of one who has no truth-knowledge, and the ultimate abandonment is in the case of one who has accomplished the truth-knowledge. But there is none who, having felt *Śamatha* (alone) abandons the lust ultimately. In case he also does so, the heretics will also abandon it ultimately. But the fact is not so. Therefore we understand that this (abandonment by heretic) is simply an impediment-abandonment.

The Sūtra says: One pacifies his mind through *Śamatha* and experiences the release on the support of *Vipaśyanā*. One pacifies his mind through *Vipaśyanā* and experiences the release on the support of *Śamatha*. This means: If the ascetic, depending on concentration and aiming at the destruction (of defilements) produces wisdom, then it is said that he pacifies his mind through *Samatha* and experiences the release on the support of *Vipaśyanā*. If he analyses through his distracted mind five aggregates, twelve bases and eighteen elements, and depending upon it and aiming at the destruction experiences *Śamatha*, then it is said that he pacifies his mind through *Vipaśyanā* and experiences the release on the support of *Śamatha*. If he, effecting the earnest applications of the mindfulness, and *Nirvedhabhāgīyas*, controls his mind then it is said that he contemplates both *Śamatha* and *Vipaśyanā* jointly. All the ascetics relying on these two dharmas, cease their mind and experience the release.

188. *Concentration-Culture*
(*Samādhi-bhāvanā*)

The Buddha says: One should cultivate concentration. The concentration-mind appearing and disappearing every moment, how could it be cultivated? We experience actually that the corporeal action, even though it is momentary, is capable of discharging effectively different functions by virtue of cultivation. Being repeatedly practised it becomes easier. The same case with the vocal action, e.g. the text-recitation (*adhyayana*). The mental action though it is momentary, must be cultivated. The fire, e.g. disfigures any thing; the water breaks up the stones and the wind blows up things. Thus all the momentary things when they are combined have some abnormal strength. The defilements follow (the mind) in accordance with their habitual force (*vāsanā*). A man, e.g. developing the mind of sexual act again and again accomplishes several sensual pleasures. The same case with the hate and illusion. The Sūtra says: What object one inculcates on his mind (*manasi karoti*), he acts upon it; a man, e.g. pursuing *kāmavitarka*, sensual pleasure-consideration, acts for the same pleasure. Therefore we understand that the mind, though momentary ought to be cultivated.

Bhāvanā is an accumulation (*upacaya*). All things are perceived in the form of progressive accumulation. The Sūtra says: The ascetic because of incorrect thinking, arouses *āsravas*, (*kāma*), etc. and develops them, from inferior degree to moderate one from the moderate to the superior degree. E.g. from the seed, the sprout arises and from the latter the stem, etc. and the latter goes on upto the fruit. Thus from the cause the result appears gradually in a developed form. Likewise the concentration and other elements also will develop gradually. It is also our experience that the odour of the perfumed sesame seed increases by contact; this seed and odour are both momentary; nevertheless they have the perfuming capacity. Therefore, we understand that things though momentary, are to be cultivated.

If things are stationary, they are not liable to cultivation. If they are momentary, then there is a scope for their cultivation, viz. from the inferior form to the moderate one and from the moderate form to the superior one. Q. The flower reaching the sesame-seed perfumes it, but the knowledge does not reach the mind. Hence there is no perfuming. A. Previously in the simile of *karman*, it is expounded that the subsequent action does not reach the previous action and the speech of the previous moment does not depend on the speech of the subsequent time; nevertheless there is the cultivation-character between them. Therefore your argument that what is not reached is not cultivated is not a serious criticism. It is experienced in our perception that though the cause and fruit are phenomena of different times the cause produces the fruit. Likewise the mental element, though momentary, is liable to cultivation. Just as the seed soaked in the water even without reaching the (subsequent) sprout, etc. produces them, just so does the wisdom cultivate the previous mind and its subsequent mind becomes developed.

Q. From one sesame seed proceeds another, (please tell me) whether the produced seed is perfumed or not perfumed. In the latter alternative, the seed will be perfumeless, while in the first one there will be no use for again perfuming. A. Because of its being perfuming cause. Just as the sprout springs up from the soaked seed, just so is another seed produced depending on the previous contact with the flower; and this seed is produced as perfumed. You have pointed out there will be no use for perfuming again. Your Sūtra, e.g. says: Due to the contact with the fire, the black colour in atoms is ceased and the red colour is produced. If the black colour of thing that is contacted with the fire is ceased at first, it will not appear again. If the red colour of the same thing appears at first, what use will be there for the fire-contact again? If at first, at the moment of the fire-contact only the black colour is produced, and not the red one, and if at the second moment the red colour is produced,

again what use will be there for continued fire-contact? If it is your intention that the red colour is produced gradually, the mind also would likewise be developed, and what harm will be there? Likewise the transformation is also possible.

All things that are due to the causes and conditions come gradually into being . Embrio, e.g. accomplishes the body gradually. Likewise the concentration, the wisdom, etc. though momentary, are developed gradually from the inferior form upto the superiormost. The cultivational development, though very subtle, transforms the mind's stream. E.g. the temperature of the bird's feather is very subtle, yet it serves to transform the egg; the handle of the axe is gradually decayed on account of its being rubbed by the palm. The mind likewise gets transformed gradually. One, cultivating a thing, understands its transformation when it is perceptible. The stanza says:

> One receives everything from the teacher; everything (improves) by his own volition
>
> and everything matures by virtue of time.

A man, even though he studies constantly, does not succeed in his realization like one who does with the maturity of time. Numerous flowers perfume the sesame seed at one and the same time, but not a few flowers can perfume it gradually and in the long run. The bodily growth, the sinking of the ship in the water, and the construction of the wall are all gradual. It is our common experience that the growth of the seed, sprout, etc. is very subtle and imperceptible. The fact that the body of the child, etc. gets matured through drinking milk, etc. is likewise very subtle. Therefore, we understand that the development of elements by cultivation is very subtle and hardly understandable.

The cultivational improvement is gradual. This is already expounded. None can accomplish anything by mere awakening the mind. The Sūtra says: The person is not engaged in the

act of cultivation of meritorious dharmas, but makes a mere resolve (*praṇidadhāti*) of his mind's release from *āsrava*s; his desirable resolve does not materialize, because he is not engaged in the act of their cultivation. If the Yogin is engaged so, his mind will get released from *āsrava*s even if he makes no resolve. The fruit results from its cause and not from one's own resolve. For example, the bird's incubation is necessary for bringing out the youngling; no youngling will come out of the egg by mere bird's resolve. The shining of the lamp becomes bright not by our mere resolve. But it requires pure oil, wick, and non-disturbance by other circumstances. The harvest is effected not by mere resolve, but it is achieved in the presence of good soil, seed, season, etc. The body gains the beauty and strength not by mere resolve but on account of better garments, food, tonic and other nourishing factors. Likewise the destruction of *āsrava*s is not achieved by mere resolve, but necessarily by the knowledge of the truth.

One cultivating dharma, perceives the fruit-resultant in this life itself. The Sūtra says: Let the seven days roll on; my disciples being taught by me, after cultivating an hour (*muhūrta*) the good dharma, would experience the pleasant feeling for unlimited years. The nuns address the revered Ānanda thus: We are well anchored in the foundations of mindfulness and realize an excellence more than before. The Buddha addresses his disciples thus: When a disciple approaches me with a straightforward mind, what dharma I teach to him in the morning he will secure its objective in the evening or what I teach in the evening he will secure its advantage in the next morning. When (the Yogin) experiences the Arhan-path, neither does only other person give it to him nor does his own man give it to him; he attains to the advantage of cultivating only its right cause. He, further experiences the supreme Buddha-path as a result of the accumulated cultivation of the good dharma. The Buddha addresses his disciples thus: "I attained to the supreme path relying on the two dharmas viz. undisgusted delight towards the

good (dharma) and untiring endeavour in cultivating the path." There is no limit for the Buddha's meritorious dharmas.

Bodhisattvas, even when they do not experience the concentration do not turn to be idle. If any good dharma is not done, the Bodhisattva gains nothing and even if it is done he has no sign of bodily transformation. There is no welfare for him who has not done any good dharma; thinking thiswise one should endeavour and cultivate good dharmas. The endeavour being made there will be either gain or loss. But if the endeavour is not made, there is no any hope for the gain. Therefore one should undertake the cultivation lest he should lament in future. The wise gets released necessarily at the end. The person bereft of the cultivation has no any means. The wise should therefore undertake the cultivation (of good dharma).

The Tathāgata appears before the man of good behaviour. (He thinks) I am in possession of the factors of the path-attainment, viz. human body, perfection in sense-organs, and others and how can I not obtain the fruit resultant of cultivation? The abandonment of defilements is very subtle and hardly understandable like the decay of the axe's handle. I also shall have it; hence it is understood that the supreme endeavour is necessary in order to cultivate the good (dharma). The wisdom even in a small degree destroys the defilements as a dim light dispels the darkness. Thus one, gaining a small degree of wisdom becomes the fulfiller of his duties. So he does not get grieved. The attainment of concentration is hardly accomplished even in the long run. When the concentration is attained, other virtues accompany it immediately. He does not grieve even if he does not succeed in gaining them.

The Yogin should contemplate thus: The attainment of concentration is very difficult; for example, in the olden days the Bodhisattva (= Buddha) who was highly burdened with merits and wisdom endeavoured for six years and at the end he ultimately attained to it. It is difficult for other ascetics also and how

can I, a worldling of dull-faculty attain to it speedily? Contemplating thiswise, he does not grieve over it. The Yogin should necessarily undertake the cultivation of concentration, for he has no other duty to do. Therefore he ought to cultivate the concentration in order to obtain what is not obtained. The cultivator, even though not attaining to concentration, gains the physical seclusion, then the concentration becomes easier for him. Undertaking this cultivation he becomes freed from the debt to the Buddha's grace. As he walks in the physical seclusion he gains the designation of *Yogāvacara*. Cultivating the good for long time his disposition becomes good and until his body is active, only the good accompanies him. He gets acquaintance with good people and becomes fit for the highest object (*artha*). The cultivator of the good, may sometimes in this very life, experience the destruction of *āsrava*s, or at the time of death. Or at his life's end he may be born in a happy sphere, or in the meantime he may experience it. All this is as stated in *Dharmaśravaṇānuśaṁsa*.

The Yogin, presenting before his own mind the characteristic of a brave man, thinks: I, without cutting the defilement-obstruction, will never return back in vain. He, further thinks: Others attain to the concentration for the reason that they have good faculties, faith, etc. I also have them now, why shall I not attain to it? Just as in the olden days, the Bodhisattva (= Buddha) having listened to the dharma from the sages, Aḍāra and others thought: Since these sages had the good faculties, faith, etc. they obtained the dharma; now I also have them, why shall I not obtain it? The Yogin understands very well that defilements are weaker and the wisdom is stronger, how will it be hard to abandon them? The Sūtra says: A monk possessed of six dharmas (of concentration) would blow up even (the mountain-king) Himavant by means of his breathing air (*mukhamāruta*) what is to speak of his ignorance?

The Yogin further thinks: I did not cultivate the concentration in the previous period and hence I do not attain now; if,

now, I do not endeavour, I would not attain to it in future also. Therefore he undertakes to cultivate it. Since he is constantly in concentration, his mind is anchored in one object. A pot, e.g. rolling on incessantly comes necessarily to stop at a place. He further thinks: If, now, I make a constant effort, and obtain what is not obtained previously; then, in future, I shall not repent. Therefore he endeavours to cultivate concentrations with the mind's one-pointedness.

189. *Knowledge-Characteristic*

Wisdom about the truth is termed knowledge. The truth is the same as the void-non-soulness. The wisdom about that is the knowledge of the truth. It is "wisdom" (*prajñā*) in the empirical sphere but not "knowledge". It is said in the Sūtra! just as the sword cuts, (so) the noble disciples cut their all defilements, fetters and other residual forces by means of their wisdom-sword and not by other means—I declare; nor do they cut the defilements by means of non-truth. Therefore, it is evident that the wisdom is (the knowledge of) the truth.

Q. A notion (*saññā*) also cuts the defilements. So says the Sūtra. The impermanence-notion being cultivated cuts all lust for sensual pleasure, etc. A. What destruction is made by the wisdom, the same (destruction) is said to be made by the notion. The Buddha has two expressions: absolute and nominal (*saññā*). The Sūtra says: Loving-kindness cuts malevolence: This loving-kindness as matter of fact does not cut the fetter; but only the knowledge cuts it, so says the Sūtra: Knowledge-sword cuts all the defilements. Therefore, we understand that to say that loving-kindness cuts the fetter is a nominal expression. It is said in the Sūtra in the import of wisdom: *Prajñā* is what discerns (*prajānāti*) Release. What thing it discerns as release? It discerns truly impermanent *rūpa* as impermanent, impermanent feeling, idea, formation and consciousness as impermanent—this is the wisdom alone. It is said again: The noble disciples being

concentrated discern them as they are. Therefore, we understand that the supreme import is the wisdom. It is said in the Wisdom-simile: Knowledge is sword and the wisdom is arrow, etc. The knowledge of truth alone destroys the defilements. Therefore, the wisdom alone is the truth (knowledge).

The Yogin perceives that all men and gods
are deviated from the truth-knowledge and
adhere to the name and form (*nāma-rūpa*)
(= mind-and-matter).

The worldly men generally see a despicable thing (*tuccha*) as permanent, good and happiness and fall from the truth-knowledge. The person who sees it as absolutely void and non-soul, etc. becomes knower of the truth. Therefore, the wisdom alone is the truth (= knowledge).

The Buddha says in the Sūtra: The person who lost wealth, has lost a small gain; but the person who has lost wisdom has lost a great gain. Amongst gains the wealth is a small gain; and the wisdom is the superior gain. Of the lights the sun-and moon-light is a small one while the wisdom is the supreme light. The wisdom-organ is counted in the noble truths—says the Sūtra. It says: one should discern that the knowledge of the origin of misery, etc. is the truth; the wisdom is supreme amongst the elements conducive to the Bodhi; the transcendental right *Sambodhi* is termed as the wisdom-organ. The Buddha's ten forces (*bala*) are all in the nature of knowledge. Therefore, we understand that the wisdom has the supreme thing as its object. The wisdom is in fact transcendental, because mundane thought relies on the empirical thing while the transcendental one relies on non-soul-voidness. What is empirical is the world itself and what is surpassing the empirical is transcendental (so non-soul-voidness is transcendental and the thing other than that is empirical).

Q. Your contention is not proper. For, the Sūtra says: What does the consciousness cognize? It cognizes the colour, sound, odour, taste and touch, just as it cognizes through the mind the five aggregates, eighteen elements and twelve bases. This (latter) consciousness would be a transcendental one. Therefore your contention that mundane thought relies on the empirical thing alone is improper. Non-sensuous conscious has as its object the truth as it relies on the feeling, the idea and the formation, etc. The Buddha says that there are two right views: mundane and transcendental. The vision of the merits and demerits is mundane, while the wisdom of the noble disciples relying on the misery, its origin, its cessation and the path leading to the cessation is transcendental. It is said in the Gāthā: A man possessed of the mundane and ultra-mundane views roams about in the empirical life for several hundred years, but never falls in an unhappy realm of life.

The Sūtra says: The wrong-doer is born in a happy place. When his wrong action is not accomplished, his good condition-factor first matures, and sometimes at the time of death his good thought together with a right view appears before him. Hence he is born in a happy place. Amongst ten modes of good actions the right view is included. The Buddha says: There is three-fold wisdom: (1) wisdom born of listening, (2) wisdom born of thinking, and (3) wisdom born of contemplation. The first two are mundane while the last one is both. The Buddha aroused the mindfulness of respiration. The monk, Rāhula obtained imperfect release-wisdom. It is said: Five dharmas make mature the release-mind which is immature. All this is the mundane wisdom. The Sūtra says: Some are adept in going out of home but not in the analytical knowledge. One is adept in analytical knowledge but not adept in crossing over the life. Because of the mundane-knowledge-gain he is said to be adept in going out of home. As he has no vision of four truths, he is said to be not adept in the analytical thought (*vipaśyanā*). Even though he

has gained the vision of the four truths, he has not gained the destruction of *āsravas*; for this reason he is said to be not adept in crossing over the stream. The Buddha himself says: The elemental knowledge, the inferential knowledge (*anvaya-jñāna*) and the discernment of others' thought are mundane. He says again: The knowledge of the previous births and the knowledge of birth and death are *āsrava*-tainted. All these sayings point out that there is an *āsrava*-tainted knowledge.

Now the author replies: If there is *āsrava*-tainted wisdom you must explain the distinction between the knowledges *āsrava*-tainted and the *āsrava*-freed. If you say that what leads to the empirical existence is *āsrava*-tainted and the others are *āsrava*-freed, then you must define separately what leads to the empirical existence and what not. In case of not defining them, the distinction is not possible. You have stated that there is a mundane cognition that relies on the non-empirical object, viz. colour, sound, etc. This is not correct. The Buddha says: The worldlings constantly run after the empirical things. The meaning of this saying is this: Their mind never gets rid of the empirical idea and hence it always is in the grip of I-sense and never gets separated from it. Though they perceive *rūpa* (colour, odour, taste and touch), their mind is not separated from the sense of the pitcher, etc. Therefore their mind does not rely, on the real object. Though it relies on the feeling, idea, etc. (by analysing them) it entertains the notion of 'I' and of something pertaining to 'I'. Therefore, we understand that all the mundane thought relies on the empirical thing.

You argue that there is a mundane wisdom, viz. (one of) the two right views. I may reply that there is a two-fold mind: The mind (in the form of) infatuation, and the mind (in form of) knowledge. The first is that which relies on empirical things while the second is what relies on the void-non-soul-element alone. Ignorance is explained in the *Vibhaṅga-Sūtra*: What is ignorance? It is non-knowing of the previous end, of the future

end....non-knowing of things as they are, non-intuition, darkness, dullness—this is called ignorance. Here non-knowing of things as they are is the non-knowing of the void-non-soulness. This is the mind of worldlings that is constantly attached to empirical things and relies on the empirical things. The knowledge is what relies on voidness. Now, if every mundane thought relies on empirical things and if the mind that relies on the empirical thing is ignorance, how do you say that there is mundane wisdom?

Q. As you says: if the wisdom that relies on the empirical thing is ignorance, then Arhan would have ignorance as he has the thought relying empirical things like the pot. A. Arhan has never that thought, because he has at very moment of his enlightenment, destroyed all the empirical characteristic notions. He talks of the pot, etc. just for the sake of carrying on the worldly activities; but he does not adhere to the views of mine towards them. There are three talks: (1) talk born of the wrong view, (2) talk born of 'I' and 'mine' notion and (3) talk born of just usage. The talk of the worldlings regarding the pot and the soul (*pudgala*) is born of wrong views. The learners, despite they have non-soul-view, talk on account of forgetfulness, of the soul, the pot, etc. in respect of the five aggregates, etc. This is as said in the *Kṣemaka-Sūtra* (This is born of I-and mine-notion). The Arhan's talk is born of the just usage. For example, Mahākāśyapa seeing his robe (*Saṅghāṭi*) says this is mine. The Buddha explaining this says: This Mahākāśyapa has utterly rooted out the faculty of 'I' and 'mine' and how will he be possessed of the notion of 'I' and 'mine'? However, he says so nominally. Therefore Arhan may have the idea of the pot, etc.

How will you explain the Sūtra of two right views? This is all an idea (*sañjñā*), it is, however, given the name "knowledge". The Buddha establishes different names in accordance with the living beings to be rescued E.g. he preaches the wisdom in terms of feeling, etc. in the saying: "the feeler gets released from every

thing"; the impermanence-notion being cultivated breaks up all the defilements, etc. The stanza says:

> One crosses over flood through faith, ocean through carefulness.
>
> One transcends misery through diligence and gets purified through wisdom.

The eye has a desire for the vision of colour. The eye has really no desire, but the mind alone desiring so, is spoken of by the name 'eye'.

The idea (*saññā*) may be brought under different classes. Certain idea is in the form of extreme dullness which does not distinguish what is good and what is bad. Certain in the form of inferior dullness which distinguishes them. Certain in the form of mild dullness which relies on the notion of skeleton, etc. Without abandoning empiricism one cannot blow up the five aggregates and hence this notion (of voidness) favours the knowledge which breaks up the idea of aggregates; for this reason the Buddha preaches it as "knowledge". This notion again as it causes the truth-knowledge is termed knowledge. The metaphorical talk of the cause as result is common in the world; the saying: e.g. one eats gold; many other examples are cited to this effect. Therefore, the cause of knowledge is spoken of as knowledge and hence no fault (in our thesis).

The mind in the foundations of mindfulness and in the stages of *Ūṣmā*, etc. relies on true dharma; is it *āsrava*-freed? It is the *āsrava*-freed mind which blows up empiricism. Therefore when the mind blows up empiricism, the mind that accompanies it becomes immediately *āsrava*-freed. When one is possessed of the insight into the birth and death of the five aggregates, then he gains their impermanence-notion which accomplishes the non-soul-notion for the Yogin. So it is said (in the Sūtra): "To the disciples who cultivate their mind through impermanence-notion, the non-soul-notion becomes firmly established. The

mind of those who cultivate it through the non-soul-notion gets released from the lust, hatred and infatuation." Then misery-notion is established for those who cultivate their mind through non-soul-notion. Therefore the Yogin understands that what element is impermanent and non-soul is suffering also. Thus understanding he gets detached from the un-meritorious action. Thus non-soul-notion accomplishes the misery-notion.

Q. The Sūtra gives a different order thus: "What is impermanent is misery and what is misery is non-soul. Therefore impermanence-notion accomplishes misery-notion which accomplishes in return non-soul-notion. A. (Another) Sūtra says: "The mind of the disciples that has been cultivated through impermanence-notion is firmly established in non-soul-notion." Therefore impermanence-notion accomplishes non-soul-notion. In this saying there is an (implied) reason. The advocate of the soul pleads that the soul is permanent. Therefore, the person perceiving the five aggregates as impermanent understands that they are non-soul. It is said in the Sūtra: "The person who says that the eye is the soul, does not achieve his goal. The eye has birth and death. If the eye is soul, the soul would have birth and death. This is wrong.

These two Sūtras are to be reconciled thus: The misery is two-fold: The misery that is aroused by impermanence-notion is the transformation-(*vipariṇāma*) misery, and the same aroused by non-soul-notion is the formation-(*saṁskāra*) misery. There is impermanence-notion in the foundations of mindfulness and the stages of *Ūṣmā*, etc. and it is also *āsrava*-freed. The worldling may have also an unreal foundation of mindfulness. Is it *āsrava*-freed? That person is really not a worldling; he is termed a stream-entrant. He is two-fold: The stream-entrant of the mindfulness is a remote entrant and the one having the truth-vision is nearer entrant. This is evident from the *Vāśi-jaṭopama-Sūtra*.

Q. Thus is rūpa, thus is its origin, such its cessation—this knowledge that is stated (in the above Sūtra) is the path of the first fruit. The next stated three examples are (indicators of) the path of three fruits. Therefore, one is not entrant in the first fruit. A. If the eggs are not heat-contacted, they perish. When they are done so, they come out well. Likewise beginning with the foundation of mindfulness one starts cultivation. If he does not succeed well in it, he does not become entrant. Being successful he becomes learner (*Śaikṣa*) and termed a fresh-feeler. Therefore one being rotton in the application of mindfulness, etc. becomes worldling. The person who is of successful cultivation becomes entrant in the first fruit, like a youngling within egg-shell. Being come out of it, he becomes stream-entrant. Therefore we understand that one engaged in the application of mindfulness, etc. termed remote stream-entrant. When Ugra invited the Order for meal, gods approaching him informed: This person is Arhan, etc. That person is entrant in the first fruit. If he is in the path of truth-vision, how would the gods have informed him? Hence he is understood to be a remote stream-entrant.

The Buddha again says: One who has no five faculties, faith, etc. I declare him to be an external worldling. The meaning of this saying is this: There are two worldlings: internal and external. One who has no good faculties partaking of penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya*) is an external worldling; one who has them is internal. This internal worldling is also termed 'noble' (*ārya*) and also 'worldling'. He is 'noble' taking into account of other external worldlings and the 'worldling' taking into account the path of truth-vision. For example, Ānanda addressing Channa says: The worldling does not recollect that matter is void and non-soul and the feeling, idea, formation and consciousness are void and non-soul and that all elements are void and non-soul and their cessation is Nirvāṇa. Even then Channa's mind did not enter into the law of elements (*dharma-niyāma*).

Q. Whether one is remote or nearer, both are the stream-entrants. What is distinction between them? A. The person who perceives the cessation-truth is the real stream-entrant and he who is possessed of good faculties and perceives five aggregates as impermanent, misery, void and non-soul but not their cessation, is nominal stream-entrant. Why? The Sūtra says: The monks ask the Buddha: How should we see dharma? The Buddha replies: The Visual consciousness arises on the basis of the eye and the colour; along with it arise the feeling, idea, volition, and all which are impermanent, transform-characterized and untruth-worthy. What element is impermanent is misery. Its origin also is misery, its stay also is misery, and its again and again becoming also is misery. So are all the elements including the mental ones. If this misery ceases, other miseries would not arise, nor would the stream of elements continue. This occurs in the Yogin's mind: This is the finest abode of peace which is the disappearance of all false sensual pleasures and cravings, destruction, lust-freedom, cessation and Nirvāṇa. If, in this dharma the mind enters, remains resolute, does not shake, not turn back, not lament, and not get frightened, we should see *dharma* as conditioned by that view (*tato nidāna*). Therefore we understand that the Yogin while looking at the five aggregates by way of impermanence and other aspects is termed "remote stream-entrant" and that he while perceiving their cessation is "nearer stream-entrant". For example, Channa replies the elders thus: This occurs to me also: the matter is impermanent and consciousness impermanent, the matter is non-soul and consciousness non-soul and all the elements are impermanent and non-soul. Even then my mind does not enter into Nirvāṇa, cessation and destruction of all elements and cravings, and does not get calm; the thirst is not got rid of; grasping arises, and the mind turns back. Then, what is my soul? This does not occur to one who perceives this dharma (i.e. the cessation dharma).

Again (the Buddha) says: The Yogin who believes in perseverance towards this dharma through his mild wisdom is a

" faith-following entrant ". None is born amidst gods without surpassing the sphere of worldling and without obtaining the first fruit on entering into the (stage of) elements' order (*dharma-niyāma*). The Yogin who believes in perseverance through his sharp wisdom is " dharma-following entrant ". The person, who perceiving this dharma, cuts three fetters is stream-entrant. The person who is cognisant of entire (impermanence, etc. and cessation) is Arhan. Therefore we understand that the person perceiving the cessation becomes a " nearer-(stream) entrant ".

Q. Why does not the Yogin perceive the ultimate and utter cessation? A. The Sūtra says: " Things are originated dependently. This dharma is very deep. The entire-craving-destruction, appeasing, cessation is Nirvāṇa; this abode is hardly perceivable. The Buddha, perceiving the cessation of twelve causal links became cognizant of the supreme enlightenment ". The *Dharma mudrā-Sūtra* says: " The Yogin perceives the five aggregates as impermanent, deceiving, false, non-essential and void, thus his knowledge-vision become, impure ". The same Sūtra says at the end: " This occurs to the Yogin: What is by me seen, heard, smelt, tasted, touched and thought is all dependently originated; so is the consciousness. The knowledge about the causes and conditions of this consciousness is impermanent. How could the consciousness that has arisen from the impermanent causes be permanent? Therefore, all the five aggregates are impermanent, dependently originated, and characterized by destruction, transformation, separation and cessation—thus he perceives. Then the Yogin's knowledge-vision become pure ". By the expression ' ultimate and utter cessation ' is spoken of the pure knowledge-vision. Therefore, the cessation-knowledge-vision becomes noble-truth-vision. At the commencement what is the elemental order-knowledge (*dharma-sthiti-jñāna*) the same becomes Nirvāṇa-knowledge at the end. Therefore, the cessation-truth-vision itself becomes the noble-path-gain.

190. *One-Truth-Vision*

Q. You pleaded: By perceiving the cessation-truth alone one becomes the fruit-entrant. That is not correct. For, the

Buddha says: "Not realising truly the four noble truths, our wandering and transmigration are for this long time; now those four truths are realized and due to that realization is cut our transmigration, and no more will the body be experienced". So it is to be understood that one becomes fruit-entrant because of the four-truths-vision, but not merely of the cessation-vision. The Buddha again says: The supreme dharma is what are four noble truths. Therefore the Yogin should know and see all (the truths). (The Sūtra) says: Those who are dressed in the role of dharma and have despised the body and believe in going out of home, are all for the realization of the four noble truths. Those who desire to gain the fruit of the stream-entrant, once returning, never-returning are all because they have perceived the four truths. And those who gain Arhant-hood, Pratyaka-Buddha-hood and Buddha-hood are all because they have perceived the four truths. Therefore, we understand that cessation-truth-vision alone is not (the *āryan*-truth). It says: One obtains the four truths gradually. *Dharma-cakra-pravartana-Sūtra* says: This is misery; this is its origin; this is its cessation; this is the path leading to its cessation—to me thus perceiving arose the eye, arose the knowledge, arose *vidyā*, and arose enlightenment in respect of those (truths). Thus he spoke of the four truths in three times. It says: Just as white garments being placed in the lake their colour one experiences very well; likewise this person sitting in a place perceives four truths. (The Sūtra) again says: A man of pure mind meditates on the truth of misery upto the truth of the path and the mind of the man thus perceiving gets released from the sensual-pleasure-intoxicant, becoming-intoxicant and ignorance-intoxicant. In whichever Sūtra is stated the noble truth, in all such places the four truths are mentioned and not the cessation-truth-alone. The Buddha says: There are four knowledges: misery-knowledge, origin-knowledge, cessation-knowledge and the path-knowledge. All these four are aimed at four noble truths. Yogin should analyse by way of dharma the four truths. Just as a physician understands the disease,

its origin, destruction and its medicine, just so the Yogin desiring the removal of miseries should know the misery, its origin, its cessation and the path leading to the cessation. If he does not understand the misery, how will he know its origin, its cessation and the path leading to the cessation? Therefore, we understand, that cessation-vision alone is not (the path).

Now the author replies: What you stated that certain men gain the four truths, that is said in respect of the 5 aggregates, 12 bases and 18 elements, viz. this is the matter, this is tis origin, this is its disappearance etc.; of the person understanding the above, the intoxicants are destroyed. The Buddha again says: I experienced the supreme path without understanding truly the taste, danger and removal of the aggregates, matter, etc.—this I do not say. But I do say that I, truly understanding so, experienced the path. It is said in the *Nagaropama-Sūtra*: When knowledge did not occur to me that thus is the old-age-death, thus its origin, its cessation and the path leading to its cessation.. thus is the formation, its origin, its cessation and the path leading to its cessation, then I do not say that the supreme path is realized. Seeing this and other sayings if we say that this is the gaining (*adhigama*) of the vision-path (*darśana-mārga*), then sixteen minds' (moments) would not be the gaining of *darśana-mārga*.

Q. I do not say this is the gaining of *darśana-mārga*, but it is the time of investigation. A. The same is to be said in respect of four truths; it ought to be stated that it is the time of investigation. If it is not so, you must give reason (for this) that the vision of four truths is the time of the path-gaining (*adhigama*) and the vision of five aggregates, etc. is the time of investigation. Q. The knowledge of defilement-abandonment is the gaining of the path, and the investigation of the five aggregates, etc. does not lead to abandon defilements. A. We have already stated that the knowledge of the five aggregates, etc. also leads to the abandonment of defilements. So it is said: "From the knowledge-vision of the matter, etc. intoxicants, *āsravas* are

destroyed". The Sūtra again says: "When one cognizes the origin of the world, his nihilistic view ceases and when he cognizes the cessation of the world his eternalistic view ceases. The Buddha himself looking at the causal links gained (or realized) the path. It is said in the *Kiṁśuka-Sūtra*: There are various factors for gaining (realization) of the path: certain men perceiving the five aggregates (as impermanent, etc.) realize the path; certain men perceiving twelve bases, eighteen elements or twelve causal links and others (as impermanent etc.) realize the path. Therefore we understand that the gaining (or realization) of the path is not merely by the vision of four-truths. If you think that in spite of this statement one does not abandon the defilements through the vision of the above said things, then we may reply that one does not abandon them even through the vision of the four truths. But this cannot be stated; for, the *Catussatya-vibhaṅga*-Sūtra has supported it by saying that birth is ill and old age is ill, etc. It says: The origin of the ill is what is craving, etc. By the vision of this and others the destruction of *āsravas* would not be possible; for all that is an empirical truth and not the ultimate one.

Q. Though by perceiving the birth and death, etc. as ills the destruction of intoxicants, *āsravas* may not be possible; nevertheless, when one understands that the five aggregates in brief are ill his defilements are destroyed. A. How do the other three become truths? Therefore, it is understood that it is (all) your own imaginative construction of conceptuals recollections. One seeing the five aggregates as ill, distracts his mind alone and does not gain nor realize the path. By what dharma would one realize it? By one truth alone, which is known as cessation. So says the Sūtra: "*Mṛṣā* is untruth, its reverse is truth. All the manifest elements are false and untrue graspings". Therefore we understand that the Yogin remains in the manifest elements by virtue of his deluded mind alone, and not from the view of the ultimate supreme truth. The Sūtra says: The manifest elements

are untrue, comparable to magic, flame and debt. The *Dharmapada* says:

> This world is tied up to untruth and shines as if it is firm and true,
>
> It is non-existent and appears as though existent, but it is non-existent in the angle of supreme wisdom.

There is no such thing as "woman and man" in fact. The worldlings talk of such thing in respect of mere continuity of five aggregates and become deluded by perversion. The Yogin, however, meditates on the aggregates as void non-soul; hence he sees no more in them anything like 'woman' or 'man'. The *Dharmamudrā-Sūtra* says: The Yogin meditates on the matter as impermanent, void and separation-characterized. 'Impermanent' is what is so in its own form; 'void' is as the people say that the pot is empty when water is absent in it. Likewise since there is no soul in the five aggregates they are void. The person who meditates so, is al o void. His knowledge-vision is also impure, as he has not perceived the cessation of the five aggregates. Finally, at the end the Yogin perceives the cessation thus: what is seen, heard, etc. (are all dependently originated). It is clear, therefore, that if the person perceives the cessation his defilements are then destroyed.

Why is it so? At that time Yogin's misery-notion becomes firmly established. When he does not bring before himself the cessation, his misery-notion in respect of manifest elements does not become firmly established. For example, when one does not obtain joy-happiness in the first dhyāna he could not form the disgust-notion towards the five sensual pleasures; when one does not obtain the concentration free from *vitarka* and *vicāra*, he does not cherish a sense of folly towards concentration tainted with *vitarka* and *vicāra*. Likewise the Yogin without realizing the Nirvāṇa as peace-characterized, does not realize the misery (-notion) towards the formation-elements (*Saṁskāra = duḥkha*).

Therefore it is understood that the misery-notion becomes fulfilled only when one perceives the cessation-truth, and because of the misery-notion being fulfilled, the craving and other fetters are abandoned.

Q. Then one will perceive first cessation-truth and then afterwards his defilements will be abandoned, because the misery-notion becomes fulfilled only after perceiving the cessation-truth. A. No, not afterwards they are abandoned. The moment cessation is realized, misery-notion becomes fulfilled; it appears, however, before him afterwards. The Sūtra says: "The Yogin understanding what is rising-characterized is waning-characterized obtains a pure dharma-eye". There is always a sense of 'I' on the five aggregates. One, even perceiving the aggregates as impermanent and misery does not obtain the cessation. When he perceives the cessation, because it is characterized as non-existent, the sense of 'I' utterly ceases to exist. Then why does the Buddha preach the four truths and not only the cessation-truth? There is a process by way of progress to the path. The impermanence-notion accomplishes non-soul-notion and due to this one obtains the vision that this is misery. Since this (vision) is proximate to the path, he speaks of it together.

If, at the time of gaining the path itself, the soul-view is abandoned, why are the contagion of mere rules and rituals and the perplexity stated again? The Yogin, perceiving in this life things as void and non-soul gets no more perplexed. He is not similar to the worldlings in listening and thinking, etc. Perceiving the path-truth he understands that this is only one truth and no more else. Therefore he states three. Q. If, at the time of gaining the path all the defilements that are to be abandoned by the truth-vission are destroyed, why does he say the destruction of only three fetters? A. All the defilements are rooted in the soul-view. The Buddha asks the monks: This view occurs through what thing and on what basis?....The monks reply: You are the source of dharmas, and beg of you for exposition. The Buddha says: The soul-view arises when there is the

matter; it arises basing on the matter and adhering to it.... so is to be stated upto the consciousness. It is thus understood, that all the defilements appear basing on the soul-view. When there is the soul-view, they say that this soul is either permanent or impermanent. To see it permanent, is eternalism and to see it impermanent is nihilism. If it is permanent, no need of *karman*, its resultant, and no release. If it is impermanent, then also no need of *karman*, etc. None would obtain Nirvāṇa by means of meditating on the path. More prominence of this view turns to be the contagion of the wrong view. The same being further developed becomes the contagion of mere rules and rituals. The soul-view being present, there is craving, and the sense of ' other ' being present there is aversion. To view one-self as high is pride. Emergence of defilements as a result of not knowing things as they are is ignorance. Therefore, since the soul-view is destroyed the abandonment of defilements is affected through the truth-vision.

The contagion of mere rules and rituals and perplexity are particularly stated above, because of their prominence. When the Yogin brings before his mind the characteristic of things, he is no more perplexed. The perplexity makes one doubt whether there is the soul or no soul and whether the path leads to purification or not purification. Now the misery-truth being perceived, the soul-view is abandoned. He further understands that this alone is the path and nothing else. Therefore it is said that the abandonment of the soul-view is truly insight into misery. By destroying the contagion of mere rules and rituals and practising the path one does not get perplexed in respect of knowledge and knowable dharmas. The person understands the knowable things through right knowledge; he alone, abandoning the origin (of misery, i.e. craving) and realizing the cessation, is termed as accomplished in four truths. The expression of the three truths points out the absence of perplexity which arises with reference to the soul and the path. The Sūtra says: The first *abhisambodhi*-characteristic is that one perceives dharma, under-

stands dharma and experiences dharma; he crossing over the net of perplexity, does not follow others' doctrine, and attaining to the strength of fearlessness in Buddha's dispensation he remains well situated in the fruit.

191. *All-thing-Object-Knowledge*
(*Sarvālambana-jñāna*)

The knowledge which cognizes (lit. ranges over) the eighteen elements and twelve bases, etc. becomes the all-thing-object. When twelve bases and eighteen elements are expressed, all things (included therein) become objects, contents and cognizable, etc. The knowledge which relies on them is termed 'all-thing-object' (*sarvālambana-jñāna*).

Q. This knowledge does not cognize things which are mind's associates and its-co-existent. A. It cognizes all. If it relies on twelve bases, etc. it becomes a generality-characterized knowledge. Since it is generality-characterized, it relies on everything, because the expression 'twelve bases' includes everything in it and there is nothing other than that. It is, therefore, evident that this knowledge also relies on the self (*svātman*).

Q. The Sūtra says: 'Consciousness arises by means of two causal factors'. So the knowledge would not rely on its own self. This is proved by examples. No tip of the finger touches its self and the eye also does not see its self. A. There is no such rule that every consciousness arises by means of causal factors. Knowledge may arise even in the absence of an object (*anālambana*). The sixth consciousness, in its own stream (*kalāpa*) has an object which is absolutely non-existent. For, (the sensuous consciousness) has the present thing as its object and this sixth consciousness has not the colour, etc. as its objects. If it relies on the colour, etc.; even the blind can see the colour. The mind and mental states of this man at that time linger in things past and future which are non-existent. Of what consciousness then do they (past and future things) become objects?

Since the assumption of the soul is denied, it is said so. If any consciousness occurs, all that occurs due to two causal factors but not four. Certain consciousness arises even without them. The Sūtra says: "The sensation (*sparśa*) is conditioned by six bases". But in fact, all the six bases are not conditional factors to the sensation (ch. 14.4). What arises does not arise from the six bases alone (it arises from non-base also); for the seventh base is not accepted. Likewise denying the four conditions, the Buddha says: 'two bases' (i.e. conditions).

Knowledge arises with reference to the past, future, space, time, quarters, etc. which are not real entities, this is what is the objectless knowledge *anālambana*.

Q. For this very reason the past and future, etc. are real entities. If they are non-entities, what produces their knowledge? No knowledge arises with reference to horn of the hare, hair of the tortoise, etc. A. Knowledge arises with reference to (something) functioning. Thus when the vision of a person is past, the man recollects that past time. When one hears the person talk, the man recollects that past time. Thus the things that are past have no any function and therefore (their knowledge) is improper. Q. How is the past recollected? A. There does not exist any dharma of the recollection. You may ask: Why are the horn of the hare, etc. not recollected? What thing being arisen, is ceased, that thing can be recollected. Something being non-existent by itself, how can it be recollected? For example, a thing that is previously *sattva*-designated is at present also *sattva*-designated. Since the recollection of that thing has arisen previously, the same mind is again recollected but not another mind. This person previously grasped the *nimitta*, characteristic mark of a thing (dharma). Though that thing is ceased, the person, giving rise to the recollection of the mark of the thing constructs the thing. What thing appears in his mind that thing is ceased and then in the next moment the non-sensuous consciousness cognizes the same thing. This is what is termed

consciousness relying on the mark (*nimitta*). This mark provides the cause of the subsequent consciousness relying on the same. The consciousness of horn of the hare, etc. is not caused by the perceived characteristic mark-cause and hence does not arise. However, consciousness depending on the horn of the hare, etc. may also arise. If it is not so, how could one be able to talk of them?

Q. The horn-characteristic is not cognizable; for the recollection of its characteristics: shortness, length, whiteness, and blackness, etc. never occurs in our mind. Likewise will be the past thing; for, it does not come before us in the present moment. E.g. the noble men understanding the future thing say that it would be like this and not like that. A. The force of āryan knowledge is such that it cognizes beforehand things that are non-existent. Just as the noble person breaking the stony wall submerges and emerges unobstructed, just so does he understand the non-existent thing. One understands it by force of memory. E.g. the visual consciousness does not discern this is a woman or a man. If it does not discern it, the non-sensuous consciousness also would not do so. But in fact, it discerns so. Likewise this (āryan knowledge) also would (understand the non-existent things). Just as we have the knowledge in respect of the thing that is experienced once and ceased, just so do the noble men have the knowledge with reference to the non-existent things. E.g. when the word '*devadatta*' is uttered, no one consciousness understands the four letters; nevertheless it understands the word. Number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, *paratva* and *aparatva*, though they are unperceived, cause their own consciousness. The man's body is not understandable in one moment, nor is it understandable by the consciousness of each limb. Even in the absence of the knowledge of the man in each limb, the knowledge of the man arises from its knowledge in one (last) moment. This (āryan knowledge) also will be like that (i.e. will understand the non-existent thing).

You have stated that there is no knowledge relying on its own self on the analogy of given examples. Here is a saying that the mind cognizes its own self. For, it is said: The Yogin pursues the analytical thought; the mind is not (operating) with reference to the past and future things. E.g. the present moment's mind relies on the present moment's mind. If it is not so, none would ever cognize (mental) element associated with the present moment's mind. Q. The Sūtra says:

> "If one perceives all things non-soul through wisdom
> Then he gets disgusted towards (them i.e.) misery: this is
> the path for purification."

This wisdom dispels the self, its co-existing elements and all other objects.

A. This knowledge (i.e. wisdom) is relying on the object tainted with *āsrava* but not on the *āsrava*-freed object. For, it is said in the stanza: "Then he gets disgusted towards misery". So it is relying on the misery-truth. The contemplation on non-soul-ness is for the destruction of the soul-view which is related to the five aggregates. Therefore it is understood that the non-soul-view is also related to the five aggregates. They are non-soul because they are impermanent. The Sūtra says: 'What is impermanent is non-soul and what is non-soul is misery'. The Buddha says: What is yours, abandon it. The monks reply: We understand it. The Buddha says: How is it understood? They reply: The matter is not the soul, and not anything pertaining to the soul, feeling, etc. are not the soul, etc. and them we have to abandon. The Buddha says: Well, it is so. Therefore, it is understood the sense of 'I' arises only on the basis of the five aggregates. More the Sūtra passages are cited to show that non-soul-knowledge relies on the five clinging aggregates. There is no any passage in the Sūtra to the effect that the knowledge of non-soul-ness is relying on all things (*Sarvālambana*). It is said everywhere, on the other hand, that this knowledge relies on the five aggregates.

Q. The Buddha himself says: All things are non-soul. Therefore this knowledge is related to all things, *Saṁskṛta* and *asaṁskṛta* as its objects, and not merely to the five aggregates. He says: ten-fold voidness is related to all things. What is voidness is the same as non-soul-ness. He says: All formations are impermanent and misery and all things (*dharma*) are non-soul. What is non-soul-knowledge is related to misery-truth. Since all things are said to be non-soul, the term "formation" in the above passage refers to the manifest elements. The term, *dharma* refers to all things. The Sūtra says: The Buddha alone bringing before himself the thing that is one-characterized and the thing that is other-characterized discerns them just as he perceives the visible through his knowledge-eye. All things are one-characterized by way of non-soul-characteristic. Therefore, we understand that non-soul-knowledge relies on all things and not on the misery alone.

The author replies: 'All' is two-fold: (1) one inclusive of entire universe and (2) the other inclusive of some part. The first 'all' is implied in the Buddha's saying: I am *sarvajña*, all-knower. Here 'all' stands for twelve bases. The second 'all' (*sarva*) is meant in the saying: all is ablaze (*ādīpta*). The *āsrva*-freed thing and *asaṁskṛta* element are not ablaze. It is said in the *Tathāgata*-chapter: Tathāgata is all-forsaker and all-conquerer. Moral and others are not to be forsaken; but un-meritorious elements are to be forsaken. Having them in view it is said "all-forsaker". Again (the Sūtra) says: Which monk is *sarvajña*, all-knower? One who understands truly the origination and cessation of six bases of touch is said to be knower of all things' general characteristics but not of their particular ones. The Buddha, on the other hand, is *sarvajña*, the knower of the general as well as particular characteristics. This monk knows in general all things as impermanent and hence he is *sarvajña*. Though this name is common to the Buddha, there is a distinction in its content. This 'all' is inclusive of a portion (*ekadeśa*).

The Buddha says: What is introduced in the Sūtras, found in the Vinaya and not contradictory to the law of nature (*dharmatā*) is to be adopted. It is again said: A monk says: this is the Buddha's saying: he may be of a good expression (*suvyañjana*); but not of a good import. The learned should express his expression with a good import by which the expression of this learned monk becomes praiseworthy. Again there is certain (monk) a speaker of good import but not in good expression. (The learned) should join the good import with the good expression. In this and other sūtras the Buddha preaches " all " (things). Again there are two categories of sūtra: *nītārtha*, of explicit import, and *neyārtha*, of implied import. The present sūtra is a *neyārtha*, because the term " all " is used with reference to a single object, and its intention must be understood.

The people in the world use ' all ' with reference to a single thing thus: ' he sacrifices all ': ' gives all food ', ' he eats all '. Therefore we understand that even though there is expression: ' all ' is non-soul, it is said only with reference to the five clinging aggregates.

You refer to ten *śūnyatā*. No unmanifest element is experienced as void; it does not produce the soul-notion. You also say that the void is linked with what is misery. Therefore voidness is not related to everything. Q. The mundane voidness relies on everything but not the *āsrava*-freed one. A. There is no mundane voidness; all voidness is *āsrava*-freed. Voidness that is spoken of in the *Dharmamudrā-Sūtra* is also transcendental voidness and not mundane one. Q. Since the knowledge-vision spoken of here is impure, the voidness is mundane. A. I have already stated that the *āsrava*-freed mind is the destroyer of empiricism. Since it destroys empiricism, it becomes *āsrava*-freed. Later on, perceiving the cessation-truth one gives up the self-pride and then his knowledge-vision become pure.

You have cited the passage that all formations are impermanent, and all things are non-soul etc. Then, this will mean;

when the Yogin is possessed of non-soul-notion, then as a result of his possession of dharma-notion, the notion of dharma is spoken of with reference to the non-soul-view. It is said in the Vision-chapter. The person who does not perceive misery becomes perceiver of the soul and one who perceives truly the misery, perceives the soul no more. 'Truly' (*Yathābhūta*) is the non-soul-vision. Therefore, the expression 'all things are non-soul' being related to the misery-truth expresses the idea that *saṁskāra* is non-soul. With reference to your *eka-lakṣaṇa-dharma*, the eighteen elements and twelve bases are said to be one-characterized as they are (brought under) one category (of *dhātu* or *āyatana*).

192. *Noble-Dwelling* (*Vihāra*)

There is two-fold-dwelling: void-dwelling and non-soul-dwelling. The vision that there is no *sattva*, a living being in the five aggregates is void-dwelling and the vision that even the five aggregates are non-existent is non-soul-dwelling. It is evident from the Sūtra which says: (The Yogin) perceives the matter as non-essential and feeling, idea, formation and consciousness as non-essential. The Sūtra says: On the basis of non-essential (character) he gets released. Therefore, the matter-character, etc. are unreal. It is said: The five aggregates are void and comparable to magic. So, they are un-real things. Since they are unreal, ignorant talks about them (as existent). The Yogin perceives everything as void. Therefore they are non-existent. Just as things like the wall, etc. do not exist on account of blowing up of their unique character (*ekalakṣaṇa*) just so are the five aggregates, and there is no any ultimate element in them.

Q. If the (integrated) matter, etc. are un-real, then one empirical truth alone will be there. A. The cessation exists by way of absolute truth. The Sūtra says: False is what is trifling (*tucchaka*). Truth is what exists truly (*yathābhūta*). The cessation is definitely *yathābhūta* and hence it is truly existing.

Q. You have stated that the vision that there is no *sattva* in the five aggregates is void-dwelling. By what reason they are said to be *sattva* ? Is it impure (*sāsrava*) or pure (*anāsrava*)? A. It is both. Q. The Sūtra says: The person who sees *sattva*, sees the five aggregates. So it is impure (*sāsrava*). A. There is also *āsrava*-freed character in the sattva-designated aggregates but not in the asattva-designated like tree, stone, etc. Therefore, we understand that *sattva* exists even on the basis of the pure five aggregates. When the wise is in the pure mind, even at that time there is the mind (known as) *sattva*. Therefore pure mind becomes *sattva*. All the aggregates are termed clinging aggregates as they are produced from clinging.

Q. How does everything arise from clinging? A. The pure *dharma* arises from the thought of charity, morality and concentration-cultivation and other actions, and not otherwise. The Sūtra says: The ignorant, being tied by the fetter of craving covered with ignorance obtains this body. So also does the wise. The body itself is clinging aggregate. What is the distinction between pure and impure aggregates? The five aggregates are termed clinging aggregates because they are produced from the clinging. Since they will not undergo becoming again, they are pure (*anāsrava*). They are clinging aggregates as they are produced from the clinging together with the clinging aggregates. Thus no Sūtra is contradicted.

These two dwellings relate to the denial of something, which is the same as the elements, matter, etc. which are void and subject to cessation in their character. The idea that the two dwellings relate to the denial of something is argued till the end of this chapter.

193. *Knowledge-Vision* (*jñāna-darśana*)

What is the difference between the right vision and right knowledge? Both are of the same import and no distinction between them. The right vision is two-fold: mundane and transcendental. The first is (to see) that there is merit and there is sin while the

second is to recognize the truths of misery, etc. The right knowledge will also be likewise (two-fold, etc.).

Q. Their characteristics that you have stated are not thiswise. *Kṣānti*, perseverance is only *darśana*, vision and not knowledge. The knowledge of defilement destruction and of no more birth and the wisdom associated with five-fold sensuous consciousness are only knowledge and not perseverance. A. Why is perseverance not knowledge? The opponent continues: The faculty of *ajñāsyāmi*) is because of the thought: I shall come to know the unknown. If the perseverance of the law, dharma towards misery is knowledge, that perseverance is already understood, and the knowledge of misery towards *dharma* would be the gnosis-faculty but not the faculty of *ājñāsyāmi*. Therefore, perseverance is not knowledge. The Sūtra says: When the Yogin contemplates on things as "limitted" (*parītta*) through his wisdom, this is perseverance i.e. insight (*vipaśyanā*) not accomplished. The latter being accomplished becomes knowledge. Perseverance is un-accomplished insight, pure wisdom of the first moment and the first vision. No first vision would be knowledge. At the moment of perseverance no conviction (*viniścaya*) occurs. It occurs necessarily at the moment of knowledge. At the rising time of perseverance the perplexity again continues. Therefore perseverance is not knowledge.

The author replies: What is perseverance is the knowledge itself. For, *Chanda*, *abhirati* and *kṣānti* are synonyms. The Yogin, first understanding the misery becomes delighted in its perseverance. If there is no knowledge previously, what delight will be there towards one to be persevered? In the saying of 'limitted' it is only stated that the insight is the perseverance and not the knowledge. If it is so, the fruit-entrant would be devoid of knowledge. If you think that only when the Yogin gains knowledge he will have perseverance, then the experience of the perseverance alone will be the knowledge. The Sūtra says: The Yogin thus knowing and thus viewing gets released from

āsravas. It is also said that knowledge and vision are of the same import.

The Buddha says: There are misery-knowledge, origination, cessation, and the path-knowledge. He does not say about the perseverance. Therefore, it is evident that the knowledge itself is the perseverance. The Buddha says for release: One discerns the truth as it is (*yathābhūta*) and that is the knowledge. The perseverance also discerns the truth as it is and hence it is not different from the knowledge. If (you say that) the faculty of thought: 'I shall come to know' is the perseverance, it is not correct. We do not accept that the perseverance is previous and the knowledge is subsequent. One and the same mind has (two) names—*kṣānti* and *jñāna*. The meaning of the Sūtra (i.e. first is the perseverance and then the knowledge) is not established. How do you achieve your objective by means of unestablished fact? You have stated that the unaccomplished (insight) is the perseverance. This has been replied by me that the knowledge is first and the perseverance is subsequent. Therefore what is accomplished is the perseverance. You have stated that at the time of the perseverance no conviction exists. In your system one abandons the fetter through the perseverance. Thus what is undecided, what fetter would it abandon? You have stated the perplexity continues at the time of perseverance. If it is so, even at the vision of the path-truth the perplexity will be continuing, then the knowledge even if that has arisen about that, would become non-knowledge. This constructive perseverance does not become the knowledge. Just as the mundane insight penetrating into four truths is termed the perseverance as well as the knowledge, the pure perseverance and the pure knowledge also will be likewise (identical).

Q. Destruction-knowledge and no-more-birth-knowledge alone will be knowledge and not view, *dṛṣṭi*. What is the reason? The Sūtra has stated them separately as "right-view" and "right-knowledge". Therefore, they are separate. A. If it is so,

right view does not become right knowledge. If you think that the right view is right knowledge, right knowledge also would be right view. In the five-limbed body of dharmic aggregates, the release-knowledge-vision which is stated separately from the wisdom-aggregate would not be wisdom. Likewise destruction-knowledge and no-more-birth-knowledge also are not wisdom. Now, right-view itself is said as right-knowledge through a different characteristic, viz. the destruction of all defilements has taken place in the mind of Arhan and it is termed 'right-knowledge'.

Q. If the right knowledge and right view are the same, Arhan would not be possessed of ten limbs (*daśāṅga*). A. Only one thing is differently named, e.g. *dharma*-knowledge and misery-knowledge. It is said: Arhan is the field of merit with eight virtues. Therefore the right knowledge itself is the right view. Of the six straight views (*Sāmīcī*) the sixth is named "Balance-view". As per your opinion the destruction-knowledge and no-more-birth-knowledge do not become straight view (*sāmīcī*). The right view is because it rightly penetrates (or analyses). The destruction-knowledge and no-more-birth-knowledge are right views because they rightly penetrate (*vipaśyati*).

Q. The wisdom that is associated with five-fold (sensuous) consciousness is the knowledge alone and not view. A. Why is it not view? Q. The five sensuous consciousnesses are non-discursive as they reach their object for the first time. The view means a cumulative and contemplative thought. The sensuous consciousness relies on the present object; hence it is not view. A. The sensuous consciousness does not construct as it lacks in *vitarka* and *vicāra*. Your opinion that it is not the view because it reaches its object for the first time is not correct; for, your system is: the visual consciousness has as its object the stream of elements (*santāna*) just like the non-sensuous consciousness. Therefore, it should not be stated that the visual consciousness reaches its object for the first time. If it is so, the non-sensuous

consciousness also will not be the view. You again say that it is not the view because it relies on the object of present moment. This is also not correct. The discernment of other's thought also will not be the view as it relies on the present object. In the five-(fold sensuous) consciousness there is no true (*yathābhūta*) knowledge, because of its lack in *pratipatti*, insight and because it pursues always empiricism (contrast ch. 189, author's Reply). There is no view, no knowledge, no wisdom and no everything, why do you say that only the view is not there?

Some masters say: The eye is perceiver (*dṛṣṭi*). The author does not accept this; (for him) the visual consciousness relies on (i.e. perceives) the object. The eye is termed *dṛṣṭi* from the standpoint of empirical talk. Some masters say: There are eight *dṛṣṭis*, five wrong views, mundane right view, the learner's view and the learning-ender's view. Apart from these eight views, others are wisdom and not the view. The author replies: Knowledge-vision, release-gain, experience and bringing before one's mind (*sākṣātkāra*) are all of the same import. Your saying that this is the view and that is not so is all constructed by your own ideas. Q. The Sūtra says: thus knowing and thus viewing one gets released from *āsravas*. How is there the distinction between them? A. When one knowing at first breaks up empiricism, that is termed knowledge. To enter into the *dharmasthititā*, elemental status is vision. The first insight (*vipaśyanā*) is knowledge and its experience is vision. This is the deep distinction.

194. *Three-Fold Wisdom*

Three wisdoms: (1) wisdom born of listening, (2) wisdom born of thinking and (3) wisdom born of contemplation. The first wisdom comes from listening to twelve-membered discourses. This causes pure noble wisdom and hence it is 'wisdom'. One even listening to the Vedas, etc. does not have pure wisdom and therefore it is not the wisdom born of listening. Thinking of the Discourses (Sūtra) and their imports one has the wisdom born

of thinking. It is said: The Yogin, listening to the doctrine thinks of its meaning and follows the path. That which brings before itself the knowledge-vision is the wisdom born of contemplation (*bhāvanā*). It is said in the Sūtra: You, monks, cultivating dhyāna and concentration, will bring before you the true-knowledge-vision. It is said in the *Sapta-samyag-jñāna-Sūtra*: When the monk knows the doctrine, this is the wisdom of listening. When he thinks of its meaning it is the wisdom of thinking. When he knows the time, etc. it is the wisdom of contemplation. E.g. Rāhula studies the text of the five clinging aggregates, etc. this is the wisdom of listening. When he thinks of their meanings in a solitary place: this is the wisdom of thinking. Then at the time of gaining the path (*-sambodhi*) it becomes the wisdom of contemplation. The Sūtra says: There are three weapons: (1) listening-weapon, (2) analysing-weapon, and (3) wisdom-weapon. The first is the wisdom of listening. The second is the wisdom of thinking. The third is the wisdom of contemplation. The Sūtra says: There are five advantages in listening to the discourses: (1) one listens to what is not listened, (2) he causes to take up what is listened, (3) kills the doubt, (4) straightens his view and (5) his mind becomes pure (*prasāda*). The first two form the wisdom of listening. The third and the fourth the wisdom of thinking and the fifth the wisdom of contemplation. It is said in the *Advantage of dharma-listening*: One listens through the ear and studies it by his mouth this is the wisdom of listening. He investigates it by his mind: this is the wisdom of thinking. He perceiving it realizes it: this is the wisdom of contemplation. In the four constituents of the stream-entrance, listening to the good dharma is the listening-wisdom. Rational thinking is the thinking-wisdom. Practice of *dharma* and *anudharma* the contemplation-wisdom. In the five release-bases to listen to the doctrine from an elderly person is listening-wisdom, to realize the meaning of the doctrine is thinking-wisdom. The genesis of rejoicing, etc. in the person is contemplation-wisdom. The Sūtra again says: The Buddha preaches dharma auspicious

in all three times, etc. Listening to dharma by the young or the old is the listening-wisdom. He, then, thinks that the household life is obstructional and going out of home obstruction-free; this is the thinking-wisdom. Then abandoning the five hindrances he gains the *āsrava*-destruction; this is the contemplation-wisdom. The Sūtra says: The right view arises from the two factors, viz., (1) listening to the doctrine from others and (2) rationally thinking. The first factor is the listening-wisdom and the second one is the thinking wisdom and the genesis of the right view is the contemplation-wisdom. The stanza says:

> Approaching to a good person, listening to the good doctrine
> And being delighted in a solitary place one should subdue his mind.

The first line speaks of the listening wisdom; 'being delighted in a solitary place' is the thinking wisdom and the subduing the mind is the contemplation-wisdom. The Buddha admonishes his disciples: while speaking you should speak the four truths and while thinking, you should think of the same truths. Here speaking the four truths is the listening-wisdom and thinking the same is the thinking-wisdom and winning the truths is contemplation-wisdom. Thus the Buddha has spoken of the three-fold wisdom in such and other Sūtras.

In the desire-world all the three wisdoms are obtained. Hastaka, a lay devotee being born amongst the *Atapya* gods preaches the doctrine and thinks of its meaning. Therefore the thinking-wisdom is obtained in the form-world and the contemplation-wisdom is obtained in the formless world. Some masters say: In the desire-world there is no contemplation-wisdom and no thinking-wisdom in the form-world. Why? None abandons by means of the path of the desire-world all the hindrances and outburst of *anuśaya*s, latent vicos. The author replies: In your system there is no saying to that effect. There is however a saying: One breaks up his defilements through the

path of the desire-world. In this world there is the foul-meditation. The Sūtra says: Cultivating the foul meditation, one roots out the lust for sensual pleasure. The same is the case with reference to *karuṇā*. If you say that one abandons the defilements by meditating on the aspects of turbulence (*dauṣṭhulya*) and displeasure and not by the foul-meditation, I have to state that there is no any Sūtra to such effect. It is said on the other hand in the Sūtra that one roots out the defilements by the foul-meditation, etc. What special force do the aspects of turbulence, etc. have which (special force) the foul-meditation, etc. do not. If there is *dauṣṭhulya* aspect in the desire-world, then it would destroy the defilements. If it is not there, you must give reason why there is the foul-meditation and not the turbulence aspect. If you say that though it is there, it does not destroy defilements; it would not do so in the form-world. Here you must give reason why it destroys them in the form-world but not in the desire-world.

Q. The aspect of turbulence even though present in the desire-world, does not destroy the defilements as the desire-world is a distracting sphere; a man of distracted mind cannot destroy any vice. The Sūtra says: The mind's concentration is path and its distraction is non-path. A. You must state the reason why the desire-world is the distracting sphere. Here is the meditation on the foul object, etc. If it is the distracting sphere, how does one perceive the skeleton and other disfigured objects? What object becomes disfigured in the form world what object- does not become so in the desire-world? Q. One obtains detachment (from the desire-world) through the path of form-world and in the meantime is born in the form-world as one wedge drives away another wedge. A. What is this detachment? Q. The detachment is an abandonment of defilements and it is effected by the path of form-world and not by that of the desire-world. A. The heretics though they are of abandoned defilements are again born in the desire-world; so they are ordinary men and not stated as men of abandoned defilements. If one,

abandoning them, is born again, then even being *āsrava*-freed and of abandoned fetters he would be reborn; but this is not possible.

In the Sūtra it is again stated: " A man of destroyed three fetters roots out three poisons ". The ordinary man does not destroy them and hence he is not lust-freed man. The ordinary man has always the soul-view, etc. and hence has not destroyed them. If the worldling remains well in the detachment, all the defilements he would not have; for, they dependently on the soul-view are accomplished. The Sūtra says: The soul-view arises from the conditioning factors. If the worldling has not the Soul-view towards the five aggregates of the desire-world, he would not have it towards the aggregates of the higher world also. Then the worldling would be free from the soul-view. This kind of logical error is there. Therefore all the defilements ought to be destroyed (by him). Then the worldling would be Arhan. As a matter of fact, he has not destroyed them entirely. The Sūtra says: Two persons do not fear from a roaring thunder, viz. Arhan and the Cakravartin king. Now this worldling also would not fear. The Arhan rejoices neither in the life nor is frightened in the death. This worldling also would be likewise. E.g. Arhan, Upasena, being bitten by the serpent did not become transformed either in his sense-organ or in his figure. This worldling also would be likewise. Though the person (i.e. a heretic) may be called the lust-freed, he has no characteristic of the lust-freed person. Thus we understand that he is not of destroyed defilements.

Q. The worldling (i.e. a heretic wise) abandoning the fetters, is born in the form-world at the end of this life. If he does not abandon them, how can he be born there? The Sūtra also says: There is a heretic freed from the lust. It says: Arāḍa, Kalāma, Udraka, Rāma's son, being detached from the form-world is born in the formless world. (The Sūtra) says: One suppresses the desire-plane by form-plane, the latter by formless

plane and the foundation of mindfulness by the cessation. Therefore, your statement that the outsider though of destroyed defilements, is reborn and hence he is not of destroyed defilements' is not proper. You have also stated that the outsider (*pṛthakjana*) has destroyed everything:—this is in fact to be denied. Therefore he is apparently lust-and-defilement-freed. Though he is, in fact, not of destroyed defilements, he is so spoken of; though he is, in fact, not lust-freed, he is said to be lust-freed. It is said in the stanza:

> "The thought of 'I' and 'mine', the man, while dying, abandons it."

This alone is what is named lust-freedman. The abandonment by the heretics is different from the (I-thought) abandonment at the death-moment. Having abandoned it at death one is not reborn in the form-world or the formless world. The worldlings may surpass their own spheres; one, paying homage to them does not obtain the great resultant. If one pays homage to the lust-freed heretic, he obtains an immense retribution. Though the expression (i.e. paying homage) is the same, its import is different. Therefore, we understand that the outsider is truly of destroyed defilements and lust-freed.

The author replies: In denial there is a distinction. If the deep defilements are dispelled, then he is born in the form and the formless worlds. If he has cut off the soul-view (and is reborn) then lingers the above said folly. If he has not cut off the soul-view pertaining to the desire-plane, how will he be reborn in the form and formless worlds? When one curbs lust and aversion he alone is reborn in the form-world, but when he curbs the soul-view, he is not born there. Therefore, it is understood that the outsider is not, in fact, a man of the abandoned fetters. There is a good *dharma* in the desire-world which cuts off the defilements. Therefore we understand that even in the desire-world there is the contemplation-wisdom. In the Sūtra also it is said: Transcending the seven abodes (*niśraya*) one secures *sambodhi*. It is

therefore evident that the concentration that is related to the desire-world produces the truth-knowledge.

To say that this person, *pudgala* reaching the region in the neighbourhood of the first dhyāna obtains the path of Arhan and not reaching the concentration of the desire-world, is not proper. From the saying of transcending the seven abodes, it is evident that the first dhyāna and its neighbour region are both passed over. There is no any reason for saying that one reaches the neighbour region (of the first dhyāna) and not the concentration of the desire-world. If this Yogin has reached the neighbour-region, why does he not reach the first dhyāna. For this also there is no any reason. The *Susima-Sūtra* says: 'The first is the knowledge in regard to the elemental status (*dharma-sthiti*) and then the knowledge on Nirvāṇa. The idea of this saying is this: The destruction of *āsrava*s is not necessarily preceded by the dhyāna and concentration; but on the other hand, having the knowledge of the elemental status as precedent the destruction of *āsravas* is secured. Therefore we understand that the Yogin transcends all the dhyānas and concentrations. The *Susima-Sūtra* states for the sake of transcending dhyānas and concentrations. In the Sūtra there is no such expression as the neighbouring region. It is a constructive recollection of your own concepts.

Q. I have previously stated the example of one wedge removing another. Therefore, it is clear that one abandons the fetters of one region by the path of other region. Just as a subtle wedge drives away the gross one, just so does the path of form-world lead to abandon the desire-world. If the Yogin first abandons the desire-world and unmeritorious actions and then enters into the first dhyāna then there should be a neighbouring region through which he abandons the desire-world. (The Sūtra) says: On the support of form-world the Yogin transcends the desire-world. If there is no neighbouring region, how will he take to the form-world? The Sūtra says: The Yogin obtaining the good gives up the bad; e.g. Nanda gave up his previous object

of love on the support of his craving for the heavenly nymphs. The person who does not taste the sweetness of tranquillity in the first dhyāna does not have an aversion for the five sensuous objects. Therefore, it is understood that he first reaching the neighbouring region abandons the desire- world.

The author replies: The Yogin, obtaining the good within the desire-world abandons the bad. If a noble disciple sometimes recollects that the five sensuous objects do not cause joy and happiness, then his mind is not delighted in them. If he recollects that they are things of separation-nature (*nissaraṇa*), then his mind is delighted. It says: When the Yogin has the consideration of bad things, he suppresses it by the consideration of good things. Therefore your wedge-example is also possible in the desire-world. You have stated that the Yogin transcends the desire-world taking support on the form-world. This is the affair of the last stage. If the Yogin abandons the defilements through the path of desire-world, then, gradually he obtains upto the good dharmas of the form-world. Now the absolute abandonment of the desire-world means the gain of things of form-world. You have also stated that the Yogin obtaining the good, fine delight and the tranquillity taste (abandons the bad) etc. This has been replied in general.

If, in the desire-world does not exist the concentration, how does one, through his distracted mind, realize good *dharma* of form-world? You may plead that Arhan who is released through wisdom, does not have the concentration, but he has only wisdom. True, he does not enter into *dhyāna* and concentrations; however, he must have been engaged a little while in the concentration. The Buddha says: The monks having acknowledged the robe, have suppressed the attachment for the robe though they may have three defilements. There is no any Sūtra to the effect that a man of distracted mind arouses the truth-knowledge. It always says: A man of concentrated mind discerns things as they are.

195. *Four Comprehensions* (*Pratisaṃvid*)

There is one knowledge breaking empiricism in relation to the dharma, *ūṣma*, etc. It is mundane as it is in the form of vision of empirical truths, and since it is proximate to the noble path it is termed proximate to the elemental status. Q. This knowledge is the same as the knowledge of the future contemplation in the path of truth-vision. A. It will be stated later on that there is no knowledge of future contemplation; for when the dharma-characteristics are broken up, no empirical mind lingers. Therefore, in the path of truth-vision one does not cultivate the mundane knowledge.

In the Sūtra are stated four comprehensions. They are: Comprehension with reference to syllables or letters is *dharma*-comprehension. The same with reference to *ruta*, speeches is *nirukti*-comprehension, viz. understanding of different languages that are in vogue in various quarters. It is said in the Sūtra: The Yogin should not adhere to the urban languages (*janapada-nirukti*). In the absence of their employment the meaning is hardly understandable. In the absence of letters the meaning cannot be expressed. This *nirukti* itself, being unstunted indestructible and unambiguous is termed well-spoken (*subhāṣita*). The Sūtra says: There are four qualities of speech (*bhāṣita-dharma*): some speech conveys meaning but not imperishable; some is imperishable, but does not convey the meaning; some is of both the qualities and some lacks in both. On the understanding of word and sentence, the comprehension of the whole import is the import-comprehension; this three-fold knowledge is an instrument to the speech. It says: There are four qualities of speech: certain is instrument to the meaning; certain instrument to the words; certain instrument to the both and certain instrument to neither. The person who is in possession of these four comprehensions is accomplished in expediency; he is hardly impeachable and approachable in his preaching *dharma*. His speech conveys the imperishable import, his wisdom is inexhaustible and the voice of speech unimpeded.

This comprehension is obtained due to deeds of the previous birth. If anyone well cultivates every time the aggregates and other devices caused by wisdom, then by virtue of that cultivation he gains it even in this period, although he is not taught in the Sūtras, as he may gain the divine eye and other supernormal powers. The noble person alone gains it. Some masters say: Only the Arhan gains it and not the learners. But there is no such rule. The learners (*śaikṣa*) secure the eight emancipations, why do they not gain this knowledge?

They are all obtained in the worlds of desire and the form; in the formless world there is only the import-comprehension. Two-fold is comprehension: pure and impure. The learners obtain both but the learning-enders obtain only pure comprehension. If they obtain, they obtain all the four at one time. Women also obtain them, e.g. the nun, Dharmadinnā, and others.

196. *Five Knowledges*

Five knowledges are: (1) *Dharma-sthiti-jñāna*, (2) *Nirvāṇa-jñāna*, (3) *Araṇā-jñāna*, (4) *praṇidhi-jñāna*, (5) *prānta-koṭika-jñāna*.

The first knowledge is that of origination of elements (12 causal links), e.g. old-age-death is conditioned by birth, formation is conditioned by ignorance. Be there Tathāgata or be not He, there the elements' characteristic constantly remains, —this sort of understanding is the knowledge of elemental status. Cessation of these elements is Nirvāṇa-knowledge, e.g. at the cessation of birth there is the cessation of the old-age-death, at the cessation of ignorance there is the cessation of formations.

The destruction-cessation of elements is Nirvāṇa. At this destruction-cessation stage what dharma exists? Q. Is Nirvāṇa something non-substantial? A. Entire cessation of all aggregates is termed Nirvāṇa. What remain there? Q. Nirvāṇa is substantially existing; for, the cessation is a truth. The misery and others are substantial; hence *Nirvāṇa* also is substantial. The knowledge of Nirvāṇa is the cessation-knowledge. If it is a

non-entity, of what dharma the knowledge arises? The Buddha in the Sūtra says: There is some manifest element, manufactured, produced and born and there is some un-manifest element, un-manufactured, unproduced and un-born. It is said: 'There are two elements, manifested and unmanifested'. The first is affected by genesis, stay and decay, while the second is by their converse. The Sūtra says: Things whether manifest or un-manifest their topmost is termed cessation, Nirvāṇa. It says: The matter is impermanent, in its cessation exists Nirvāṇa permanent, the same is to be said upto consciousness. It is said in the Sūtra: 'The cessation is to be brought before one's self'. If it is a non-entity, what is to be brought so? The Buddha in the *Bahudhātuka* Sūtra says: The wise discerns very well the manifest elements and the unmanifest elements as they are. The un-manifest element is the Nirvāṇa. How can the knowledge of elements as they are be said to be non-entity? In the Sūtras there is no saying to the effect that Nirvāṇa is a non-entity. Therefore we understand that the statement that Nirvāṇa is non-entity is your own idea-construction.

The author replies: If, at the separation of the five aggregates there is still some other element existing known as Nirvāṇa, then Nirvāṇa would not be the entire cessation of elements. If it is an entity then there is some self-being and you must specify it. The concentration relying on Nirvāṇa is termed *animitta*, concept-less. It is said in the Sūtra: The Yogin perceives the characteristic of visible as abandoned and perceives the characteristics of elements, dharmas as abandoned, In different Sūtras it is said: 'All elements are impermanent, non-soul and their appeasement is Nirvāṇa'. The soul is the self-being of all elements. Non-vision of the self-being of all the elements is the vision of non-soul. If Nirvāṇa is an element (*dharma*), then the vision that there is no self-being (in it) cannot be experienced, because that *dharma* is not ceased, e.g. where there exists a pitcher there does not exist its destruction-nature. When the pitcher is destroyed, then it can be said that it is destroyed. If the formation-elements

still exist, then it cannot be termed as Nirvāṇa. At their cessation, however, Nirvāṇa is spoken of.

Cessation of misery is not another element. So says the Sūtra: When this misery is ceased, no other misery arises again nor is there its continuity. This place is extremely peaceful, wholesome, viz. dispeller of everything, utter separation from the passion, corporeal and mental elements, and their cessation is Nirvāṇa. In the expression that this misery is ceased and no other misery arises what *dharma* known as Nirvāṇa exists? Nor is there any separate destruction-nature (*kṣaya-dharma*). The craving that is born is ceased, the unborn one will not be born. At that time there is *kṣaya*. What *dharma* would be there again, that could be talked as *kṣaya*? It cannot be said by way of substance.

Existence (or being=*Sattā*) is another name for the element (*dharma*). The non-existence of the five aggregates is termed Nirvāṇa. The non-entity, if it is existent, is to be termed *sattā*—this is impossible. At the entire cessation Nirvāṇa is spoken of, e.g. the destruction of the robe is not a separate another entity, *dharma*. If it is so, the robe-destruction, etc. would also be a separate another entity, *dharma*.

You have stated there exists the cessation-knowledge; this is also not contradictory. For example, when the tree is cut, its knowledge arises. It does not however follow therefrom that there is a separate element of *cheda*, cutting. Due to *saṃskāra*, mind's impression that knowledge arises there. Non-existence of every manifest element (*saṃskāra*) becomes Nirvāṇa, e.g. what thing is absent or non-existent in a place, that place is devoid of that thing—one knows. Q. Now does Nirvāṇa not exist? A. Not that Nirvāṇa does not exist, but it does not exist by way of substance. If Nirvāṇa does not exist, then there will always be birth and death; and there will be no occasion for release. For example, there are breaking of the pot and the cutting of the tree; but they do not exist as a separate dharma

by way of substance. This will reply all your arguments about the other truths. Since there exists the cessation of misery, the expression that there is un-born, un-become, un-manufactured and un-manifest, etc. is not at all contradictory.

Araṇā-jñāna:—By what knowledge one does not quarerl with others, this is termed *araṇā*-knowledge. Some masters say that this is *maitrī-citta*, the mind of loving-kindness, on account of which one does not harm the sentient beings. Some other masters say that it is the practice of voidness due to which one does not quarrel for any object (*vastu*). Still some other masters say it is a delightful mind towards Nirvāṇa for the reason of which there is no opportunity for quarrel. Again some masters say that it is pertaining to the fourth meditation. This is not invariably so. The Arhan whose mind is cultivated by this knowledge has nothing to quarrel.

Praṇidhi-jñāna: It is an unimpeded knowledge with reference to everything. The Buddha alone has possessed this knowledge; others may have it when they are presided over by the Buddha's force.

Prānta-koṭika-jñāna: This type of knowledge is when the Yogin, gaining the topmost and advanced knowledge as cultivated and matured by the practice of all meditations and concentrations, secures the complete mastery over the curtailment or prolongation of his own life.

197. *Six Supernormal Intellections (abhijñā)*

They are: (1) The Bodily potency (*ṛddhi*), (2) divine eye, (3) divine ear, (4) discerning other's thought, (5) reminiscence of former births, (6) knowledge about the extinction of intoxicants, *āsravas*. The bodily *ṛddhi* is: The Yogin emits from his own body the water and fire, moves through the air, appears and disappears, contacts with the sun and the moon and approaches the Brahmā, the lord, and creates magic beings (*nirmitas*). These marvels are termed bodily *ṛddhi*. This power, the Yogin

secures through proper-cultivation of meditations and concentrations. The Sūtra says: The force of meditation-concentration is unthinkable, some masters say: This creative thought is indeterminate. It is not correct; for, if the Yogin exhibits different creative marvels for the good of others, how can it be indeterminate. Some masters say: The Yogin creates the magic being of the desire-world through the mind of desire-world and the magic being of the form-world through the mind of the same world. This is also improper. The divine eye, etc. also will then be likewise, viz. consciousness of the desire-world would see the visible of the same world. If the mind of the *Rūpa*-world makes that of the desire-world, what harm will be there? Some masters say: he goes to Brahman world by means of supernormal intellection of the first meditation and by that of the fourth meditation he goes to the end of the form-world. That is also not good. He goes anywhere he likes through the strength of his faculty. If he is of sharp faculty, he may attain through the supernormal intellection of the first meditation to the fourth meditation. If he is of feeble faculty, he may not even through the supernormal intellection of the second meditation utilize the first meditation. E.g. Mahābrahmā, the lord of *Sahām* entered into the inner side of meditation, but he gained no supernormal intellection (due to it). He obtains or meets with other gods of Brahman-world through the force of the first meditation, but not discerns the Brahman-abode (*Brahmāvāsa*) through the same meditation. The Buddha recollects the formless-world through (reminiscence of) previous births. The Sūtra says: The Buddha understands the previous birth and the place of birth and everything either of the form-world or of the formless world. Therefore, the (above said) rule is not permissible.

(2) The divine eye: Some masters say: it is in the nature of wisdom. It is improper. It is achieved through the light. The wisdom is not so. Q. The Sūtra says: One cultivating the light-characteristic achieves the knowledge-vision; it is the same as the divine eye. A. This is not so. Another Sūtra

says: The divine ear is not of wisdom-nature; it is termed the ear. The divine eye relies on the visible that is present; but the non-sensuous knowledge is not so. It is said in the Exposition of the divine eye: The knowledge is a resultant of the actions done by the living beings. The visual consciousness has not this force. The knowledge (= experience) about the non-sensuous consciousness arises at the time of employing the visual consciousness. Therefore, some material that is produced from the meditations and concentrations is termed divine eye. Its size is similar to the star, *tārakā* of the eye-ball. It is situated along with the base of the eye. Its number is two. It pervades all the quarters and perceives them all. The creator only has it and not the created being.

(3) The same detail is applicable to the divine ear.

(4) When the Yogin discerns the other's thought, it is *paracitta-jñānam*. Since the discernment of other's mental states is not stated here, the mental state is not separate element. The discernment of other's feeling, idea, etc. is also *paracitta-jñāna*. Some masters say: this knowledge is relied on the similar object, e.g. the āsrava-freed mind discerns the āsrava-freed mind and the āsrava-tainted mind discerns the āsrava-tainted mind. That is not correct; for, no argument is given by them. Some masters say: it is relied on the present object alone. That also is not good. Certain thought is relied on the future object, e.g. the Yogin entering into a *vitarka*-freed concentration discerns that at the time of his emerging from the concentration he will have such and such *vitarka*. Some masters say: This knowledge does not discern the path-truth-vision. That is incorrect. What harm is there if it discerns. It is said: The Pratyeka-Buddha, thinking that he shall come to know the third thought-moment pertaining to the path-truth-vision perceives the seventh mind; the disciple (*śrāvaka*) thinking that he shall come to know the third thought-moment perceives the sixteenth thought-moment. Does this person not discern the path-truth-vision? Some masters say: This

knowledge does not discern the higher sphere; the higher person (discerns) higher faculty. This is also improper. Gods also discern the Buddha's thought: e.g. the Buddha thought to leave the assembly of disciples and resume it. All that the Brahmā discerned. Once he thought: I shall become a king and lead the world as per law: Māra, discerning it, approached (the Buddha) and prayed. Gods also discern that this person is Arhan and that other person is a stream-entrant. The monks also discern the Buddha's thought; e.g. when the Buddha was bent on entering into *Parinirvāṇa*. Aniruddha duly discerned the meditations and concentration attained by the Buddha. Some masters say: This knowledge does not discern the formless world. This is also incorrect. The Buddha discerns the formless world through reminiscence of former births. If he discerns it through discerning other's thought, what harm is there?

It discerns when the object is present. The discerning mind, if it is related to the form-sphere becomes relied on the object of that sphere and so on. Q. It would then be relying on everything. A. If this thought does not discern, which thought would do so? The Sūtra says: Buddha's thought discerns everything in such and such manner.

It is three-fold: (1) The first obtained through the (body-) sign (*nimitta*), (2) the second obtained by virtue of retribution and (3) the third obtained through mental culture. The first is when one discerns other's thought through body-sign and magic charms. The second is of demons. The third is obtained by the force of meditation and concentration-culture. This last alone is counted amongst six supernormal intellections.

(5) Reminiscence of the former births is the recollection of the past and the future aggregates. It recollects one's own aggregates as well as others. It recollects the past and the future Tathāgatas' thought as well as their moral dharmas, etc. Śāriputra, e.g. tells Buddha: I recollect the past and the future Tathāgatas' thoughts as well as their dharmas, laws. The Suddhāvāsa gods

recollected the thought of Tathāgata, and as a result of this alone they approached him and said that the past Tathāgatas' modes of deportment (*iryāpatha*) are also likewise.

In the Exposition of the Reminiscence of the former births it is said that it is effected together with the sign and *jāti*, clan. The Reminiscence is so because it is distinct and vivid. When a substance is well cognized, it is termed *nimitta*, sign. Jāti is clan or family, e.g. one says: This is your family and this is your clan. Since it indicates the sign and clan both combined, its insight (*Jñāna-darśana*) is vivid. The past things ceased and they are no more signs (for arousing cognition). Nevertheless, it is capable to understand them and hence it is marvellous. Certain person understands them through the guess of *nimitta* but not vividly do so as the Buddha's disciples do. Therefore it is stated with *jāti* and *nimitta* combined. Certain person employs Reminiscence of the former births (to know the past), and certain sometimes discerns the past period through the wisdom born of thinking combined with the path, viz. (Rebirth)—Consciousness is conditioned by the formations. Of these two (reminiscence and wisdom) the latter is superior. For, certain person (say, a heretic) may understand eight thousand great aeons; nevertheless, he does not have this wisdom born of thinking. So he may arouse a wrong view, viz. old-age-death come from this (cause) and beyond that there is no such thing. The person having the wisdom born of thinking combined with (the knowledge of) the path does not have this wrong view.

Some masters say: This knowledge recalls the past events in their order. This is not proper; if it recalls in the order of the (event-) moments, it would be difficult to recall the events of one aeon, *kalpa*, how will it be possible to do so of the immeasurable aeons? Q. It is said in the Sūtra: 'I did not, for over-ninety-one aeons, see any donation being perished without its retribution'. How is this? A. The Buddha means here that he has witnessed the seven Buddhas. The Sudhāvāsa gods of very long

life-duration do not have the vision similar to that of the Buddhas. The Buddha has obtained the true knowledge and therefore he is of very pure virtuous character. If anyone pays homage to him, he gains the merit in both of the worlds. So these two (questions) are improper.

Some masters say: This knowledge does not discern the higher sphere. This is incorrect; and it is replied in the context of the bodily *ṛddhi*. If this intellection is in the nature of memory, why is it said to be knowledge? Memory becomes possible on the basis of a conceived sign (*nimitta*). What is past is not the sign. Nevertheless, it recollects it. (So), we call it a type of wisdom.

It is three-fold: (1) the first is employing the knowledge about the former births, (2) the second obtained as retribution, and (3) the third productive of again the self-memory. The first knowledge about the former births is obtained by mental culture. The second, i.e. obtained as retribution is common to demons and others. The third, the productive of again the self-memory occurs in the sphere of men. How does one obtain this? Because of not doing any harm to the living beings. At the time of death and birth the memory is absent as one is afflicted by pains. The presence of memory is rare on that occasion. Therefore one needs good action. Some masters say: This supernormal intellection recalls the past births upto the seventh as the extreme limit. This rule is not necessary. One, having cultivated in every period the virtue, dharma, of not harming anyone, recollects even the longer period.

(6) Supernormal intellection bringing before oneself the knowledge about the extinction of the intoxicants, *āsravas*: This is the concentration comparable to diamond. It consists of the extinction of āsravas and the path free from obscurations (*āvaraṇa*), and it is termed the intellection of visualizing the *āśaikṣa*-knowledge. By what action does one realize the steps of *ṛddhi*? It is previously stated that cultivating deeply the meditation-concentrations one realizes them.

Some masters say: All the Āryan paths are instruments for extinction of āsravas. The Sūtra says: When Tathāgata appeared in the world good men listened to the discourses, went out from home, adopted moral life, dispelled their five hindrances, cultivated concentration and realized the truth. All this is the instrument for the extinction of intoxicants, āsravas. Some masters say: The meritorious actions, charity, etc. are also its causal factors. The Sūtra says: The charity given to the Yogin achieves the void-non-soul-knowledge of the āsrava-freed man. This is termed truly the supernormal intellection realizing the extinction of *āsravas*. Of this very dharma another name is the concentration comparable to the diamond. Its diamond-nature is (evident) because it roots out the concepts (*nimittas*). Heretics have the five intellections only. They do not secure this sixth knowledge of truth.

Through the non-soul-knowledge one destroys all the concepts and these concepts being absent, all the defilements are ceased. Q. The concepts are ceased by means of the first non-soul-knowledge. What use will be of the second knowledge? A. Though they ceased, they again arise and therefore the second knowledge, etc. are needed. If the ceased concept again springs up, it will do so endlessly and hence no Arhan-path will be possible. No. There will be a final check. We see, e.g. the breast-milk, being dried up, again springs up. However, there will be an occasion when it has once stopped its flow, it will stop for ever; that will be its final check. The concept also will be likewise. In the red-hot iron plate e.g. the black colour that once ceased, may spring up again. When the red colour (finally) arises, that will be its check of the black colour. When the concepts are (finally) ceased and no more spring up that is the time of gaining the Āryan path. Are the concepts utterly non-existent for Arhan? When he is not in the concentrated thought, at that time though the concepts, matter, etc. are existent, they cause no pollution. If anyone seeing the visible with his eye

conceives wrongly through his wrong thinking, then the concepts cause pollution.

What is the non-soul-void-knowledge? When the Yogin does not perceive the empirically conceived soul (*sattva*) in the five aggregates; because of these separate elements being void he perceives the cessation of the matter and the cessation of consciousness; this is termed non-soul-void-knowledge. Q. Empirical things eternally existing, the craving, etc. for them are to be abandoned. It is said: "Things remain eternally. The energetic Yogin, however, abandons his lust and craving towards them". What is it then that needs the cessation-character? A. The Sūtra says: "Whatever is origination-characterized, all that (element) is cessation-characterized. The Yogin obtains this lust-free dharmic eye towards those things". What is abandonment through cessation that is the ultimate abandonment. Certain Yogin, being freed from lust for matters destroys the lust and aversion (towards that matter). For this reason the Buddha said this stanza. He again says: The manifest elements are devoid of their self-being and are magic-like. The ignorant worldlings say that they are truly existing. The learners (*śaikṣa*) discern that they are trifling and empty like the magic. The Arhan also perceives this as magic. Therefore, we understand that the wisdom through which the Yogin realizes the cessation of things is the supernormal intellection realizing the knowledge about the extinction of *āsravas*.

198. *Knowledge-Perseverance*

The Sūtra says: The Yogin who is in possession of seven devices and three import-supervisions reaches quickly extinction of āsravas in this *dharma*. The seven devices are the listening-wisdom and thinking wisdom. For, a man of non-concentrative mind investigates thus: (1) this is matter; (2) this is its origination, (3) this is its cessation, (4) this is the path leading to the cessation, (5) this is its taste, (6) this is its danger and (7) this is its separation. Though this is simply what are the listening

wisdom and the thinking wisdom nevertheless the Yogin investigating the five aggregates this way breaks up the soul-idea. Therefore, it is said that he reaches quickly the extinction of āsravas. Three-fold supervision-knowledge is: the elements are impermanent, misery and non-soul. Perceiving the elements by way of the division of aggregates bases and elements he finds no any objective or advantage. Q. The phrase 'impermanent and misery' expresses the danger and the phrase 'non-soul' expresses separation (*nissaraṇa*). What is then necessity for the three-fold supervision? A. The Yogin learns three wisdoms: first listening wisdom and thinking-wisdom and subsequently contemplation-wisdom. The above-said seven devices are brought under the first two wisdoms and three supervision-devices under the third wisdom......

Eight perseverances: Whichever knowledge breaks up empiricism that is termed *kṣānti*. This perseverance exists in the *Ūṣma, mūrdhan, kṣānti* and the world-topmost *dharma*. Q. Yogin has it towards the Buddha, Dharma, Order and morality, etc. Why are they not included and why the eight only stated? A. Because of their prominence, viz. proximity to the path, e.g. perseverance of dharma towards the misery is for the purpose of dharma-knowledge towards the same and so on. For, the Yogin first employs the thinking-wisdom favourable to the path and subsequently reaches the perceptive knowledge. For example, elephant-hunter first finding the elephant foot-steps comes to understand that there is the animal and then he catches it. Likewise the Yogin first guesses Nirvāṇa through perseverance and inferential knowledge and subsequently meets it face to face through that knowledge. Therefore, it is said in the Sūtra: knowing thiswise and perceiving thiswise he reaches the *āsrava*-extinction.

199. *Nine Knowledges*

Q. Some masters of the Śāstra say: Arhan visualizing the extinction-knowledge obtains nine empirical knowledges, viz.

good and indeterminate knowledge pertaining to the desire-world and the same pertaining to eight other spheres of existence upto the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception. How is this? A. All Arhans do not obtain all the meditations and concentrations. How would they obtain the nine knowledges? Q. All the Arhans obtain meditations and concentrations but do not meet with the absorption (*samāpatti*). A. If he does not meet with (*abhimukhī-karoti*) the absorption; what is then *prāpti*? Your contention is like one saying: I know the text but I do not know even a single letter in it. Q. The person who is desire-freed and has not till now visualized the first meditation-trance (*samāpatti*) will not obtain it even at the end of his life. A. But in the Sūtra it is said: Having attained to it during this interval will subsequently arouse it. How will he arouse it when he has not attained to it in this interval? Q. For one who is desire-freed all the meditations past and future are secured originally and as a result of that he will attain to their gain. A. The future action is not done, and the non-existent (action) does not cause retribution. If the past meditations that were previously produced in the mind, cause now their retribution; then there is the defect of the non-existent causality (*avidya-mānatā-hāni*). Nor would one gain the future actions. If you say they ought to be obtained, then all the future would become obtained (*prāpyam*). Due to what impediment there is the gain of one thing and non-gain of another thing?

Q. If the future thing is not to be obtained, the learner (*śaikṣa*) would not be in possession of the eight constituents of the path and the learning-ender (*aśaikṣa*) also would not be in possession of the ten constituents. For, one who, on the support of the second dhyāna, meditation, etc. has the *samyakta-dharma-niyāmā-vikrānti* would obtain in future right aspiration (*saṅkalpa*). If the Yogin brings before himself the extinction-knowledge then he will obtain in future the right view. Certain person on the support of the formless-meditation (*samādhi*) obtains the Arhant-fruit, he will in future obtain the right aspira-

tion, right-speech, right action and right livelihood. If he, on the support of the third dhyāna, meditation, etc. obtains the āryan path, he will in future obtain the joy. Things of this nature would not then be possible. Therefore, we understand that there is a future dharma. If it does not exist, how will the cultivator (or meditator) gain the fruits, meditation, concentration, etc. When the Yogin remains in the path-inferential knowledge (*anvaya-jñāna*), he secures all the knowledges that are brought under the first fruit, as well as the concentrations. If it is not so, he would secure the fruits by counting and counting. For, it is not possible that he would secure all the fruits at the time of his meeting with (the first fruit). Therefore, we understand that the meditation (*bhāvanā*) of the future ought to be there (obtained).

A. You have stated that a man is in possession of (the eight and ten) constituents. This is not vitiated (by us); for we say that the constituents, moral behaviours are gradually obtained and not simultaneously. Therefore there is no any logical fallacy. You have stated that certain things being gained, other things of the same category are also gained. When the Yogin gains misery-knowledge with reference to certain things other misery-knowledge-genus become gained. e.g. man-genus (*manuṣya-jāti*) being obtained, the man-characteristic also is obtained; but it is not that the man-characteristic is obtained gradually and every moment. This also is to be explained likewise. You may plead that the Yogin obtains gradually all the knowledges about the misery, etc.; however, the gain of the knowledges that are brought under the fruit of the stream-entrance (etc.) is simultaneous. Here my reply is this: the āsrava-freed knowledge once gained, gets never fallen down. Q. Then, in that case there will be no distinction between the gain and practice. The person that has gained the fruit would alone be Yogin, practiser—this and other defects are there. A. What is harm if there is no such distinction? For example, the person of the accomplished fruit also is designated *Yogin*. This person gains

again a distinguished fruit. Thus the distinction can be made, e.g. a man receives first five moral conducts and then gains the restraints due to renunciation (*pravrajyā*), and even then he does not slacken the original five moral conducts. The distinction is also possible on the ground that a man of the already obtained (first) fruit has not (yet) the vision of the path; e.g. a man even though he understands at first things in general; yet strives to understand them in detail. Therefore, we understand that there is no gain (at present moment) of the future (things). Further the Yogin dwells in the void-non-soul-knowledge; at the same time how will he obtain a mundane thing (*dharma*)? Therefore, it is evident that at the time of gaining the extinction-knowledge he does not gain the mundane knowledge.

Q. These mundane knowledges together with the extinction-knowledge help the Arhan to gain the mind's operation of the attainment to concentration and emergence from it. A. The mind of the Arhan continuing in succession remains perfectly pure in every moment. If he again obtains the nine knowledges, he would obtain all other (things like) the eye (-consciousness), etc. If he does not obtain the latter, the nine knowledges also he would not obtain. It is said: There is no cause or condition (in the present moment) for the future contemplation. For, these masters say: In the path of truth-vision alone (the Yogin) contemplates on the concept-reflecting knowledge; in the contemplation-path (*cintanā-mārga*) he contemplates on the knowledge both the concept-reflecting and non-concept-reflecting. He does not contemplate on the higher region in the path of truth-vision, but in the contemplation-path (*cintanā-mārga*) he does so. At the time of the path-inferential knowledge he does not contemplate on the mundane good (dharma) but he does so at the time of other knowledge. In the *ānantarya* path he does not contemplate on the discernment of other's thought. The person released through faith and rolling on by way of the obtained vision of truth, does not contemplate on the mundane path in all paths of *ānantarya* and *vimukti*. The temporarily released

person rolling on by way of unshakable release, does not contemplate on the mundane path in the nine *ānantarya* paths and eight release-paths, but he does so in the ninth release-path; while in a subtle mind, he does not contemplate on every *āsrava*-freed (knowledge). This and other similar statements become baseless. Therefore you should either state sound reason or convince (us in your proposition). The contemplation is possible through that of the learner. At the time of remaining in the stage of *ūṣma*, etc. he contemplates on all the higher roots of merit for the purpose of absolute higher up advancement. e.g. a person who is engaged in repeated study of the Sūtras has the advantage of absolute clarification of the Sūtras. Therefore, at the time of *ūṣma-gata*, etc. and till the extinction-knowledge, contemplation on everything takes place. If it is not so, you must state a sound reason (for otherwise position).

200. *Ten Knowledges*

They are: (1) Dharma-knowledge, (2) inferential-knowledge, (3) discerning the other's thought, (4) knowledge about empiricism, (5-8) knowledge about the misery origin, cessation and the path leading to the cessation, (9) extinction-knowledge and (10) non-origination-knowledge. (1) Dharma-knowledge is the same as that of present thing. The Buddha addressed Ānanda: "At this dharma looking through thiswise knowledge understand thiswise; also understand thiswise in respect of the past and the future (things)". It should be termed present-*dharma*-knowledge. Omitting 'the present', it is simply said as *Dharma*-knowledge. The Sūtra says: The ignorant considers highly the present thing; while the wise the future. It says: The present as well as the future sensual pleasures are the army of Māra, etc. In this and other places there is the expression "present". But here in this context is said only as Dharma-knowledge for the sake of brevity.

(2) *Anvaya-jñāna* is the knowledge about the things other than the present ones. The other things are those of the past

and future. What knows them just after following the present things is *anvaya-jñāna*. It is preceded by a knowledge about what is perceived (*dṛṣṭa*). Dharma-knowledge is termed *dṛṣṭa-jñāna*, knowledge about the perceived things (in the present period). Following this knowledge what is guessed is *anvaya-jñāna*. This latter knowledge is a pure one (*anāsrava*). Q. How does such pure knowledge become a guessed knowledge? A. It is so in the world also. The first three (*dṛṣṭa-anvaya*-and *paracitta*) and four truths-knowledges are both pure and impure. When they are in the stages of *ūṣma-gata*, etc. they are impure, while they are pure in the stage of *Niyāmā vikrānti*.

Q. Some Masters say: The pure knowledge with reference to things (*Saṃskāra*) pertaining to the desire-world; the same about their cause, their cessation and the path leading to it, all this is *Dharma-jñāna*. The pure knowledge with reference to things pertaining to the form and formless worlds and the same about their cause, their cessation and the path leading to it, all this is termed *anvaya-jñāna*. How is this? A. The Buddha addresses Ānanda thus: Understand thiswise also in respect of the past and the futures (things). There is no Sūtra which declares that knowledge in respect of things pertaining to the form and formless world is *anvaya*-knowledge. The Sūtra says: The Yogin should remember thus: I am now afflicted by the present things; I was afflicted by the past things and I shall be afflicted by the future things. It says again: old-age-death is conditioned by birth. So it was in the past and so will be in the future. *Aśvaghoṣa-Bodhisattva* says:

> Looking at the present birth as misery, understand the past also as misery.
>
> As this as well as that are misery, so also understand the future as misery.
>
> Just as the fire before our eyes is hot, so also was the past fire and will be the future fire.

Thiswise the misery the great Śāstra-masters (Vaibhāṣika) also speak.

The knowledge about the past and future things alone is *anvaya*-knowledge; the reason for this is not lacking. The Yogin gets disgusted with the past, the future and the present things. This disgust alone with reference to these things is just what is termed the rise of truth-knowledge. Just as the present formations are misery, so are the past and future formations also. By what knowledge does the Yogín understand the past and the future things as misery? If this knowledge also is the *dharma*-knowledge, there are things past and future pertaining to the form-and formless-worlds and their knowledge also will be *dharma*-knowledge. Thus there will be only *dharma*-knowledge and no guessing (*anvaya*) knowledge. If (you plead) there a separate knowledge in respect of things past and future pertaining to the form-and formless-worlds, the same knowledge would be applicable to things past and future pertaining to the desire-world also. (Thus *anvaya*-knowledge is necessary and applicable to the understanding of things past and future pertaining to three spheres of existence). For this reason only the Ābhidharmikas say: there are two elements *prāpti* and *aprāpti* and due to them the Yogin perceives the truth gradually (one after another). The misery pertaining to the desire-world is *prāpti* and the same of the form-and formless-world is *aprāpti*. Therefore these two knowledges do not happen at one and the same time. If *aprāpti*-misery (of other worlds) is understood through *anvaya*-knowledge, *aprāpti*-misery of the desire-world will also be understood through *anvaya*-knowledge.

Through what knowledge is the abandonment of fetters possible? Dharma-knowledge alone is employed there, but *anvaya*-knowledge exists as related to the device-path. What sort of dharma-knowledge is employed there? Dharma-knowledge about the misery and the same about the cessation are employed there; for, the Yogin perceiving that the impermanent

is misery, perceives it as void and non-soul. At that time he visualizes the cessation of all formations. All other knowledges serve as device. Perceiving what (dharma) as misery the cessation becomes possible? The Yogin perceives the feelings as misery. The soul-idea arises therein. Therefore he perceives their cessation also. It is said: Since he is released internally in his self, the craving being extinguished and ceased, he is verily declared as gained Arhanthood by himself. Q. Is it not stated in the Sūtra that the abandonment of all formations is the abandonment-characteristic? A. This Yogin having visualized the cessation of the internal things becomes disgusted with everything. Further the Yogin should necessarily witness the cessation of the internal elements and (the cessation of) other elements is not so necessary.

(5-8) How is the knowledge in respect of the four truths effected? The knowledge that birth is misery is (at first) produced. This vision having arisen one notices the defect of the impermanence, etc. in the five aggregates and produces the notions of misery and non-soul (towards them). So says the Sūtra: ' What is misery is impermanent and what is impermanent is non-soul '. For, the eye and other sense-organs have origination and annihilation. If they are the same as the soul, then the soul will be perishable and hence they are not the soul. The eye at the time of its origination does not come from somewhere else; and since it is a product, it is not the soul. The Sūtra says nowhere that there is any creator. While the Yogin rightly thinks thiswise, viz. what is impermanent is non-soul his body and mind become tranquil. He experiences torture when the formations have arisen and hence he has the misery-notion formed. Just as a skin-less cow experiences an acute pain even at a mild touch just so does the Yogin by virtue of non-soul-notion achieve the supreme misery-notion. The ignorant, on the other hand, by virtue of the soul-notion does not experience any fatigue even on the occasion of great calamity and suffering. This is what is termed misery-knowledge. To view the origina-

tion of all formation-elements is the cause-knowledge. To view their annihilation is the cessation-knowledge. To follow and practise the path from the lower end to the upper one is the path-knowledge.

(9) What is extinction-knowledge? It is so called because it extinguishes all the concepts. The concept that is abandoned by the learner may arise again; but the extinction-knowledge extinguishes them utterly. The Sūtra says: When one discerns that all this is unreal concept and unreal notion alone, all his sufferings become extinct. The learner discerns that the soul is an un-real notion only. This soul-thought being utterly extinct, there is extinction-knowledge. The Sūtra says: Certain Arhan declares before the Buddha: I have none of those that are preached by you. I have no perplexity with reference to the fetters. I am always concentrated in my mind, and mindful of right behaviour; hence the sensual pleasures and other evils become no more intoxicants in my mind. Since one grasps concepts, the fetters operate and they are ceased when the concepts are abandoned. The learners dwell in the idea of no-concept at the sight of concepts; nevertheless the idea of the soul may occasionally spring up for them, e.g. a man seeing a post doubts whether it is a man. Therefore the Arhan who is freed from perplexity gains (*prāpti*) it; since his mind constantly dwells in (the state of) no-concept; he first noticing the soul-voidness, perceives no more the soul on the five aggregates and then subsequently again as the elements are void, he perceives no more the self-beings of the matter and other aggregates. Therefore we understand that the extinction of all concepts is (termed) the extinction-knowledge.

(10) To know non-origination of all concepts is non-origination-knowledge. The rebirth is extinguished for the learner who has abandoned the notion of concepts (*nimitta*). For the learning-ender the concepts are extinguished and they arise no more. At the extinction and cessation of all concepts there will

be no more rebirth; that is the non-origination-knowledge. The learner also knows that he has the extinction-knowledge and non-origination-knowledge; e.g. a man of three abandoned fetters becomes mindful that he shall have no more rebirth. Q. Why do you not say that he is in possession of ten constituents? A. The learner has not abandoned all the notions; hence he does not claim the said two knowledges; e.g. a man being bound severally here and there, if he is freed from one bondage, he cannot be said to be freed completely. Śāriputra spoke to Anāthapiṇḍada about the possession of ten constituents. The Arhan, since he has gained the strength of mastery (over every duty) discerns: My fetters are extinguished, and I shall have no more rebirth. So also is the learner. Arhan having gained the *aśaikṣa*-path discerns: My rebirth is extinguished—this is termed the extinction-knowledge. The expression that the celibacy has been well practised means the abandonment of the training course. Having done what is to be done, he discerns that there is no another becoming apart from the present one. Therefore the Arhan alone has gained the mastery over his all duties and would be in possession of the extinction-knowledge and non-origination-knowledge and not the learner. The Sūtra says:

> My delight for all is rooted out, the multitude of the darkness
> is chopped into pieces.
> Having conquered the army of the Death (king) I remain
> freed from āsravas.

(3) The discernment of other's thought is as it has been detailed in the chapter on supernormal intellections.

(4) Congeries of five aggregates is Sattva. The knowledge about that is the knowledge of empiricism. The truth-knowledge is pure (*anāsrava*); this (empiricism), appearing as though it is pure is given the designation of knowledge; hence it is said as the knowledge of empiricism. Some masters say: All the men are equally possessed of this knowledge. How is this? The disciple of the Buddha who understands that things are

dependently-originated gains (this knowledge) and none else. All other sentient beings understand only the employment of conceptions. If they sometimes obtain this knowledge, then they are termed 'internal ordinary folk'.

201. *Forty-four Knowledges*

Q. The Sūtra says: Forty-four knowledges are: Knowledge about the old-age-death, knowledge about its origination, knowledge about its cessation and knowledge about the path leading to its cessation. The same four types of knowledge are to be enumerated in the case of other causal links, viz. birth, becoming, clinging, craving, feeling, contact, six bases, name and form, (rebirth-) consciousness and formations (which work out 44 knowledges). Why is this? A. (The Yogin) enters into the jewel-truth, i.e. Nirvāṇa through different doors. Certain enters through the door of the five aggregates, certain through door of the elements, bases, and causal links and certain through the door of the four truths, etc. This is deduced from the following Sūtra: For example, suppose a lord of the city is sitting in his palace then a pair of messengers entering through certain door and approaching carries the true message to the lord and returns through the same route. Likewise other messengers enter through other doors and carry the message. Here the Yogin is comparable to the lord of the city. The doors are expressions of the analysis of the five aggregates, eighteen elements and twelve bases and other (devices). The pair of messenger is comparable to serenity and insight (*Śamatha-vipaśyanā*). The true message is the expression of Nirvāṇa. The messengers enter through different doors, but they approach one and the same place. Likewise meditations on the aggregates, elements, bases and others are different doors and serve as devices for entering into Nirvāṇa. Rāhula, e.g. sitting in a solitary place meditates on dharma and discerns thus: This dharma reaches nearer to Nirvāṇa.

The Buddha in the Discourse on the Advantage of Dharma says: This dharma is termed *Nirodha* since it ceases all the fires

of defilements; it is *praśānta*, tranquil as it appeases the Yogin's mind, and it is *pārāyaṇa*, ultimate goal, as it leads the Yogin's matured right knowledge to a far off distance. These are praiseworthy expressions of Nirvāṇa. *Brahmacarya* is the path of eight constituents. The right knowledge is the supreme-most in that path. The fruit of this very right knowledge is Nirvāṇa. The dispensation taught by the Buddha all leads to Nirvāṇa. Therefore we understand that the five aggregates, etc. (being analysed) are the doors leading to Nirvāṇa.

Ābhidharmikas say: knowledge about the old-age-death is the misery-knowledge. This is not correct; for, the aspect of misery is not stated there. So it is not a misery-knowledge. But it is the knowledge about the self-being of the old-age-death. The expression of the origination of the old-age-death, its cessation and the path leading to its cessation is the door for *nidāna*, causal link and not the door for truth. Therefore, it is not to be said as the misery-aspect. The same explanation is to be applied in the case of its origination, etc.

Why are not stated the knowledges about their taste, danger, and separation, etc. All these are included here, but the compilers of the Sūtras have stated them in brief but not detailed.

202. *Seventy-seven Knowledges*

The Sūtra says: There are seventy-seven knowledges, viz. (1) the knowledge that the old-age-death is conditioned by birth; (2) the knowledge that in the absence of birth there is no old-age-death; (3-6) The similar two knowledges are to be enumerated in regard to the old-age-death of the past period and of the future period, two in each case; (7) What is the knowledge of this elemental status, that also is impermanent, manifest, product, dependantly originated, extinction-natured, transformation-natured, separation-natured and annihilation-natured-thiswise knowledge. Thus said seven-fold knowledge is to be applied suitably in the case of other causal links upto the formations (7 X 11 = 77).

The majority of heretics who are much 'illusioned' in the primary cause of things say that the cause of the worldly things is in the nature of the world. Therefore, the Buddha states only the cause (*nidāna*) of those things. The statement that in the absence of birth no old-age-death is found is for the sake of *niyama*, definite law; e.g. (one says): charity is the cause of merit. But the merit can be acquired by morality also. So says the Sūtra: A person of moral character is born amongst gods. Some masters say: birth is conditioned by old-age-death. Others say: birth is not conditioned by any cause. Therefore the Buddha states *niyama*, a definite cause. This *niyama* is also repeated with reference to the past and future links in order to obviate the doubt that the past things may vary from the present; e.g. the life-period of the past man was immeasurable and their lustre was similar to that of gods, etc. Likewise people may say that the cause of old-age-death of the past might be different from the present one. Therefore *niyama* is to be stated. The same is to be repeated in the case of future causal links also.

The first six-fold knowledge is the elemental status-knowledge. The last (seventh) one is the Nirvāṇa-knowledge. Because the old-age and death are continued in the stream of succession they are said as: "impermanent, manifest, product, dependently originated, and extinction-characterized and transformation-characterized" expressing the impermanence-aspect; "separation characterized" expresses the misery aspect, and "annihilation-characterized" expresses the non-soul-void aspect.

For, the self-being of the matter is cessation, and that of feeling, idea, formation and consciousness also is cessation. This is said to be the purpose of three-fold supervision (Chap. 198). The Sūtra says: The Yogin, being possessed of seven place-devices (Chap. 198) and three supervision-purposes reaches quickly the extinction of intoxicants (*āsrava*). This alone becomes what is the knowledge of Nirvāṇa.

This and other knowledges of causal links are innumerable and hundred-thousands in number. For example, the Sūtra says: The conditioning factor of the eye is the action, that of the action is craving, that of craving is ignorance, that of the ignorance is irrational thinking, that of the irrational thinking is the eye-and-colour; that of the intoxicants is irrational contemplation; that of the food is craving; that of the five sensual pleasures is the edible food; that of the hells and a short-life-span is the violation of life, etc.; that of the present and the past misery is the false idea, that of the false idea is the bodily and mental liking and disliking, that of liking and disliking is the lust for sensual pleasure that of the latter is perverted *vitarka*. Thus, the knowledge of the conditioning factors is innumerable and un-limited and ought to be imagined by oneself.

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N.B.:—Figures in thick types refer to chapters and others to pages.

D

E

F

N

CORRIGENDA

Page	Line	Read	For
13	1	-damya	-daumya
20	19	Rādha-	Rāgha-
"	30	(12)	(2)
24	12	Persons	Person
35	20	Omit 'Fire'	—
"	21	Sens—	sens-
46	15	preceeding	pro-
50	29	they	thet
60	20	we	We
67	5	and exp.	ande xp.
67	10	I-notion	Ino-
91	1	omit the first line	—
93	13	Vātsip.	Vātsap.
117	5	thing's	things
118	23	amūrta	amurto
128	8	(View of)	(View Of)
130	3	been criticized	-criticized
131	16	(avidyā)	(vidyā)
132	1	several	sevral
145	14	your	you
149	28	n.297 a	-2970
154	22	ājñātam	ājñātau
157	26	nominal is	nominal
179	22	force	foce
180	9	Sprout	sprost
181	2	wish	with
185	13	is	in
187	14	Serenity	Cerenety
189	33	down of	-on
200	24	much	such
201	29	relieved	releved
211	17	you say	.... says
220	26	audārika-	sudā-
221	21	-bhavika	-bhayika
226	8	resultant	resultants
"	19	omit 'in'	in
"	31	the trance	trance
239	27	upto	and

253	24	Illimitables	illim-
254	1	a small	the small
255	7	Loss	less
259	28	of unmerit-	of an un-
260	Last	good conduct	-conduct
262	3	Sundaka	Sanduka
265	12	grieves	grives
267	2	bhavarāga	bhava rāga
274	34-5	Co-Brahman-farer	co-Brāhmaṇa-
280	33	parsed	perverse
282	7	non-soul	soulless
288	6	, all	-All .
293	26	in the air	in air
295	13	loss of what	loss what
308	10	resilient	residient
313	17	torpor	torper
314	29-31	kulam labham.varnam.	kulam lābham varṇam
319	22	right path	light-path
321	34	Stream of	stream-
322	31	duhkha	duhkh
329	11	born	bore.
344	29	your	tour
345	26	identical	indentical
347	32	vanishes	venishes
349	4	arises	arisen
358	21	Similes	similies
379	8	is	in
408	15	āniñjya	āniniya
412	5	non-soul	selfless.
417	25	promoter	promotar
431	6	reclining	redining
435	30	Co-Brahman-farer	-farer?
440	21	Thiswise	In this-